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Preface and 
acknowledgments 
This textbook is designed mainly for use by students in departments 
of French Studies or European Studies, i.e. those who in addition to 
learning the French language are studying the social and political 
structure of modem France. We also hope, however, that it will be of 
interest to students in politics departments, perhaps by dint of its 
rather different approach. Our book aims to analyse the working of 
the French political system and set this into its social and economic 
context. We give considerable attention to the latter, in fact, and 
spend less time than some authors on the formal mechanisms of govern-
ment decision-making; in our vjew, these are more than adequately 
analysed in much recent work on French politics (see bibliography) 
which fits into the 'government and politics' tradition, rather than 
into the 'politics and society' approach undertaken here. 
A second feature of the book is that its approach is historical. 
This reflects not simply the fact that its authors all teach modem 
French history, but also a methodological belief common to them 
all, viz. that a social system can only be understood in any of its con-
stituent parts - political, cultural or whatever - if analysed in terms 
of its historical development. For this reason we begin with a general 
historical outline of developments in key sectors - social and economic 
structures, domestic politics, foreign relations - since 1945. After 
this, specific aspects of the social and political system are then analysed 
in tum, again from a historical point of view. 
It is hoped that thus equipped students will be able to engage in 
further exploration of French politics and society. Our book there-
fore embodies a third distinctive feature, a critical bibliography. At 
the risk of sacrificing quantity for quality, we have tried to give some 
idea of what various secondary works involve {degree of difficulty, type 
of analysis, etc.), rather than giving the undifferentiated list in alpha-
betical order that some textbooks use. As we assume that any serious 
student of contemporary France will have a reading knowledge of the lan-
guage, no special effort has been made to single out material in English. 
So far as possible we have tried to avoid jargon and to explain 
fully our terminology. This may involve being over-explicit in places; 
but we feel that this is a risk worth taking in a work which aims above 
viii 
Pref ace and acknowledgments ix 
all to initiate. Although there was clearly a division of labour among 
the authors (D.L. Hanley was responsible for chapters 1(1 ), I( 4), 1(5), 
2, 3(3) and 4: A.P. Kerr for 1(3), 3(1), 3(2) and 6: and N.H. Waites for 
1(2) and 5), this work is to some extent a joint effort, in that it re-
presents several years of dialogue and shared experience. None the 
less, readers will notice clear differences of emphasis or approach in 
some parts of the book. There are no apologies to be made for this: 
it simply reflects the fact that in the social sciences there are in the 
end no definite answers, particularly in the study of a society like 
contemporary France, which is clearly in a period of dynamic change. 
But this does not mean that the book fails to express any opinions; 
the authors have made their viewpoints and conclusions clear at each 
stage of the book rather than impose a formal conclusion at the very 
end. Their intention is to encourage argument and discussion among 
readers who can formulate judgments of their own on the basis of 
the text, followed up by the recommended reading. 
Our thanks are due to the staffs of several institutions, who helped 
us greatly with documentation - the Centre de documentation of the 
Ministere de !'education and the former Ministere des universites: the 
lnstitut d'etudes politiques: the lnstitut national de la statistique et 
des etudes economiques (rue de Berey, Paris): the French Embassy, 
London: the Royal Institute of International Affairs: the Service de 
traitement de !'information et de la statistique industrielle. We are also 
grateful to the Research Board of Reading University for the provision 
of money to facilitate our research and to Reading University Library 
for helping to provide resources in books and periodicals despite severe 
financial cuts. 
Many individuals helped particularly in the preparation of this book, 
by giving expert advice or technical assistance, or answering questions. 
Our thanks are offered to them in alphabetical order - J. Boisson, 
C. Calvez, S. Cann, G. de Carmoy, P. Collet, A. Duguet, M. Fowkes, 
D. Hay, P.M. Jones, V. Laloy, F. Loncle, J. Ouvrier, K. Sainsbury, 
F. de la Serre, A. Shlaim, M. Vaisse and P. Woodward. For the second 
edition we are additionally grateful to J .-A. Arneodo, D. Breillat, 
H. andJ.Chuquet,A. Gardrat,B. Hughes, T. Lyne, Y. Madiot,M.Paillard, 
M.-C. Smouts, C. Verley, and P. Wass. Valerie Andrews was a marvel 
of efficiency and helpfulness in producing the final typescript. As 
always, there were many others, too numerous to mention, who helped 
in many different ways; our thanks are offered to them also. Responsi-
bility for errors remains of course with us. 
The authors and publishers are grateful to the following for permission 
to reproduce copyright material: the French Embassy, London, for Fig. 
5 .2; Librairie Armand Colin for Table 1.1; Le Nouvel Observateur for 
Table 2.8; La Documentation fran~aise for Tables 2.9 and 2.10; OECD 
for Table 2.11; Professor Thompson and Butterworths for Table 2.13; 
Hodder & Stoughton Ltd for Table 2.14. 
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Chapter r 
The French experience 
• 
since 1944 
(1) The liberation era and the Fourth Republic, 1944-58 
The years 1944-58 are decisive ones for the development of modern 
France. During them France experienced major change in all her main 
structures - economic, social, political and diplomatic. In many ways 
the France of 1944 was more like that of 1900 than that of 1958; 
but by 1958 France was already clearly moving towards the rank she 
enjoys today - that of a foremost second-rank power. The following 
pages will outline some of these changes. 
Our analysis must begin, however, with some attempt, brief though 
it may be, to evoke the peculiar atmosphere of liberation France - a 
moral and political climate which it is quite difficult to understand a 
generation later. In 1944 France was emerging from a foreign oc-
cupation, following on the humiliating defeat of 1940; her economy lay 
in ruins. Her status as an international power, taken for granted before 
1939, was now open to question: the very liberation of French ter-
ritory had been achieved largely by the force of Allied arms, with the 
Free French forces and various resistance groups playing an ancillary 
role. Above all, the field of domestic politics was one of bitter strife, 
with in the latter stages of the war a virtual civil war being waged 
between the various groups who collaborated with the Nazi occupier 
and the resistance, pledged to overthrow the occupier and his sup-
porters. Paradoxically, though, the climate of the liberation was one of 
exhilaration, almost of lightheartedness, despite the enormous tasks 
confronting France. The newly emerged elites and many of the great 
mass of French people seemed to feel that as the country had reached 
a nadir, it could only set a new and better course. The different re-
sistance groups which provided the forcing-ground, as it were, of the 
new generation of political and economic elites had already caught the 
mood of optimism in their various pronouncements which called for 
a radical shake-up of the whole of the French social structure. 
Changes there were to be, of course, and they would be many and 
far reaching. On the whole, though, they would fall short of what 
many of the elites and many ordinary Frenchmen expected. In many 
ways, then, the years after 1944 are a long, slow descent from the 
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peaks of optimism. We shall now try to seize the most important 
changes as they occurred in the fields of economic and social life, 
domestic politics and international relations. 
At the liberation in 1944 the economy lay in ruins after the defeat 
of 1940, a Nazi occupation which pillaged French resources systemati-
cally and the effects of Allied bombing and invasion. Much infra-
structure (ports, roads, rail) was destroyed or unusable; there was a 
chronic housing shortage: energy and industrial output were below the 
level of 1938 and much industrial plant was in any case antiquated, 
due to pre-war failure to invest in new equipment. There was insuf-
ficient food available to feed a population which had lost 600,000 
killed or missing and a further half million of whom were still in 
German prisons - a grave loss to a country whose population decline 
had been a source of worry even before 1939. Finally, France faced 
acute inflationary problems connected with money supply. Given 
these accumulated difficulties, the economic and political leaders 
of 1944 had very much the feeling that they were starting from zero 
- which helps perhaps to explain the bold nature of some of their 
reconstruction policies. 
Their strategy had two axes: first, structural reforms of certain 
areas of the economy and second, use of limited economic planning. 
As regards structural reforms, nationalizations were to play a key 
role. The Renault car company was the first, in January 1945 (its 
owner had collaborated with the Nazis, which made the operation 
more acceptable politically). It was followed by the major part of the 
aerospace industry, the coalmines and Air France: in January 1946 
came gas, electricity and the four main deposit banks, plus a large part 
of the insurance sector. The state now employed directly one-tenth 
of the workforce and was responsible for one-quarter of all investment: 
indeed thanks to its control of banking it was in effect directly in-
fluencing some 4 7 per cent of all investment by 1949. 
The state could not rebuild the economy on its own, however; 
clearly, the co-operation of the working classes and of employers was 
crucial. To enlist the aid of the former, the post-war governments 
created, like their counterparts in much of western Europe, the nucleus 
of a welfare state. By April 1946 a system of social security had been 
extended to all wage-earners, replacing the previous rather patchy 
system of private or co-operative schemes and giving protection against 
the major hazards of sickness, accident and old age. It was supported 
by a generous system of family allowances, aimed at raising the birth-
rate, which was crucial if France were to have a labour force capable 
of expanding production. The policy would pay off handsomely, with 
population rising by 5.6 per cent by 1954 and by 8.8 per cent in the 
eight years following. Inside the workplace, the decree of February 
1945 set up the comites d'entreprise and the delegue syndical was 
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given official recognition. The latter's task was to transmit workers' 
grievances to management; the former body, where labour and manage-
ment sat together, was supposed to discuss the general workings of the 
firm (it was restricted to large firms). In practice its powers would tum 
out to extend no further than organizing social activities within the 
firm; and the hope that workers would participate in the running of 
industry remained no more than a hope. 
To secure the help of private industry, governments adopted the 
system of five-year plans advocated by J. Monnet, who would be the 
first Planning Commissioner. Unlike the Soviet plans, which set com-
pulsory targets for industry, French plans were indicative. They 
brought together in committee employers, state experts and in the early 
stages at least, representatives of organized labour. The committees 
were to assess the resources and possibilities of their sector of the 
economy and propose targets which might realistically be achieved 
given the co-operation of all partners, especially government. The latter 
had, in fact, extensive statutory powers at its disposal, whereby it could 
requisition goods and services from firms if required; but these were 
never used. Collaboration was forthcoming, because the plans were 
modest in their aims and suited a wide spectrum of interests. The first 
(1947-53) aimed to rebuild the infrastructure vital for basic economic 
activity - coal, electricity, transport, agricultural equipment. The 
second (1954-7) continued on the same lines, but branched out more 
into housing and regional development. 
It is important to point out that although during the decisive period 
of reforms from 1944-6 socialist and communist influence was strong 
both in government and administration, the reforms described did not 
mean that France was embarking upon a socialist economy, with 
control of the means of production in the hands of workers. The 
presence of General de Gaulle at the head of the provisional govern-
ment until January 1946 and of the strong christian democrat party 
MRP in the governing coalition were insurance against that. Rather 
the reforms of 1944-6 are symptomatic of a desire for renewal arising 
in the resistance organizations which had fought against the occupiers 
and had hoped for a new republic after the war. The charter of the 
main resistance organization CNR (conseil national de la resistance) 
had spoken in 1943 of 'une veritable democratie economique et sociale, 
impliquant l'eviction des grandes feodalites economiques et finan-
cieres de la direction de l'economie'. But such a project requires that 
power be firmly in the hands of socialist forces with unambiguous 
aims, and this was not the case in 1944. Post-war economic recon-
struction is really the prolongation of an old French tradition of 
dirigisme (the state giving clear and precise leadership to the piivate 
sector), to revive a moribund capitalism. But as such the operation 
succeeded very well. 
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Table 1.1 shows the steady rise of French GDP (and within it, of 
industrial production) during the Fourth Republic. It is a rapid growth 
of around 5 per cent per annum and a fairly even one overall. Un-
fortunately it was marred for some years by monetary problems. 
Table 1.1 Growth of French production, 1947-58 (indices)* 
Year Total GDP Industrial production 
1947 109.9 113.4 
1948 113.2 118 
1949 107.5 106.5 
1950 107.9 108.7 
1951 106.4 109.6 
1952 102.3 102 
1953 103.1 102.4 
1954 105.4 104.7 
1955 106 106 
1956 105.1 109.1 
1957 106.3 105.8 
1958 102.6 103.8 
* Each index takes the previous year as 100. 
Source: M. Parodi, L 'Economie et la societe fran<;aise de 1945 d 1970, 
Colin, 1971, p. 64. 
At the root of the inflation lay the fact that too much money was 
in circulation at the liberation; in the run-down economy of the period, 
with less goods available, this inevitably meant higher prices. Govern-
ments were reluctant to grasp the nettle, either by reducing the value 
of the currency or by soaking up the excess with stiff taxation; either 
of these measures would have upset some of the better-off, though 
they would have prevented an inflationary spiral. As it was, wage-
earners could only press for higher wages to cover higher costs of 
living, and so the spiral began. All sectors of the population lost con-
fidence in the value of money. The only actions taken by government 
were attempts at wage and price freezes, which were unsuccessful 
and only aroused the hostility of capital and labour alike. 
The loss of confidence was compounded by another related pro-
blem, the inadequacy of government finance. As well as the usual-
state debts, the post-war liberation governments inherited the legacy 
of reparations paid to the occupant, the cost of maintaining a war 
effort through 1945 and a major share of reconstruction investment. 
As economic activity was at a low ebb and it was in any case difficult 
to evaluate resources available, the government could never raise 
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enough by taxation. Moreover, French governments had long pre-
ferred indirect tax to direct; in other words they had taxed the poorer 
end of the population proportionally more heavily than the rich. There 
was little real change in this policy for several years after 1944, with 
the result that the budget was in constant deficit - a factor which 
hardly encouraged non-inflationary behaviour in the population at 
large. 
To bring down the spiral it took the injection of Marshall Aid 
from the USA 1 and some classic deflationary policies applied after 
1948 by governments of more conservative hue (in particular reducing 
expenditure, raising rents and costs of some public services and selec-
tive taxation). By 1949 these measures, together with the effects of 
post-war investment that were beginning to show through, meant 
that prices could remain fairly stable while real expansion got under 
way. Although this situation would be perturbed in the 1950s (es-
pecially as a result of the Korean war), it did mean that the economy 
had turned a comer. But the modernization had been achieved by 
inflation, and this meant that the wage-earners had carried a major 
share of the burden. 
There is no doubt either that the nature of the economy was now 
changed. Before 1939 it was often described as 'Malthusian': the 
family firm predominated, modest in scale (though there were ex-
ceptions, notably in steel and motors), fearful of expansion, and prone 
to hiding behind tariff barriers. Instead of profits being ploughed 
back into expanded production, they were often immobilized in 
safe but unproductive outlets, like government stock. The modern-
izers aimed to break this structure, and part of their strategy was to 
encourage mergers so as to give bigger units of production. This pro-
cess was well under way by 1958: Parodi shows that for limited com-
panies in the period 1950-60 there was an average of eighty-five 
mergers per year.2 The other axis of the modernizing strategy was 
to open up the economy to international competition, with the aim 
of forcing it into greater rationalization and efficiency. Thus it was 
that in 1950 France joined the European Coal and Steel Community 
and in 1957 a much wider trade area, the European Economic Com-
munity. 
This streamlining and directing outwards of the economy had 
inevitable repercussions on social structure. Growth implies always 
a move away from the primary sector (agriculture and fisheries) into 
the secondary (manufacturing) and tertiary (commerce, services, 
administration). France was typical of this after 1945. Before 1939 
the peasantry had been the largest and most inert class in France; 
after 1945 it declined by 1 or 2 per cent annually. By 1958 the per-
centage of workforce on the land had fallen from 35 to 23, and 
300,000 farmers had disappeared. In 1947 agriculture still took 25.4 
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per cent of the national income; after 1951 it would take between 11 
and 14 per cent.3 Post-war growth told against the farmer. There 
were limits to how much produce he could sell (families spent pro-
gressively less of their income on food) and at the same time the 
price of machinery (tractors, etc.) rose faster than the prices he re-
ceived. Modernization meant in fact that only the bigger farmers 
using advanced techniques could be assured of survival; many of the 
smaller ones could linger on for a few years at the level of subsistence 
farming (G. Wright estimates that half of them were in these straits 
by 1958), or else leave the land and go to work in one of the new 
factories springing up, perhaps selling off their land to a bigger op-
erator. Thus agriculture underwent concentration of productive units 
as did industry. The process was resisted by farmers, sometimes 
violently; but the rural exodus went on, with governments reluctant 
to tackle the problem of agricultural structures till the 1960s. 
The other main victims of modernization were also old social groups, 
the artisans or craftsmen ( especially those in the older trades, whose 
skills were made obsolete by mechanization) and the small shop-
keepers, squeezed by the growth of co-operatives and supermarkets, 
and finding taxes difficult to pay once inflation had slowed down. 
Like the peasants, such categories were too numerous for a developed 
economy, and a certain thinning-out was bound to occur. A shop-
keeper from the Lot, P. Poujade, organized resistance to tax inspectors, 
which developed into a political movement. Battening on the dis-
content of the self-employed and of the poor farmers, especially in 
the centre and south-west, Poujadism was the violent and anarchic 
protest movement par excellence. Although it had over fifty deputies 
elected to the 1956 parliament, they were able to do little about the 
structural problem which explained their presence there, viz. that 
of obsolescent economic groups, squeezed out by a developing 
economy. 
Other social changes included the emergence of new managerial 
strata (cadres), whose numbers rose sharply and whose self-awareness 
was reflected in the creation of their own professional organization, 
the CGC. Beside them there emerged, in the advanced industries, 
highly skilled types of worker, whose knowledge and sophistication 
seemed to contrast increasingly with the subaltern roles assigned 
them in the productive process. By the end of the 1950s, observers 
were wondering if they might not be the beginnings of a 'new working 
class'. 
The social and economic changes of the period were not accom-
panied, however, by a similar renovation in the field of politics. 
Politically, liberation France was in a vacuum. The Third Republic 
had committed suicide in July 1940, when most of the deputies and 
senators, panicked by the French collapse, voted the abolition of the 
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republic and passed over full powers to Marshal Petain. The latter 
ruled over the etat franrais (the part of France not occupied by the 
Nazis); this was a regime of personal power, based largely on the 
prestige and moral authority of the Marshal. It collaborated fairly 
willingly with Nazism in all domains, even to the extent of helping the 
Nazis implement their policies of genocide. Its own domestic policies 
were an odd mixture of cultural archaism and economic dynamism, 
with an increasingly fascist influence predominating in the later stages. 
By 1943 the Vichy regime, as it was called (Vichy being its capital), 
was engaged in virtual civil war with the resistance, those who had 
decided to oppose the occupant and his allies by armed force. This 
explains the savagery with which collaborationists were punished 
when France was liberated.4 When the Nazis withdrew in 1944, Vichy 
collapsed. In its place was installed a provisional government, based 
on personalities and groups from the resistance and the Free French 
forces which had fought outside France; this included representatives 
of the political left as well as followers of de Gaulle, widely recognized 
as head of the resistance. De Gaulle was head of the provisional govern-
ments (until he resigned in January 1946) but his authority was moral. 
To obtain the legitimacy conferred by universal suffrage the govern-
ment had to organize elections for a constituent assembly, which would 
devise a constitution and submit it to the French people in a refer-
endum for approval or rejection. In this way regular political life could 
restart. 
In fact it proved hard to devise an acceptable constitution. A con-
stituent assembly was duly elected in October 1945, but its draft 
constitution was rejected in May 1946 by 10.5 million to 9 .5 million 
votes, mainly because it had no provision for an upper chamber. A 
second constituent assembly elected in June 1946 produced another 
draft, which was voted on in October. This time it scraped the barest 
measure of popular approval with 9 million for, 8 million against and 
8.5 million abstaining. But France now had a constitution and elections 
for a national assembly (lower house) were held in November 1946. 
Thus was the Fourth Republic born with grudging approval; it is per-
haps unsurprising that it was only to last twelve years. 
Its politics fall into several phases. First there is tripartisme, with 
government shared between socialists, communists and MRP. This is 
a period of social and economic reform and inflation; it ends in May 
194 7 when the socialists evict the communists from government 
as the Cold War begins. Governments now need an alternative basis, 
which means that Radicals and conservatives now enter ruling co-
alitions; their influence helps bring some financial stability. We are 
now in the period of the 'third force', i.e. groups supporting the re-
public and opposed both to communism and a new challenger, Gaul-
lism. The 1951 elections give the right a majority, and governments 
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are now based mainly on conservatives and radicals; economic growth 
continues, but problems of foreign policy loom larger, as France 
adjusts traumatically to its new role as a second-rank power. Social 
discontent from the victims of modernization takes the shape of 
farmers' revolts and Poujadism. The 1956 elections give a majority 
to the socialists and their allies in the 'republican front'; but by now 
the dominant problem is the colonial war in Algeria. This will tax 
both the economic resources of governments and their political auth-
ority to a point where in 1958 the republic will emulate its predecessor 
and call in a saviour, de Gaulle. We shall now explore in detail the 
political failure of the republic. 
Discerning observers had seen that the new constitution promised 
to be very like that of the late Third Republic, which many still blamed 
for the collapse of 1940. it had been characterized by a clear lack 
of governmental authority, which was due to several factors. One 
was cultural. It was widely felt among republican politicians that 
firm government was only one step away from the authoritarianism 
(cesarisme) which has often marked French political life. Weakness 
or at least pliability was almost a civic virtue: energetic personalities 
with strong ideas about policy were kept carefully away from office, 
unless needed in times of crisis. But behind this lay a more structural 
factor. French society, economically underdeveloped and with deep 
cultural divisions, had spawned a great variety of political opinions 
and sectional interests, which all found their expression in political 
movements. In other words, the chamber of deputies was never 
dominated by one or two parties, as in Anglo-Saxon systems; it was 
a place where several groups of roughly equal strength confronted 
each other. Governments were always coalitions, which meant com-
promises between their members (and these were often hard to achieve) 
or plain immobilism (by doing nothing, one offended nobody). 
Premiers were weak, hostages of their party colleagues, of deputies 
from other groups and ultimately of the pressure groups outside 
parliament, who pushed their demands vigorously. The parties them-
selves were mostly undisciplined and unstructured, having little contact 
with their supporters outside election time. Now, such a system can 
last a long time, provided that (a) social change proceeds slowly, so 
that there is no unmanageable discontent from displaced groups and 
(b) there is no external threat. The Third Republic lasted seventy 
years on this basis, though it did have periodic recourse to heroic 
leadership, the deputies scenting trouble and passing their prerogatives 
briefly to a strong premier. But the economic crisis of the thirties, 
followed by the Nazi invasion, found the Republic too weak to riposte. 
Gouvemement d'assemblee stood condemned: hence the anxiety when 
the Fourth Republic seemed likely to develop on similar lines to its 
predecessor. 
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To begin with, the occupation and resistance had had little effect 
on the fragmentation of political opinion. No united left-wing party 
emerged, and the right was still as untidy as ever. The centre was oc-
cupied by an apparently new force, the MRP. Later on, new move-
ments such as Gaullism or Poujadism would mushroom in response to 
various grievances. Even the change in the electoral system from the 
old single-member system (which favoured local dignitaries and thus 
encouraged fragmentation) to proportional representation had little 
effect: there were still some six major groups in the parliaments. 
Their demands were as conllicting as ever, at least on paper. Com-
munists and socialists could agree about nationalizations, but not on 
wage controls or foreign policy. Socialists and MRP both favoured 
European political and economic integration, but could be split on 
a question like state aid to catholic schools. Radicals might agree with 
socialists about schools, but would quarrel with them bitterly over 
how to deal with nationalist movements inside the empire. Parties 
were often split internally on these and other questions. In short, no 
durable consensus was possible. 
In addition, the president of the republic was still a figurehead 
without authority; at most he could be an 'honest broker' between 
party leaders. A premier wishing to confirm his authority dare not 
follow an option open to his British equivalent, i.e. dissolve parliament 
and call elections, even though he had the constitutional right to do 
so. The one premier who did dissolve, Faure, never became prime 
minister again. A premier could not, incredibly, plan his legislation 
by controlling the parliamentary timetable; this was the prerogative 
of party leaders. If he wanted too much authority in some matters, 
deputies might delay voting the budget and eke out money supply 
to the government in monthly douziemes provisoires. And there was 
still a last obstacle before bills got on the statute book - the senate. 
Dominated by rural interests, it had a long tradition of obstructing and 
occasionally overthrowing upstart governments. In short, the deputy 
still ruled, and behind him the pressure groups were as active as ever, 
urging him to obtain concessions and favours: the North African 
lobby and the wine and alcohol producers are the classical ones, but 
there were a host of others. Scandals involving greedy or corrupt 
parliamentarians continued, as they had done under the previous 
republic. 
The result was that by the mid-1950s the 'system', as many now 
called it, seemed to work in a vacuum, cut off from the voters and very 
much the preserve of the professionals from the political class. At-
tempts were made to give governments some authority but they came 
to little; increasingly canvassed was a presidential solution, whereby 
the clear focus of authority would be a president with some sort of 
electoral mandate and power to dissolve the lower house if need be. 
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De Gaulle suggested this as early as 1946, and his RPF challenged the 
republic on this basis. Increasingly, then, the republic seemed unable 
to deal with the urgent problems of France - less her economic ones, 
perhaps, than her political ones. And foremost among the latter were 
those of foreign and colonial policy. 
The domestic politics of the Fourth Republic were always over-
shadowed by foreign questions in fact, which compounded differences 
already existing between parties. These questions come under two 
headings: relations with (a) Europe and the USA, and (b) the empire. 
The Yalta treaty of 1945 effectively split Europe into two spheres 
of influence, the east falling under Soviet hegemony, the west under 
American. Some time was necessary for both politicians and public 
to realize that a new map of the world had been drawn and that for the 
older powers, especially Britain and France, their role was now reduced. 
They could at best aspire to that of second-rank powers behind the 
two super-powers, the USA and the USSR. Tension grew between the 
latter after 1945, as the extent of Soviet influence over the new com-
munist-dominated governments in the East became clear. Marshall 
Aid and the Prague coup of February 1948 (when Czech communists 
seized full power in an insurrection) confirmed that the wartime 
alliance had broken down and that capitalist and Soviet blocks con-
fronted each other in a 'cold war'. French governments recognized 
this by their decision in 1949 to join NATO, the alliance of western 
states under US leadership, formed to confront what seemed to be a 
threat of Soviet expansionism. Within NATO lay a delicate problem 
for French governments, though - that of Germany. When West 
Germany was admitted to statehood by the Allies in 1949, the question 
of adding its military and economic potential to the Western alliance 
was clearly acute. It became even more so the following year when 
the cold war became a hot one. In Korea, the USA and its allies inter-
vened to save the regime in the south from a Soviet-backed invasion 
by the communist north. One consequence of this was that Western 
governments felt obliged to re-arm, thus putting an unwanted strain 
on the new resources that post-war growth was beginning to produce; 
but the other was political. How could Germany be admitted into 
NATO? French foreign policy had, for obvious reasons, always seen 
Germany as a major threat: and this was still so after 1945 (cf. French 
demands for the dismemberment of Germany at the end of the war). 
This clearly made the admission of Germany into the alliance very 
hard to swallow, despite the fact that the balance of forces in Europe 
had now been changed drastically. 
An ingenious way around the problem was proposed by R. Pleven, 
premier in October 1950. This was the European Defence Community 
(EDC) - a sort of European army into which would be incorporated 
soldiers from all NATO countries, along with Germans, under a central-
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ized, multi-national command. Gennan soldiers would thus be dis-
guised as European ones, as it were, and the spectre of Gennan re-
annament somehow concealed. The Pinay government signed the 
EDC treaty in 1952, but it needed parliamentary ratification. For two 
years governments procrastinated, because opinion in country and 
parliament was extremely divided. Eventually in 19 54 the energetic 
Mendes-France forced the deputies to a vote, and ratification was 
refused. It made little difference to France, because eventually the 
USA was able to force acceptance of Gennan rearmament and admis-
sion into NATO as a full member. But it did make for further division 
inside French politics, giving a boost to those who were increasingly 
dissatisfied with what seemed to be lack of independence from out-
side (read US) pressure and who were anxious about France's status 
in the world. 
Similar feelings were bred in the other crisis area, that of colonial 
policy. In 1945 the French empire was second only to the British, 
covering much of North, West and sub-Saharan Africa and including, 
in Asia, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Like other colonial powers, 
France soon faced demands for autonomy or independence from 
nationalist forces inside her empire. Her reply was negative: the Braz-
zaville conference of 1944, called by the Gaullists to discuss the future 
of the empire, spoke of economic development for colonies, but 
eschewed any idea of independence. The reasons for this attitude are 
complex: certainly the idea of assimilation is important (according to 
this official philosophy, in time all indigenous populations were sup-
posed to develop into French men and women). So too are the ac-
tivities of various colonial lobbies. Whatever the reasons, though, 
France was the slowest of all imperial powers, Portugal apart, to learn 
that decolonization must be carried out in the end. The two main 
arenas of decolonization were Indo-China and North Africa. 
At the end of the war Vietnam was mostly under the control of 
the nationalist Vietminh.5 The Japanese occupation during wartime 
had displaced the fonner colonial officials, and the Vietminh had 
filled the vacuum left by the Japanese surrender. France had thus a 
choice: either to find an arrangement with the Vietminh or begin what 
was in effect a war of reconquest. Although the Vietminh was led 
by Ho Chi Minh, head of the Vietnamese communist party, it was by 
no means exclusively communist, grouping together other types of 
nationalists under a common umbrella. Moreover, its demands were 
modest - recognition by France of a unified Vietnamese state inside 
the French union (as the empire had been prudently rebaptized) but 
with its own government, parliament, defence and finances. Ho and 
Sainteny, the French negotiator, agreed on the above tenns in March 
1946, and the agreement was to be submitted to government and 
parliament for approval; the nature of Vietnam's diplomatic relations 
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and her future status (whether the agreement was a stepping-stone to 
total independence or not) was left vague. But what had been agreed 
was a useful basis. It was never to be incorporated into a formal treaty, 
though: the ill-will and cowardice of governments in Paris and the 
provocative actions of local administrative and military chiefs saw to 
that. In the summer of 1946 Thierry d'Argenlieu, whom de Gaulle 
had appointed Commissioner for Vietnam, proclaimed - quite il-
legally - a separate republic of Cochin-China. This was a deliberate 
attempt to split off the Catholic south from the rest of Vietnam. 
In November the French fleet shelled Haiphong, killing several 
thousand people, on the slimmest of provocations. Neither action 
was countermanded from Paris, and war became inevitable. The Viet-
minh began an armed struggle that would last seven years, and in which 
France would pay dearly for the missed opportunity of 1946. 
The war of reconquest meant increasing expenditure and heavy 
commitment of men and material, despite an influx of US aid after 
1950 as part of their wider anti-communist strategy. It also brought 
military and diplomatic defeat: even by 1950 large tracts of territory 
had been abandoned to the Vietminh and were run by them as 
'liberated zones'. In their search for support inside Vietnam, the French 
were forced to offer first autonomy and then total independence to 
alternative nationalist forces, based on the wealthier sections of Viet-
namese society and headed by the hereditary monarch Bao Dai. But 
even this, which was more than Ho ever received, proved too little. 
New techniques of rural guerilla warfare, perfected by General Giap 
and combined with skilful building of political support among the 
local population were crucial. Eventually in May 1954 a large part 
of the French forces was trapped and defeated, despite its superior 
equipment, in the base at Dien Bien Phu. The war was lost, and in the 
resultant peace conference at Geneva during July it took the energy 
and lucidity of Mendes-France to secure reasonable terms for French 
withdrawal. Vietnam was cut in two, with the north left to the Viet-
minh, by now much more communist and dependent on Soviet aid. 
The south was left to clients of the USA; one imperialism replaced 
another, with results known to all. France escaped cheaply in fact. 
Vietnam was far from home and there were few settlers to repatriate. 
Conscript troops had never been used. Even the drain on the economy 
had been palliated by US aid, and Mendes-France's skill at Geneva 
had avoided excessive diplomatic humiliation. Unfortunately, then, 
the real lessons were never learned. Few saw the danger of abandoning 
policy initiatives to local officials or the trauma that the army had 
experienced. Many soldiers, captured by the Vietminh and admiring 
their tactical and political skills, could still never understand how they 
had lost: the temptation to blame others - 'the politicians' - was 
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strong. In these circumstances France faced her next colonial ordeal 
in Africa. 
France was able to disengage with relative ease from her protec-
torates of Morocco and Tunisia, with their small settler populations, 
in 1955 and 1956. The outline-law of G. Defferre in 1956 also set 
decolonization in motion in Black Africa: it would result in the cre-
ation of a series of new states, most of them clients of France, which 
would become first members of the French union, then fully inde-
pendent by 1960. If there was comparatively little opposition to this 
strategy, then Algeria was a different matter. It was legally part of 
France, under the jurisdiction of the interior minister. Its nine million 
people included a million white settlers, colons or pieds-noirs, of 
French nationality (most of whose parents had in fact come from 
parts of the Mediterranean other than France). The other eight million, 
Arab Muslims in the main, enjoyed few political or civic rights, the 
commanding heights of the Algerian economy being firmly in white 
hands. The colons had the ear of local officials sent from France and 
powerful friends in parliament. They were thus easily able to stifle 
attempts to improve the political and economic lot of Arabs, such 
as the 194 7 statute (parts of which were simply never applied and 
parts of which were adapted, by devices such as intimidation and 
electoral fraud, so as to preserve the status quo). In November 1954 
the nationalist FLN (Front de liberation nationale) began an armed 
rising that would lead to Algerian independence in 1962. 
Few French politicians were inclined to concede anything to the 
FLN. Most favoured a military solution, i.e. defeat of the FLN by 
force of arms; though some, notably the left and some MRP, would 
follow this up with a package of political and economic reforms. 
No one, not even the communists, admitted independence. The con-
sequences of this attitude would be fatal for Algeria and for the Fourth 
Republic. 
First, France had to mount massive repression: by 1957 some 
400,000 troops, including conscripts, were needed to maintain order 
in Algeria. Military service was extended. From 1954 to 1960 the cost 
of the war was reckoned to amount to some 28 per cent of the budget. 
There were nasty side-effects: hundreds of thousands of Arabs were 
herded into internment camps: urban civilian life was subjected to 
sophisticated and degrading techniques of military surveillance: torture 
and murder of Algerian nationalists and European sympathizers went 
unchecked. In France itself, governments suppressed opposition papers 
and jailed suspected FLN sympathizers arbitrarily. These tendencies 
reached their peak in 1956-7 when government was dominated by 
socialists and Radicals, who were drawn, despite good intentions, 
into the implacable logic of colonialist nationalism. Observers coined 
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the phrase 'national molletism' (after G. Mollet, the socialist premier) 
to describe the feeling of national decline and frustrated impotence 
which seemed by now to be widespread in France, and which found 
expression in the Suez expedition of November 1956. Here French 
and British combined to invade Egypt in a classic piece of gunboat-
diplomacy, the French because of alleged Egyptian support for the 
FLN and the British because Egypt had nationalized the Suez canal 
(where the majority of the share capital was British). The warnings 
of the two super-powers and the condemnation of the United Nations 
were necessary before the expeditionary forces withdrew in humili-
ation and it was realized where real power lay in the modem world. 
The crucial effects of Algeria were on domestic French politics, 
however. Increasingly governments in Paris shut their eyes to events 
in Algeria, leaving policy to local forces - a collusion of settlers' 
leaders, pro-settler administrators ( of whom the socialist minister-
resident, R. Lacoste, was to become particularly notorious) and above 
all the army, desperate to retrieve honour lost in Vietnam. Orders 
from Paris were disobeyed or disregarded. In 1956 the FLN leader 
Ahmed Ben Bella was illegally abducted from a Moroccan aircraft. 
Presented with the fait accompli by his secret services, Mollet merely 
gave his approval. In February 1958 the airforce bombed illegally a 
village in Tunisia, Sakhiet (allegedly a shelter for FLN troops) and 
killed sixty-nine civilians. The premier Gaillard by now did not dare 
to condemn this. When he resigned soon after over Algerian policy, 
no one could form a government for thirty-eight days - the longest 
ministerial crisis in a republic that had known plenty of them. The 
system was grinding to a halt. When P. Pflimlin, leader of a liberal 
tendency in the MRP who was reputed ~o be less severe on Algerian 
nationalism than some, was eventually appointed prime minister, 
the pent-up forces in Algiers exploded. 
On 13 May 1958 colons and soldiers staged an open insurrection 
in Algiers, setting up para-governmental bodies called, with appropriate 
nostalgia for earlier centuries, committees of public safety. Corsica 
was already under the control of insurgent troops: there were rumours 
of an invasion of Paris. The Fourth Republic had lost control, and the 
only alternative to civil war seemed to the political class to be an 
appeal to a figure whom they believed capable of placating all sides 
(and whose supporters had certainly been hard at work amid the 
Algiers insurrectionists) - de Gaulle. The General accepted office 
as prime minister, but only on the understanding that he could devise 
a new constitution. This would be drafted and approved by referendum 
at the end of the summer. Civil war was thus averted, but the Fourth 
Republic was dead. 
Its unfortunate end might make us forget its achievements. It had 
an impressive record in economic and social modernization, and in 
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foreign policy it took the NATO and EEC options clearly and de-
cisively. Later governments would benefit from its work - much more 
than they ever admit. Its failure was political, with its lack of authority 
being cruelly exposed by the colonial crisis. Some explanations have 
been suggested for this, mainly of a structural order; though as Julliard 
says, the cowardice and weakness of the political class, and its failure 
to bring party politics closer to the public, are also important. It 
remained to be seen whether the new republic would deal any better 
with the major problems still facing France. 
(2) The Fifth Republic: establishment and consolidation, 1958-68 
The crisis of 13 May became the matrix for the birth of the Fifth 
Republic. On 1 June General de Gaulle was voted the last prime minis-
ter of the Fourth Republic by 329 to 224 deputies in the national 
assembly. His coalition government containing SFIO socialists and 
conservatives was handed a basket of special powers for six months, 
mainly to restore public order and resolve the Algerian problem but 
also, on de Gaulle's insistence, to propose changes to the constitution 
so as to get rid of what he saw as weaknesses in the public powers in 
France. Thus the deputies were induced to issue a death sentence for 
the Fourth Republic in their anxiety to end the Algerian crisis. Never-
theless, the basic socio-economic structures developing in France since 
1945 were not likely to be revolutionized by a fonnal change of regime 
in 1958; nor were the issues at stake in the Algerian war.6 
Although legal power could be conferred by the national assembly 
in Paris, real power lay in Algeria. The anny had joined with colons 
to fonn the committees of public safety, in Algiers and other large 
cities, which continued to rule local affairs for several months. Colonels 
in the parachute regiments were particularly detennined to recover 
military pride and to keep Algeria French by winning the war. Older 
generals, however, feared anny disunity if civil war broke out in France; 
their caution opened the minds of Massu and Salan to persuasion that 
perhaps de Gaulle would guarantee a French Algeria. The loyalties 
of General Salan hung in the balance for he was military commander 
and head of the civil administration in Algeria while at the same time 
acting as nominal leader of the rebellion. 
De Gaulle had no ready-made Algerian policy any more than his 
predecessors. 7 But he was careful during several flying visits to Algeria 
to maintain his acceptability to the rebels by making vague but sym-
pathetic speeches such as the one at the Forum in Algiers on 4 June 
which began 'Je vous ai compris!'; at Mostaganem on 7 June he even 
cried for the first and last time 'Vive l'Algerie frani;aise!' Moreover, 
he reaffirmed the authority of General Salan. But he usually preferred 
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to adopt sphinx-like attitudes while appointing new and trusted ad-
ministrators. By the middle of October, army officers were withdrawn 
from the committees of public safety which were finding themselves 
increasingly by-passed by administrators from Paris. Thus was quietly 
severed the umbilical cord attaching de Gaulle to the rebellion of 
13 May; but his survival would remain precarious for another four 
years. 
The search for a solution to the Algerian problem went through 
four stages. Initially, between June 1958 and September 1959, de 
Gaulle's policy was to float trial balloons to test public opinion while 
also introducing reforms to improve the climate for a settlement 
without making any commitments on the future status of Algeria. 
At Constantine early in October he outlined a plan to spend 100,000 
million francs per annum over five years on a programme of social and 
economic reform to benefit Moslems and enable them to participate 
in Algerian administration. That this was not enough in itself to win 
Moslem confidence was apparent when de Gaulle's appeal for a pave 
des braves in his first press conference on 23 October was rejected by 
the FLN who regarded it as merely a cease-fire without guarantees. 
Just as the army and colons in Algeria waited anxiously for reassurance, 
so did Moslem doubts persist. Even if they achieved military success, 
the Algerian nationalists feared that the French might resort to par-
titioning the coastal area and the oil-producing regions of the Sahara. 
Such fears were justified, for de Gaulle's first prime minister, M. Debn:, 
was suggesting a partition policy as late as June 1961 . 
The search for a settlement entered a second phase on 16 September 
1959, when de Gaulle admitted the right of all Algerians to eventual 
self-determination, while clearly hoping that they would choose to 
retain close links with France. A storm of protest culminated in a 
revolt in Algiers in January 1960 by colons aided by some army of-
ficers. De Gaulle survived this crisis with a successful broadcast appeal 
for army loyalty and then moved some dangerous officers to metro-
politan France. Having restored order, de Gaulle made secret prep-
arations leading to negotiations with FLN leaders at Melun in June 
1960. The talks soon broke down, but having now recognized the 
FLN as a representative Algerian organization, de Gaulle put his plan 
to prepare for self-determination in Algeria before the French people 
in the form of a referendum, in January 1961. He was encouraged 
by the 75 per cent vote in favour of his plan, but the result provoked 
another revolt in Algeria in April led this time by four generals whom 
de Gaulle had recently retired. Generals Challe, Jouhaud, Salan and 
Zeller won support from only part of the army, and after only four 
days their insurrection collapsed in confusion. Secure once more, de 
Gaulle had further abortive negotiations with the FLN between May 
and July, this time held at Evian, a French spa town on Lake Geneva. 
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There followed a third phase during the summer of 1961, a period 
of reappraisal when there were serious doubts whether de Gaulle was 
capable of solving the Algerian problem, which was the task for which 
he had been given power. Public opinion had become increasingly 
critical of the war and its brutalities, and the previous September a 
declaration des 121 signed by well-known intellectuals had even pro-
claimed the right of national servicemen to refuse to fight in Algeria. 
Meanwhile on the extreme right the Organisation de l'armee secrete 
(OAS) mounted a campaign of assassinations and plastic bomb attacks 
intended to break down law and order by terrorism and thereby pre-
vent a settlement in Algeria. To meet the challenge the FLN tightened 
its organization and redefined its aims to combine socialist revolution 
with the fight for independence. 
The way was cleared for the final phase of the crisis when de Gaulle 
renounced the possibility of partition at his press conference on 5 
September 1961 and thereby based his hopes on association between 
France and a unified Algeria. The FLN responded on 24 October by 
suggesting provisions to serve the interests of France and colons re-
maining in Algeria after independence. Secret preparations led to more 
negotiations at Evian which resulted in a cease-fire agreement on 18 
March 1962, accompanied by a complex settlement labelled 'inde-
pendence in co-operation with France', which was approved by 91 per 
cent of French voters in a referendum on 8 April and by almost 100 
per cent of Algerians on 1 July. The settlement provided for minority 
rights for colons if they chose to stay; it provided for French interests 
in Saharan oil, atomic tests and the Mers-el-Kebir naval base, but only 
for a limited period; it provided for a major role by the FLN in or-
ganizing the referendum; and most important it provided for absolute 
sovereignty in internal and external affairs for an independent Algeria. 
By means of an aid programme on a similar scale to the Constantine 
Plan the French hoped to keep a special relationship with Algeria, 
but after eight years of war and in view of differences of ideology and 
national interest, it was unlikely that a spirit of co-operation would 
prevail. Both before and after the settlement of 1962 most of the 
million colons in Algeria moved to metropolitan France. Last des-
perate efforts at sabotage by the OAS merely made the break more 
complete, their bomb attacks driving colons out and their assassination 
attempts against de Gaulle enabling him to win support to entrench 
himself in power. 
Apart from returning to power to restore order and solve the Algerian 
problem, de Gaulle and his coalition government were empowered 
to draft a new constitution according to five principles embodied in 
a constitutional act passed on 3 June 1958. To meet de Gaulle's wishes, 
the executive should be strengthened and separated from the legis-
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lature. To meet the wishes of the leading Fourth Republic politicians 
both legislature and executive should be based on universal suffrage, 
the government should be responsible to the legislature, an independent 
judiciary should be maintained, and relations between France and her 
overseas territories should be reformed. Accordingly, de Gaulle's legal 
advisor, Debrt\ drafted a text that was slightly amended by a com-
mittee formed by both government and parliament before being pub-
lished on 4 September and submitted to a referendum. 
The subsequent campaign paid little attention to constitutional 
details because most French people feared that a rejection of the 
constitution would cause de Gaulle to resign, leaving them with little 
hope of peace in Algeria and the strong possibility of civil war in 
France. In any case, the absence of clear proposals for an alternative 
constitution left the opposition weak and disunited. It was in these 
circumstances that the referendum on 28 September 1958 resulted in 
79 per cent of the vote in metropolitan France being cast in favour 
of the. constitution. The opposition vote of mainly four million com-
munists. was much lower than anticipated. For the overseas territories 
the constitution offered a choice between secession and co-operation 
that would involve devolution of power; only Guinea voted for seces-
sion, but when the snags involved in the terms of co-operation with 
France became clear during the following year, most of the other 
territories followed the path towards independence, so that the world-
wide French empire had largely disappeared by 1962. 
The most significant features of the new constitution were the 
presidential powers to dissolve the national assembly (but not more 
than once a year), to hold a referendum under certain conditions, 
to appoint the prime minister and other ministers, and to assume full 
powers when he deemed that there was a state of emergency; for its 
part the government had power to extend legislation by means of 
decrees and ordinances, and could control parliamentary agendas 
during the relatively short sessions of the national assembly; finally 
parliament had power to refuse a vote of confidence in a new govern-
ment and to pass a motion of censure to force an existing government 
to resign. There was considerable debate at the time as to whether it 
was a presidential or a parliamentary regime, but in reality the 1958 
constitution had to be hybrid to satisfy de Gaulle and the politjcians 
in his coalition government. 
Following provisions in the new constitution, national assembly 
elections were held in November to fill 532 seats (including 67 in 
Algeria) by means of single-member constituencies decided by two 
ballots failing an overall majority in the first ballot; this reverted to 
a Third Republic practice, instead of the proportional representation 
of the Fourth Republic. The Gaullists formed a new organization, 
the Union pour la nouvelle republique (VNR), and surprised everyone 
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by increasing their seats from 20 to 189; with the dependable support 
of 132 conservative deputies in the Centre national des independants 
et paysans (CNIP) the Gaullists would be able to form a reliable ma-
jority. Likely to be in opposition on the other hand were thirty-four 
radicals and other centre groups, fifty-seven MRP, forty SFIO, two 
other socialists and ten communists. Apart from the communists, who 
polled over a million votes less than in 1956, the opposition parties 
maintained their vote; but they all suffered from a disproportion 
between votes and seats, partly due to new constituency boundaries 
but mainly due to fragmented strategies exposed by safety-first voting 
for the UNR and CNIP in the second ballot. Three-quarters of former 
deputies had not been returned to the national assembly which was 
therefore revolutionized, though many former deputies subsequently 
managed to win seats in elections to the senate. 8 
Encouraged by this evidence of public support, de Gaulle pro-
ceeded to contest the presidential election held on 21 December with 
an electorate of 81,764 deputies, senators, local mayors and council-
lors. He duly won 79 per cent of the poll against 8 per cent for a 
centrist and 13 per cent for a communist. Now securely in power, 
de Gaulle announced drastic financial and economic reforms including 
a 17 per cent devaluation of the currency; the gradual introduction 
of a new franc worth 100 old francs; a major reduction in tariffs on 
foreign imports, particularly from countries in the new European', 
Economic Community (EEC); increased budgetary expenditure for 
military and other purposes; reduced subsidies on public services and 
family allowances, and finally new taxes that would meet about half 
the increase in expenditure. De Gaulle could now afford to dispense 
with the socialists, who refused to serve in the new government in 
protest against his economic policies, though promising to continue 
to vote for his Algerian policy. Confident of a safe majority in the 
national assembly, de Gaulle could appoint Deb re prime minister 
in January 1959, together with the conservative Pinay as finance 
minister, in terms that emphasized presidential power while paying 
scant regard to the need for the government to win a vote of parlia-
mentary confidence. 
Now president instead of prime minister, de Gaulle nevertheless 
wished to keep personal direction of government policy in Algeria 
and foreign affairs to an extent that exceeded the presidential role 
of arbiter according to the constitution. The Gaullist party congress 
in 1959 justified the creation of a domaine reserve, a presidential 
sector of policy; but the extent and nature of the sector was not 
defined by de Gaulle and was likely to vary according to the presi-
dent's interests. Moreover, de Gaulle assumed special powers in 1961, 
when he declared a state of emergency from 23 April to 30 September, 
even though the generals' revolt lasted only four days. He was aware 
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of considerable speculation that he might be manoeuvred out of power 
when the Algerian war ended and that the OAS were attempting to 
bring his rule to a rather more sudden end, and his greatest concern 
was that the essentials of presidential power in France should be 
upheld beyond his term of office. He therefore decided that election 
by universal suffrage would be the best means to give the president 
a national authority at least as great as that of the national assembly. 
Fears of political instability were widespread due to persistent OAS 
terrorism, particularly following de Gaulle's narrow escape from as-
sassination at Petit-Clamart in August 1962. De Gaulle chose this 
opportunity to propose, by means of a referendum, that the presi-
dential electoral system be changed from a restricted to a universal 
suffrage. The politicians in .the national assembly objected that it was 
constitutionally unjustifiable to make such a change by referendum 
and they passed a motion of censure against the government on 4 
October. In the referendum on 28 October, of the 77 per cent who 
went to the polls, only 62 per cent voted to support the government's 
proposal; but rather than change his government to suit the national 
assembly, de Gaulle chose a dissolution. In the elections in November 
1962 the Gaullist UNR, with its left-wing Union democratique du 
travail (UDT), won 230 seats out of 482 and could rely on support 
from 35 Independent Republicans plus a few other conservative al-
lies. Indications of doubt and opposition among the electorate were 
that only 69 per cent voted in the first ballot and that the parties 
campaigning for a 'no' vote in the October referendum raised their 
votes from eight to eleven millions, against seven millions for the 
Gaullists and their allies. But incoherent programmes and strategies 
resulted in the opposition groups occupying only 189 seats, of which 
the SFIO had 66 and the communists had 41. 
Thus de Gaulle had not only strengthened the presidency through 
success in the referendum, but even more by the unexpected triumph 
of the UNR in the elections. He had replaced Debre in March, partly 
due to differences over Algerian policy, and appointed a new prime 
minister, G. Pompidou, who was regarded as a nonentity and who 
lost a vote of censure within six months. But after the elections had 
returned a safe majority, Pompidou was reappointed for the next 
six years to become the longest serving prime minister in French 
republican history. Freed from the Algerian incubus and with a firm 
power base, de Gaulle was able not only to pursue his foreign policy 
ambitions to the full but even to win re-election to the presidency 
in December 1965, in spite of opposition efforts to combine more 
effectively against him in the meantime. 
In his speeches and writings de Gaulle had always attached the greatest 
importance to French influence and independence in world affairs. 
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On his return to power in 1958 he proceeded to interpret articles 5 
and 15 of the new constitution, which made the president guarantor 
of national independence, territorial integrity, and respect for treaties, 
as well as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, as authority for 
him to take control of all aspects of foreign affairs and defence policy. 9 
But he shared the same problems that handicapped his predecessors, 
whatever the formal powers he assumed; the constraints arising from 
the cold war and preoccupations with the Algerian problem also af-
fected him during his first four years in power. This was anticipated 
by allied powers who tended to disregard French interests. De Gaulle's 
ambitions were largely ignored in June 1958 when American and 
British troops moved into Jordan and the Lebanon, a traditional 
French sphere of interest, and again in September when his request 
for a French share in the direction of NATO met with no reply from 
Washington. His one moderate achievement during these early years 
was to develop French participation and influence in the EEC. By 
devaluing the franc he cushioned the French balance of trade against 
the scheduled tariff cuts laid down by the 1957 treaty of Rome; and 
by exchanging friendly visits with Chancellor Adenauer, beginning in 
July 1960, he cultivated West German support in order to create a 
political base from which he could prepare to launch an attack on 
the existing international power structure. 
Nevertheless, it was not until 1962 that developments at home 
and abroad significantly increased French freedom of action in world 
affairs. In France de Gaulle's power was strengthened by the ending 
of the Algerian war and by the election of a stable majority to the 
national assembly. Abroad there was a cold war crisis in October 
1962 when the United States refused to allow the siting of Soviet 
missiles on the island of Cuba; although they came close to war, the 
two super-powers resolved the crisis peacefully in a way that indicated 
their agreement to co-exist. Friction was reduced by a clearer de-
marcation of interests. The Soviet Union withdrew its missiles from 
Cuba, but it had proceeded from August 1961 to build a wall to divide 
East and West Berlin, the area of greatest tension in Europe. Co-ex-
istence instead of conflict brought a sigh of relief from the world, 
followed by the dawning recognition that detente between the super-
powers might provide scope for lesser powers to take initiatives in 
their own interest, rather than lining up automatically with Moscow 
or Washington. This view was most clearly articulated in France where 
traditions of great power status made cold war constraints particu-
larly objectionable. 
De Gaulle broke the conventions of American leadership at a press 
conference on 14 January 1963. A recent Anglo-American meeting 
in the Bahamas had reaffirmed their long-standing co-operation in 
producing nuclear weapons, while perfunctorily suggesting that France 
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might buy some sea-to-air Polaris rockets. Now de Gaulle rejected 
the offer, pointing out that France had neither the submarines nor 
the warheads to use such rockets; he also rejected American proposals 
for a multilateral Atlantic nuclear force, which he believed might under-
mine French plans for a nuclear force of their own. At the same press 
conference he indicated that he considered it impossible for Britain 
to enter the EEC, his veto thus bringing to an abrupt end negotiations 
begun in October 1961. He did not refer directly to Anglo-American 
military agreements, but by expressing concern that their economic 
links might adversely affect the EEC if Britain joined, he indicated 
his belief that Britain was an American 'Trojan horse'. Thus de Gaulle 
declared a war of independence from 'Anglo-Saxon' overlordship. 
C. Delmas points out (Defense nationale, January 1983) that apart from 
personal motives the General's decision arose from concern in France 
about Anglo-American policies dating back to the Fourth Republic in 
1957. 
At the same time he strengthened his power base in Europe by 
signing a treaty on Franco-German co-operation on 22 January, which 
involved links in foreign affairs, defence and education by means of 
regular meetings between heads of state and relevant ministers. Close 
West German relations with Washington meant that the timing of the 
treaty with France was an embarrassment to the Germans; Adenauer's 
visit to Paris to sign the treaty had been arranged before the 14 January 
press conference and he decided to go through with it, though the 
subsequent terms of ratification by the Bundestag set limits to co-
operation with de Gaulle. Suspicion of his personal friendship with 
Adenauer lay beneath the surface in German politics, until the latter's 
retirement in March 1966 allowed an open assertion of German in-
terests diverging from those of France. 
The decision taken under the Fourth Republic in 1954 to develop 
a French nuclear weapon system was upheld enthusiastically by de 
Gaulle, who greeted the first successful atomic test in the Sahara in 
February 1960 with the acclamation 'Hourra pour la France!' But 
his ambition would not be satisfied until there was a nuclear striking 
force under independent French command. This became official 
policy in spite of the great expense involved, and it survived a motion 
of censure which had the support of more than two hundred deputies 
in the national assembly on 25 October 1960. De Gaulle also resisted 
constraints from abroad by refusing, in July 1963, to sign a nuclear 
test ban treaty sponsored by the United States, the Soviet Union and 
Britain; he regarded it as an attempt to protect their existing privi-
leges to the detriment of China and France, the newest nuclear powers. 
De Gaulle was convinced that an independent French foreign policy 
was restricted by the integrated military command structure of NATO. 
As early as March 1959 he withdrew the French navy from NATO 
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command, though the decision was interpreted as mainly serving 
special French security needs in the Mediterranean during the Algerian 
war. In spite of de Gaulle's efforts to develop friendly relations with 
communist powers, firstly by recognizing the Chinese People's Republic 
in 1964, and then by negotiating several commercial and diplomatic 
agreements with the Soviet Union in 1965, many Frenchmen remained 
convinced that national security required the firmest possible alliance 
with the United States. Therefore it was only after being safely re-
elected to the presidency in December 1965 that de Gaulle announced 
in February 1966 his decision to leave the NATO military system, 
while remaining in the Atlantic Alliance as a purely diplomatic agree-
ment. The decision meant that American forces had to leave French 
soil within twelve months, together with NATO headquarters which 
had to be transferred from Paris to Brussels. De Gaulle then visited 
the Soviet Union in June 1966 and agreed to consult regularly and to 
construct a direct telephone link between the Kremlin and the Elysee. 
He insisted, however, that his aim was not neutrality but rather to 
make France an independent power within the western alliance. 
Contacts with the Soviet Union and subsequently with other states 
in eastern Europe were part of a European policy not confined to the 
six members of the EEC but geared rather to a Europe stretching from 
the Atlantic to the Urals. De Gaulle appreciated the economic benefits 
of the EEC, particularly those derived from the Common Agricultural 
Policy which solved the problem of French farming surpluses; but 
he objected to supranational integration, as proposed in the treaty of 
Rome. Between 1960 and 1962 he presented plans to the EEC through 
Fouchet, his ambassador in Copenhagen, which purported to strengthen 
political co-operation in the Common Market but were rejected because 
they ruled out genuine integration by leaving full sovereignty with 
each member state. A loosely-knit political co-operation was the kind 
which de Gaulle hoped would be ultimately acceptable to eastern 
European states. As he was attempting to bridge east and west, the 
other five EEC members proposed to go ahead with integration by 
means of qualified majority voting procedures on the council of minis-
ters which were laid down in agreements under the treaty of Rome. 
For seven months there was deadlock while French delegates boycot-
ted EEC meetings, until the Luxembourg agreements in January 1966 
enabled France to keep a veto on issues involving her vital interests. 
The French veto was exercised yet again, in spite of opposition from 
the other five members, when a second British application for member-
ship was blocked in May 1967. 
During his presidency de Gaulle travelled to most parts of the 
world. He offered his creed of national independence to the developing 
countries, particularly those subjected to neo-colonialism at the hands 
of the United States. He was bitterly critical of American policy in 
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the Vietnam war. Convinced that American influence in the world 
was artificially maintained by privileges derived from the Bretton 
Woods monetary system created at the end of the Second World 
War, the gold exchange standard which gave the dollar equal status to 
gold, de Gaulle recommended at a press conference on 4 February 
1965 a return to a straightforward gold standard without privileged 
currencies. The subsequent French practice of converting dollars into 
gold amounted to a 'gold war' that proved an irritant to the United 
States though not actually defeating their policies. Nevertheless, at the 
cost of considerable isolation, de Gaulle had succeeded in creating 
world-wide awareness of a distinctive French policy and influence. 
Its durability would depend, however, on how long conditions at home 
and abroad continued to allow scope for French freedom of action. 
De Gaulle's electoral successes and general popularity were partly 
due to the prosperity of the influential sectors of French society 
derived from economic growth since the Second World War.10 An 
average 5 per cent per annum growth rate meant that by 1965 the 
French gross national product was twice that of 1950. The regime 
in power benefited politically from the general feeling of prosperity. 
Inflationary tendencies, however, were as endemic under the Fifth 
as under the Fourth Republic. The 1958 devaluation eased the problem 
for a time, but unlike his predecessors de Gaulle attached pride and 
prestige to maintaining the value of the new franc. In September 
1963 the finance minister, Giscard d'Estaing, leader of the independent 
republicans supporting de Gaulle, introduced a deflationary plan de 
stabilisation involving cuts in public spending and tighter controls on 
credit which lasted well beyond 1965. This coincided with the Fourth 
Plan (1962-5), whose social investment priorities for items such as 
schools and hospitals were jeopardized; the priorities remained, but 
comers were cut by means such as jerry-building. The planning com-
missariat was overridden by the ministry of finance with its short-
term budgetary priorities, and this continued to be so under the Fifth 
Plan (1966-70). The pursuit of economic growth was maintained by 
giving tax-rebate incentives to business corporations. But, if inflation 
was to be controlled whiJe high industrial investment was accompanied 
by high social investment, then the sole remaining target for a credit 
squeeze had to be consumer spending. In these circumstances it was 
hardly surprising that the trade unions objected to planning discussions 
that tended to focus on wage controls, or that they were impelled to 
produce a counter-plan of their own in 1965. Expectations of full 
employment and increasing incomes were now shaken ·by pressure on 
wages and a significant rise in the unemployment figures by 1968. 
It was against this background that the government decided to rule 
by ordinance in the economic sphere for six months from April 1967. 
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Harsh measures such as price increases in the public services became 
the focus of attack from the increasingly combative French left. 
From 1964 the opposition to de Gaulle became more coherent and 
effective. Undoubtedly his foreign policy was generally popular; his 
ability to score points off the United States contrasted with the in-
security and ignominy of the war and post-war years. But his economic 
and social policies on the other hand met with increasing criticism, 
particularly as de Gaulle clearly regarded foreign and defence policies 
as being vastly more important. His paternalistic declarations at press 
conferences and in appearances on state-controlled television pwvoked 
all the more resentment because the attenuated role of the national 
assembly left public opinion with few outlets. 
In May 1964 the French communist party decided on various 
changes in organization and strategy that would facilitate co-operation 
with other parties of the left in the period leading to the presidential 
election in December 1965. Disorganization in the non-communist 
left, however, was not resolved until Mitterrand emerged as the leader 
capable of creating a framework to meet the interests of diverse tend-
encies. He became the candidate of a united left on 9 September, 
having won communist backing and at the same time organized the 
SFIO, the Radicals and socialist clubs, into a new Federation de la 
gauche democrate et socialiste (FGDS). Although this achievement 
came rather late, it did enable Mitterrand to force de Gaulle into a 
second ballot before he won with a 55 per cent to 45 per cent majority 
on 19 December 1965. It was a lively campaign in which access to 
state television for the first time enabled Mitterrand, and the centrist 
candidate Lecanuet, to rival de Gaulle briefly as public personalities. 
Moreover debates on the economy such as one between Mendes-France 
and Debre in November revealed attractive possible alternatives to 
government policies. Public interest resulted in an 85 per cent poll. 
Preparations soon followed for the national assembly elections due 
in March 1967. The structure of the non-communist left was main-
tained and the FGDS published its election programme by July 1966; 
its critique of government social and economic policies lost some of 
its impact, however, when attention was diverted during the campaign 
towards constitutional conflicts between president and parliament. 
Rivalries on the left resulted in the five million communist and four 
million FGDS voters only forming an alliance in the second ballot on 
12 March 1967. Nevertheless the eight million Gaullist voters needed 
to recuperate all possible support from centrists and independent 
republicans, whose leader Giscard d'Estaing had only grudgingly offered 
qualified support, before they could emerge with a knife-edge majority 
- 244 seats in an assembly numbering 485. Faced with opposition from 
73 communist and 116 FGDS deputies, apart from possible defections 
among the 43 independent republicans, the government chose to rule 
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by ordinance in economic and financial affairs from April to October 
and thereby exacerbated a tense and potentially unstable political 
situation. 
De Gaulle had to cope with problems abroad in 1967 as well as in 
France. Although he had emerged from EEC disputes in 1966 with 
the French veto intact and the Common Agricultural Policy firmly 
established, opposition from other members was increasing. He became 
particularly isolated after March 1966 when Adenauer's successors 
in West Germany pursued policies less sympathetic to French interests; 
with a considerable growth of economic power behind them, they 
felt able to adopt more independent policies such as negotiating di-
rectly with the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, and maintaining 
the value of the mark to preserve their favourable trade balance. It 
was not merely that de Gaulle resented being upstaged in international 
diplomacy, but also that West German economic and financial strength 
placed competitive pressure on France. 
At this difficult time 'perfidious Albion' increased the isolation of 
France within the EEC by submitting a second application for member-
ship in 1967. Although de Gaulle promptly issued a veto in May, the 
British left their application on the table. This meant that the issue 
remained on the agenda of subsequent EEC meetings and provided 
a focus for anti-French criticism and resulted in deadlock in all im-
portant Common Market negotiating. 
De Gaulle continued to cultivate support in the developing countries 
of the third world, partly to extend the rayonnement of French civiliz-
ation. But his travels abroad showed an increasing tendency to play 
to the gallery, so much so that foreign governments became wary 
of offering him invitations. During a visit to Canada in July 1967 he 
was asked to leave after proclaiming 'Vive le Quebec libre!', and a 
subsequent visit to Poland gave rise to anxiety that he might ignite 
Russo-Polish relations. The French public, too, were increasingly 
critical of his fascination for the world stage at the expense of French 
problems at home. 
Of all the problems facing French society in the aftermath of the 
196 7 elections, the most deep-seated and intractable arose from a 
massive increase in population over twenty years, together with a huge 
migration from country to town. France needed to give high priority 
to resolving attendant socio-economic problems such as shortages in 
housing, hospitals, schools and recreational facilities. Action had been 
delayed until the Fourth Plan in the early 1960s which in any case 
had been undermined by changes in government policy. It was not 
surprising, therefore, that a challenge to de Gaulle's regime in 1968 
should come from young people, particularly school-children and 
students. 
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(3) The events of May 1968 
Student unrest since the war had been concerned with practical con-
siderations, unless stirred by political events such as the Algerian and 
Vietnam wars. The unrest which immediately sparked off the events 
was generated at Nanterre, one of several university institutions built 
in the 1960s to cope with the ever increasing student population; in 
this case specifically to take up some of the overspill from the 
Sorbonne. Although of modem design, there seemed to have been little 
thought as to the suitability of the site (it had originally belonged to 
the defence ministry), nor had any provision been made for cultural 
facilities - the building of the library was only begun in 1968.11 
Yet students at Nanterre enjoyed better material conditions for 
their work, and from an academic standpoint the situation should 
have been easier than at the Sorbonne. A number of teachers were 
attracted by the new complex and by the possibilities that it offered 
of a new approach to teaching, and to staff-student relations. They 
were encouraged in this attitude by the dean, P. Grappin, whose efforts 
had succeeded in creating a more human and liberal atmosphere. Why 
did things go wrong? One cause was the growth of student numbers 
which at Nanterre had been phenomenal (1964 (opening year) -
2,000; 1967 - over 11,000), with the inevitable over-straining of the 
academic facilities; but all university institutions were in a similar 
position. Two other factors, specific to Nanterre, added to the unrest. 
First, there was a strong sociology department, with between 600 
and 700 students mainly in their first and second years. Sociology 
students have always played a central role in student protest move-
ments, whether in France or elsewhere. They study society, which 
gives rise to a critical attitude to their own society. In practical terms 
also, students of sociology had reason to be dissatisfied with con-
temporary society, since it offered little in the way of jobs to sociology 
graduates, who were thus particularly vulnerable at what was then 
regarded as a time of general unemployment. 
The second factor was the comparatively liberal climate of Nanterre; 
it was at once too extensive and too limited. 'Le liberalisme de la 
faculte fut assez grand pour tolerer certains actes, mais trop limite 
pour remettre activement en cause une situation universitaire qui 
empechait des initiatives autonomes.'12 The liberalism of Nanterre 
can thus be viewed as a provocation in that it promised but could 
not perform, given the centralized organization of higher education 
in France. 
Unrest had broken out in Nanterre in autumn 1967. This was 
caused by the Fouchet reforms of 1965 which were then due to come 
into effect. There was uncertainty about how these were to operate 
- which was particularly worrying for students who had begun their 
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studies under the old dispensation, and had now to change over to the 
new. It was enough to cause a ten-day strike of about 10,000 students, 
under moderate leadership. The demands at this stage were moderate, 
dealing with size of classes, examination standards and student re-
presentation in university councils. The last of these demands was 
perhaps the most significant. A committee composed of both staff 
and students was indeed set up to propose changes which would be put 
to the ministry of education. However, since it had no powers itself 
to make changes, it achieved very little. Students were thus made to 
realize that partisans of mere reform were likely to get nowhere, 
and moderate demands were therefore fruitless. The more moderate 
student leadership thus lost its following to those of more radical 
persuasions (such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a second-year sociology 
student), whose criticisms went far beyond the French university 
system and who wished to see an entirely new form of society es-
tablished in France and elsewhere. 
After the notorious exchange between F. Missoffe, minister of 
youth and sports, and Cohn-Bendit on 8 January, when the swimming-
pool at Nanterre was opened, the rumour became current that the 
student - a German national - was likely to be expelled by order 
of the ministry of the interior.13 Another rumour, never proved, 
about the existence of a 'black list' of militant students, served to 
poison the atmosphere yet further, and P. Grappin, the dean, became 
the object of personal attacks. On 6 January, a number of militants 
demonstrated in the sociology building. Strictly speaking, political 
activity on the campus was forbidden, and when members of the 
administration asked the students to stop they were roughly handled. 
Grappin called for police assistance to restore order. A fight took 
place between police and students and the former were chased off 
the campus. 
In common with other faculties throughout France, Nanterre 
was involved in protests over visiting hours in student residences in 
1968 - a protest symbolic of the students' desire not to be kept in 
a kind of artificial minority by the authorities, but to be treated as 
adults with all the liberties which that implies. An issue of more im-
mediate significance was that of American involvement in south Viet-
nam. 
The war in Vietnam aroused not only the political consciousness 
of students, but also that of the lyceens, via the organization of the 
Comite Vietnam national in 1966 by the JCR and the PSU. Many 
CVN committees were formed in the lycees and these were to form 
the basis of the comites d'action lyceens (CAL), which were to be 
very active during May, bringing many lyceens out on to the streets 
in support of the students. The Tet offensive in spring 1968 caused 
demonstrations in Paris which became more violent in mid-March. 
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Members of the CVN (among them one Nanterre student) were ar-
rested after bombs were exploded outside some buildings which housed 
American organizations. On 22 March a meeting was held at Nanterre 
to protest against these arrests, which were regarded as repressive 
action by the police. After the meeting, Cohn-Bendit led a move to 
take over the conference chamber in the administration building, 
where lengthy discussions were held late into the night. Thus was born 
the mouvement du 22 mars (M22M). A teach-in on the struggle against 
imperialism was proposed for 29 March, but when this news became 
known to the administration, Grappin closed Nanterre from 28 March 
to 1 April. 
During April, it became increasingly clear that the administration 
could not control the campus at Nanterre - in part, at least, because 
it could not decide what tactics to adopt. It seems to have been neither 
authoritarian enough to take up a hard line and stick to it, nor liberal 
(or independent) enough to make concessions; and the student mili-
tants, gauging this to a nicety, knew very well how to prey upon it. 
The originality of Nanterre lay not in the environmental con-
ditions of the students there, but in the tactical sense of Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit and some of his fellow-students. Their genius lay in 
drawing the conclusions from the failure of traditional forms of 
protest. Their answer lay in taking, and keeping, what they de-
manded, and so forcing the authorities to choose between total 
surrender or forceful repression. (J. Gretton, Students and Workers, 
p. 77) 
Later on, similar tactics were to be equally effective on a much grander 
scale. 
The short Easter vacation was punctuated by the news that se-
lection was to be introduced at university entrance (instead of the 
'open door' policy hitherto practised) and of the attempted murder 
in West Berlin of Rudi Dutschke, the socialist student leader, which 
provoked left-wing student protest in France. At the end of April, 
fear of reprisals by the right-wing commando groups, principally 
Occident (an up-dated version of the pre-war Action franraise), caused 
a further heightening of tension at Nanterre, and on the night of 1-2 
May, preparations of a quasi-military nature were made by students 
in case of attack. Matters were not improved by the knowledge that 
eight students - all members of M22M - had been ordered to appear 
before a disciplinary committee at the Sorbonne on 6 May. Further 
disorders occurred, and on 3 May all teaching was suspended at 
Nanterre. 14 
The focal point of activity was now the Sorbonne, where, on the 
morning of 3 May, a demonstration took place to protest against the 
closure of Nanterre and the possibility of disciplinary action to be 
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taken against the eight students. The main student organizations 
were represented: UNEF (vice president/acting president: J. Sau-
vageot), JCR (founded and led by A. Krivine), FER, MAU (formed 
by Sorbonne graduates in March 1968) and M22M, led by D. Cohn-
Bendit. These people, together with A. Geismar, leader of SNESup 
(part of the FEN), were to be the most prominent amongst the leaders 
of protest during the May events. A similar meeting was held in the 
afternoon, but there were again fears of a clash with the right-wing 
groups. The Sorbonne authorities were consequently very anxious 
for the demonstrators to leave, but initially they declined to do so. 
The Occident forces did try to reach the Sorbonne, but were repulsed 
by the police, who were present in force outside. Since the danger of 
a left-right clash had been averted, it might have been thought that no 
further police action was necessary. The recteur, J. Roche, possibly 
under pressure from the education minister, A. Peyrefitte, seems to 
have felt the need to have the police evacuate the Sorbonne, which 
was done only after written instructions had been given to that effect. 
The police entered the Sorbonne, and after discussions with the student 
leaders, it was agreed that the students would leave quietly. However, 
on quitting the courtyard, they found that they were all ( over 500) 
put into police vans and driven away to have their papers verified.15 
Outside was a crowd of about two thousand, comprised partly of 
militant students, partly of others who had left the Sorbonne earlier, 
on the suspension of their classes. At the sight of their comrades 
herded into police vans, there were jeers and shouts, and anger soon 
turned to action - paving stones were thrown at the police who re-
sponded with tear gas and truncheons. Several hundred people were 
injured, of whom 80 were policemen, and 590 people were arrested. 
It seems clear from all accounts that not only was the student 
reaction spontaneous, but it was also very violent (it took 1,500 police-
men a long time to bring 2,000 students under control). This violence 
caused the police to over-react, which was to assist in bringing the 
forces of law and order into disrepute. Moreover, the police had had 
to enter the Sorbonne, which was seen as a violation of the academic 
freedom of France's most ancient university. Previously uncommitted 
students had consequently become very partisan. This would not 
perhaps have affected the non-student population at all, but it was 
the police 'mopping-up' operations which did the most harm in terms 
of public opinion. Many innocent passers-by suffered from police 
attack and arrest, and these arbitrary actions inevitably gave the im-
pression that the students were the victims of police oppression. There 
seems little doubt that the police were at a later stage guilty of violent 
and at times sadistic attacks on demonstrators. However, the point 
must in fairness be made that, for a few weeks following 3 May, the 
police would have been guilty in the eyes of the public, whatever 
The French experience since 1944 31 
they had done. 16 By 8 May, 80 per cent of the Parisian population 
was pro-student. 
On the afternoon of 6 May there was another violent clash between 
police and students who were pressing for the release of four students 
sentenced by the courts over the weekend to two months' imprison-
ment for their actions on 3 May. The fighting lasted for twelve hours; 
422 arrests were made, with several hundred people injured on each 
side. Further protest demonstrations against the violence occurred on 
7 and 8 May. 
At this stage the student demands were simple enough: the re-
opening of the Sorbonne, the withdrawal of the police from the Latin 
Quarter and the release of students sentenced by the courts. 
Hitherto the students had been regarded as 'faux revolutionnaires', 
guilty of 'aventurisme gauchiste', who would without fail bring dis-
repute on the genuine revolutionary movement pursued by the working 
class (see L 'Humanite, 3 May 1968). On 8 May, communist attacks 
switched from the students to the government, not only in L 'Humanite, 
but also in the assemblee nationale. 
For the government, too, 8 May was a significant moment. The 
politicians were in difficulties; G. Pompidou, the prime minister, 
was on an official visit to Iran and Afghanistan from 2 to 11 May. 
Interim authority was in the hands of L. Joxe Gustice minister and 
acting prime minister), A. Peyrefitte ( education) and C. Fouchet 
(formerly education, now interior minister). Such a divided authority 
was difficult to exercise, since the essential power lay with the 
president of the republic. Furthermore, the triumvirate appear to have 
had differing views on what should be done. Fouchet seems to have 
taken a hard line throughout, whereas Peyrefitte, possibly less con-
sistent, seems to have been more flexible in his approach. During the 
debate in the assemblee nationale he let it be known that if calm were 
restored, both the Sorbonne and Nanterre could soon be re-opened. 
While not complying with all the student demands, Peyrefitte's state-
ment was vaguely conciliatory; but on 9 May a tougher line was im-
posed on him by de Gaulle himself, and the minister was forced to 
announce that the Sorbonne would remain closed, much to the dismay 
of many liberal-minded university teachers, whose hopes had been 
raised by his earlier pronouncement.17 An opportunity to defuse the 
situation was lost, causing a hardening of the students' attitude, not 
without significance in view of the violence to come on the night of 
10-11 May. 
The fighting on 10-11 May in the Latin Quarter was by all accounts 
savage, particularly in the rue Gay-Lussac (see Gretton, op. cit., pp. 
110-12). Prior to it, there had been vain attempts at negotiation and 
much hesitation on the government's part which, incidentally, gave 
time for the building of barricades. The order to clear the area was 
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not given until early on II May; fighting began around 2.30 am and 
went on until about 6 am. CS gas and tear-gas were used by the police 
and hand-to-hand fighting occurred in an endeavour to take over the 
barricades. Many of these were set on fire before their defenders 
retreated; 367 people were wounded, 460 arrested and 188 cars were 
either damaged or destroyed. 
It was inevitable that excessive violence would occur in such a 
situation, with the students trying to repel police attacks with paving-
stones and molotov cocktails. What caused greater shock were the 
police attacks on Red Cross volunteers, on people already wounded, 
on spectators looking on from their flat windows (some were dragged 
from their homes). Certainly some onlookers did render assistance to 
the students, taking them in to avoid arrest, providing food and 
generally giving moral and practical support. M. Grimaud asserts18 
that objects were thrown at the police from flat windows; this may 
explain, if not justify, certain actions, but the police were the object 
of virtually universal blame. 
This was the situation confronting Pompidou on his return to 
France; but he, unlike his ministers, was able to persuade de Gaulle 
that a policy of conciliation might work. In his television broadcast 
of 11 May, he announced that student demands would be met (in-
cluding the release of students after an appeal court hearing). The 
worst seemed to be over, but the change of policy had come too 
late. There was to be a twenty-four-hour general strike and demon-
stration, called by the CGT, CFDT and FEN on 13 May to protest 
against police brutality. Circumstances had forced the communists 
to adopt a more positive attitude to the students, but the student-
worker alliance was never an easy one. Negotiations over the organiz-
ation of the demonstration were difficult.19 The atmosphere of dis-
trust and resentment was not lessened when, after the joint demon-
stration, a reference was made by Cohn-Bendit, whom the CGT had 
wished to exclude, to 'Stalinist filth'. Such a gross insult to the com-
munist leadership may account for the continued hostility with which 
he was regarded. 
The demonstration was massive; calculations range from half a 
million to a million. Student protest could no longer be brushed aside 
as the work of a few trouble-makers. There were also echoes in the 
provinces, where similar demonstrations were held - notably in 
Marseille, Toulouse, Lyon and Nantes. 
After the demonstration the Sorbonne, re-opened as promised, was 
occupied and an occupation committee elected. Thus was born the 
'commune etudiante' of the Sorbonne (and its extension in the Odeon 
theatre, taken over on 15 May), which lasted until 16 June. This was 
certainly the most picturesque of the May events, if perhaps less than 
wholly positive. All power stemmed in theory from the daily general 
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assembly, but it was the occupation committee (in theory re-elected 
each day) which held effective power and dealt with the logistics and 
organization, while debates on every conceivable issue went on in-
cessantly. The 'commune' was an immense talking-shop, with an aura 
of festival about it. It was also perhaps a kind of defoulement, where 
each individual re-discovers the pleasure of communication, of escaping 
from society's strait-jacket, of the freedom to speak, to work out 
ideas without any constraint. 'Everywhere spirits were unmuzzled, and 
intellectual dykes burst in a splendidly wasteful release of youthful 
energy .'20 Splendid it may have been, but there was a negative side 
to it. Up till then, there had been virtual unity among the students, 
moulded by what was viewed as state repression; once the Sorbonne 
was occupied, the luxury of disagreement was again possible. Grou-
puscules apart, there were two main currents of thought, one concerned 
principally with university problems and the other which viewed 
university reform as of secondary importance, when compared with 
the need to bring about a total revolution in state and society. 
After 13 May begins the second phase of events, when the em-
phasis shifts from students to workers. De Gaulle left France on 14 
May for a state visit to Romania, leaving Pompidou in charge, but 
announcing that he would address the nation on 24 May. In the few 
days of his absence, drastic changes occurred. Young workers were 
attracted to the ideas of worker participation or control, and all had 
seen that forceful action had compelled the authorities to react. It 
was clearly a good opportunity to obtain redress of grievances, of 
which there were many. Between 13 and 20 May, factory after factory 
was occupied until, by about 23 May, many millions of workers were 
on strike.21 Even then the unity which the students sought so eagerly 
between themselves and the working class was not assured. Attempts 
made by the students on 16 and 17 May to link up with the workers 
occupying the Renault factory at Boulogne-Billancourt were frustrated 
by the watchful and suspicious shop stewards of the CGT, anxious to 
prevent any ideological 'infection'. 
One of the most interesting aspects of the strike was the involve-
ment of professional people (usually assumed to be essentially middle-
class and consequently conservative). In many cases they showed 
themselves to be more radical than the workers in their demands for 
the structural reform of their professional activity, for a greater degree 
of autonomy. Demands of this kind were made throughout France 
in areas such as the cinema, medicine, teaching and the arts. One 
strike which was particularly serious for the government was that 
of the ORTF, where a complete reorganization of the media was 
demanded, to make it independent of the state and safeguard freedom 
of expression. 
With the country virtually at a standstill, de Gaulle decided to 
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return from Romania earlier than planned. Exceedingly angry with 
his government for having let matters get out of hand, he was only 
persuaded with difficulty from having the Sorbonne and the Odeon 
forcibly evacuated. Meanwhile Pompidou was preparing for negotiations 
with the CNPF. 
On 21-22 May the government faced and survived a censure motion 
in the assemblee nationale. For over a week there had been little 
street fighting, but the news that Cohn-Bendit, then in Germany, 
was forbidden to return to France, provoked an upsurge on 23 May 
and again on 24 May (which the student leadership tried vainly to 
prevent), with the inevitable score of wounded; 110 demonstrators, 
78 policemen. On 24 May also, de Gaulle addressed the nation on 
television, promising a referendum: 'la voie la plus directe et la plus 
democratique possible' (see Le Monde, 26 May 1968). It would be 
centred on renovation of the education system and of the economy. 
He made it clear that if the referendum went against him, he would 
resign. The address was, unusually for de Gaulle, who is said to have 
recognized the fact, a 'flop'; reaction to it was at best lukewarm. It 
was now up to Pompidou to see what negotiations with the unions 
and the employers could achieve. These lasted from 25 until 27 May; 
the outcome was the following package, known as the accords de 
Grenelle: a 35 per cent increase in both SMIG and SMAG (now 3 NF 
per hour - a monthly increase on a theoretical forty-hour week from 
384 NF to 520 NF, and on an actual working week of forty-five hours, 
nearly 600 NF per month); a general wage increase of 10 per cent 
(7 per cent immediately and 3 per cent in October); an agreement 
in principle on a shorter working week; the proportion of medical 
expenses not reimbursed by social security reduced from 30 to 25 
per cent; strike pay at 50 per cent of normal wages; a government 
promise to introduce legislation giving greater rights to unions on the 
shop floor. Not all union demands had been met, but the CGT, with 
its emphasis on practical improvements, was probably better pleased 
than the CFDT which was more interested in the reform of structures 
via participation or workers' control. Substantial gains had however 
been extracted from the employers, and it was thought that the strike 
would soon end. With the rejection of the package by workers at 
Boulogne-Billancourt when it was presented to them, G. Seguy, the 
CGT leader, had no option but to accept, and to make his own, the 
decision to continue the strike. Other large factories followed suit, 
and it seemed as if nothing could save the Fifth Republic from the 
fate of its predecessors. 
Inevitably, members of the opposition considered the possibility 
of stepping into the apparent power vacuum, which would have re-
quired the existence of a united left; and it seemed, with the rally 
at the Charlety stadium on the evening of 27 May," organized by UNEF, 
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the FEN and the PSU, as if a new left-wing revolutionary, but non-
communist, movement had been born. Although no clear strategy was 
formulated, the meeting was critical of the CGT's attitude: there 
were calls for Seguy's resignation, and an enthusiastic welcome for 
A. Barjonet, an ex-CGT official who had resigned in protest at what 
he viewed as betrayal of the socialist cause by the CGT. The link 
between the 'new left' and the conventional political world was pro-
vided by P. Mendes-France, one of the few real statesmen of the Fourth 
Republic, and a member of the PSU. He declined to speak at the 
rally, but received a considerable ovation.22 At a press conference 
on 28 May, F. Mitterrand, leader of the FGDS, proposed the formation 
of a provisional government headed by Mendes-France, in the event 
of the government's fall. He would himself be a candidate at the presi-
dential elections which would ensue if de Gaulle resigned. This did 
not suit the communists, always suspicious of Mendes-France's atlantic 
sympathies, and now outraged by his presence at Charlety on the 
previous evening. 
All this came to nothing with the news, on 29 May, of de Gaulle's 
'disappearance'. Ostensibly wishing to spend a quiet day at his home 
in Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, he in fact went to Baden-Baden to 
confer with General Massu, commander of the French armed forces 
there. It seems reasonably certain that de Gaulle did, in various ways, 
assure himself of military support (which was later paid for by the 
release of General Salan and his associates), but also that his disap-
pearance was merely a tactical manoeuvre, designed to tum attention 
away from events in Paris. On his return on 30 May he made an ener-
getic radio broadcast to the nation. He would not resign, nor change 
his prime minister. The referendum was deferred, the assemblee 
nationale dissolved, and elections would be held (this last decision 
included at Pompidou's specific request). That evening, a vast anti-
communist demonstration (300 or 400 thousand people) organized 
in advance by leaders of the Gaullist party and the various Gaullist 
organizations took place. This show of strength was perhaps less im-
portant than the disarray of the left in the face of a government which 
had regained its confidence. For differing reasons, the unions were, 
on the whole, opposed to any demonstration against de Gaulle's policy 
as revealed in the 30 May address. UNEF therefore, supported by the 
PSU, decided to go it alone, in the teeth of a round condemnation by 
the CGT, now only interested in the elections. The split between 
students and unions was now self-evident, a factor which would be of 
weight during the electoral campaign. The UNEF demonstration of 
1 June was a large one - 35,000 people - but there was now a feeling 
of lassitude and defeat. 
The workers' strike, too, began to fade during June, although some 
did not return to work until the second half of the month. Strikes 
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ended through lack of money, or a feeling that public opinion was 
no longer sympathetic, which allowed various types of pressure to 
be used. Force was used against strikers in two car factories, at Flins 
(Renault), where a lyceen, Gilles Tautin, was drowned on 10 June 
while trying to escape from the police, and at Sochaux (Peugeot), 
where two workers died on 11 June. These deaths brought one final 
protest demonstr~tion on 11 June, in which the street fighting was 
very violent; but this time the students, not the police, were blamed. 
A frightened public opinion had become hostile to the students, and 
this in tum allowed the government to act decisively. On 1 June it 
banned demonstrations until the elections, and outlawed a number of 
extreme left-wing groups. On 14 and 16 June respectively, the Sorbon-
ne and the Odeon were cleared of their last occupants. 
It is perhaps in its electoral campaign that the government showed 
clearly its move to the right, in spite of the presence in Pompidou's 
revamped administration of several left-wing Gaullists. Taking its 
tone from de Gaulle's broadcast of 30 May, it was dominated by the 
theme of law and order, and the threat of a communist dictatorship. 
All the parties of the left were lumped together by the Gaullists for 
electoral purposes. This was an effective strategy, but was unfair not 
only on the PCF and the CGT (which could, in Gaullist terms, have 
taken advantage of an apparently crumbling Fifth Republic, and 
did not do so), but also on Mitterrand (and the FGDS) who had acted 
in a perfectly legal manner. 
From a Gaullist standpoint the calling of elections was a master-
stroke. It gave a scared electorate the chance to express an opinion, 
at the same time doing away with the justification of revolutionary 
action, since the elections could not be viewed as anything but demo-
cratic. While the students did their best to persuade the electorate 
that it should boycott the elections, rather than accept a bourgeois 
form of legality, i.e. the existing political framework and its mechan-
isms, the electorate did not accept such a view, as the election results 
proved. After the second ballot, it was clear that the Gaullists and 
their allies had won 358 seats out of 485, a victory which para-
doxically owed its existence to the events which had almost destroyed 
the regime a month earlier. 
The causes of the May events, though complex, may be looked at 
from two main standpoints - educational and social. If we look first 
at the educational aspect, one cause is clearly a long-standing dis-
satisfaction with inadequate facilities: overcrowding caused by rising 
student numbers (136,700 in 1949; 508,199 in 1967 - of which 
153,865 were students of literature); the inadequacy of the grant 
system which forced students to pay their own way through uni-
versity, and the inevitable wastage that ensued.23 Education, which 
provided qualifications, was increasingly viewed as a passport to 
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financial and social advance, but the system was defective. In 1967, 
for example, 57 per cent of the children of top management and the 
liberal professions attended university, whereas only 3 .4 per cent of 
working-class children did so.24 There thus seemed to be a self-perpetu-
ating upper-class elite, maintained by the educational system, which 
was therefore considered socially unjust. Unemployment, which had 
risen to almost 400,000 in 1967, was also a factor.25 The post-war 
population explosion was in part responsible, with many young people, 
graduates amongst them, seeking work. These problems caused students 
to think deeply about the purposes of education, which seemed on 
the one hand to keep a small class of people perpetually in power, 
and on the other to be governed solely by market forces. 
Yet, had student unrest encountered no echoes in the rest of French 
society, it seems unlikely that the events could have taken hold of the 
country as they did; and here, students and other workers had similar 
grievances. That society was suffering from a malaise is demonstrated 
by the reaction, not only of students, but of numerous categories 
of professional people as well as some of the younger industrial workers 
(those not yet 'set in their ways'), against the hierarchical structures 
of their own professional activities. It was suggested, shortly before 
the events began, that France was bored (P. Viansson-Ponte in Le 
Monde, 15 March 1968). This can well be accounted for by the central-
ization of French society, administratively and, to a lesser extent, 
politically. 'The constitution created and interpreted by General de 
Gaulle has done much to exclude the citizen from government. He 
has downgraded the Assembly, which at least offered the voter a share 
in public affairs by proxy, and has bypassed it with the referendum 
which offers the citizen only the primitive choice of saying "yes" or 
"no" to loaded questions' (C. Serpell, 'Participation', Listener, 27 
June 1968). This may help to explain the significance of a number 
of key words for people in very differing walks of life - participation, 
autogestion, autonomie, contestation. The use of these words reveals 
a thirst for responsibility, for personal involvement, and for com-
munication and discussion, which France's institutions did not provide, 
and which was not satisfied by de Gaulle's alternatives of national 
independence and policy of 'grandeur'. 
It might perhaps be thought that the May events achieved nothing, 
in view of de Gaulle's devastating come-back. In the short term, they 
brought about an attempt to change the higher education system 
(Loi d'Orientation, November 1968). They also hastened the radical-
ization of the CFDT, with its emphasis on total change of industrial 
structures via workers' control and hence of the -whole of society. 
They also brought about a change of leadership and changes in policy. 
De Gaulle's promised referendum on participation (regional reform 
and reform of the senate) was rejected in April I 969, and his resignation 
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followed immediately. Some changes had already taken place; although 
the accords de Grenelle had not been accepted overall, they had 
formed the basis for subsequent agreements in numerous industries. 
This, together with the effects of the long general strike, put France 
in a weaker economic position, forced her to abandon her monetary 
policy (the etalon-or), and brought her within a hairsbreadth of 
devaluation, while de Gaulle was still president. De Gaulle's policy 
of national independence also, based as it was on co-existence between 
east and west, seemed less credible in view of the Russian invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the Brezhnev doctrine of 'limited 
sovereignty'. 
In the long term, its effects are not easy to define. It cannot be said 
that the structures of French society have as yet been seriously altered. 
Yet some changes of approach can be discerned. There have been some 
small-scale attempts to work out different forms of education, the eco/es 
nouvelles, ecoles paral/eles, where an attempt has been made to bring 
up children according to a different set of values - the basis for an al-
ternative culture (for more details see Autrement, no. 13, April 1978, 
and Le Monde de /'Education, May 1978, pp. 8-13).26 
The political world too has not escaped the effects of the events of 
May. 'II faut voir qu'aujourd'hui toutes les formations politiques 
s'occupent des questions qui, auparavant, etaient tabou. Les jeunes, les 
femmes, les irnmigres, les prisonniers, l'ecologie: ce sont les ptoduits de 
Mai 68 .... Mai 68 a impregne profondement tous ceux qui ont eu une 
responsabilite dans ce pays' (P. Mendes-France in Le Nouvel Observateur 
no. 695, 4 March 1978). In the first decade after 1968, there was perhaps 
a greater concern with social justice, particularly in the early years of 
Giscard's presidency, shown in the Haby reform of 1975, as well as in 
the reduction of the age of majority to eighteen, more liberal legislation 
on abortion, divorce, radio and television. 
If May 1968 had a perceptible effect on the parties of the right and 
centre when in power, it was inevitable that there should have been an 
even greater one on the parties of the left. While they were still in op-
position, there had to be some ideological adjustment (the CGT, for 
example was forced to adopt the concepts of participation and auto-
gestion ). Since coming to power, the left is in the process of introducing 
legislation which, if not showing signs of direct influence, indicates a 
desire to prevent a repetition of the events. One example is the Savary 
higher education law of21 December 1983, whose purpose is essentially 
to improve upon the loi d'orientation of 1968. The most telling example, 
however, must be the decentralization laws of 2 March 1982, 7 January 
and 22 July 1983, which purport to bring about a fundamental change 
away from administrative centralization. If this legislation proves to be 
efficacious, in terms of genuine participation, it might well be that similar 
disturbances would be less likely to occur. 
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At this stage, it is perhaps appropriate to ask how the events of May 
should be described. From what has already been said, two interpretations 
are possible, namely that they were the outcome (a) of a crisis in higher 
education, and (b) of a crisis in the institutions of the Fifth Republic. 
Further interpretations include the consequence of subversion with 
massive resources, undertaken by the left. This has been adequately 
refuted by M. Grimaud,27 as far as foreign subsidies were concerned. 
The economic crisis has also been indicated as the source of the troubles, 
as in the case of earlier revolutions. It has been further suggested that the 
events constitute a kind of mass liberation, a psycho-drama, where 
students acted out a revolution.28 This interpretation aroused some 
hostility at the time, but it must be admitted that, in the past, a certain 
revolutionary mythology has influenced the leaders, even although on 
this occasion the influences were perhaps not wholly French in origin. 
For Alain Touraine, the May events present the first example of a new 
kind of class struggle, against the technological society, undertaken not 
only by the working class, but by the students and the professional 
classes. One, however, which may embrace all of these interpretations 
(all of which undoubtedly contain some element of truth) is that which 
sees the May events as one example of a crisis of our civilization. It could 
well be suggested that, with the decline of organized religion, which lies 
at the basis of Western civilization, the values which it imposed became 
somewhat eroded and were replaced by an indiscriminate materialism 
and a consumer society, so strongly condemned in May '68. 
Yet the view has also been put forward that the passage of time and 
an economic crisis, in comparison with which that of 1968 pales into 
insignificance, have brought about a different attitude to those things 
which the student leaders of '68 regarded as worthy of so much blame. 
La France de '83 a d'autres soucis en tete: le chomage, la diminution 
du niveau de vie, la peur des voleurs et celle de la guerre. Elle n'est 
pas loin d'avoir la nostalgie non seulement de cette societe de 
consommation dont elle se croyait, il y a quinze ans, degofitee, mais 
de tabous sociaux et moraux que '68 a durablement mis a mal. 
{A. Fontaine,Le Monde, 2 May, 1983) 
Paradoxically, therefore, May '68 is at once both more and less sig-
nificant in French society. Some of the values it condemned are regarded 
differently in the present economic climate, but at the same time May '68 
certainly represents a watershed in terms of a change in social values. A 
recent poll makes it clear that the French nation in general still regards 
May '68 as significant in a number of areas, but more on a social than 
on a political level.29 
In political terms, however, May '68 has assumed its place as a land-
mark, albeit a recent one, to which all political parties refer, for good or 
ill, depending on the ideological viewpoint. Certainly prophecies of a 
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return to May '68 tend to be made often, either on the anniversary of 
the events (e.g. M. Jobert in Le Monde, 6 May 1978), or when violent 
demonstrations over a specific grievance conjure up yet again the possi-
bility that the violence may once again spill over into other groups and 
provoke a nation-wide response. 
Yet there is a specific sense in which May '68 may be said to have a 
greater possibility of triumphing than it has ever had before. If it is true 
to say that the legislation enacted by the present government may prevent 
a return of May '68, it could equally be true to suggest, more positively, 
that this is because some of the aspirations so much desired fifteen years 
ago have now some chance of being met. 
(4) From Gaullisrn to Giscardism: 1968-81 
1968 had ended in apparent triumph for Gaullism. The Grenelle agree-
ments, the electoral victory and the intelligent concessions of Faure's 
education law seemed to have brought the regime out of danger. But 
in the spring of 1969 de Gaulle made an attempt to confirm his auth-
ority that was to misfire and to open up a new era in French politics: 
this was the April referendum. In it the General offered voters a 
package deal: they were asked to approve a regional law providing for 
some small measure of decentralization away from Paris and, in the 
same vote, to approve changes in the composition and powers of the 
senate, long a thorn in de Gaulle's side (especially since its opposition 
to the 1962 referendum on presidential elections). The senate was 
now to lose its legislative powers, and henceforth only half of it would 
be elected - the other half being nominated by interest groups. The 
stick was thus combined with the carrot, and the French asked to 
give a single yes or no to two quite different proposals, which in any 
case contained several dozen sub-clauses. Opinion polls and de Gaulle's 
advisers suggested that there were limits to how far the public's ann 
could be twisted, but he went ahead with the referendum, making a 
'yes' vote the condition of his staying in office. Whether this reflected 
his belief that he could coerce the electorate or whether, as some 
have claimed, it was a kind of deliberate political suicide, the General 
lost his referendum by 53.2 per cent to 46.8. Decisive in his defeat 
were not merely votes from the left, but also those of the centrists 
and most of all, the Independent Republicans of V. Giscard d'Estaing 
who were allied with Gaullism, but whose leader had been dropped 
from government in 1966. On 24 April de Gaulle resigned, to die 
the following year. A new chapter in politics had been opened. 
The June presidential election saw the Gaullists present G. 
Pompidou as their candidate - a clear admission that the victor of 
1968 was heir-apparent. He faced opposition from A. Poher, centrist 
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senator and acting president of the republic until elections could be 
held. There were also two challengers from the left, as socialists and 
communists were still feuding. The former ran G. Defferre, considered 
one of their more moderate figures, and the latter presented the veteran 
J. Duclos. On the first ballot Defferre was beaten badly and Duclos 
did well, pulling in all the available communist votes. Poher did better 
than expected for such a mild gentleman with· a Fourth Republic 
image, and Pompidou came first. The second ballot was thus between 
him and Poher, and he won easily (57.5 per cent to 42.5), as not many 
left supporters were ready to vote Poher rather than Pompidou (it 
was, as Duclos put it, a choice between 'blanc bonnet et bonnet blanc'). 
Pompidou thus began a presidency that would last till his untimely 
death in April 1974: this period forms a whole to some extent, so 
we shall deal with it as such, leaving the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing 
till later. 
Pompidou's presidency was no period of dramatic social and econ-
omic change. By now the broad lines of French development were 
clearly fixed and Pompidou continued the course set in the 1960s. 
France aimed to become a major economic power, which meant greater 
efficiency and productivity, plus a heavier commitment to exports. 
It also meant more French investment abroad and greater penetration 
into France of foreign investment (by 1971 there would be more of 
this in France than in Germany). Inside France the number of in-
dustrial mergers would continue: the number of self-employed, es-
pecially in agriculture, would decline and that of wage-earners rise 
steadily. Pompidou's reign saw no great change in foreign policy, 
either: if there was slightly less frigidity with regard to the USA, 
then France still maintained privileged links with Eastern Europe. 
And if Britain was admitted to the EEC, then traditional French 
hostility to supranational initiatives remained strong. What is interesting 
about Pompidou's presidency is domestic political development and 
we shall concentrate heavily on this. 
Pompidou had two premiers - J. Chaban-Delmas from June 1969 
to July 1972 and P. Messmer until his death. Chaban saw himself as 
the progressive type of Gaullist, eager to innovate and broaden the 
bases of governmental support; the dour Messmer believed that what 
France needed was order and stability. That Pompidou used both is 
significant. 
Any examination of his policies should begin, however, with an 
attempt to situate him in the context of Gaullism. Clearly Pompidou 
could never have the charismatic authority of de Gaulle: he admitted 
as much by his careful cultivation of the image of a shrewd Auvergnat, 
dependable and undramatic. While the Gaullist barons (Debn\ Foccart, 
etc.) had been closely involved in all the heroic periods of Gaullism, 
as well as in the 'traversee du desert' (the long years when de Gaulle 
42 The French experience since 1944 
was out of power), Pompidou had been working quietly in banking, 
occasionally giving the General financial advice. If he had risen in the 
hierarchy after 1962 thanks to his political skills, this did not mean 
that he was popular with historic Gaullists, or indeed with the General, 
who had in the end sacked him for being right in 1968 against the 
General's own point of view. But these personal and historical dif-
ferences were compounded by a more serious one, namely the differing 
analyses of French society which Pompidou and the older Gaullists 
had. The latter had a dynamic view of the state: it was to give leader-
ship and drive in the modernization of France, and make her a great 
power again. It has been shown how the 'technocrats' of the Fifth 
Republic pursued vigorous industrial policies, encouraging the private 
sector to expand - to such an extent that some analysts have spoken 
in terms of a state capitalism, animated by aims of national grandeur. 
Now, such policies have their social costs: modernization hit at large 
sectors of the peasantry, as well as shopkeepers, craftsmen and small 
businessmen. De Gaulle and his associates believed that these categories 
could be carried along on a tide of economic growth and nationalist 
rhetoric; but Pompidou was clever enough to see the extent of their 
hardship (manifest in the emergence of militant organizations such 
as CIDUNATI) and to try and placate them. For their electoral weight 
(worth up to four" million votes, according to how one calculates) 
was clearly vital to Gaullism and arguably to the regime. In 1968 
Pompidou had appealed pretty directly to the fears of such categories: 
increasingly his presidency could be seen as an attempt to steer between 
concessions to them and modernizing imperatives. 
There was another twist to Pompidou's Gaullism, however, which 
involved an attempt to broaden its support in another direction. At 
its peak in the 1960s when the economy was booming, the UDR had 
pulled in an increasing number of working-class and lower white-collar 
votes, many of which the left might normally expect to claim. It seemed 
possible to Pompidou to try and reconcile them more durably to the 
regime, however, even though their claims might differ radically from 
those of the categories just described. This thinking probably lay behind 
the appointment of Chaban-Delmas, with his project for a 'new society'. 
Chaban was as keen a modernizer as Pompidou, and he believed it pos-
sible to build a very wide consensus inside French society on the basis 
of economic growth and political stability (both of which could be 
attributed to the Fifth Republic). Such a consensus could be fou,nd by 
a series of reforms, thought Chaban; if it did not already exist, then this 
was because (a) the administration was out-dated and arbitrary in its 
practices, and (b) too many people had an ideological ( therefore wrong) 
view of social relations, which stressed conflict at the expense of con-
sensus. In fact this mixture of pious hope and shrewd political calculation 
proved hard to translate into practice. In industrial relations, Chaban 
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achieved some small changes: manual workers began to be paid in-
creasingly on a monthly, not weekly basis; the guaranteed minimum 
wage, SMIG ( dating from 1952), was indexed to the cost of living 
and became SMIC (the C standing for 'croissant'). In the Renault 
works, a small percentage of dividends was redistributed to workers 
(Pompidou's version of de Gaulle's participation involved turning 
workers into small capitalists). More importantly, in the public sector 
Chaban was able to sign contrats de progres with unions ( detailed 
agreements covering wages and prices). Whether these measures would 
suffice to rally more lower-class support to the regime without fright-
ening off some of its more comfortable supporters remained to be 
seen. 
Certainly in other areas of policy where he might appeal to a more 
progressive audience, Chaban was less successful. The regional law of 
1972 created bodies with no power, hence incapable of dealing with 
grave problems of economic imbalance faced by regions like Alsace-
Lorraine, with its declining coal and steel industries, the Vosges, with 
its obsolescent textile production, or the south-west with its industrial 
under-development and inefficient farming. In the field of civic 
liberties, Chaban's attempts to liberalize the notoriously pro-govern-
ment news broadcasts were killed at birth by Pompidou's private 
office. All this suggested that part at least of the Pompidolian majority 
was not in favour of trying to broaden the regime's appeal towards 
more popular or more progressive groups. 
Pompidou's modernizing tendencies were seen in his use of the 
state as industrial spearhead. The building of the Fos port and in-
dustrial complex near Marseille used government funds to cover the 
first one-sixth of the costs: the two steel giants of Usinor and Wendel 
were then persuaded to amalgamate and the remaining cost was covered 
by a 25 per cent participation by foreign capital. This is a good ex-
ample of heroic state leadership to the private sector. On another level, 
the acceptance of British entry into the EEC served notice that 
Pompidou was fully committed to the ultimate logic of economic 
expansion, exposure to foreign competition. 
Yet such policies had their counterpart: if Pompidolism favoured 
the development of big capital, it had also to make concessions to 
small. Thus in agriculture, although the Common Agricultural Policy, 
with its guaranteed prices and insurance against market risks, was 
especially favourable to the big farmers of northern France, it also 
slowed down the exodus of the smaller farmers, because of both the 
price supports and the structural reforms agreed by the EEC on the 
basis of the Mansholt Plan. Thus Pompidou did not run the risk of 
too rapid a rural exodus and the alienation of farmers' support. Similar 
steps were taken in commerce, where the small shopkeepers were 
struggling against competition from larger units by the early 1970s. 
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To keep the support of this numerous and vocal category, J. Royer, 
minister of commerce, passed in December 1973 a law which ef-
fectively gave small shopkeepers blocking power over the granting 
of building permits for commercial premises - this despite the claims 
of finance minister Giscard d'Estaing that the whole of the commercial 
structure still needed considerable modernization. 
Another category favoured by Pompidolism was property-develop-
ment. Developers enjoyed something of a golden age in the early 
1970s, when Paris and many other towns were covered in concrete, 
which was lucrative for them, if less pleasant for those who had to 
live in or look at their buildings. Given the extent of the housing 
crisis, it was perhaps inevitable that there should be a property boom. 
What was more surprising was the extent to which the Gaullist machine 
became involved in it, even though certain developers were known 
to be enthusiastic contributors to UDR funds. Gaullist favouritism 
extended from granting developers planning permission in green belts 
to involvement by a number of deputies in schemes where house-
buyers were the victims of distinctly sharp practice. Some of these 
deputies resigned or were expelled from the UDR. This helped to 
spread an atmosphere of scandal, redolent of previous republics, which 
did no good to the general reputation of the UDR: nor did the pub-
lication in 1972 of documents showing Chaban's skill at tax avoidance. 
By this time indeed 'le systeme Pompidou', as hostile observers 
called it, was beginning to creak. The crisis with which all are familiar 
since 1974 had ilot yet fully broken, but there were disturbing signs. 
Unemployment was over half a million; prices were rising steadily; 
some regions and sectors stood out in sharp decline; housing was 
inadequate. Pompidou's 1972 referendum on British entry to the 
EEC turned out to be a very damp squib, with 46.6 per cent of the 
electorate abstaining. To prepare for the 1973 elections, Pompidou 
replaced Chaban with Messmer. In so doing he had almost certainly 
been swayed by his private advisers - P. Juliet and M. -F. Garaud -
who wanted to move Gaullism on to an increasingly conservative 
course. They believed that reformism of the Chaban type ( anodine 
as it might seem to outsiders) was already a concession to the op-
position left. As such, it would never win wider support but merely 
antagonize 'la France des profondeurs' - the rural, the aged, the 
religious, the reactionary pure and simple, many of whom fitted into 
the declining economic categories described above and whose votes 
were increasingly necessary to Gaullism. Such people wanted not 
dynamic change, but preservation of their own status; not workers' 
participation in industry, but measures against trade unions and com-
munists; not liberalization of media or mores, but rather 'law and 
order'. Whether Pompidou could satisfy their demands is dubious: 
but the dismissal of Chaban signified a step to the right and set the 
The French experience since 1944 45 
tone for the 1973 parliamentary elections. 
Pompidou and his allies fought these defensively, on a platform 
of anti-left, and especially anti-communist, feeling. There was a reason 
for this. Since 1969 the socialist party had renewed its organization, 
its leaders and its policies. It had also moved closer to the communists 
after the freeze of 1968. In 1972 the two signed, for the first time, 
a common programme of government (CPG), which committed them, 
if victorious at the polls, to making certain changes within precise 
deadlines. In the constitutional field, they were pledged to abolition 
of the special presidential powers and creation of a supreme court; 
in economic policy, as well as a large give-away element (wage rises 
and improved benefits), the programme promised higher growth and 
looked to more intensive planning, based on a number of strategic 
nationalizations, as the means of achieving this. Differences in foreign 
and defence policy (e.g. over NATO and the EEC) and in economic 
policy (how to run nationalized industry) were disguised with reason-
able skill. 
The attractions of this package, plus discontent with long years 
of 'l'Etat UDR', were likely to mean a swing towards the opposition. 
Hence the defensive campaign of the government and Pompidou's 
special appeal on the media just before polling - both of them on 
the themes of the dangers to France implied by the 'adventurist' and 
'irresponsible' economic strategy of the left and the fundamental 
incompatibility of socialists and communists. The mixture worked 
well enough for the UDR to remain the leading party, though the 
socialists gained considerably. But the three years of peace to which 
Pompidou had looked forward before the 1976 presidential elections 
were not to be. He looked increasingly ill and seemed progressively 
less in command of government; thus few were surprised when, after 
a painful illness, he died in April 1974. Once again, there was turmoil 
at the prospect of unexpected presidential elections. 
In the May election, three major candidates stood at the first ballot, 
along with a wide spectrum of others, from the feminist and Trotskyist 
candidate A. Laguiller to ex-minister Royer, whose appeal was very 
much to 'la France des profondeurs'. F. Mitterrand was again candidate 
of the united left (though not pledged to implement the common 
programme in its entirety); V. Giscard d'Estaing, with his long ex-
perience as finance minister, comp~ted with the ex-premier Chaban-
Delmas for the votes of the right. · The latter pair were rated fairly 
evenly by opinion polls until there occurred an event which had more 
implications than many realized. Forty-three UDR deputies, led by 
J. Chirac, had doubts about whether Chaban (a 'fragile' candidate 
because of his recent sacking and the publicity about his tax affairs) 
could beat Mitterrand in the run-off at the second ballot. They there-
fore declared publicly in favour of Giscard (a non-Gaullist). Chaban's 
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rating in the polls collapsed drastically, once it was known that some 
of his own party considered him a loser. At the same time Giscard 
secured the support of the opposition centrists of Lecanuet (worth, 
as the latter boasted on BBC television, some three million votes). 
This effectively meant a second-round duel between Giscard and 
Mitterrand, with the former scraping home by 50.6 per cent to 49 .4. 
The left could lament the missed opportunity, and Giscard now had 
to govern with a majority (in parliamentary terms) which was broadly 
sympathetic, but wlrose dominant party was not his own. This fact 
he recognized by making Chirac his premier. Gaullism had paid dearly 
for not having a successor to Pompidou ready in the wings. 
Giscard had placed his campaign under the sign of 'change without 
risk': he promised voters an 'advanced liberal society'. His approach, 
then, was more along the lines of Chaban-Delmas than the conservative 
course lately set by Pompidou. It implied broadening the power-base 
of the government - a task doubly necessary given the slimness of 
Giscard's victory. But as with Chaban-Delmas, there were limits to 
how far Giscard could go. Nothing in his background or that of his 
party suggested any radical disagreement with the workings of French 
capitalist society in the seventies. It would rather be a question of 
making this society work less conflictually, by reconciling as many 
social groups to it as possible. This would involve reforms, but not 
far-reaching ones: it might also involve a good deal of publicity, to 
suggest that more was being changed than was actually the case. We 
shall now examine some of the policies of the advanced liberal society. 
Giscard clearly intended his presidency to be a reforming one. His 
book Democratie franraise (197 6) gives a theoretical justification of 
his politics. Like most developed countries France is, he writes, losing 
those features of class antagonism characteristic of early phases of 
industrialization. Society today consists of a vast middle group, white-
and blue-collar alike, which has known political stability and steady econ-
omic growth: this has brought rising living standards, increased property 
ownership and indeed a similar culture and aspirations. What modern 
Frenchmen want then is more of the same - steady material progress in 
an atmosphere of political and social consensus. This is best guaranteed 
in a pluralistic, democratic society under the aegis of enlightened leaders 
who know when and how to reform and who can 'plan the twenty-first 
century'. There is no need for revolution nor for the type of peaceful 
but far-reaching structural changes proposed by the left: the existing 
framework of French capitalism is adequate for such progress. Such is 
the essential of Giscardian philosophy: it is descended, as its author 
proudly claims, from a long tradition of nineteenth-century liberalism 
albeit suffused here with a number of humanistic and fraternal glosses 
which the founding fathers would probably have disliked. 
Unfortunately for Giscard, whatever the sincerity of his intentions, 
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it was always likely to be hard to turn them into effective policies. As 
he won office the effects of the first oil crisis struck at the industrial 
world, with the depressive results that have since become familiar. In 
international relations, the era of detente between East and West rapidly 
subsided into what some have called the second Cold War. More seriously, 
it was doubtful if within France herself there were the social or cultural 
bases to sustain such a vision. Divisions within France were and are 
deeper than Giscard cared to admit: so too - and this is more important 
- are the ideological ways in which people see such differences. Politi-
cally, half the country had just voted against Giscard and even within 
his own camp, the right, there would soon emerge opposition to the 
man and his policies that would prove fatal. Retrospectively it seems 
that the dice were loaded against Giscard before he begun: but even so, 
his presidency seemed to develop an increasing reluctance to attempt 
any sort of change and an obsession with survival. Reformism became 
attentisme. We shall now examine some aspects of the presidency in 
detail. 
So far as decision-making goes, Giscard accentuated the trend towards 
presidential power incarnate in the Fifth Republic.30 His style reinforced 
this impression, with his six-monthly open letters to the government 
laying down the next policy objectives to be followed, his interventions 
in electoral campaigns to urge 'le bon choix' upon the public and his 
heavy use of the pedagogical fireside chat to explain policy to the nation. 
More concrete evidence can be seen in the steady expansion of his private 
office to cover the increasing number of areas in which he took a direct 
interest and his systematic packing of key posts in the state apparatus, 
especially the media, so as to ensure better execution of his decisions.31 
The Etat-UDR was fast becomingl'Etat-UDF;and this seemed especially 
true after the first prime minister, J. Chirac, was forced to resign in 
September 1976. 
It is true that Giscard never used those devices in the constitution such 
as ordinances, referenda or special powers which enable government to 
bypass parliament. Yet it would be hard to say that the latter's influence 
increased during his term, despite his known enthusiasm for strengthening 
it. Giscard made it easier for parliamentarians to seize the conseil con-
stitutionnel (see chapter 3) as to the legality of government bills: but 
many saw this less as an assertion of parliament than as agarde-fou against 
the actions of a possible left government.32 His proposal after the 1978 
parliamentary elections to involve the opposition more, by dint of giving 
it the chairmanship of two of the six standing committees in the National 
Assembly, was effectively crushed by Chirac. As time went on his relations 
with this body, where in theory he had an easy majority - provided 
that Chirac's supporters voted with his own - became sourer. Chirac 
stepped up a series of niggling campaigns against his ex-ally, and the left 
stood by. At the end of 1980 Giscard and his prime minister R. Barre 
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were forced to use Article 49-iii (heavy artillery in parliamentary terms), 
to get their budget through the lower house. Long before 1981 it was 
clear that hopes of a parliamentary consensus were dead. 
Turning from the institutional sphere to the economic we find that 
again the passage was less than smooth. The early phase particularly was 
very much one of 'stop-go' - encouraging periods of strong expansion 
then, when these caused problems in areas such as balance of payments, 
cracking down with a harsh deflationary package. Thus Chirac began by 
encouraging a frenetic phase of expansion, the government running a big 
deficit to pay for public sector infrastructure in the hope of stimulating 
private industry. The higher growth obtained was however accompanied 
by an increasing deficit on the balance of payments and with an inflation 
rate still much higher than that of competitors. The economy was over-
heated; to cool it down Giscard replaced Chirac (with whom he also 
had more political disagreements) with R. Barre, who would serve out 
the rest of the presidency. He would implement a more conservative 
economic policy in the series of plans named after him, with the aim of 
laying foundations for a long-term recovery of the economy. 
'Barrism' was a series of macro-economic measures aimed at clearing 
the problems left by previous governments. If successful it would re-
create conditions in which the normal workings of the market could 
resume and, so the theory has it, lead to growth and prosperity. In its 
underlying logic of restoring priority to market forces it is close to 
those monetarist policies now widely used in Western countries. 
fBarre aimed to reduce the trade deficit, cut inflation, and maintain 
the value of the franc. The means to this end were to be balanced budgets 
and control of money supply: he also counted on discreet pressure on 
wage settlements (a formal prices and incomes policy was out of the 
question) and, after the 1978 election win, freeing price controls and 
making higher charges for public services. These latter measures would 
in effect transfer resources from labour towards capital, in the form of 
increased profits for firms. Some of this should then return in the form 
of job-creating investment, though as Barre said, to provide this was not 
the task of the state, but rather of the employers; 'c'est leur affaire'. 
As regards industry Barre wanted to end the overmanning and feather-
bedding which he believed widespread in France. Henceforth lame ducks 
(Edward Heath's phrase became very popular in Giscardian France) were 
not to be baled out by the state but rely on their own efforts. If the 
firms could not make sufficient profits to continue they must face 
the consequences. In practice, as Green shows, a less harsh attitude 
prevailed.33 The CIASI (Comite interministeriel d'amenagement des 
structures industrielles) continued to act as an 'infirmary' for ailing firms, 
often with local political considerations in mind. At the same time, 
market rhetoric apart, the Barrists carried on the Gaullist strategy of 
'national champions', encouraging well-placed firms to increase their 
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shares of key export markets. This drew from the left charges that the 
government had submitted to a new 'international division of labour', 
dictated by the USA, whereby France was led to abandon some types 
of industry and specialize in others, usually not the most advanced ones. 
The left suggested that it would both protect the older industries which 
Barre was allowing to decline and make sure that enough investment 
occurred to ensure that France would be well involved in the new 'sunrise 
industries'. Barre's strategy was further diverted by his having to intervene 
in areas where previous governments had long put off awkward decisions. 
Thus a Vosges plan (1979) had to be hastily put together to save the 
disintegrating textile industry, and a special steel plan virtually national-
ized what remained of the French steel industry, the state paying out 
huge sums in redundancy money and alternative job creation. 
In the end the results of Barrism were bound to fall below expec-
tations. If exports were rising by 1979, the second 'hike' of oil prices 
following the Iranian revolution cancelled that out at a stroke. If industry 
had to some extent been slimmed down, then it was at high cost. Green 
estimates that by 1979 bankruptcies were running at 1,300 per month, 
with rising unemployment partially concealed by temporary job-schemes 
for school-leavers not unlike the British YOPS. Increased profitability 
was still not being translated quickly enough into job-creating investment. 
The government borrowing deficit remained high and the reaction was 
to print more money (money supply was rising at 14 per cent per annum 
instead of the anticipated 11 per cent). Barre would doubtless argue 
that the monetarist medicine was beginning to work and that without it 
things would be worse; but on the right as well as on the left alternative 
strategies were advocated. 
One long-term aspect of Giscardian economics was the systematic 
development of civil nuclear energy. By 1981 France had some 3 dozen 
such power stations in operation, being built or projected. The aim was 
clearly to reduce dependence on imported oil and with it balance of 
payments deficits. The potential hazards of such a choice also became 
clearer after incidents like the accident at Three Mile Island in the USA 
in 1979. As Barre left office it emerged that France was in fact over-
endowed with energy ;34 but by then the nuclear choice was well-nigh 
irreversible, despite the protests of the growing ecological movement 
(see chapter 4). 
In non-economic policy Giscard showed evidence of a reforming zeal 
which was never taken too far. In local government he was known to 
favour increased decentralization of power and resources, if not some 
kind of regional power. Yet he did little. Doubtless under Gaullist pressure 
he soon abandoned any moves towards regionalism. If he allowed com-
munes (see chapter 3) greater freedom to spend government money and 
to vary their local tax base, he was not ready to go further in challenging 
either local habits or the mistrust of his Gaullist partner. In 197 5 he did 
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reform the statute of the city of Paris, allowing it to elect its own mayor 
in line with other communes. This in fact led to a bitter battle in the 
1977 municipal directions, when Chirac beat a Giscardian nominee to 
take the town hall. 
The field of civil liberties showed similar traits. The septennate began 
enthusiastically with laws liberalizing divorce and abortion, and lowering 
the majority to eighteen, even if the help of the parliamentary left was 
required to pass them against the wishes of some Giscardians! This first 
impulse waned, though, as economic and social tension grew. Giscard's 
first interior minister, M. Poniatowski, took from the first a tough line: 
his use of police dogs to clear strikers out of occupied workplaces and 
his media denunciations of 'soft' magistrates never did blend particularly 
well with the liberal tones of his leader. The independence of judges 
was, in the view of many, weakened by a series of disciplinary measures 
against magistrates who had stood up visibly to pressure from above. At 
the end of the septennate justice minister A. Peyrefitte, responding to a 
widespread psychosis about law and order which the government had in 
no small measure helped to create, would present the bill Securite et 
liberte, which sharply increased repressive powers.35 And as Frears shows, 
nothing was done about those aspects of the legal system which seem to 
privilege the state against the individual, such as the excessive custodial 
powers (garde a vue) or the existence of special tribunals outside the 
normal hierarchy of courts and on which the military sat; these were 
used to try regional autonomists.36 
In this context we should mention immigration policy. Throughout 
the years of post-war expansion, France encouraged immigration, but 
tried to shut the door once the recession set in. No work permits were 
issued after 1976 and the minister, L. Stoleru, offered 10,000-franc 
lump-sums to immigrants willing to return home - an offer later deemed 
illegal by the constitutional council. From then on the government 
sought to round up and expel illegal immigrants (hundreds of thousands 
of whom had been encouraged to enter during the boom, for the simple 
reason that an illegal immigrant is far more docile to employ than one 
who has some rights). Indeed it is hard to avoid the feeling that the 
government was less active than it might have been in discouraging those 
xenophobic and racialist feelings which arise in times of crisis. Scapegoats 
have their uses. 
One large group that might feel disappointed with Giscardian social 
policy was women. It is true that at times the government contained 
more women than any other European one, including a junior minister 
for women's affairs. But it is hard to see more substantial results. Women's 
earnings remained systematically lower than men's and they suffered 
most from unemployment. On the credit side, maternity leave provisions 
were improved as were financial arrangements for widows, and the 
government did pass a law (later repealed by the constitutional council) 
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which imposed a quota of 20 per cent women on lists for municipal 
elections. Feminists would find this a rather modest record. 
In education Giscard began with the Haby reform of 1975 (see chapter 
6). It aimed to increase equality of opportunity for school-children and 
to adapt schooling to the needs of a modem economy. Overambitious 
in terms of the resources available and never popular with teachers, the 
new reform seemed like its innumerable predecessors to be unlikely to 
change very much. In higher education after 197 6 Alice Saunier-Seite led 
a more open attack, in her highly personal style. Proclaiming the need 
to make university syllabuses 'relevant', she cut numerous programmes, 
especially in establishments reputed hostile to the government. She also 
increased pressure on younger staff and tried to reverse some of the 
effects of the Faure Act by concentrating more power in the hands of 
senior professors. Clearly reformism had its limits in the colleges. 
One area in which there was again little movement was industrial 
relations. If the 1976 Sudreau report recommended involving workers 
in the running of firms, albeit on a consultative rather than a decision-
making basis, these proposals were promptly shelved. Stoleru made a 
number of gestures towards workers, including savings schemes for those 
wanting to set up their own businesses and early retirement for some 
categories, but these actions and their accompanying rhetoric ('valoriser 
le travail manuel') remained peripheral and rather cosmetic. Giscardism 
was not interested in integrating the working class by institutional or 
legal means. It simply relied on its overall economic performamce to 
secure enough working-class votes for re-election. 
It is now possible to assess roughly who, in sociological terms, ben-
efited from Giscard's running of the economy. At the bottom of the 
scale, old age pensioners' buying power increased by some 65 per cent, 
albeit from a very low base in 1974; average workers' buying power 
rose by 29 per cent and that of smicards (minimum wage earners) by 
some 28 per cent.37 Lower white-collars did slightly better and the upper 
part of the working class (supervisors, etc.) slightly worse. In other 
words Giscardism assured some redistribution of income, in a way that 
we expe~t more from social-democratic types of regime. Generally few 
lost out overall in terms of income ( agriculture being perhaps the major 
exception), even though by the end income levels were beginning to 
taper off rather than rise steadily as had been the case previously. Against 
this achievement must be set the fact that unemployment rose by 320 per 
cent (from 2.3 per cent to 7.3 per cent of the workforce) up to 1981: 
the young people, women and those who generally lived in declining 
regions, all of whom were the worst-affected categories, clearly fell 
behind the overall level of prosperity. Giscard himself favoured reducing 
income differentials, as shown by his 1976 proposal for a capital gains 
tax; but his own conservative majority in parliament saddled it with a 
series of exemptions that made it worthless. There were obviously limits 
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to how far economic egalitarianism could be extended. Yet Giscard was 
careful not to disturb the established system of welfare benefits (family 
allowances, social security, etc.) even though the funds which finance 
these were in chronic deficit by 1981 ('le trou delaSecu').HealthMinis-
ter J. Barrot attempted to introduce a two-tier system of medical charges 
which would have forced some patients to pay more for their treat-
ment,38 and there was the one-off tax on pensions already mentioned. But 
the unpopularity of such measures led Giscard to reflect that reform of 
the system of benefits, urgent though it was ( commentators spoke of 'la 
crise de l'Etat-providence') could best be left to a future government. 
Foreign policy was as Frears remarks, heavily tied to economic (see 
chapter 5). In Europe, while increasing inter-governmental co-operation 
through the regular summit meetings of EEC heads of state and govern-
ment, Giscard prized Franco-German co-operation above all. He saw the 
Paris/Bonn axis as the motor of Europe and made considerable financial 
sacrifices to put the franc into the new EMS (European Monetary System) 
in 1979 as proof of his goodwill. He saw a division of labour, as it were, 
between German economic power and French diplomatic and military 
strength, whereby the two could give leadership to the rest of Europe. 
As regards the USA, he kept his distance from NATO, refusing to rejoin 
the integrated command structure or to offer the French nuclear arsenal 
in disarmament negotiations. French conventional and nuclear forces 
were kept at a high level, with defence spending increasing threefold in 
seven years. Sensitive to accusations of pro-Americanism, Giscard also 
improved links with the USSR;his 1980 trip to Warsaw to meet Brezhnev 
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was considered by many to be 
overindulgent towards the USSR (Mitterrand called him 'le petit tele-
graphiste'). 
With regard to the third world, Giscard talked of a new economic 
order to bridge the gap between developed and underdeveloped countries, 
calling the North-South conferences from 1975-9 and appealing for a 
'trialogue' between the Arab world, the EEC and the Organization for 
African Unity. These initiatives were prompted by the belief that 
exchanges between North and South could be adjusted to the advantage 
of both without making major structural changes. Hardly surprisingly 
there has been little tangible follow-up. 
In the Middle East,pragmatism prevailed. Whatever Giscard's personal 
sympathy for Israel, France remains a heavy importer of Gulf oil. Thus 
he maintained strong economic and political ties with Gulf oil producers, 
notably Saudi Arabia and Iraq ( to whom he sold arms and nuclear power 
facilities), as well as recognizing officially the PLO (Palestine Liberation 
Organization). 
Africa revealed much of the nature of Giscardian foreign policy. The 
quasi-imperial links, economic, diplomatic and military, which France 
had forged with her ex-colonies in the de Gaulle era were kept intact. 
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African policy was still decided by the President himself and his Africa 
specialist in the Elysee and conducted in a highly personal and sometimes 
spectacular manner. The basic pattern was that sympathetic African 
elites were nurtured by France in return for economic and other benefits 
which she derived (see chapter 2). At times -such help could take the 
form of military intervention, as in 1978 to rescue the Mobutu regime 
in Zaire from an internal rebellion, or with the numerous and complex 
interventions in Chad. Sometimes when the elites became embarrassing, 
as with the Central African dictator Bokassa, who committed some 
particularly foul atrocities on his subjects, they were replaced by alter-
native leaders ushered in by French arms. African policy had changed 
little since the time of de Gaulle and Foccart. 
All in all, Giscardian foreign policy showed a heavy pragmatism and 
an awareness of the economic bases of such policy. It also showed up 
the weight of the Gaullian legacy of independence. As such it could not 
be said to have innovated much. 
In party politics, the new president deplored the division of France 
into two and called for a relaxing of the hostility between left and 
right. Decrispation was a slogan much used in the media; but how it 
was to be translated into practice was not clear. Giscard would have 
liked some arrangement with the socialists, detaching them from their 
communist partners and at the same time allowing his own supporters 
to escape from the Gaullists. This was never likely to be forthcoming, 
though, and Giscard would probably have been happy with the kind 
of polite relationship that prevails in Britain between government and 
opposition, with regular exchanges of views between party leaders. 
Despite his numerous overtures in this direction, all he had managed 
to achieve by the summer of 1978 was to win over one or two person-
alities from the fringe of the opposition (with the prospect of some 
others to follow, no doubt) and to have had talks at the Elysee with 
the trade-union and opposition leaders, following the left's defeat in 
the election of March 1978. Later he .persuaded R. Fabre, the MRG 
leader, to accept a special mission on unemployment and then to become 
the mediateur (roughly the equivalent of the British parliamentary com-
missioner or ombudsman). Doubtless Fabre regretted his decision when 
he saw the election results in 1981, for he would have enjoyed high 
office under Mitterand. Apart from that Giscard's attempt to change 
the political culture of France met with little success. 
The oppositions in French politics run deeper perhaps than Giscard 
or some commentators realize. Perhaps the comment of the veteran 
Gaullist Sanguinetti is appropriate in this context: 'Qu'est-ce que Giscard? 
C'est Guizot, c'est la grande bourgeoisie liberale d'emanation protestante, 
quant a la mentalite, meme si elle est en pays catholique. On veut gou-
verner ce pays comme s'il etait anglais ou allemand. C'est une erreur, 
qui peut couter cher a la France'.39 
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In fact as we shall see Giscard had increasing difficulty in keeping 
harmony within his own camp, never mind that of the opposition. 
(5) A socialist France? The Mitterrand years, 1981-
As 1981 dawned Giscard could perhaps feel fairly satisfied with his term 
of office. In the economy things could have been much worse: growth 
was higher than in the rest of Europe and if unemployment was rising it 
was still well below that of the UK or West Germany. Inflation was still 
high, and the balance of payments deficit was beginning to look perman-
ent, but most people's living standards were still holding steady if not 
creeping upwards. Investment was just beginning to accelerate and 
Barre, feeling that recovery was coming, resisted fairly successfully the 
temptation of a give-away budget before the election, preferring to 
appear consistent with his stated aims. In foreign policy consistency 
had been shown, and in the area of social reform there had been some 
small achievements even if, as we saw, there was often a tendency to 
back away from reforms which needed to be done and could have been 
with more commitment - taxation, industrial relations, social security, 
local government. On the debit side, the increasingly aloof and almost 
monarchical style of the president was becoming tiresome and the regime 
was slowly becoming engulfed in an air of scandal. The diamonds which 
Bokassa offered his 'cher parent', the suicide of Labour Minister R. Boutin 
in mysterious circumstances and what looked like a parliamentary cover-
up of possible government foreknowledge of the murder of de Broglie, 
a Giscardian deputy - all these were publicized assiduously by the 
opposition press and must have weakened the regime's image. 
At the same time Chirac's RPR party increased its coups de canif, 
sniping at Giscard's foreign policy (now too pro-American, now too 
pro-Soviet) or his economic management ( deriding Barre for his failure 
to generate higher growth) and obstructing him in parliament. But 
many thought this mere ritual. As for the left, communists (PCF) and 
socialists (PS) remained polemically divided. Since the signing of the 
CPG in 1972 the alliance had prospered, picking up increasing numbers 
of votes in local and national elections, until it seemed sure to win the 
1978 elections to the national assembly. Then in September 1977 the 
partners split, largely through PCF intransigence (see chapter 4), and 
the right won against the odds in 1978. Subsequent PCF behaviour con-
firmed that it preferred to see the right in office rather than help elect a 
left government where it would only have a junior role. The PS itself 
was badly divided after 1978, some claiming that the old style of state 
socialism incarnated by the CPG needed replacing by a modern, liberal-
tinged version aimed at the new middle classes. This clash of beliefs, 
symbolized by the clash between Mitterrand and M. Rocard for the 
The French experience since 1944 55 
party's presidential nomination, caused clashes within the PS as bitter 
as those which have rent the British Labour party of late, threatening to 
damage electoral credibility beyond repair. The left electorate at large, 
however, continued to vote in a unitary way in by-elections, showing its 
desire for change irrespective of the quarrels of party elites. Nevertheless 
as the two-round presidential contest of 26 April and 10 May neared, 
few believed that the weaknesses of the Giscard camp were less than 
those of its opponents. The re-election of Giscard II, as one newspaper 
gloomily called him, seemed inevitable. 
All four major parties fielded candidates, as did the centre-left MRG, 
far left PSU and the Trotskyites (this was Arlette Laguiller who stood 
in 1974). B. Lalonde represented the ecologists and there were two 
independent right-wingers in M. Debre and Marie-France Garaud. All 
the small candidates displayed some ingenuity in finding the required 
500 signatures from local officials to be present on the ballot.40 The 
PCF campaign had begun before the end of 1980 and the candidate 
G. Marchais made every effort to mobilize both the party and the trade-
union CGT (see chapter 4). His main aim was clearly to stop Mitterrand, 
whose 'virage a droite' he regularly denounced, predicting austerity for 
the French if he were elected. This the PCF pledged itself to combat, and 
to give the public a foretaste of its likely tactics, PCF and CGT activists 
indulged in such operations as breaking up a live election debate in the 
TV studios. Another tactic used was the openly racist, anti-immigrant 
campaign undertaken in several PCF-controlled suburbs; here the party 
was trying to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand it was 
after the sort of votes that normally go to the far right, on the other it was 
frightening off, by such irresponsible behaviour, floating voters from 
the middle of the political spectrum who might be thinking of voting 
for its notional ally, Mitterrand. 
Mitterrand had eventually been endorsed as the PS candidate after 
Rocard withdrew. His campaign was based on his '110 propositions', 
considerably less radical than the official PS line. He promised economic 
reflation, based on a number of key nationalizations, criticized Giscard's 
monarchical style and modest record on civil liberties and above all was 
clever enough to avoid promising to have PCF ministers in his govern-
ment. He used all factions of his party, especially Rocard who was so 
popular with the media, to help with the campaign, and his publicity, 
run by J. Seguela, a professional advertiser, was incomparably better 
than in 1974. 
Giscard started his campaign late, relying on his media skill and his 
control of the state apparatus. He seemed much less enthusiastic than in 
1974 and was perhaps overconfident that the PCF would take care of 
Mitterrand for him. After much speculation, Chirac declared his own 
candidacy in February; his organization was superb, his publicity skilful 
and his confidence abundant. Immediately - perhaps with the help of a 
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little manipulation of opinion polls - he suggested that he was catching 
up with Giscard. 
As the campaign progressed the polls showed a latish swing to Mitter-
rand, while Giscard stagnated, as did Marchais.41 Sensing that its spoiling 
tactics were not paying off and that its supporters were drifting towards 
Mitterrand, the PCF changed tack. Attacks on Mitterrand became 
demands for places in the now inevitable 'government of popular unity'. 
The results of the first ballot showed Mitterrand close enough to Giscard 
to be able to beat him on the second. 
The lessons of the vote were eloquent. A quarter of PCF support had 
gone straight to Mitterrand on the first ballot; this was tactical voting 
(le vote utile). Chirac and the dissident right-wingers Debre and Garaud 
had taken enough votes offGiscard to weaken him fatally. In the middle 
Lalonde with his surprising million votes virtually held the balance (see 
Table 1.2). 
The fortnight between ballots sealed Giscard's fate. Having failed to 
beat Mitterrand the PCF could only join him, and it urged support for 
him with few conditions (though in PCF-run towns, voters were some-
times given different recommendations). Mitterrand went some small 
way towards ecologist demands on nuclear energy and thereby got two-
thirds of Lalonde's votes on the second ballot, even though the latter 
made no recommendation to his supporters. Finally Chirac, in a much-
awaited speech, declared that ,he personally felt obliged to vote for 
Giscard, but made no recommendation to his supporters ... 
On 10 May the results were thus: Mitterrand 15. 7 million votes 
(51.75 per cent of votes cast), Giscard 14.6 million ( 48.25 per cent). A 
furious Giscard denounced the 'premeditated treason' which had led to 
his defeat. Chirac could reflect that as in 1974 he had been kingmaker; 
Table 1.2 Presidential election 26 April 1981, fust ballot 
Votes % Votes % Registered 
Candidate (millions) cast electorate 
V. Giscard d'Estaing (UDP) 8.22 28.3 22.6 
F. Mitterrand (PS) 7.51 25.8 20.6 
J. Chirac (RPR) 5.23 18 14.3 
G. Marchais (PCF) 4.47 15.3 12.2 
B. Lalonde (Ecol.) 1.13 3.9 3.1 
A. Laguiller (Trotskyi\;t) 0.67 2.3 1.8 
M. Crepeau (MRG) 0.64 2.2 1.8 
M. Debre (Independent) 0.48 1.7 1.3 
M. F. Garaud (Independent) 0.39 1.3 1.1 
H. Bouchardeau (PSU) 0.32 1.1 0.9 
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but now there was a real chance of his own coronation in 1988. Mean-
while the Fifth Republic had its first socialist president. He rapidly made 
P. Mauroy head of a caretaker government, which passed some hasty 
reforms by decree, and then as he had promised to do dissolved the 
national assembly. The voters knew what they had to do if they were to 
be consistent with their vote of 10 May, and with Mitterrand visibly not 
owing much to the PCF, felt free to give him a parliamentary majority. 
The second round turned into a landslide, with the PS winning a 
huge majority over all the others combined for the first time ever. The 











14 (+ 4) 
6 (+ 5) 
65 (- 55) 
86 (- 69) 
7 (- 5) 
The government now had a firm majority as it set out to implement 
Mitterrand's brand of socialism. But the Mitterrand experiment was 
constrained by even graver limits than Giscard had faced in 1974. The 
recession had now deepened everywhere in the West, with declining pro-
duction and rising unemployment. Most of the governments who are 
France's main trading partners sought to fight these trends not by Keynes-
ian policies of expansion but by harsh monetarist remedies, cutting ex-
penditure and money supply in order to 'purge' their economies. France 
was now more 'locked in' to the international economy as her foreign 
trade had increased, and hence that much more dependent on inter-
national fluctuations. The steady worsening of East-West relations 
scarcely needs comment. Moreover, in France itselfMitterrand's power 
base was narrow: the victories of 1981 were not massive mandates for a 
'break with capitalism', but more a desire for some moderate change 
without destabilization of habits or institutions. They were also the cul-
mination of a slowly maturing discontent with twenty-five years of rule 
by the right and the expression of readiness by previously conservative 
categories to vote for the moderate left ( to put it briefly, I am referring 
culturally to certain Catholic voters and sociologically to parts of the 
salaried middle classes - see chapter 2). And finally the socialists knew 
that some of their latter support was due not to the unitary alliance 
with the PCF but to the fact that many voters perceived them as 
dominating the latter and reducing it to impotence! Thus, high as the 
stakes were, the room for manoeuvre was very narrow. 
Mitterrand's early governments were characterized by high numbers 
and relatively high consistency of personnel. The two major reshuffles in 
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mid-1982 and after the municipal election reverses of March 1983 did not 
amount to structural change. Throughout this period the premiership 
remained in the hands of P. Mauroy, leader of the socialists of Northern 
France, considered a moderate pragmatist. The economy was entrusted 
to J. Del ors, a former adviser to Chaban-Delmas, again considered 
reassuring to business. Foreign affairs remained the province of C. Cheys-
son, career diplomat and long-time Mitterrand supporter. Justice was 
entrusted, boldly, to another old friend of Mitterrand, R. Badinter, a 
lawyer famous for his libertarian views. The delicate post of Interior 
Minister, responsible for local government as well as law and order, 
went to the veteran mayor of Marseille, G. Defferre, again from the 
reformist wing of the party. Four PCF ministers were squeezed into 
relatively minor posts, so as to mollify that party and also so as to make 
it more difficult for it to cause obstruction. The only big post to go to a 
left socialist was Research (later merged with Industry) which was given 
to J.-P. Chevenement, leader of the CERES fraction (see chapter 4). His 
resignation in March 1983 at what he saw as the excessively deflationary 
policies of Delors was compensated by the promotion of L. Fabius, a 
clever young leader of the new generation of Mitterrandists. Earlier 
P. Beregovoy, a Mitterrand camp-follower of long standing, had replaced 
the CERES activist Nicole Questiaux at Social Affairs, when she protested 
at spending cuts. Thus if any pattern can be discerned, it is in the sense 
of a weakening of the socialist left to the advantage of the more prag-
matic wing of the party. 
By late 1983 it was possible to see how the Mitterrand experiment 
was working. We shall consider succinctly the main policy areas, starting 
with the one by which the rest stand or fall, economic policy. The social-
ists aimed by a mixture of Keynesian techniques (basically increasing 
domestic demand) and dirigisme ( deliberate structural intervention by 
the state) to provoke a steady expansion of the economy which should 
cut unemployment, maintain or improve living standards and firms' 
profits, without leading to high inflation or a big foreign trade deficit. 
To increase demand (i.e. give households more to spend), the govern-
ment increased the wages of smicards, whose purchasing power rose by 
over 11 per cent in two years,42 shortened the working week by one 
hour without loss of pay (this after some haggling), gave an extra week's 
paid holiday per year and stepped up welfare benefits, especially family 
allowances and pensions. The pump was thus primed and the new money 
would be spent, it was hoped, on French goods and services: firms should 
thus make more profits and be able to reinvest, taking on more staff. 
They would also be able to afford to pay higher taxes which would 
enable the government to recoup its initial outlay, which of course it 
had financed by deficit. The circle would thus be squared and a whole 
virtuous cycle of economic growth begin. Such is the hope of Keynesian 
economists. 
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In addition there were the structural changes. The main commercial 
banks were nationalized, as were several major industrial groups and the 
two big finance companies Suez and Paribas;43 the groups were deemed 
to have a strategic importance for the French economy, either because 
they had monopolistic positions on the market, were vital for defence 
purposes or were in any case living off public subsidies or contracts. 
The public sector now comprized 29.4 per cent of all industrial activity 
and 22.2 per cent of the industrial workforce; it represented 29.9 per 
cent of value-added and 51.9 per cent of industrial investment. The 
figures before 1981 were respectively: 17 .2 per cent, 11 per cent, 17.3 
per cent and 43.5 per cent. This reinforced public sector, plus control 
of the financial circuits, gave the socialists a strong economic weapon 
for which they had prepared a detailed strategy. It is this graft of a bold 
dirigi,sme on to a traditional Keynesian type of reflation that had led 
some analysts to describe French socialism as being of a 'third type', 
different from classic social-democracy and from what passes for social-
ism in Eastern Europe.44 
The new public sector was to play a central role in the economy. Re-
organized and suitably fuelled by the national banks, it should remain 
competitive in those creneaux (key positions) which France had already 
won on export markets; thus the strategy of 'national champions' con-
tinues. In the longer term, the state would guarantee a high rate of invest-
ment, especially into the research budget of the groups (sadly neglected 
by the previous management). Thus when world recovery occurred 
France would be in a position, .financially and technologically, to take 
advantage of it. The public sector would also serve as a tow-rope for the 
rest of the economy, in which by now smaller firms (PME) were in the 
majority: by subcontracting, purchasing and selling it would stimulate 
these smaller firms, releasing their full potential for productivity gains 
and above all job creation. It should also be possible to fulfil a strategic 
objective, viz. to attain independence in some sectors by creating filieres 
( complete industrial systems in which virtually every input from the raw 
materials to the end product is made largely or wholly in one country). 
And lastly it should prove possible to renew and deepen the type of 
indicative planning so successful after 1 ?45, preferably by making it a 
more decentralized process with more inputs from local authorities and 
firms. 
Two final pieces completed the socialist economic design. One was a 
classic programme of job-creation out of public funds ( over 100,000 
jobs in the public services in the first eighteen months), and the other 
was more political. The Auroux Acts (named after the labour minister) 
of August and December 1982, increased workers' rights in firms. They 
provided greater benefits and protection for recognized union represen-
tatives, more stringent observation of health and safety norms and an 
obligation for firms above a certain size to provide more information 
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and to negotiate annually on pay and conditions ( though not of course 
to award increases). These acts aimed not so much at generalized workers' 
control of the type which the PS had been advocating as at involving 
workers more in their firms, hoping to reduce conflict and stimulate 
productivity. It is significant that these acts did not give the workforce 
any say in matters such as forward planning or redundancies. In this 
context too should be placed the law of December 1982 which restored 
to workers their right to elect administrators to the social security funds 
- a practice broken by de Gaulle in 1967. 
Such was the policy for revitalizing the economy. Success would prove 
elusive but after two years it could not be said that Mitterrand had 
failed either. Taking the negative aspects first, one major consequence of 
reflation was a balance of payments deficit, as the French spent their 
new money not on home-produced goods but on imports. This put 
pressure on the franc which would eventually have to be three times 
devalued (autumn 1981, June 1982, March 1983).45 As the expected 
growth did not materialize fully, the government debt, aggravated by 
the cost of the nationalizations and the huge cash needs of the new 
public sector, also swelled: this meant heavy borrowing abroad and 
increased pressure on the franc. British observers who remembered 
Labour governments of the 1960s being 'blown off course' by balance-
of-payments and sterling problems had a sense of deja vu. Moreover too 
little private investment was forthcoming, whether through lack of con-
fidence in the government on the part of capital owners, employers' 
dislike of the Auroux acts or the timidity of the banks in lending. All of 
this meant that there was no chance of developing a new type of planning; 
ad hoe plans for each sector remained the rule.46 Even the current Ninth 
Plan is, as Estrin and Holmes point out (Guardian, 28 September 1983) 
reluctant to give mid-term forecasts, so depressed is the international en-
vironment. And as these authors show, the lack of internal co-ordination 
and of corporate planning within large firms, even publicly owned ones, 
does not make planning any easier. Finally inflation remained high, as 
it must when increased money wages are not bolstered by higher pro-
ductivity. 
By mid-1982 the government was obliged to change tack sharply; 
after the 'go' came the 'stop'. The by-word was now la rigueur, as Delors 
strove to peg inflation. Early measures included a five-month wages-and-
prices freeze, expenditure cuts and higher social security contributions. 
Firms' overheads were reduced with a mixture of tax deferments and 
exemptions, and the shifting of some employer-paid benefits on to 
employees. In general the state tried to transfer resources from con-
sumption towards investment, that is from households towards firms. 
But despite this compressing of living standards, private investment 
trickled steadily downwards and employers demanded more concessions, 
including greater freedom to make workers redundant. When the govern-
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ment raised finns' contributions (along with employees') to the UNEDIC 
unemployment funds, the employers walked out of this jointly run 
institution. A further austerity package followed in 1983, with increased 
health charges and higher public service charges; there was a 1 per cent 
across-the-board tax increase and a compulsory savings scheme ( over three 
years) for higher incomes. A foreign exchange limit of £200 per head 
per year was also imposed; though temporary, it caused an exasperation 
which made some wonder if politically it was worth the currency saved. 
If the strategy had run into problems, it was not wholly unsuccessful. 
Growth for 1981-2 was around 2 per cent higher than in rival countries, 
even if government borrowing was high and the balance on foreign 
trade depressingly poor. Unemployment had been stabilized around 
two millions, whereas it rose steadily elsewhere. Inflation was falling 
slowly but still likely to be over 9 per cent in 1983. And ground had 
been laid for the future with the invisible but vital heavy investment in 
the new public sector. 
Other policy areas showed an almost frenetic desire to make changes. 
In local government the 1982 act (see chapter 3) began a break with 
centuries-old habits as it decentralized power away from Paris. On the 
liberties front, Peyrefitte's act was abrogated, as was the death penalty. 
The state security courts and army tribunals disappeared, their functions 
reverting to the normal courts. The very repressive high security wings 
in prisons were closed and the loi anti-casseurs (a conspiracy law) was 
abolished. As well as providing extra redress for the victims of crime, 
Badinter sought to make the penal system more supple. For all these 
efforts he was denounced, predictably, by the right as being 'soft on 
criminals'. More seriously in June 1983, policemen in Paris staged some 
highly political demonstrations,largely inspired by hostility to Badinter. 
Though Defferre reacted promptly by sacking the ringleaders, this episode 
was disturbingly reminiscent of the latter days of the Fourth Republic. 
As regards immigration, an area where the right continued to exploit 
fears about jobs and housing, the socialists retreated from their proposal 
to allow immigrants the vote in local elections and stepped up their 
pursuit of illegal entrants. 
In communications, the Filioud Act of 1982 tried to make broad-
casting more independent by creating a High Authority for audiovisual 
matters (see chapter 3), which would give licences to radio networks 
and appoint senior officials. The principle of the state monopoly of 
broadcasting was not infringed. In housing, the Quilliot Act increased 
tenants' rights in such areas as rent and tenure. The short-term effect 
may well have been to reduce the supply of rented accommodation, as 
property owners resisted this curtailment of their prerogatives. British 
Labour governments had faced similar difficulties with their housing 
acts, and clearly this is an area where vested interests are particularly 
hard to tackle. 
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In education (see chapter 6), Mitterrand avoided grasping the nettle 
as long as he dared. Eventually Savary's higher education act tried to 
rationalize access to overcrowded faculties and to increase the workloads 
of staff; the summer of 1983 was thus marked yet again by teacher and 
student demonstrations. In secondary education, the government was 
pushed by its anti-clerical supporters into outlining proposals for the 
'integration' of private (mainly catholic) schools into the state system. 
The catholic education lobby was, understandably, not keen and 1984 
seemed likely to see ideological struggles from the Third Republic coming 
back to the centre of the political stage. More relevant was the reform 
of the top training school for civil service elites, ENA, where a 'third 
way' of entry was opened up to cater for those in full-time employment, 
especially in local government trade unions or voluntary associations. 
Former enarques promptly denounced this modest democratization as 
'lowering of standards' and 'giving presents to the communist CGT'. 
Foreign policy and defence were areas where continuity was stronger 
than change (see chapter 5). If Mitterrand spoke of new relationships 
with the Third World and made supportive gestures towards the San-
dinistas and other progressive movements in Latin America, the overall 
line of policy was faithful to Gaullian orthodoxy. As international 
tensions increased, so did Mitterrand move closer to the USA, as de 
Gaulle had had to do on occasions. This is seen in his generally more 
anti-Soviet line than his predecessor, notably in his support for the 
installation of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe - though not of 
course in France. There was still no question of France's returning to 
NATO, however, and she continued to modernize her nuclear capacity. 
One newer note was the hint, frequently made by leading socialists and 
later by other party leaders, that the Atlantic Alliance would prove less 
and less reliable, placing thus an onus on Europeans to make alternative 
collaborative arrangements for their defence, nuclear and conventional. 
Orthodoxy prevailed in African policy and it was discreetly criticized 
by the minister in charge J .-P. Cot, who resigned in November 1982. 
The reasons were that the policy was still run from the Elysee over the 
minister's head and that French succour for sympathetic clients some-
times went beyond the bounds of the acceptable, as when Mitterrand 
invited to Paris the Guinean dictator Sekou Toure, whose record on 
human rights was sadly wanting. In European affairs, it is clear that 
Mitterrand sought much greater EEC cohesion, particularly against US 
monetary and commercial hegemony. But the dominant right-wing and 
monetarist orientation in most of the rest of Europe, combined with 
strong national perceptions of self-interest, meant that this would be 
hard to find. 
Politically, Mitterrand encountered relatively few difficulties in 
governing. Despite cries from supporters that 'heads should roll' (e.g. 
at the PS congress in 1981 ), the socialists did not purge the state appar-
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atus extensively so as to insert their own men into key positions. If one 
or two media administrators were removed and some familiar faces dis-
appeared, temporarily, from the TV screen, there were virtually no 
changes at the top of the armed forces or in the prefectoral corps; in 
the ministries of justice, interior or foreign affairs, senior officials left in 
post outnumbered those removed.47 In education some sixteen recteurs 
out of twenty-eight were removed. None of this suggests systematic 
packing of the type practised by Giscard. In terms of his social basis of 
support, the president again had relatively little hardship. The trade 
unions supported his economic policies with more solidarity than British 
Labour governments usually experience, with the exception of the major 
white-collar unions who represent, it is true, many of the sorts of people 
who had swung to Mitterrand in 1981.48 The PCF with its four ministers 
kept its criticisms fairly muted; its departure from government was 
predicted frequently but still seems unlikely in the near future (see 
chapter 4). In the PS itself factionalism remained resolutely subterranean, 
as is often the case when socialist parties are in government rather than 
opposition. To some extent quiet was guaranteed by a skilful distribution 
of government posts among factions and by regular consultation between 
Mitterrand and his loyal henchman in charge of the party, L. Jospin.49 
Little changed in the presidential nature of government decision-making: 
clearly the machinery of the Fifth Republic suited the socialists well as 
a means of getting policy decided and executed. One obstacle which did 
prove hard to circumvent was the constitutional council, which on the 
nationalizations and other matters held up the government considerably 
and fully justified its reputation as a last refuge for ageing sexists. 
As 1983 ended, electoral losses, slipping opinion-poll ratings and dis-
content from white-collar groups suggested that the government was 
struggling. The right-wing parties felt confident as they fanned the flames 
of discontent. Political commentators went back to their favourite game 
of guessing what would happen when a left president has to deal with a 
right parliamentary majority, supposing that the latter would win in 
1986. Against this the socialists might feel that their economic strategy 
was working slowly ( the foreign trade figures moved briefly into surplus 
in September) and that the qualitative, non-economic reforms might 
show their effect before long. 
The popular verdict on the socialist experiment is anything but cut 
and dried, in fact. It is not the intention here to guess what the voters 
will say, but rather to take a longer-term look. The historians of the 
future may well see in the Mitterrand years a second great wave of 
modernization, comparable to that undertaken by de Gaulle. France 
has been prodded into updating herself in many areas where she had 
begun to slip behind - economic policy certainly, but also local govern-
ment, justice, civil liberties and industrial relations. These efforts may 
not have been an unqualified success, any more than they were under 
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Gaullism;50 and it is true that foreign affairs do not seem to have under-
gone the same dynamic impulse as domestic. None the less a resolute 
attempt at modernization has been made and in the long run it is hard 
to believe that it will have been worse for France than the morose years 
of Giscardian attentisme. 
Chapter 2 
The structures of 
contemporary France 
(1) The economy 
The process of industrialization in France was long and relatively 
complex, compared with that of other developed countries. Economic 
historians have some difficulty in singling out any one period of 'take-
off, such as is held to have occurred in, say, Britain or Germany, 
i.e. a relatively short time during which, from being agriculture-based, 
the economy moved decisively towards domination by industry. In 
France it seems that from the early nineteenth century onwards the 
pattern was one of slow but steady industrial advances ( especially 
in the Second Empire, early Third Republic and 1920s) without there 
ever having been a dramatic industrializing surge. Such industrial 
growth varied greatly between sectors and regions, and the reasons 
for the slowness are too complex to be discussed here.1 A good index 
of this slowness is to look at the high percentage of the workforce 
employed on the land, in comparison with other countries. Clearly 
this high density of peasantry is important not just in explaining 
France's industrial lag, but also some aspects of her politics; we shall 
have to refer to this phenomenon later (see Figure 2.1 ). 
Since 1945, though, industrial expansion has been spectacular, 
and France today is one of the foremost industrial powers. Table 2.1 
shows the growth of the French GDP per capita over the past years, 
in comparison with other developed economies. Of the French GDP 
in 1981, a mere 8.6 per cent was accounted for by agriculture, with 
industry representing 31.9 per cent. The full measure of French industrial 
dynamism is given by looking at the growth of the GDP since the full 
effects of the world recession began to be felt after 1974. 
In the past ten years French GDP has still grown at an average of 2.6 
per cent p.a. If this compares unfavourably with the average of 5.2 per 
cent between 195 2 and 1973, it is still better than the average growth 
in similar countries over the last decade (UK 1.9 per cent p.a., USA 2.3 
per cent, W. Germany 2.4 per cent). 
Another index of industrial strength is exports; France has developed 
rapidly here. In 1981 she ranked fifth among world exporters, some 22 
per cent of GDP going in exports, compared with 18 per cent in 1973. 
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Table 2.1 GDP per head of developed nations since 1960 (dollars) 
1960 1970 1975 1979 1982 
W. Germany 1,301 3,055 6,798 12,419 10,650 
Belgium 1,232 2,652 6,417 11,260 8,400 
France 1,315 2,775 6,419 10,720 9,937 
Italy 690 1,875 3,440 5,686 6,100 
U.K. 1,360 2,702 4,140 7,192 8,379 
EEC 1,160 2,310 5,060 8,670 8,719 
USA 2,757 4,851 7,205 10,777 13,100 
Japan 462 1,969 4,470 8,627 8,900 
Source: UN, Yearbook of National Account Statistics, 1980, vol. 2. Nouvel Ob-
servateur, Atlaseco 1983 
This sum amounted to 5.2 per cent of total world trade.2 The jobs of 
some six million people depend, directly or indirectly, on exports. Par-
ticular export strengths include agricultural products ( only the USA 
exports more), where France has 9 per cent of world markets. Industrial 
exports include particularly electrical and mechanical engineering, arms, 
telecommunications, air and land transport and nuclear energy facilities 
(plants often being built abroad by French firms and delivered 'cle en 
mains' to purchasing governments. Earnings from invisibles ( export of 
services, tourism etc.) are also rising. Yet French imports have also risen 
from 17 .6 per cent of GDP in 1973 to 24.4 per cent today. The ratio of 
exports to imports has dropped from 105 to 90 - as sure an index as 
any of the growing internationalization of the economy and a source of 
potential problems. 
At this point we might pause briefly to consider the reasons behind 
this exceptional economic performance. Clearly the seeds were sown 
in the immediate postwar years, but historians are divided in their 
explanations of the ultimate causes. While most admit that the plans 
were of some importance (especially, perhaps, British commentators 
trying to explain why the French economy has forged far ahead of 
its British counterpart), many are reluctant to ascribe overmuch in-
fluence to what was after all only a flexible, indicative type of planning. 
Thus for C. Kindleberger the plans were important only insofar as 
Table 2.2 Value of French exports since 1962 (millions of francs) 
1962 1965 1968 1974 1975 1977 1979 1981 
Value 36,345 49,619 62,576 217,181 220,751 311,550 414,675 550,363 
Index* 294 387 506 1754 1785 2520 3354 4452 
* The indices take 1949 as 100. 
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Figure 2.1 Agricultural workers as percentage of total workforce per 
country, 1900-74 
Source: INSEE, Les Agriculteurs, 1977, p.25. 
they helped foster or spread new attitudes among the public; if growth 
took place it was because the public wanted to consume more and 
because entrepreneurs were now on hand who were willing to invest 
more so as to satisfy the new demand. 3 Perhaps the spread of such 
attitudes is part of a wider revulsion towards the whole ethos of the 
1930s, with its economic and political stagnation, which postwar 
Frenchmen could now see as responsible for the disasters of 1940-4. 
Kindleberger also draws attention to the role of 'new men' with 
dynamic ideas, both· in the state apparatus and in business. R. Paxton 
has shown that some of them were not entirely new, in fact; for even 
under the Vichy regime there were areas where men of an expansion-
ist, 'technocratic' outlook came to the fore, and some of them would 
still be influential after 1945.4 Another vital input came from the civil 
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service elites emerging from grandes ecoles such as the Ecole Nationale 
d'Administration andPolytechnique. These highly trained administrators, 
generalists and specialists alike, would find themselves increasingly in-
volved in work outside the ministries, running public and semi-public 
companies and later private ones. Their competence, dynamism and 
their excellent relations with the state that had trained them made a 
major contribution to the resurgence of French business. M. Parodi insists 
more on another cause of growth, viz. the role of the state.5 It provided 
both the infra-structural improvement necessary for expansion and also 
strong competition for an ailing private sector, the new nationalized 
sector serving as a spur to the latter. More crucial was its role as a direct 
investor, referred to in chapter 1, and its creation of the various social 
institutions of the liberation era. These were surely vital in creating 
among wage-earners that climate of security and confidence necessary 
to any phase of demand-led growth. In more recent years government 
policy has again been important in streamlining French industry and 
agriculture, with the express aim of orienting the economy increasingly 
towards export, i.e. towards competition with other advanced in-
dustrial states. Whatever the underlying reasons for three decades 
and more of economic growth, though, that growth has been impres-
sive, and France's future as an industrial power looks more secure 
than that of some of her neighbours. 
The most dynamic sectors of French industry today are probably 
chemicals and certain areas of the metal-working industries, notably 
motor vehicles and armaments; all of these figure prominently among 
French exports. Sectors in decline include textiles, especially of the 
cheaper varieties, shipbuilding and steel. All these industries, which are 
quite long established, have suffered, like their counterparts in OECD 
countries, from the competition of emergent, more efficient rivals 
(Taiwan, south Korea, etc.). 
A potential weakness of industry in France is its high dependence 
on imported energy; 'la France n'a pas de petrole', as government 
advertising slogans put it. Despite her domestic production of coal, 
natural gas and hydroelectric energy, reinforced of late by nuclear 
power, France has seen a steady widening of the gap between the 
energy she produces and that which she consumes (see Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3 French energy consumption 
1970 1972 1974 1977 1978 1980 
Home produced energy 
as percentage of total 35.2 29.1 25.4 25.3 24.9 26.2 
domestic consumption 
Source: STISI (Ministry of Industry Statistical Office) 
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Strenuous government efforts to reduce firms' and households' con-
sumption and to substitute nuclear energy for other sources have of late 
begun to bear fruit. Thus the equivalent of 78 kg. of oil was needed to 
produce a thousand francs worth of GDP in 1973, compared with only 
70 today. Similarly whereas nuclear energy represented only 1.5 per 
cent of energy consumed in 1973, it now represents over 12 per cent 
and should be nearer to 30 per cent by 1990. As most inputs into nuclear 
power are home-produced, this will reduce energy dependence sharply; 
it is predicted that the amount of home-produced energy used in 1983 
will be as high as 37 per cent. 
Let us now look more closely into the structures of French in-
dustry, however. Figure 2.2 shows the location of industrial activity 
according to the number of workers employed; in so doing, it clearly 
reveals some long-standing regional disparities. The heaviest industrial 
concentrations are clearly in the Paris region, Nord/Pas-de-Calais, the 
north-east and the Rhone valley; these were the original industrial 
areas, based on mining, metal-working and textiles. To the west of 
the Caen-Marseille line, there is much less industry, especially in the 
south-west ( even here the apparently industrialized regions of Aqui-
taine and Midi-Pyrenees are accounted for largely by the success of 
two towns, Bordeaux and Toulouse, home of much of France's aero-
space industry). 
Regional imbalances are paralleled by imbalances in the size of 
firms. In general, the more developed an economy is, the higher will 
be the degree of concentration. By this term is meant not just mergers, 
whereby one firm acquires a controlling interest in another, but any 
arrangement whereby two or more firms pool their resources in an 
attempt to obtain greater efficiency and a bigger share of the market. 
Concentration thus includes such practices as the creation of sub-
sidiary companies (filiales), by one firm or by several acting together, 
the grouping of numerous firms in different conglomerates or under 
the aegis of financial groups, the creation of networks of sub-con-
tractors, and so on. In all such operations the aim is to comer a bigger 
share of the market; hence it is a tendency that is potentially monop-
olistic. The extent to which concentration has been taken in France 
shows how far economic structures have changed since 1945; its in-
dustrial structure today is a far cry from the 'Malthusian' structure 
of the 1930s, dominated by the small family firm, largely self-financing 
and unadventurous. 
This means that to some extent France has a dual industrial struc-
ture. On the one hand a small number of vast groups, public and 
private, increasingly dominant in their sector of the economy; on the 
other a host of small and medium-sized firms, les petites et moyennes 
entreprises (PME).6 Table 2.4 gives the position in 1981. 
In 1981, out of the top 500 companies outside the USA, forty-two 











Figure 2.2 Location of industrial activity, January 1974 
BTP = Biitiments et travaux publics (building industry) 
Source: Ministere de l'industrie, L 'Jndustrie franfaise, vol. 1, 1975, p. 11. 
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were French (eighty-eight British and 121 Japanese); fourteen of these 
figured in the top hundred and eight were publicly owned. 7 
Many of the largest French finns are now multinationals, realizing 
increasing amounts of their production abroad, where productivity 
gains are higher (and wages and social protection usually lower)than in 
Europe. This is especially true of the recent additions to the public 
sector (e.g. 55 per cent of the production of the chemical giant Rhone-
Poulenc takes place abroad). Their weight in the economy - and that 
of the groups of firms immediately below them in terms of size - is 
considerable. G. Mathieu demonstrated in 1972 that some 1,100 
firms (0.7 per cent of the total) accounted for over 33 per cent of 
turnover. At the other end of the scale, 1.5 million firms (93 per cent 
of the total) accounted for a mere 15.9 per cent of total turnover. 
To put it another way, 1.300 small firms achieve less than one huge one. 
Recent years have however seen a certain sluggishness on the part of the 
big groups. Whereas in 1981 the top 500 French firms showed an overall 
loss, their counterparts elsewhere were moving into healthy profit (an 
average of 15 per cent in the USA and 10 per cent in Japan). In other 
words such dynamism as French business was still capable of coming 
increasingly from the PME. In 1981 this sector created a net 15,000 
jobs and averaged a rate of profit of 7 .5 per cent; clearly productivity 
here was much higher than among the big market leaders.8 
Concentration has gone furthest in heavy industry (steel, engineering, 
chemicals) and in the newer industries ( oil, electronics, cars); it is rela-
tively weak in such areas as precision engineering, furniture and clothing 
- in other words, hardly the leading sectors of an advanced economy. 
Mining, energy, transport and communications are also fairly highly 
concentrated. 
Table 2.4 French firms by size, 1981 
No. of(%) Employees Sales(%) % of national 
Size firms (%) thousands (bn. francs) exports 
Nos. of workers 
employed per firm 
10-19 10,149 (29.9) 150 (3.5) 38 (1.9) 13.0 
20-49 12,665 (37 .3) 418 (9.7) 120 (6.2) 10.5 
50-99 4,591 (13.5) 328 (7.6) 96 (4.9) 13.5 
100-199 2,839 (8.4) 396 (9.2) 131 (6.7) 18.2 
200-499 1,955 (5.8) 603 (13.9) 206 (10.6) 20.7 
500 + 1,126 (3.3) 2,410 (55.7) 1,334 (68.4) 24.1 
Total 33.956 (100) 4,323 (100) 1,950 (100) 100 
Source: Ministere de la recherche et de l'industrie, Les chiffres-cle: industrie, 1983 
N.B.: Firms employing below ten are now considered statistically as part of the artisanat. 
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With its growing degree of concentration, the French economy is 
like that of other developed capitalist systems. It resembles these in 
another way also - the extent of its internationalization. There are 
two measures of this. One is the growth of foreign trade, to which 
reference has already been made; the other is the penetration of foreign 
capital into French industry and the export of similar French capital 
abroad. 
An increasing number of French workers are working for foreign 
capital within France. In 1979 it was estimated at 13.5 per cent of the 
workforce. Figure 2.3 shows where such capital goes; the further to 
the right the horizontal lines, the more that sector is controlled by 
non-French capital. Foreign capital favours, logically, areas where 
profits will be highest, i.e. industry which is, as INSEE put it, 'quali-
tativement concentree, dynamique, moderne'. Until 1968 most of 
such capital came from the USA. Since then, with the growth of the 
EEC (and perhaps, to a small extent, Gaullist anti-Americanism?) 
the percentage of US capital in France has tended to decline in favour 
of EEC investment. 
The countervailing tendency is for French capital to be exported 
overseas; like Britain, France has had, historically, great expertise in 
this field. Interestingly, most French capital today goes not so much 
to the USA or the EEC, but to under-developed capitalist countries, 
especially former French colonies in Africa. Thus in 1970 some 63.5 
per cent of direct French investment overseas went outside the EEC 
and North America, most of it towards the under-developed world, 
where it was absorbed mainly in oil and other extractive industry. 
This economic link that France retains with her former possessions 
is reinforced by the panoply of military and political agreements which 
the Fifth Republic has concluded with most of its former dependencies, 
and the arrangement works very much to France's advantage. 
This assertion is borne out when we consider France's trade balance 
with these countries. In 1981 French trade with the developing world 
accounted for some 28 per cent of exports, of which some 10 per cent 
went to OPEC countries; but in return some 28 per cent of French 
imports came from these countries, of which 18 per cent came from 
OPEC (i.e. oil). In other words, French industry needs to import from 
the under-developed world most of its energy, considerable amounts of 
raw materials (including some food) and indeed, when the economic 
situation requires it, quantities of immigrant labour; in return France 
exports to such countries manufactures (both consumer goods and 
some capital goods). Such a neo-colonialist or imperialist arrangement 
is, then, crucial to the running of the French industrial system, as of 
course are similar deals to virtually every developed economy (see Table 
2.5). 
Agriculture has long occupied a privileged place in French life. 
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Figure 2.3 Penetration of French industry by foreign capital, 1970 
Source: INSEE, La Mutation industrielle en France, vol. 1, 
1975, p. 82. 
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Source: Statistiques et etudes financieres, nos. 338, 1982-3, p. 84. 
For people in Britain where only 2.3 per cent of the workforce is 
employed on the land and where for two centuries a large proportion 
of food has been imported from cheap primary producers, with prices 
cushioned by government subsidies, agriculture is by and large some-
thing that one takes for granted. In France it is different, however; 
some understanding of French agricultural structures is necessary if 
one is to grasp some aspects of politics and society. 
Exceptionally suited to agriculture by her geographical and climatic 
situation, France has long been a surplus producer of food and drink 
of high quality - both of which, incidentally, are much more highly 
esteemed, in every sector of the population, than in Britain. As has 
been explained, the exodus from the land was slower than elsewhere; 
even today 9 .3 per cent of the workforce still works there (7 .6 per 
cent are owner-farmers, 1.7 are agricultural labourers). Many town 
dwellers still have relatives in the country to whom they will go (or, 
more likely, send their children) for holidays. The peasantry has played 
an important role in French history (albeit usually one of inertia, 
rather than dynamism) and it has acquired over the centuries a certain 
ideological stock. There is in French opinion a vision of the country-
man as the epitome of hard work, individual enterprise, frugality and 
common-sense - a reflection perhaps, even if a crude one, of what 
many believe to be the qualities of the nation as a whole. This vision is 
by no means dead, even if it is based on a shrinking reality. 
For since the war the rural exodus has speeded up. The causes 
are those always associated with rapid industrialization. The spread 
of mechanization on farms, the gap between farmers' incomes and 
the prices of industrial goods (tractors, combine-harvesters, etc.), the 
difficulties in obtaining credit to cope with increasing debt - all this 
made it harder for the small farmer to survive. Increasingly he could 
either sell up and leave the land for the new factories that were 
springing up, or group together with neighbours in a similar plight. 
For only the bigger and more efficient units survived. Even the 
Common Agricultural Policy and measures based on the Mansholt 
Plan ( designed precisely to humanize this relentless weeding-out of 
the small man) have not changed this basic fact. Farming is becoming 
increasingly capital-intensive and industrialized; there will be less 
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and less room for the small producer, as Giscard d'Estaing himself 
has made plain.9 
Where does this leave French agriculture today? In 1981 the activity 
of French farmers could be broken down as in Table 2.6. 
Turning from type of production to size of farms, one finds some 
interesting discrepancies: other figures reveal a steady disappearance 
of farms at the rate of 1.9 per cent per annum over the last twenty years 
(see Table 2.7). 
As with French industry one notices a dualistic tendency; there 
are indeed 'two agricultures' in France. If we take farms of less than 
20 hectares as 'small', then we see that they account for 55 per cent 
of the total of farms but cover only 18 per cent of the arable surface. 
At the other end of the scale, large farms (50 hectares and above) 
account for a mere 13.5 per cent of the total of farms, but cover over 
44 per cent of the arable surface. On the one hand, the tendency is 
toward& the family farm ill-equipped, technically, financially and 
organizationally; on the other, the industrial farm, run impersonally 
and efficiently, like a large corporation. There is a world of difference 
Table 2.6 French agricultural production, 1981 
Type of product % of national agricultural product 
Cereals 












Source: adapted from INSEE, Les Comptes de !'agriculture en 1981, 1982c, p. 35. 
Table 2. 7 French farm sizes, 1979* 













Source: INSEE, Tableaux de l 'economie franraise, 1982. 







*1 hectare= 2t acres (approx.). The number of farms in 1979 was some 1,103,000 
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between, say, the ageing melon-grower of Lot-et-Garonne, working 
long hours on his 20 hectares to make a bare and hazardous living and 
the cereal-grower of the Paris basin, producing massively for the export 
market. 
The geography of French agriculture brings this out even more 
cruelly. Figure 2.4 shows the strong areas with the big farms: the 
northern departments, Paris basin, Normandy and some of Brittany 
(though the latter area has many poor farms also). Equally the south-
west, Auvergne, Llmousin and the east in general, are all areas, not 
on the whole favoured by their geography, where the further decline 
of agriculture seems inevitable. 
It remains briefly to set French agriculture in an international 
context. France is the leading agricultural producer of the EEC, pro-
ducing 27.1 per cent of the total value added therein.10 In Table 2.8 
the high percentage of GDP accounted for by agriculture in Greece and 
Ireland should not mislead the reader, for in both cases the total 
value added is well below that of France. In other words, the agri-
cultural sectors of both these countries are too large and too inef-
ficient, compared with the French. 
In terms of international trade, France is probably now second to 
the USA as an exporter of agricultural products; as an exporter of the 
key commodity cereals she ranks third in the world. 
We must also consider the 'tertiary' sector of the French economy. 
This accounts for an increasing part of the workforce ( currently some 
55 per cent) and covers such activities as transport, education, banking 
and insurance as well as the more classical activity, commerce. Table 2.9 
shows the variety of branches in which people are increasingly finding 
employment. The tertiary sector employed 55 per cent of the work-
force in 1978 compared with 44 per cent in 1962.11 In terms of job 


































Source: Nouvel Observateur, Atlaseco, 1983 (adapted) 
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Figure 2.4 Average productivity per farm, 1982 - comparison 
between departments 
Source: INSEE, Les Comptes de /'agriculture franraise en 1982, p. 124. 
creation it is the liveliest sector of the economy and has been called 'un 
refuge de main d'oeuvre', thanks to its alleged sensitivity towards new 
demands for services as they emerge, responding easily and quickly to 
these. We shall concentrate particularly on commerce here, because of its 
rather special place in the economic and political structures of the 
country. 
Commerce in France bears witness in many ways to the late econ-
omic development of that country; it has many features that seem 
archaic in a system that in so many other ways is ultra-modern. The 
first of these is undoubtedly the very high proportion of self-employed 
shopkeepers or independants, as they like to call themselves. Anyone 
who has spent much time in France knows that the French use these 
Table 2.9 Employment in tertiary sector, 1962-78 
Commerce 
Vehicle repairs etc. 
Hotel and Catering 
Transport 
Posts and Telecom 
Services to firms 
Services to individuals 






annual average of jobs created 
(thousands) 
1962-8 1968-73 1973-8 
40.4 29.0 18.6 
14.9 10.8 4.5 
2.6 6.5 3.7 
10.3 4.0 5.0 
9.8 7.2 12.9 
33.8 30.7 23.7 
33.4 56.7 86.5 
1.8 4.2 2.1 
2.2 4.7 3.0 
10.0 20.9 11.0 
11.0 66.4 28.9 
170.1 241.1 200.0 
Source: INSEE, Rapport sur les comptes de la nation, 1978. 
(b) 
(a) as% increase p.a. 
1962-8 1968-73 1973-8 1962-78 
+1.8 + 1.2 +0.7 + 1.3 ~ 
+ 5.4 + 3.1 +1.1 +3.3 (b 
+0.5 + 1.2 +0.7 +0.8 
.. 
~ 
+ 1.3 + 0.5 +0.6 +0.8 i:: ~ 
+ 3.1 + 2.0 +3.1 +2.8 
... 
i:: .... 
+6.8 + 4.5 +2.9 +4.8 (b .. 
+ 3.5 + 4.7 +5.6 +4.5 ~ 
+8.5 + 12.3 +4.1 +8.2 ~ C 
+2.7 + 4.8 +2.6 +3.3 ;:s ... 
+5.0 + 7.6 +3.0 +5.2 (b ;! 
+0.3 + 1.9 +0.8 +1.0 ~ 
C 
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small and often quite specialized shops (boulangerie, cremerie, cordon-
nerie, etc.) much more than do the British. Why this should be so is 
hard to say. It has certainly something to do with a culture which 
still places a high value on well-made things, as opposed to mass-
produced but less aesthetically appealing ones, and in which stress is 
placed on rather formal personal relationships ( cf. the mystique of 
'personal service' which surrounds the shopkeeper/customer relation-
ship). Whatever the reasons for its survival, though, le petit commerce 
has proved remarkably long-lived, even though the percentage of 
owners is going down steadily and that of wage-earners increasing. 
That this shrinkage still takes place relatively slowly is due as much as 
anything to the obstinacy of the petit commerrant, who, tightly 
organized in his professional associations and pressure groups and using 
his political muscle to the maximum, manages to delay his lingering 
decline: how this happens will be discussed below in chapter 4. In com-
merce as elsewhere in the economy, the struggle of big and small goes 
on; here perhaps the small seem to have put up a more effective resistance. 
In 1980 they could still claim 60 per cent of the retail trade against 
bigger competitors. One could say that it is harder to classify commerce 
under the headings of grand, petit and moyen, as is domi for industry. 
The essential polarity, though, is still between the big chain on the one 
hand and the family business on the other, between giant and 'indepen-
dent' (see Table 2.10). 
Small commerce is in fact a very volatile. sector, where many still 
feel confident enough to set up in business 'se mettre a leur compte'. 
If a surprising 9,000 small enterprises per year were appearing at the 
end of the 1970s (mainly in the non-food branches) and if economists 
were looking to commerce to create 20,000 jobs a year (albeit many of 
them part-time), this does mask the underlying trend to some extent. 
That trend is towards reduction of the number of self-employed (a net 
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loss of 15,000 from 1968 to 1974) and also of the number of establish-
ments. The petit commerrant remains an obstinate but shrinking breed. 
Thus far we have concentrated on those in employment. Of late 
however these have been a rapidly diminishing species, in France as 
elsewhere. In August 1983 the government admitted to some 2,035,400 
unemployed.12 There is always controversy about unemployment figures, 
which governments understandbly try to minimize, usually by expedients 
such as omitting certain categories (males over fifty-five, say, or house-
wives seeking work) from the registers. Thus International Labour Office 
or trade-union figures will usually be higher than official ones. That said, 
the French figures are much less depressing than those for the UK or 
West Germany. Whichever figure one takes, though, it is clear that un-
employment is high, and shows no sign of diminishing substantially. 
Unemployment hits at the young and the less qualified (white-collar 
rather than manual). But even the managerial strata (cadres) are suf-
ficiently affected for their unions to be worried (see Tables 2.11 and 
2.12). 
The situation in 1984 
It is clear that France increasingly faces the same structural problems as 
other developed states; thus these general concluding remarks will have 
a deliberately international scope. The slump in the world economy is 
no transitory phenomenon, which can be ascribed simplistically to the 
greed of Arab oil magnates or trade unions pushing up wage rates. The 
crisis is as much a mutation of a mode of production as anything else, 
and the solutions to it, if such there be, are more political than economic, 
however much this may displease those who blame the crisis on increasing 
state intervention in the economy.13 
The 'trente glorieuses' - three decades of post-war economic growth 
- combined high productivity with high wages and high consumption, 
this balance being buttressed by a well-developed system of social ben-
efits: marxist economists sometimes refer to this mode of production as 
'fordism'. Yet by the early 1970s the fordist model was reaching the 
point of exhaustion. As the economies of developed states became more 
and more internationalized, the subtle link between high productivity, 
high wages and high profits became distended: rising inflation and 
Table 2.11 Unemployment trends in France since 1965 (thousands) 
1965 1967 1968 1970 1974 1975 1976 1979 1982 
Unemployed 142 196 254 







Source: OECD, Economic Surveys, INSEE, Bulletin mensuel de statistique 
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Table 2.12 (a) Unemployment in France by socio-economic group (CSP), 1981. 
agriculteurs 
salaries agricole 
patrons de l 'industrie 




personnel de service 












(b) Unemployment by age and sex, 1981 
Men 












% of total 
no. (thousands) unemployed no. (thousands) unemployed 
under 25 264 15.9 398 24.0 
25-49 188 21.2 331 20.0 
50+ 188 11.3 126 7.6 
Total 803 48.4 855 51.l 
Source: INSEE, Tableaux de l'economie franfaise,_1982, p. 65 
currency instability were symptoms of this. As productivity gains faltered, 
profits fell with consequent effect on investment, jobs and output. The 
standard remedy to this situation in the West has been monetarism, 
which seeks to restore profitability at the expense of wages and those 
social benefits financed out of state expenditure. The level of this latter, 
amounting in France to some 44 per cent of GDP, is denounced as 
excessive, whereas in Sweden it is around 60 per cent. This strategy has 
certainly cut inflation, but at the cost of a steady decline in investment, 
output and of course, employment. Investors can hardly be expected to 
finance the manufacture of products when they know that potential 
buyers of these are having their purchasing power cut in different ways. 
And at the same time the burden on state finance which the strategy was 
supposed to reduce has been increased, as there are more unemployed 
to maintain. The horse-medicine may have cured the patient's symptoms 
but at the cost of bleeding him to death. 
At the same time technology has made huge strides; the microchip is 
the symbol of possible productivity gains. Depending on how they are 
used, however, such technologies may well lead to what some have called 
the 'collapse of work', i.e. mass unemployment on an even greater scale. 
Some economists prophesy the rise of a 'dual economy' of which Japan 
might be a forerunner. Here one part of the workforce works hard and 
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earns well in the advanced, export-oriented part of the economy; the 
rest, poorly paid and ill-protected, toil on in the declining or older 
industries (often subcontracting to the market leaders) and in the public 
services ( or such of them as monetarism allows to survive). Alternatively, 
if introduced intelligently with a measure of worksharing and income 
redistribution, these technologies could lead to much greater freedom 
for the mass of working people. Yet the European economies must 
somehow integrate these technologies if they are to remain competitive, 
for the USA and Japan have built up a big lead. And this problem only 
compounds that of existing but declining industries (steel, textiles, ship-
building) where France and Europe have lost out in competitive terms 
to the 'new industrial states' of South-east Asia. 
It is hard to imagine that these problems of reconversion and invest-
ment in the high technology industries of the future will be solved by 
purely national strategies. We have seen that even the modest degree of 
economic reflation which the socialist government tried was very prob-
lematic; the type of problem to be faced here is much tougher. Action 
at European level is required if France and her European neighbours are 
to continue to exist as relatively autonomous industrial states, without 
subsiding into near-total dependency on the USA and Japan. Such action 
must aim at the development of increasingly transnational economic 
policies, pivoting on issues such as: the type and speed of economic 
reflation, industrial restructuring and the type of protective measures 
needed to ensure it, research and development particularly with regard 
to new technologies, concerted reduction of working hours and a monet-
ary policy that might counteract the worse effects of the dollar on 
international exchanges. 
Logically the EEC for all its weaknesses is the forum where such 
initiatives might be begun, and thus the Athens summit at the end of 
1983 took on unusual importance. The failure of this meeting and the 
apparent impossibility of overcoming the incubus of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy, left little ground for optimism. The immediate future 
for France and her neighbours seemed likely to be one of slow but 
steady strangulation. 
(2) Social stratification 
Who are the people, then, who carry out economic activity in France? 
France has always had a distinctive population structure, compared 
with her neighbours; in particular, observers have been struck by the 
very slow rate of population growth through the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Demographers cannot agree as to why this should 
have been so; among the many and highly varied explanations adduced 
are the effect of military service in delaying marriages, the inhibiting 
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Table 2.13 Comparative trends in fertility in Europe, 1861-1939* 
1861-70 1881-90 1901-10 1930-4 1935-9 
France 26.4 23.9 20.6 17.0 14.8 
Germany 37.2 36.8 32.9 16.3 19.4 
England 35.2 32.5 27.2 15.8 15.3 
Italy 36.9 37.8 32.7 24.5 23.2 
* Birth-rate taken per 1,000, approximately. 
Source: I. Thompson,Modem France: a Social and Economic Geography, 
Butterworths, 1970, p. 4. 
effects of an agriculture-dominated economy, the desire to limit 
property-fragmentation among heirs, or even the generally timorous 
nature of elites; whatever the reason, the French were for a century 
and a half 'Malthusian', not wishing to procreate. The First World War 
compounded an already serious -demographic weakness, and it has been 
calculated that if the French population increased at all between 
1801 and 1939, then this was only because (a) people lived longer 
and (b) immigration was encouraged (see Table 2.13). 
The turn-round began after 1945. Encouraged by the pro-natality 
policies of post-liberation governments, especially family allowances 
first promoted systematically by Vichy, the French procreated rapidly 
for some twenty years in the famous 'baby boom'. At the same time, 
as years would elapse before the new babies could join the workforce, 
and as expanding industry needed rapid supplies of labour, the 
traditional policy of immigration was continued. Now immigrants 
came increasingly, not from Italy or eastern Europe as before 1939, 
but from the Iberian peninsula, North Africa and later on, Black 
Africa. Immigration accounted for roughly one-third of the post-
war population increase. Over the last few years, the fertility boom 
has slackened off, and the French seem to be returning to a level of 
procreation near to that of the thirties. INSEE has calculated that 
by the year 2000 the population of France would still be below 60 
millions (see Table 2.14). 
The last census was taken in 1975.14 It estimated the French popu-
lation to be 52,599,430 - an increase of 5.8 per cent on the 1968 
figure. Distribution by age and sex, together with the proportion of 
working population within either of those categories, is shown in 
Table 2.15. Of the total population in 197 5, some 48 millions (93 .5 
per cent) were French; of the 6.5 per cent of foreigners, 1.4 were 
Algerian, 1.4 Portuguese and 0.9 Spanish. These foreigners represented 
some 7.3 per cent of the working population (and only 6.5 per cent 
of the total population), proving that France, like other countries, 
admits immigrants basically because the economy needs labour. 
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Table 2.14 Average number of births per annum i.;.1 France, 1945-62 
Total per 1,000 population 
1945 643,000 16.2 
1946-9 860,650 21.1 
1950-3 825,150 19.6 
1954-7 806,300 18.5 
1958-62 822,840 18.0 
Source: C. Dyer, Population and Society in Twentieth-Century France, Hodder 
&Stoughton, 1978,p. 134. 
Since 1968, some long-term trends are confirmed. Inhabitants of 
rural communes continue to diminish as a percentage of the population; 
they tend also to become older, as younger country people migrate 
to the towns and their suburbs. This phenomenon seems most marked 
in the Massif Central and the south-west, where departments like 
Gers and Lozere lose population steadily (see Table 2.16). 
Turning to the economic activities of the population, we find 
the classification given in Table 2.17 (the figures from the 1954 census 
are given so as to show up the rapid change in the socio-economic 
structure). These figures are in fact based on the socio-economic 
grouping CSP (categorie socio-professionnelle). The CSP was developed 
by INSEE as a standard measure of social stratification, and it is advis-
able for any student of French politics and society to become familiar 
with it, as it is the basis of most surveys, opinion polls and the like. 
But the CSP does have its shortcomings as a means of social analysis, 
for it clearly privileges economic status or the nature of one's em-
ployment as a determinant. In so doing, it avoids what is in our view 
a much more crucial social determinant, class. 
Although a much less visible or measurable structure than the 
CSP, class exists in France, as it does anywhere else. Much of what 
happens to an individual will in the last analysis be decided by the 
class into which he/she is born or might move, thanks to various mech-
anisms of social mobility. This is not to imply that class is a cast-iron 
framework which produces immediate and visible effects on individuals; 
rather, the whole process by which people's lives are structured by 
their class-position is a much more subtle and complex one than rather 
caricatural views of the above kind would suggest. 
We shall attempt in the brief space available to try and hint at the 
importance and the complexity of social class. Classes arise, historically, 
with economic development. In any mode of production (a structure 
in which men, tools and materials are brought together so as to trans-
form by their labour natural objects into objects that satisfy needs), 
Table 2.15 French population by age and sex, 1975 00 
°' 
Total population 
Year Age Both sexes Males Females ~ of at "' birth 1.1.76 Total % No. working Total No. working % (o) Total No. working % (o) .., 
~ 
i::: 
1971-5 0~ 3,424,210 6.5 1,752,645 1,671,565 "' ... 
1966-70 5-9 4,185,945 8.0 2,138,455 2,047,490 i::: .... 
1961-5 10-14 4,299,265 8.2 2,196,590 2,102,675 "' .., 
1956-60 15-19 4,242,255 8.1 1,012,235 2,162,380 571,255 26.4 2,079,875 440,980 21.2 ~ 
1951-5 20-24 4,211,185 8.0 2,884,400 2,127,530 1,508,555 70.9 2,083,655 1,375,845 66.0 "' Cl
1946-50 25-29 4,390,285 8.3 3,465,035 2,264,060 2,132,150 94.2 2,126,225 1,332,885 62.7 ::s ... 
1941-5 30-34 3,060,575 5.8 2,350,895 1,594,795 1,550,085 97.2 1,465,780 800,810 54.6 "' ;! 
1936~0 35-39 3,022,335 5.7 2,255,620 1,553,940 1,512,070 97.3 1,468,395 743,550 50.6 '1:1 Cl 
1931-5 40~4 3,270,555 6.2 2,402,875 1,657,915 1,605,670 96.8 1,612,640 797,205 49.4 ~ 
1926-30 45~9 3,312,455 6.3 2,409,000 1,663,055 1,586,255 95.4 1,649,360 822,745 49.9 ~ 
1921-5 50-54 3,203,030 6.1 2,231,685 1,567,415 1,445,380 92.2 1,635,615 786,305 48.1 ~ 
1916-20 55-59 2,011,740 3.8 1,230,845 971,880 794,625 81.8 1,039,860 436,220 41.9 
i::, 
::s 
1911-15 60-64 2,466,590 4.7 990,900 1,148,250 623,945 54.3 1,318,340 366,955 27.8 "' "' 
1906-10 65-69 2,442,120 4.6 343,275 1,093,285 208,040 19.0 1,348,835 135,235 10.0 
1901-05 70-74 2,096,545 4.0 118,595 882,345 67,615 7.7 1,214,200 50,980 4.2 
1900 or before 75 or over 2,960,340 5.6 79,500 969,895 37,030 3.8 1,990,445 42,470 2.1 
Total 52,599,430 100.0 21,774,860 25,744,475 13,642,675 53.0 26,854,955 8,132,185 30.3 
1956-75 0-19 16,151,675 30.7 1,012,235 8,250,070 571,255 7,901,605 440,980 
1911-55 20-64 28,948,750 55.0 20,221,255 14,548,880 12,758,735 87.7 4,399,870 7,462,520 51.8 
1910 or before 65 or over 7,499,005 14.3 541,370 2,945,525 312,685 4,553,480 228,685 
% (o) = percentage of same sex or age-group. 
Source: INSEE, Recensement de la population de 1975 (l in 5 sample). 
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Table 2.16 Population decline in rural departments, 1968-75 
Population 
1975 1968 Absolute Loss as 
loss percentage 
Gers ( total) 175,366 181,577 -6,211 -3.4 
Urban communes 61,223 58,156 +3,067 +5.3 
Rural communes 114,143 123,421 -9,278 -7.5 
Loze re ( total) 74,825 77,258 -2,433 -3.1 
Urban communes 24,131 23,315 + 816 +3.5 
Rural communes 50,694 53,943 -3,249 -6.0 
Source: INSEE, Principaux Resultats du recensement de 19 75, 1977, p. 48. 
there is no 'pure' economic activity, with production taking place 
in some neutral, technical vacuum; production always involves social 
relations between those engaged in it. Such relations involve domi-
nation by some, and subordination on the part of others; here is where 
classes have their origin. It is important to realize that they arise, and 
remain, in antagonism. Now, social relations pivot on the control of 
the means of production (land, labour, materials and, as development 
proceeds, capital - which represents the accumulated labour of 
previous workers). In the capitalist mode of production, currently 
dominant in the world, the dominant class will be that which possesses 
or effectively controls the major means of production, i.e. it is es-
sentially a capital-owning bourgeoisie. This contrasts with a working 
class which owns neither capital nor any other means of production, 
but sells its labour-power to the bourgeoisie in return for wages. The 
latter never fully cover the labour input which the worker has con-
tributed to the productive process, however; and it is this extra unpaid 
labour (taking concrete form as money or capital) that enables the 
original capital invested to reproduce or to expand itself. Workers 
and bourgeois are the two fundamental classes of any developed social 
formation, and all other social groups need situating with reference 
to them. 
But if ownership (or not) of the means of production is the prime 
determinant of social class, there are others also. Crucial in our view 
is ideology. As classes emerge, they secrete an ideology, i.e. a certain 
view of society and of their relation to it; such ideology can go very 
deep and have wide ramifications. Often, many members of a class 
will endorse a whole ideology, or large parts of it, without ever realizing 
it; many aspects of their lives (moral beliefs, work situations, personal 
relationships even) they will interpret quite spontaneously in ideo-
logical terms. Ideologies exist, and although they vary from one social 
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Table 2.17 Population by economic activity, 1975 and 1954 
1975 
CSP Number Percentage 
Agriculteurs exploitants 1,605,865 7.6 
Salaries agricoles 375,480 1.7 
industriels 59,845 0.3 
artisans 533,635 2.5 
mattres pecheurs 15,835 0.1 
gros commen,ants 186,915 0.9 
petits commer~ants 912,695 4.2 
Patrons de l'industrie et du commerce 1,708,925 7.8 
professions liberales 
professeurs, professions litteraires 
172,025 0.8 
et scientifiques 377,215 1.7 
ingt!nieurs 256,290 1.2 
cadres administratifs superieurs 653,755 3.0 
Professions liberales, cadres superieurs 1,459,285 6.7 
instituteurs, profs. intellectuelles 737,420 3.4 
services medicaux et sociaux 298,455 1.4 
techniciens 758,890 3.5 
cadres administratifs moyens 970,185 4.5 
Cadres moyens 2,764,950 12.7 
employes de bureau 3,104,105 14.3 
employes de commerce 736,595 3.4 
Employes 3,840,700 17,6 
contremattres 443,305 2.0 
ouvriers qualifies 2,985,865 13.7 
ouvriers specialises 2,946,860 13.5 
mineurs 73,444 0.3 
marins et pecheurs 38,280 0.2 
apprentis ouvriers 106,690 0.5 
mam.ieuvres 1,612,725 7.4 
Ouvriers 8,207,165 37.2 
gens de maison 234,355 1.1 
femmes <fe menage 154,100 0.7 
autres personnels de service 855,035 3.9 
Personnels de service 1,243,490 5.7 
artistes 59,075 0.3 
clerge 116,945 0.5 
armee et police 347,980 1.6 
Autres categories d'actifs 524,000 2.4 
1954 
CSP Number Percentage 
Agriculteurs exploitants 3,983,840 20.8 
Salaries agricoles 1,151,520 6.0 
Patrons de l'industrie et du commerce 2,295,840 12.0 
Professions liberales, cadres superieurs 554,240 2.9 
Cadres moyens 1,139,540 5.9 
Employes 2,078,480 10.9 
Ouvriers 6,465,100 33.8 
Personnels de service 983,870 5.1 
Autres actifs 499,040 2.6 
Total 19,151,470 100% 
Sources: INSEE, Recensement de la population de 1975 (1 in 5 sample); 
Recensement de 1954, pp. 58-9. 
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formation to another, their core can usually be identified. They help to 
give stability and cohesion to classes and class-fractions. 
Ideology as a basis of class seems to us more crucial than other 
factors sometimes adduced, e.g. income level, life-style, access to 
various desiderata. Such factors can, however, be useful adjuncts to 
class consciousness in that they help to reinforce basic feelings of 
belonging ( or not). We shall therefore discuss them briefly later; the 
ideologies of different classes are probably best left to the chapter on 
political forces. 
Finally it should be stressed that classes are not massively homo-
geneous. On the contrary, they are differentiated within themselves, 
probably increasingly so. A century ago 'the capitalists' seemed much 
easier to identify as a social group; so did the workers and the peasan-
try. The growing complexity of capitalist development obliges the 
analyst to be more nuanced, though, and to locate within each class 
layers or fractions, whose relationships are often quite conflictual, 
as they contend for overall hegemony. Indeed as new types of econ-
omic activity emerge, it can be quite difficult to place those who 
practice them firmly in one class. 
Given these reservations, then, we can perhaps reinterpret the 
French CSPs of 1975 in terms of social class. This analysis will deal 
with the working population only. 
The pivot of French society is clearly the most numerous class, 
the working class, some nine million strong in 1975. It includes all 
those engaged directly in the production of material goods and in the 
auxiliary activities vital to such production. It is located essentially, 
then, in agriculture, industry, transport, public works and construction 
and its work is largely manual (though one must beware of over-
facile distinctions between 'manual' and 'intellectual' work, as will 
be seen). Three layers are often distinguished within the class; the 
top bracket consists of three million OP (ouvriers professionnels), or 
OQ (ouvriers qualifies), as they are often called. These are skilled 
workers who have served an apprenticeship, and they command higher 
wages and prestige. Below them come the OS (ouvriers specialises) -
a misleading term, since such workers are specialized in nothing except 
the execution of one narrow, repetitive task, usually on the assembly-
line. For this they require little training; the English term 'semi-skilled' 
would be a very loose equivalent. Today there are some three million 
OS located mainly in the key industries ( two-thirds of the total work-
force in cars and electronics, over one-half in steel). Many of them 
are immigrants.15 At the bottom are the manoeuvres - over one and 
a half million totally unskilled labourers. 
The working class is a class that largely reproduces itself. Table 2.18 
shows the origins of workers in 1964; over one-half had worker fathers. 
The remainder came mostly from agriculture, and the traditional 
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Table 2.18 Origins of workers' fathers by CSP, 1964 (percentages) 
Ouvriers 51.6 
Agricul teurs 19.l 
Petits commen;ants, artisans 9.8 
Employes 9.8 
Salaries agricoles 6.7 
Cadres moyens 1.7 l ,., lndustriels, gros commercants 0.7 
Cadres superieurs 0.5 
Total 100 
Source: INSEE, Economie et statistique, February 1970. 
petty-bourgeoisie, reflecting thereby the decline of those sectors. Very 
few (some 3 per cent) had fathers from the upper reaches of society. 
Increasingly, the working class is female, with a high concentration 
of women in manoeuvre and OS jobs - a reflection of the demand for 
cheap labour by new, often provincial, industry. Thus in 1975, women 
represented 26.8 per cent of the total of OS, and 38.1 per cent of 
unskilled labourers. 
Such then is the French working class; its hard core is in the es-
tablished industrial areas, probably in factories with large numbers 
of employees. This core tends to provide the union and political elites 
of the class. But the diversity of the class and the fact that it is con-
tinually evolving, should not be forgotten. 
If it is easy to identify the working class, then this is not true of its 
counter-pole, the bourgeoisie. Who does control the major means of 
production and exchange in France, and how numerous are such 
people? The census lists some 60,000 industrialists and over 180,000 
commerrants. Many of these will, however, be in a fairly small way 
of business and cannot really be counted at the top end of the bour-
geoisie. On the other hand, many of the upper reaches of the profes-
sions liberales/cadres superieurs could be, either because of their 
level of capital ownership, their economic decision-power or their 
expertise, which is necessary to the continuation of the social system. 
Such professionals ( who need of course to be distinguished from the 
rest of their CSP) would include senior experts (technical, legal, etc.), 
senior managers (in public and private sectors alike) and certainly the 
top echelons of the different parts of the state apparatus, whether 
repressive (police, army, judiciary) or ideological (media, education). 
These figures are sometimes referred to as 'faux salaries', i.e. although 
notionally wage-earners, as with managing directors, say, they in fact 
derive most of their income from surplus produced by others. In 
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addition there are still a number of the more traditional type of capital-
ists, who live simply off dividends from shareholdings; these would 
appear in terms of CSPs as part of the non-working population! At 
any rate, in so far as it is possible to identify a ruling class in France, 
then it is comprised of these groups. They would probably amount 
to some 300-500,000 people. 
Such a class is by no means monolithic, of course. There seems to 
be one very obvious split between the big and medium-sized bour-
geoisie. The latter comprises the owners of medium-sized capital, 
whether industrial, financial or commercial; to it would be assimilated 
part of what Gramsci called the 'intellectuals': those from the middle 
ranks of the professions and state apparatus, as described above, whose 
activities are cultural or administrative and who are so necessary for 
maintaining the hegemony of a class or class-fraction within civil 
society (i.e. the process whereby such groups secure, by non-violent 
means, the consent of the mass of the population to their rule). By 
antithesis, the big bourgeoisie comprises the representatives of the 
biggest forms of capital, plus the very summit of the state apparatus, 
consisting of a few tens of thousands at most. It is distinguished from 
the medium-sized bourgeoisie primarily by the extent of the capital 
that it controls ;16 within its ranks the dominant force is that of finance 
capital. In the view of theorists such as Quin and Morin, there are 
some twenty financial groups which effectively control the major 
part of French industry and commerce; and this phenomenon is at 
the heart of what the PCF calls monopoly capitalism. 
According to this analysis, the tendency within any one sector 
of economic activity is towards concentration of capital-ownership. 
This will eventually entail monopolistic domination of that particular 
sector of the market, for this is seen as the only way in which capital, 
once invested, can reproduce itself with sufficient profit. One can 
identify some 200 monopolistic groups in France, and within their 
ranks, finance capital (banks, finance houses, etc.) has increased its 
penetration. It should be pointed out that formal ownership is not 
the only means of assuring effective control over the operations of a 
concern; thus while monopoly capital has made little direct pen-
etration into such fields as agriculture or construction, it often exer-
cises decisive control here by influencing, say, the supply of materials 
or the marketing of eventual products. F. Morin has shown 17 the hold 
of finance capital over many sectors of the French economy. Pen-
etration by foreign capital extends naturally into the monopolistic 
sector. Thus Quin claims that in 1971 fifty-six of the top hundred 
companies in France were effectively controlled by non-French big 
capital. Here lies clearly a major source of potential conflict. 
Theorists of monopoly capitalism see this tendency as a long-
standing and inevitable one within capitalism; they give the theory 
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another dimension when they speak of state monopoly capitalism. 
We shall discuss the full implications of this theory later, in connection 
with the PCF, but briefly, such theorists see the state as a ready and 
willing tool of monopoly groups. By direct aid ( contracts, subsidies, 
etc.), by economic policy (prices and incomes, taxation), by use of 
its own economic power (using the public sector as a 'crutch' for 
private capital) the state is seen as helping the drive towards con-
centration of capital and monopoly. Clearly such a theory takes no 
account of any measure of autonomy that the state might develop 
with regard to capital. 
Such, then, is the bourgeoisie in France. What of the groups be-
tween it and the workers? These are not easy to classify. The 3.8 
million employes (white-collar wage-earners, in industry and com-
merce, performing mostly subaltern tasks with little power of initiative 
or decision) and the 1.2 million service workers are unhesitatingly 
counted as 'proletarians', along with the working class, by sociologists 
like Baudelot and Establet. Although they do not enable capital to 
expand itself, as do workers (rather, their function is to transfer or 
distribute such capital), they are none the less exploited in their work, 
as are workers, and often their working conditions are similar. This 
seems to us however to ignore the cultural or ideological difference 
between white-collar and productive workers, predicated largely, as 
Poulantzas has shown, on the distinction between 'manual' and 
'intellectual' work. Although this distinction is less and less relevant 
in reality, it is always likely to induce white-collars to see themselves 
as distinct from workers.18 Hence it is advisable to see them as part 
of the petty-bourgeoisie. With them would need to be counted the 
bottom end· of the professions, the cadres moyens and most of the 
engineers and technicians; these latter categories are mostly wage 
earners, even if their income and conditions of work are usually 
superior to those of the lower white-collars. Baudelot and Establet 
believe that there is a tendency for petty-bourgeois working in the 
public sector (teachers, lower civil servants, etc.) to develop a different 
mentality from that of their equivalents in the private sector; but this 
hypothesis should be treated with some caution. 
If such categories comprise the new petty-bourgeoisie, resulting 
from a development of production that demands more and more 
auxiliary services, then they still coexist with the old petty-bour-
geoisie. This consists of the artisans, the small businessmen and the 
shopkeepers described above. Although they own their means of 
production or exchange (shop, small business, etc., usually family-run 
and employing less than five workers), they are effectively subor-
dinated to bigger capital which allots them their modest place in the 
economy, usually by controlling either their supplies or their outlets. 
Clearly there is a parallel between their class-situation and that of the 
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numerous small farmers. And like its newer variants, the traditional 
petty-bourgeoisie occupies a sandwich position between the capitalist 
class and the workers. 
If we were to redraw the map of French society in terms of class, 
rather than of CSPs, we would probably get something like this: 




top of professions liberales and agriculteurs 
bourgeoisie - rest of professions liberales; petits 
commerrants; artisans; (agriculteurs) 
- cadres moyens; top technicians; employes; 
most personnel de service; most autres 
actifs 
working class - salaries agricoles 
ouvriers 
most technicians 





If any definition of social class must start with production relations, 
there are many other factors involved outside the· workplace which 
can help in different ways to reinforce feelings of class. How much 
one earns: what sort of life-style one can afford as a result: what 
access to culture or education one has: where one lives. These factors 
are important in anyone's life and can always impinge on his/her 
way of looking at themselves and their relation to society. Without 
claiming that all members of a class experience reality in the same 
way, it does seem to us that there is a fair degree of similarity in the 
conditions that most members of a class are likely to experience in 
their everyday lives, and that this similarity can be measured; in other 
words there is a material foundation to class present in everyday 
life, even if individual members of a class perceive it to different 
degrees, if at all. 
At the risk of simplification, one can single out several factors that 
help solidify French society into classes. Taken on their own, they 
would not necessarily prove anything. Taken together, though, they 
show up a consistent pattern which suggests that the famous social 
'inequalities' about which so much debate rages in France are not 
the effects of accident or economic misjudgment, but necessary symp-
toms of a deep-lying structure whereby the productive system re-
produces itself from one generation to the next, allotting individuals 
places in the classes and fractions that compose society. By way of 
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illustration we shall look at income, education and (in the widest 
sense) patterns of consumption. 
The following figures are of necessity crude: they are averaged out 
per CSP on the basis of households rather than individuals. Clearly such 
aggregates contain innumerable individual cases ranging far above or 
below the mean. As measures of inequality they thus need treating with 
caution19 even leaving aside such questions as to how much equality is 
necessary or desirable between social groups. None the less, these figures 
do show a clear hierarchy, which when taken alongside the other dif-
ferentiations discussed here, can plausiblybe seen as helping to structure 
the class-position of groups and individuals. 
It is a commonplace to point out that economic growth has led 
to a steady increase in purchasing power per capita for all sections 
of the population (roughly 3.3 per cent per annum in 1960-1980). This 
overall increase conceals a big hierarchy, however. Just looking at 
wage-earners, the average yearly wages per CSP in 1975 were as in 
Table 2.19. For the self-employed, the figures were as stated in the 
same table (though they are not fully accurate, because less is known 
about them than about the income of wage-earners. In particular, 
the members of families of farmers and shopkeepers, the aides 
familiaux, contribute large amounts of notionally unpaid labour). 
It will be objected that the modem welfare state irons out these 
discrepancies by taxation, allowances and the like. Even after such 
transfer payments have been completed, though, and despite a small 
Table 2.19 Household income by CSP, 1975 (francs) 
(a) wage earners pretax disposable 
(after tax and 
transfers) 
Cadres superieurs 106,191 96,632 
Cadres moyens 62,109 59,134 
Employes 46,481 45,872 
Ouvriers qualifies 40,565 41,874 
Ouvriers non qualifies 34,652 32,421 
(b) self-employed 
exploitants agricoles 22,303 23,377 
salaries agricoles 29,710 33,309 
artisans/petits commerc,ants 57,307 49,461 
industriels/gros commer1,ants 132,847 100,121 
professions liberales 127,613 95,610 
national average 48,690 46,169 
Source: INSEE, Donnees statistiques sur les families, 1981, p. 109; 146 
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narrowing of differentials between groups and within any one group 
over the past ten years, the overall hierarchy of income is still clear 
enough (see Table 2.20). 
A significant point here is the high incomes not just of the self-
employed but also of cadres superieurs, most of whom belong, as 
we saw, to the top bourgeois stratum. If we take the average wage of 
the top 10 per cent of non-working-class wage-earners (mainly cadres 
superieurs, in fact) and the bottom 10 per cent (employes), we will 
find that the ratio between the two is 5 to I in France, compared with 
2.8 to 1 in the UK or 2.3 to 1 in West Germany .20 So even on the level 
of income the bourgeoisie, or part of it, stands out. The same is true 
of the petty-bourgeoisie (e.g. cadres moyens), as compared with work-
ers; the difference between the average wage of each group being 63 
per cent higher than that in the UK and 57 per cent higher than that 
in West Germany.21 
Similar hints are provided by examination of French taxation. A 
tax system usually provides insights into the political and social struc-
tures of a country. The most striking thing about France is that a high 
proportion of tax receipts comes from indirect tax (mainly VAT); 
this percentage was calculated at 65.6 in 1972, as against 33.5 per cent 
from direct taxes on incomes (in Germany the figures were 50.9 and 
48.7 per cent respectively22) .. As indirect tax, unlike a progressive 
tax on incomes, covers most basic items such as food and clothing, 
it hits all social categories equally. In other words the French state 
Table 2.20 Index of disparity for household incomes by CSP, 1975 
(100 = national average for each column) 
Gross income 
and family Gross income 
CSP of head of household Gross income allowances less tax 
Exploitants agricoles 45.8 48.9 47.2 
Salaries agricoles 61.0 67.3 65.5 
Artisans, petits commer1,ants 117.7 115.5 109.1 
Industriels, gros commer1,ants 272.8 263.1 225.2 
Professions liberates 262.1 253.1 214.6• 
Cadres superieurs 218.1 211.6 207.3 
Cadres moyens 127.6 126.1 129.8 
Employes 95.5 96.1 98.9 
Ouvriers qualifies 83.3 86.2 87.7 
Ouvriers non qualifies 71.2 76.2 75.7 
Inactifs 68.8 66.4 70.4 
Ensemble 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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has always preferred to raise its revenue by penalizing the lower classes 
more than the higher. 
Even within the income tax hierarchy, there are some striking 
discrepancies. One could cite those of the spectacular kind that can 
probably be found in most developed countries, though perhaps not 
quite to the same extent as in France, e.g. the ratio of 1 to 105 be-
tween the income of an old age pensioner ( 4 79 francs per month in 
1974) and one of the top 10,000 taxpayers. (The real gap is probably 
bigger for it is universally admitted that opportunities both for legal 
evasion and actual fraud are high at the top end of the tax scale.) 
But more significant perhaps is the fact that the bottom 42.4 per 
cent of taxpayers (representing some 21.5 per cent of the total popu-
lation) held 21.1 per cent of taxable income in 1975; what they paid 
in tax represented 8.7 per cent of government receipts. At the other 
end of the scale some 4.43 per cent of taxpayers, representing 2.23 
per cent of the population, held 19.1 per cent of taxable income; 
but what they paid in tax came to 43 .5 per cent of total receipts. 
To put it another way, some 470,000 households (the core of the 
bourgeoisie, surely) accounted for over half the receipts, whereas 
22.8 million others (working class and different petit-bourgeois frac-
tions) paid in only one-third. Of the latter, 10.7 millions did not in 
fact earn enough to be taxed.23 
So the fiscal system again sheds light on class structure, both by 
the way in which it privileges indirect tax and by the hierarchy within 
taxpayers. But if this suggests a certain material basis to class, what 
can we learn from other areas of everyday life? 
We might start by considering the availability of a commodity 
that most people consume at some time in their lives, viz. education. 
The intention here is not to give a detailed breakdown of the education 
system in France (this will be done in chapter 6) but to show how 
education contributes to the reproduction of social classes across the 
generations. Inspired by the euphoria of rapid growth, some observers 
assumed that this growth would necessarily increase social mobility, 
i.e. people would be able to rise more or less freely out of the class 
or CSP of their parents, thanks to the 'equality of opportunity' af-
forded by an expanding education system. The higher your qualifi-
cations, the better your job; all you had to do was obtain these quali-
fications. But that would happen if you were good enough to deserve 
theJt\. Recent theorists have argued, however, that although a few 
people might rise socially in accord with this meritocratic vision, they 
tend rather to be the exception that reinforces the rule. Parkin suggests 
that much social mobility in western Europe takes place on the margin 
of the lower petty-bourgeoisie and the upper reaches of the working 
class, often between generations; moves from very high up the social 
ladder to very low down are rare.24 By and large it emerges that in 
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France, as elsewhere in the developed world, education is mainly a 
process whereby, in Poulantzas's phrase, individuals are assigned places 
in the relations of production, or if one prefers to put it thus, are 
prepared for insertion into one class or another. 
It has long been realized that upper-class children are abnormally 
highly represented in higher education, with a corresponding under-
representation of the children of lower groups, notably workers and 
farmers. But we know now that this process has its roots in the second-
ary school. This is the place where future careers are effectively chosen 
and where, for all the apparent egalitarianism of the CES, bourgeois 
children will mainly tend to get into the academic streams, leading to 
university and better jobs; most working-class and white-collar children 
will gravitate towards the technical streams, which lead mainly to work 
in industry and services at the age of sixteen. Various explanations 
were initially given for this (pressure from teachers, ignorance of 
parents about the relationship between qualifications and employ-
ment, etc.) but increasingly these came to be fitted into a deeper 
sort of analysis. Theorists such as Baudelot and Establet realized that 
the process of guidance (or selection?) of children was much more 
systematic; the school was seen as the place where the productive 
system allotted roles to the rising generations, where the future bour-
geois, petty-bourgeois, workers {and unemployed?) were to be shaped. 
They claimed that there were really two education systems, running 
in parallel - PP (primaire/professionnel) and SS (secondaire/superieur) 
- and that most children would be firmly embarked on one or the 
other by the last year of primary school. PP led through the technical 
stream to worker or low-white-collar jobs; SS led on to university and 
a position of cadre or above. Although there were exceptions, most 
lower-class children tended to be PP, most upper-class ones SS. In 
between the two main streams it was possible to discern a third stream, 
producing mainly petits-bourgeois; in it one found most of those 
working-class children who did better, and the less successful bourgeois 
children. In other words, this was the place where such limited social 
mobility as existed would occur. At any rate, in 1966 a working-class 
child had a 54 per cent chance of being PP and only a 14 per cent 
one of being SS; for a bourgeois child the odds were almost the exact 
reverse. 
The Bourdieu school laid emphasis on the hidden constraints within 
education, showing how much success is not a matter of mastering a 
neutral body of knowledge, thanks to one's innate ability, but more 
of an ideological matter, involving implicit skills. They stressed the 
acquisition of what they called 'cultural capital', i.e. a whole series of 
codes, social and linguistic, which teachers and, later on, others in 
authority will expect 'good' pupils to know. To put it crudely, success 
in education is not so much what one knows as how one expresses 
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it. What teachers call 'gifted' pupils are really ones who have an articu-
late mastery of these codes, which of course are transmitted mainly 
through family mechanisms. Thus bourgeois children are obviously 
best placed to inherit this cultural capital, essential if one is to climb 
to a high place within society, because only their families possess it 
in the first place. 
Even the few who make their way out of the lower classes to uni-
versity are not guaranteed a brilliant social future. For the job market 
steadily demands new qualifications, which only those in the know 
will be aware of. Thus for some years degrees in arts and pure science 
have been losing value, whereas economics degrees seem to lead to good 
jobs. Yet of the lower-class children in university, a high percentage 
are to be found precisely in arts faculties. Moreover, as access to the 
best economics courses depends on having the maths baccalaureat C, 
the competition to get into this stream is acute; indeed for Alain 
Touraine this is one of the key points where social reproduction takes 
place. It is legitimate to suppose that lower-class children are by and 
large not preponderant in the C stream. 
One is led to conclude then that the education system is a place 
where classes compete for the life-chances of their children but where, 
pace the ideologists of social mobility, the privileged position of the 
dominant class and its ability to reproduce itself are not greatly threat-
ened. 
Where people live can often influence their view of their place in 
society, as can their ownership (or not) of their home. Table 2.21 
Table 2.21 French households, 1978: owners and occupiers (percentages) 
Renting accommodation 
CSP Total Incl.HLM* Housed Owners Owner-
tenants free occupiers 
Agriculteurs exploitants 3.1 24.3 51.9 20.7 
Patrons 34.6 (3.3) 5.2 32.1 27.1 
Inactifs 34.2 (8.5) 13.5 47.5 4.8 
Salaries agricoles 33.2 (1.8) 29 18.3 19.5 
Personnel de service 58.4 (20 ) 14.7 16.9 10 
Autres actifs 54.6 (19.3) 25.3 3.9 16.3 
Professions liberales, 
cadres superieurs 37.5 (4.7) 7.5 16.3 38.7 
Cadres moyens 49.4 (13.9) 7.8 9.1 33.7 
Employes 55 (20.3) 6.2 13 25.8 
Ouvriers 55.5 (22. 7) 5.9 13.1 25.5 
Moyenne nationale 43 (13.3) 10.3 26.8 19.9 
*Habitations a loyer modere: corresponds roughly to British council housing. 
Source: INSEE, Donnees sociales, 1981, p. 251 
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shows that property ownership does tend still to be the preserve of the 
upper groups in society, though the number of owner-occupiers among 
workers and the newer petits-bourgeois is growing, as France develops 
the mortgage system familiar in the English-speaking countries. Again, 
these figures say little about the different quality of housing available 
to social groups, or the fact that for the upper groups a second home 
is increasingly prevalent. Table 2.22 shows figures that do bring out 
the hierarchy that exists in this domain. 
Recent research has also confirmed that the area in which people 
live has much to do with social class.25 The authors distinguish several 
possible ways in which the areas of a town can be divided among 
bourgeois, petty-bourgeois and workers, and indeed among the sub-
groups thereof; what is always certain, though, is that towns are divided 
along these class lines, and measurably so, with differential access 
to various amenities for social groupings. 
There are many other factors of life-style that point up the way 
in which social classes are structured and structure their members. 
Let us consider access to medical services (cf. Table 2.23). As well 
as enjoying unequal access to medicine, social classes are unequal 
before death (cf. Table 2.24). 
Patterns of cultural consumption show a similar hierarchy, even 
if one refers to things as anodine as visits to the theatre or reading 
newspapers (Table 2.25). 
What emerges from all this is that social classes are quite clearly 
structured in France; there is a clear hierarchy within and between 
classes. J. Marceau sums up well the ways in which class structures 
people's lives when she says of the workers, small farmers and white 
collars that they earn least (but contribute most to social transfer 
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Table 2.23 Annual access to health facilities by CSP, 1973 
No. of visits to doctor per head per year 
Men Women Both 
agriculteurs 2.28 3.62 2.75 
patrons 2.91 3.84 3.27 
professions et cad. sup. 2.36 5.52 3.04 
employes et cad. moyens 4.51 5.84 5.20 
ouvriers 2.29 2.75 2.40 
personnel de service 3.14 2.94 2.98 
inactifs 3.12 3.50 3.36 
national average 3.22 4.09 3.70 
Source: INSEE, Donnees sociales 1981, p. 76 
Table 2.24 Life expectancy by CSP, 1971 
CSP No. of survivors at 75 Life 
years for every 1,000 expectancy 
at 35 years at 35 years 
Instituteurs 574 40.9 
Professions liberales, cadres superieurs 551 40.5 
Clerge catholique 524 39.5 
Cadres moyens (public) 518 39.3 
Techniciens 507 39.0 
Cadres moyens (prive) 489 38.5 
Agriculteurs exploitants 473 38.0 
Contremaitres 472 37.8 
Ouvriers qualifies (public) 446 37.3 
Employes (public) 448 37.2 
Artisans et commer1,ants 460 37.6 
Employes (prive) 448 37.4 
Ouvriers specialises (public) 406 36.0 
Ouvriers qualifies (prive) 380 35.6 
Salaries agricoles 356 34.8 
Ouvriers specialises (prive) 362 34.7 
Manoeuvres 310 32.9 
National average 412 36.1 
Source: G. Desplanches, La Mortalite des adultes suivant le milieu social, INSEE, 
1976, p. 13. 
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Table 2.25 Cultural activity by CSP, December 1974 (%) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Agriculteur 61.2 21.1 8.7 1.5 
Patron de l'industrie ou de commerce 60.2 17.2 20.8 14.6 
Professions liberales, cadres superieurs 61.1 57.2 65.3 35.8 
Cadres moyens 57.9 34.6 48.9 33.5 
Employe 60.4 18.8 36.3 12.0 
Ouvrier qualifie/contremaitre 54.3 10.7 24.7 7.4 
OS/manoeuvre/personnel de service 50.0 12.2 26.3 6.0 
Femme inactive de moins de 60 ans 41.5 9.0 28.9 13.1 
lnactif de 60 ans et plus 66.3 14.1 19.9 8.6 
National average 55.1 16.6 28.4 12.1 
(a) reading a daily newspaper; (b) reading a social or political periodical; 
(c) reading twenty books per annum on average; (d) having visited theatre 
once in past year. 
Source: INSEE, Donnees sociales, 1978, p. 310. 
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payments), have least income security (and the highest risk of un-
employment), have the least capital, the fewest consumer goods and 
the shortest holidays. They participate least in leisure and cultural 
activities, and above all they know very little about their position 
of deprivation compared with other social groups.26 Of such realities 
is class, in France and elsewhere, made. 
(3) Political culture 
In any social system, we can identify what is often called a political 
culture. By this is understood a set of political values (beliefs about the 
nature of that particular society and the ways in which it runs - or 
should run - its affairs). Such a culture is an historical product and 
depends on the classes and fractions that make up the society in 
question; it is in fact a distillation of different ideologies that has 
taken place over a period of time.27 Hence it is more appropriate to 
speak of a series of sub-cultures in any one society, rather than to 
imply the existence of one uniform, national political culture. Amid 
these contending sub-cultures, however, one can see a number of 
common threads running. A bourgeois may have a concept of the 
nation, say, that is different from that of a worker; but both do have 
a concept of nation. It is this common core of concern that we shall 
try to identify in this section. 
Such an exercise is essential if one is to have an understanding of 
French political behaviour; there is after all a strong connection be-
tween what people feel about politics and how they are likely to act 
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in the political system. Indeed we would say that for France the 
political culture is doubly important. In most areas of French life, 
not just in politics, discussion and argument are more prominent than 
in Britain; the French are less ready to concede a point and can usually 
defend their ideas articulately. Often too the level of such debate is 
different from that of Anglo-Saxon countries in that people are much 
readier to conceptualize and to analyse - and this is valid for many 
sectors of the population, not simply for intellectuals. In short, much 
French political debate takes place at a higher level of explicitness 
and self-consciousness than in Britain. Thus the outsider needs to 
become familiar with the assumptions and values of those conducting 
the debate. 
Given this, we can now try to identify some of the constants of 
French political culture - all of which are refracted in different ways 
and for different purposes, by the ideologies of the different groups 
and classes of French society. Most of these constants have their 
origin, logically enough, in the period that saw the birth of modern 
France - the Revolution of 1789. This affected the social and econ-
omic structures of France, her political system and her ideological 
structures. Socially, the Revolution confirmed the loss of hegemony 
within civil society by a declining nobility, to the advantage of what 
one is obliged to call a bourgeoisie of property-owners, timid and 
fragmented though it was; at the same time, the peasantry, acquiring 
noble and church lands, emerged as a class in its own right, the most 
numerous and the most inert in France. In the later stages of the 
Revolution, the movements of the sans-culottes and babouvistes 
showed that the urban population of small traders, artisans and manual 
workers was beginning to emerge as a social force to be reckoned with. 
Politically, the Revolution saw the change from the Ancien Regime 
(personal power of a monarch, based on divine right) to something 
approaching a constitutional monarchy, and then to a republic with 
an attempt at parliamentary government. This gave way, under the 
pressure of foreign invasions, to the 'patriotic dictatorship' of 
Jacobinism (highly centralized rule by a small elite, supposedly in-
carnating the national will). Later, when the emergent bourgeois 
fractions could not reconcile their differences by any of these systems, 
Bonapartism arrived to guarantee order. Based on personal power and 
the creation of a powerful and efficient type of state machinery, it 
combined in a unique mixture the support of the new propertied 
elite and the peasant mass. Although its duration was brief it gave 
France a series of basic institutions - administrative, legal, educational 
- that would prove remarkably long-lived. 
In short, in the quarter-century after 1789, France saw the emerg-
ence of a socio-economic structure that would change only slowly 
over the next 150 years (although the struggle between social classes 
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was unrelenting and often more violent than elsewhere in Europe), 
and of a series of political regimes (republic/constitutional monarchy/ 
Bonapartism) that would alternate with regularity. Needless to say, 
at the level of ideology or value-systems, similar bases were laid. The 
Revolution saw the emergence of a number of ideologies which express 
the aspirations of different classes or fractions. Leaving aside the 
ultra theories (total opposition to the Revolution and return to a 
divine-right monarchy), which were steadily losing influence from 
the early nineteenth century onwards, the two main ones could be 
clearly seen to be liberalism (for economic freedom, based on property: 
for political arid civil liberties and political participation, though by 
no means extended to all), and, in a crude but recognizable form, 
socialism ( opposition to a regime based on property and demands 
that individual welfare be taken in hand by the collectivity). Of course 
these value systems would undergo modification throughout the 
succeeding centuries, in the light of social and economic change, as 
well as of political experience. None the less the Revolution is the 
fountain-head of these value systems which are still very vigorous 
(as witness their bitter clash in the 1981 elections). 
As well as changing social and political structures and secreting 
these value systems, the Revolution also raised two other issues which 
seem to cut across class cleavages. One is the question of the Catholic 
church and its role in the French social and political system; the other 
is the problem of the nation. What is the nation? What values does 
it stand for? Who incarnates these? On both the religious and the 
national questions, the Revolution began a debate that is still going on. 
Let us now look in detail, then, at these problems which the 
Revolution raised and which have become constants of French political 
culture. First, the question of the regime. Textbooks on French poli-
tics, especially those written by Anglo-Saxons, delight in pointing 
out the number of regimes France has enjoyed since 1789 (fourteen, 
not counting the provisional governments in between regimes) and 
contrasting this lack of political consensus unfavourably with the solid 
basis enjoyed by the monarchy in the UK or the presidency in the 
USA. Why is there this lack of agreement about the regime? 
Discounting the racial or cultural type of explanation that one 
sometimes still hears (i.e. the French, like other Latins, are volatile 
and unstable by temperament, and this inevitably comes out in their 
political behaviour), it seems to us that there are sound historical 
reasons for this uncertainty. Ideally, each change of regime would 
need a full analysis of all the short- and long-term factors that con-
tributed to its demise, but in the brief space available, some general 
hypotheses can be put forward. The first of these concerns the type 
of bourgeoisie that emerged from the Revolution: composed of profes-
sionals, administrators, commercial and financial elements, which had 
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increased their strength under the Ancien Regime, it had been above 
all an acquirer of land. Gains realized in commerce and various forms 
of speculation during the revolutionary period were promptly im-
mobilized in landed property, which became the key to political 
influence (access to the electoral register was proportionate to the 
amount of property owned until 1848). What did not emerge was a 
dynamic, industrializing bourgeoisie. Frightened by the chaos of the 
revolutionary years, content with the comfort and power it had 
acquired, this 'Malthusian' bourgeoisie wanted not further change 
but stability. Having taken power illegally itself, it felt insecure and 
was always looking over its shoulder, as it were, to see if there were 
other social forces ready to supplant it in its tum. This bourgeoisie 
was also divided as to the nature of the regime. If most of the July 
Monarchy notables favoured the constitutional monarchy with 
restricted suffrage, others favoured the republic based on universal 
(male) suffrage; it would take until 1870 for the latter view to 
prevail.28 These internal differences were of course subordinated to 
what the various bourgeois fractions had in common, viz. defence of 
property; hence their readiness to accept a regime d'exception 
(Bonapartism) when threatened from below. But on occasions (notably 
1848) their differences could be serious enough to endanger the regime 
and their own class-domination for a while. 
It is probably this timidity that explains the reluctance to broaden 
the political basis of the early regimes (in 1848 there were only 
250,000 electors from a population of 36 million). It also explains 
why any economic or political demands from lower classes, such as 
those of the emergent working class in the 1830s, were repressed, 
either by legislation (combination laws) or violence (use of the armed 
forces in 1834-6). The coalition of bourgeojs forces that ruled France 
in the early nineteenth century had, then, some difficulty in assuring 
its hegemony (i.e. securing passive assent t~ its rule and thus making 
reliance on force unnecessary); a symptom of this is the chronic dif-
ficulty which it experienced in forming a party or parties to canalize 
its parliamentary strength. This meant that any concessions had to be 
wrung out of the political system by force; hence very often the regime 
had to collapse before concessions were obtained ( e.g. the July 
Monarchy falls in 1848, after which universal male suffrage was con-
ceded; the Second Empire collapses in 1870 as the price for the return 
to a fully parliamentary regime). · 
Such changes were often facilitated by three other factors. First, 
the high specific weight of Paris within French life. All major aspects 
of French life - culture, politics, administration, business - had their 
source in Paris, which dominated the passive and largely under-devel-
oped provinces. Crises occurred first in Paris, where it was possible 
for a revolutionary elite to mobilize the high number of under-privi-
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leged inside the capital and seize power. This could not last long, how-
ever, for soon the dead weight of peasant France, rallied by the over-
thrown notables would make itself felt and repression set in (June 
1848, May 1871). 
That this pattern could be repeated in the nineteenth century 
proves the importance of another factor, the slow rate of industrial-
ization, to which reference has already been made. This meant that 
there was no sudden arrival on the political scene of a proletariat 
(i.e. a large manual working class, employed in big units of production 
and developing a strong class-consciousness and political organizations 
to correspond to it). On the contrary, rural exodus was slow, the 
growth of working-class consciousness and organizations tardy and 
fragmented. Hence the sense of political stagnation and deja-vu, and 
the possibility for the ruling fractions to recover situations that seemed 
to be escaping from them. 
A third important factor is the foreign invasions which France has 
experienced and which have often compounded domestic tensions to 
produce the reversal of a regime ( cf. the collapse of the Second Empire 
in 1870 or the installation of the Vichy regime in 1940). 
In short, these frequent changes of regime are best explained by 
the nature of the post-Revolutionary ruling class and the type of 
opposition, domestic and foreign, which it faced. Now, such uncer-
tainty about the regime has had much to do with determining political 
stances, and it is far from being dispelled. If it is true that the republic 
has had general acceptance since 1870, and that since 1958 economic 
modernization, the emergence of a presidential executive and the 
increasing bipolarization of party politics have apparently forced most 
Frenchmen to accept the logic of the Fifth Republic, then it is equally 
true that this Republic has worked so far only because the politics of 
president and parliamentary majority have thus far coincided. If the 
right were to win the 1986 legislative elections, then real strains might 
be placed on the institutional consensus, for Mitterrand is in office till 
1988. 
The role of the church in French politics is also a long-standing 
issue. In Britain the relationship between religion and the state has 
been relatively easy for a century and a half, the established Protestant 
church coexisting comfortably with the state, as does the large Catholic 
minority. In Ireland of course - a country whose political culture is 
in many ways more similar to that of France than to that of Britain -
the problem is posed more acutely. The French church was, before the 
Revolution, a privileged ally of the monarchy, occupying key positions 
in the state apparatus in return for moral and ideological support. 
The Revolution made an attempt to make the church more subordinate 
to the political authorities and in so doing began a battle which has 
never entirely finished. It centred on control of the education system, 
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and it entailed an ideological quarrel which is part and parcel of the 
political culture. Because the church or its leaders at least tended to 
favour anti-republican regimes, republicans (and later on socialists 
and communists) built up an image of the church as a kind of anti-
republic, a sort of lay version of AntichrM. Intellectual bases for 
this opposition were provided by the 'positivist' or 'scientiste' doc-
trines of early republicanism, which laid stress on human reason and 
implied that all phenomena could be explained scientifically, thus 
doing away with any need for the supernatural, or 'superstition' as 
they often called it. Such doctrines also pointed out that Catholic 
theories implied a natural and immutable hierarchy in the universe, 
which they contrasted unfavourably with their own theories of natural 
equality (whatever the shortcomings of these in practice, especially 
in the economic field). Catholics reacted accordingly, and to the 
republican stereotype of the Catholic as reactionary, servile and super-
stitious corresponded a Catholic myth of the republican as socially 
subversive, dictatorial and atheistic. Now although the Third Republic 
showed - particularly by the 1905 Act of Separation, which reduced 
the church from the rank of an ideological apparatus to something 
ressembling that of a sundry pressure-group - that republican democ-
racy and Catholicism could coexist, the process of rapprochement was 
to take a long time. It would take the Resistance of 1941-4 and the 
emergence of a christian democrat political movement to confirm it. 
Even today, however, it would be simplistic to believe that the 'clerical 
question' is dead. There are still parts of France where politics are 
determined primarily by religious alignment or lack of it, and practising 
Catholics still vote in the majority on the right. 
Nationalism occurs in all political cultures. Here the word is taken 
in a restrictive sense, i.e. a set of beliefs about one's nation and what 
it represents. In most political systems rulers will use some kind of 
nationalism to legitimize their rule; it may well be that a polity cannot 
remain in existence without the propagation of such sentiments. This 
propagation need not, however, take place directly or obviously -
through formal instruction in schools, say. There are many more 
oblique means whereby nationalist values can be passed on to the 
citizenry, and the feeling of 'belonging' reinforced. 
What is striking about French politics, though, is precisely the 
openness with which national sentiments are displayed compared with, 
say, the discrete way in which the British propagate their nationalism 
(though 09viously this latter statement is becoming progressively less 
true). Today no major French political force dare take its distance 
publicly from nationalist sentiplents (i.e. they all have to proclaim 
allegiance to the principle of 'France first'), though in private members 
of the political class can be heard to talk differently. It is true that 
what France incarnates for a Gaullist is not perhaps the same as what 
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she represents for a communist; but both seem to employ nationalist 
rhetoric with equal ease. 
The reasons for this go beyond the recent success of Gaullism 
and its revival of xenophobic sentiments, sloganized as l'independance 
nationale. Gaullism was simply building on a capital of nationalist 
feeling that existed since the Revolution. When the Revolutionaries 
began to construct a new kind of state, they came into conflict with 
other European powers attached to the Ancien Regime. The massive 
popular mobilization which resulted and which saved France from 
defeat succeeded probably because the participants knew that basic 
patriotic or national feeling (defence of one's soil) was inseparable 
from defence of a new kind of political system. Already, then, French 
nationalism had acquired this extra dimension of value. 
From its republican and progressive origins, though, French 
nationalism was to undergo changes. The defeat by Prussia in 1870 led 
to a revival of the nationalist problematic, but this time on the right. 29 
For theorists like Barres and Maurras, the French decline was attribu-
table to the republican form of government and the equalitarian theory 
on which it rested. A return to a regime of authority and hierarchy 
was needed; essential Frenchness lay in these qualities. Nationalism 
moved away from the left, but remained a burning problem, the more 
so as France was now acquiring an overseas empire second only to 
Britain and the schools were busy imbuing the rising generations with 
ultra-patriotic (and anti-German) values, in preparation for a war of 
revenge. Every political force had to define itself in terms of national-
ism: for or against France? If for, then what sort of France? The 
problem was given a further twist with the emergence of socialist 
and then communist movements, in theory supra-national ('the worker 
has no country'). Even these were forced progressively, however, to 
present themselves in terms acceptable to an increasingly nationalist 
public opinion. 
Since the Second World War, nationalism has bitten deeper if any-
thing into French political culture. The humiliating defeat of 1940, 
Vichy, occupation and collaboration: the rise of the USSR and USA 
as super-powers, with the consequent decline of western European 
nations: the traumatic loss of the French empire after 1945 have all 
left their mark on at least one generation. All these events raised the 
question: what does France stand for? In short, given the peculiar 
historical experiences of the French over the last two centuries, it 
hardly seems surprising that the debate about nationalism should 
be so open and that no one can escape participation in it. 
It was remarked earlier that Napoleon created much of the state 
machinery of modern France. It would be more accurate to say that 
he continued Ancien Regime traditions, notably those of Louis XIV, 
i.e. the use of a highly centralized administration, headed by a trained 
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elite, capable of carrying the state almost irrespective of the nature 
or abilities of the government. Centralization means that important 
decisions are taken in Paris and as little initiative (and resources) as 
possible are allowed to lower tiers of administration elsewhere. In 
theory this is supposed to be more efficient because decisions are 
taken by the most enlightened; in practice, as those who have ex-
perienced it at first hand know, the lower one descends the adminis-
trative chain, the more frequent are the restrictive practices, blockages 
and inefficiency. It is certain, as Wright and others have shown,30 that 
the potential power of the state is never as great as its real influence; 
none the less, the average Frenchman is conscious that the state casts 
a big shadow across his life and his relationship with it is in some 
ways odd. 
Its presence appears in apparently anodine things, such as the use 
of identity cards, which must be produced on the demand of a police-
man. This card is the most important of a series of official papers 
which French people carry with them in wallets specially made for 
the purpose. In this respect they are like most of their fellow-Euro-
peans, for the majority of European states, east and west, have devel-
oped high degrees of administrative centralization. The author has 
heard French people say that they felt undressed without 'les papiers'. 
This symbolizes in a way the close relationship of state and citizen; 
the state guarantees, literally, the citizen's identity. The state guarantee 
is, moreover, the only one that counts. In education, for instance, 
a teacher applying for a post in Britain would have to show references 
from someone in the professional hierarchy, but might well not be 
asked to show a degree certificate. In France, the opposite is true. 
The state is not interested in the opinion of private citizens as to the 
suitability of X or Y, only in its own proof of competence - in this 
case a certificate approved by the minister of education. (Usually 
the original must be produced; if not, a copie conforme is acceptable, 
provided it is stamped by some authorized state representative.) This 
is a small point, perhaps; but it does illustrate the difference between 
two systems, in one of which the state keeps its distance from the 
citizen, whereas in the other it intervenes more directly in his life. 
This relationship with the state is ambiguous. On the one hand 
the state is seen as a benefactor: it dispenses credits, employs on a 
big scale and for a long time was seen as the classic means of social 
mobility by the lower classes. On the other it seems remote: often its 
local intermediaries are inscrutable or evasive: there seems to be some-
thing oppressive about this distant but powerful machine. So there 
is often a sort of reluctant tolerance of the st~te, without the indi-
vidual ever giving it his full loyalty - a state of mind well evoked by 
the Radical philosopher Alain. 
This mentality is often linked up with the fact, much stressed 
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by such as Hoffmann31 and Crozier,32 that the French have always 
taken much less part in voluntary associations than the Anglo-Saxons, 
preferring to allow the state to occupy a maximum of terrain within 
civil society and making periodic insurrectional forays against it when 
it is felt to be deaf to sectional demands or plain oppressive. This is 
probably less true now than at any time. Wright has shown that the 
relationship between state and groups is much more fluid than the 
Hoffmann style of analysis suggests. Whatever the reality of the relation-
ship between state and citizen, it still looms large in the consciousness 
of many Frenchmen. 
The special historical development of French society after 1789: 
the nature of the regime: the problem of the church: the question 
of the nation: the relations of state and citizen - these would seem 
to be the constants of French political culture. All groups and forces 
will in their political activity have to refer, consciously or uncon-
sciously, to these factors. How this process takes place will be seen 
below. 
Chapter 3 
The political framework 
(1) The problem of constitution 
The question of a constitution may seem at first glance to the apolitical 
student to be somewhat obscure, full of meaningless details which 
have little to do with any kind of reality. Yet the problem of the 
constitution has loomed large in French life for the best part of two 
hundred years. Ever since the Revolution of 1789, France has been 
searching for political stability and has sought it, via a written text, 
from several traditions in her history and political thought. 
The British reader may ask at this point why a written constitution 
is necessary, but this is how the French define a constitution. (The 
dictionary definition being: charters, fundamental texts which deter-
mine a country's form of government.) This is the essential difference 
between the political traditions of Britain and France (and most other 
countries), in that the British constitution is not written. The average 
Briton knows that British society is, to a greater or lesser degree, 
governed by certain institutions (a monarch, a prime minister and his 
cabinet, a parliament, comprising a lower and an upper house). One 
who is more politically aware may also know that these have evolved 
over centuries, without there being any document which specifically 
confirms their existence as such. Since, too, there has been no rev-
olution in Britain since the mid-seventeenth century, we may not 
unreasonably describe the British political tradition as being one of 
political stability. This tradition also has an effect on the political 
mentality of the British who, by and large, do not feel the need to call 
in question or to abolish British institutions, however much they may 
wish to see these altered. 
Such is not the case in France which has had a large number of 
written constitutions since her first one in 1791. This has a number 
of important consequences: (a) unlike Britain, there .is a different 
political tradition, one of instability and change brought about by 
revolution and (b) more important, the mentality that is engendered 
by such a situation. When a constitution has to be written, there is 
inevitably a need for great clarity of thought, and the choice which 
is finally arrived at implies a recognition of political values. Soph-
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isticated as this approach may be, it also comprises within it an element 
of instability, since there can be no absolute conviction that the con-
stitution will last. 'Les Franyais sont souvent comme le Poete: les 
pieds a peine sur terre et la tete dans les Etoiles. Specialement des 
qu'ils evoquent la Constitution, dont ils ont si souvent change: ils 
revent toujours de la prochaine, tout en se referant a la defunte qu'ils 
ont fini par comprendre, tandis qu'ils vivent presentement avec un 
autre texte' (M. Jobert, 'Le partage du pouvoir executif, Pouvoirs, 
no. 4, 1978, p. 7). 
Once a regime is established, it must face up to the supporters of 
its predecessor, it must inculcate into the nation at large a respect 
for the new institutions. It may be possible to assume general approval 
for the new regime, if there has been a referendum, for example, but 
this does not mean a pledge of undying support from a nation whose 
history has, since 1789, seen regimes come and go at an average rate 
of once every twelve years. Consequently, the political parties and 
groups all have to explain their situation vis-a-vis the institutions 
existing at the time, which cannot be taken for granted, as they tend 
to be in Britain. 
In creating a constitution, both the form and the nature of govern-
ment have to be considered. Form here is taken to mean the external 
appearance of power, as in (a) a monarchy (rule of one), whereby 
power is, to a greater or lesser degree entrusted to one individual, 
and handed on to a successor via the hereditary principle, or in (b) 
a republic, where again, as a rule, there is one individual - a president 
- holding a greater or lesser degree of power, but who has arrived at 
that pitch of eminence by process of election for a specific number of 
years. More important than the form, however, is the nature of govern-
ment. The first distinction to be made here is also the most funda-
mental: a government is either free or it is not, which means that it 
permits or forbids the exercise of the basic human and civil rights. 
However, such a basic distinction can be modified in various ways. 
A government, whether republic or monarchy, may be described as 
authoritarian, if virtually all political power is in the hands of one 
individual, without there being any checks to limit its use (arbitrary 
power). On the other hand a government may be parliamentary, i.e. 
where most power is in the hands of the law-making body of elected 
representative11 known as the legislature or parliament ( comprised of 
one single assembly, or an upper and a lower house) and where the 
executive derives its authority to act from parliament. Inasmuch as 
this form of government derives its power from the election of national 
representatives, it may reasonably be assumed that it will ensure the 
preservation of the basic freedoms since it must, every so often, face 
an electorate at the polls. However, although a parliament is an elected 
body, this does not necessarily imply that the whole nation is involved 
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in its election; there is therefore one further element which a consti-
tution-maker may wish to take into account - democracy, which 
means that the nation as a whole has a substantial say in the election 
of its government. Normally we may expect to find in a parliamentary 
democracy a head of state, with purely formal and ceremonial duties, 
an executive comprising a prime minister and a ministerial team, 
taken from the majority opinion in the legislature, and deriving its 
authority from the legislature, to whom it is responsible. In opposition 
to this form of government, one might consider a 'presidential' system, 
with power stemming from the president himself. Furthermore, a 
government may be composed of varying and contradictory elements 
and merely tend more in one direction than another. Theoretically 
at least, an authoritarian government may be democratic as well, and 
some authorities would claim that a government may be both parlia-
mentary and presidential. 
Before the Revolution of 1789, there was no written constitution; 
France was governed by a hereditary monarchy in which, although 
there was provision for consultation by the king of the nation's rep-
resentatives in assembly (the Etats-Generaux), the monarch himself 
was the fountain-head of all power - judicial, legislative and executive. 
This was particularly the case in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, when the monarchy is usually described as absolute. It was 
in 1789, even before the drafting of a new constitution, that different 
approaches to government were envisaged, specifically in the Declar-
ation des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (26 August 1789). This 
laid down a number of basic principles, which future governments 
would have to bear in mind. It declared that all men were equal before 
the law and that they had certain rights, such as freedom of thought, 
whether written or spoken, freedom of the person, the right to resist 
oppression, the right to own property. At the same time the political 
rights of the citizens were also defined, i.e. to be involved in the making 
of laws, directly or by representatives. The fundamental point was 
made that sovereignty (and hence authority) resided in the nation, 
consequently, any authority which did not explicitly emanate from 
the nation could not be exercised by any one individual or group. 
These statements were from this time on regarded as fundamental, 
at least in theory, for any constitution and the government which it 
established. 
Between 1789 and 1799 there were a number of fairly short-lived 
governments, starting off with an ill-starred attempt at a modified 
monarchy, and thereafter a republic was established under varying 
forms. It is from 1799 that a clearer picture begins to emerge of French 
political tradition which, on the basis of her history since the revol-
utionary decade, and in the terms of the nature of government, has 
The political framework 113 
two essential aspects which are undoubtedly paradoxical, if not mutu-
ally exclusive, since they concern parliamentary government on the one 
hand, and authoritarian government on the other. The French parlia-
mentary tradition derives initially in the nineteenth century from two 
attempts to establish a constitutional monarchy ( on the British pattern, 
where the monarch's powers are very much reduced as compared with 
the eighteenth-century absolute monarchy). These two attempts, the 
Bourbon Restoration (1814-30), and the July Monarchy (1830-48) 
where the Orleans dynasty (younger Bourbon line) was brought to 
the throne, both failed, and were each brought to an end by a rev-
olution, in 1830 and in 1848. The third attempt at parliamentary 
government was that of the Third Republic, which was born out of 
military disaster in 1870, gave itself a set of laws providing for parlia-
mentary government in 1875, and fell in 1940, again as a result of 
foreign invasion. A further attempt at parliamentary government was 
made with the creation of the Fourth Republic, which, unlike its 
predecessor, lasted only twelve years (1946-58). 
The second tradition may be described as authoritarian, where 
most of the power is in the hands of the executive, and where power 
of the legislature is weak or merely fictional. It could be said with 
justification that this tradition originates with the absolute -monarchy 
of pre-Revolutionary days, but it is essentially to be seen in the regimes 
headed by the two Bonapartes. These were the consulate (1799-1804) 
and the empire (1804-14) of Napoleon Bonaparte: also (to a lesser 
extent), the Second Republic (1848-52), of which Napoleon's nephew, 
Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, was president; and the Second Empire 
(1852-70) in which he took the title of Napoleon III. In each case, 
the legislature was weak, and the powers of the executive were 
strengthened by the use of what was then known as a plebiscite (now 
called a referendum) - an appeal to the people on specific issues, 
like the establishment of a new regime (which often meant the ratifi-
cation of a coup d'etat), or some important change to be made to 
already existing institutions. The powers of the executive were also 
strengthened in the Second Republic l;>y the election of the president 
of the republic by universal manhood suffrage. The use of the plebiscite 
conferred on these authoritarian regimes an aura of democracy. An 
appeal to the people, in itself democratic, could be and was used to 
bolster up regimes which, to a considerable extent, did not accord to 
the nation at large the basic freedoms as laid down in the Declaration 
des droits de l'homme et du citoyen. 1 
As far as the form of government is concerned, the French tradition 
is more straightforward. We have seen that the attempts in the thirty 
years following Napoleon's reign to establish a constitutional monarchy 
were unsuccessful, partly because the members of the lower house 
of parliament (chambre des deputes) were elected by a fraction of the 
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population, but also because, in their different ways, the monarchs 
exercised more power than the constitution gave them, and than was 
consonant with the role of constitutional monarch; hence the use by 
some experts of the term 'Orleanist' to describe a constitutional head 
of state who exercised improperly wide powers. It is also a fact that 
the early attempts to form a republic failed, particularly in terms of 
durability. The First Republic came under the influence of varying 
political factions from 1792 onwards, only to end up as the authori-
tarian consulate of Napoleon Bonaparte. The Second Republic had an 
even shorter life, being killed off by its first president, Louis Napoleon, 
who felt that it did not give him adequate powers to govern effectively. 
The third attempt, the Third Republic, was much more successful in 
terms of length, and it can be said that this long-lasting, if rather 
unspectacular, regime consolidated the republican tradition in France. 
Yet it was republicanism of a parliamentary type (unlike the Second 
Republic, where the powers of the single deliberative body, the as-
semblee nationale, and of the president had been almost equally 
weighted); but adde"d to it was universal manhood suffrage, in the 
election of its representatives. 
The situation of the president de la republique in the Third Republic 
was unusual, in that his powers were substantial, prior to the voting 
of the constitutional laws of 1875 which reduced them somewhat; 
although he still had the task of selecting the president du conseil 
{head of government). However, amongst the ceremonial and formal 
powers of the president {henceforth to be elected by the two houses 
of parliament) was one which should have given him some political 
influence. This was article 5 of the law of 25 February 1875, which 
gave the president, with the senate's (upper house's) agreement, the 
power to dissolve the chambre des deputes (lower house) before the 
expiry of its mandate. Unfortunately, the second president of the 
republic, Marshal MacMahon, a royalist, chose to exercise this right 
against an increasingly republican chambre des deputes on 16 May 
1877 - circumstances which gave rise to such controversy that no 
president ever dared to use the powers of dissolution again. The signifi-
cance of this is twofold: first, it gave rise, during the Third Republic, 
to great ministerial instability, given the number of political parties 
and the consequent need for coalition governments, since the right of 
dissolution had been intended as a weapon against the irresponsible 
overturning of cabinets. Every time a ministry was defeated and had 
to resign, there ought to have been a general election, when the 
deputies would have had to face their electorates; but since the right 
of dissolution was never used, this did not happen. Furthermore, the 
weakness of the president's powers meant that, in the main, those 
who sought the office tended not to be men of great personality or 
of authority. Any attempt to strengthen the office was stifled by 
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parliament, and presidents who attempted to use wider powers were 
pressurized out of office by an outraged parliament.2 As it was, the 
assumption tended to be that the president had no real powers; and 
at a moment of crisis, the president was left, rightly or wrongly, with 
an impression of total helplessness. 
It would nevertheless be unfair to suggest that the Third Republic 
fell only because its institutions were at fault; however, the debacle 
of l 940 did permit General de Gaulle to press for a very different type 
of constitution to be set up after the liberation. His concept of the 
ideal constitution for France was outlined in his speech at Bayeux, 
16 June 1946, where he laid the blame for a number of France's 
problems squarely at the door of the political parties, whose dis-
agreements had caused the national interest to suffer, giving rise in-
evitably to a lack of respect on the part of the French for their 
institutions. These therefore should be changed. His demands boiled 
down to two essential requirements: a strong executive (head of state) 
with wide powers, elected by a large electoral college ( not merely the 
two houses of parliament), and the separation of executive, legislative 
and judicial powers. A further requirement stemmed from the separ-
ation of powers, namely that the powers of the executive should not, 
as had been the case in the Third Republic, proceed from the legislature 
(president du conseil, supported by a majority of the chambre des 
deputes; president de la republique, elected by the two houses of 
parliament). 
These views were not heeded, and the Fourth Republic was es-
tablished with a constitution very like that of the Third, providing 
for a head of state elected by the two houses of parliament, with 
powers which made of him merely a figurehead, the real power still 
remaining in the hands of the legislature. It was not until 1958, when 
the Fourth Republic virtually ground to a halt over the Algerian crisis, 
that de Gaulle had an opportunity to put his constitutional ideas into 
effect, and the constitution of the Fifth Republic was adopted by a 
large majority at the referendum of 28 September 1958 (I 7,668,790 
in favour; 4,624,511 against; 4,016,614 abstentions). 
Since that time, the Fifth Republic has given proof of its stability. 
Of all the regimes which have governed.France since the Revolution of 
1789, only the Third Republic lasted longer. It could be alleged that 
this stability stems in part from the continuity provided by the Fifth 
Republic's first three presidents: de Gaulle, Pompidou and, to a lesser 
degree, Giscard d'Estaing, shared broadly the same political standpoint. 
At all event, the right and centre in coalition held power in France for 
the best part of twenty-three years. No alternance was to occur until 
the election of F. Mitterrand in May 1981, and the subsequent election 
in June of an assemblee nationale, where the socialists gained an overall 
majority. Yet if the transfer of power from right to left has taken place 
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so smoothly, after so long a dominance by the former, it must be admitted 
that the institutions of the Fifth Republic have proved their efficacy. 
The constitution of the Fifth Republic provides for a lower house 
(assemblee nationale}, an upper house (senat), a prime minister and a 
president of the republic with very wide powers. First of all, his role 
is defined: 'le President de la Republique veille au respect de la Con-
stitution. Il assure, par son arbitrage, le fonctionnement regulier des 
pouvoirs publics ainsi que la continuite de l'Etat. Il est le garant de 
l'independance nationale, de l'integrite du territoire, du respect des 
accords de Communaute et des traites' (article 5). This definition is 
important, because any incumbent of the presidency has a reasonably 
clear idea as to the extent of his role, and it is in order that he may 
carry out this task, that powers are allotted to him which presidents 
of the Third and Fourth Republics did not possess. He has, for 
example, the power to put to a referendum a proposed piece of legis-
lation, thereby by-passing parliament - the normal law-making body 
(article 11). He also has the right to dissolve the assemblee nationale 
(article 12) and finally, the right to take special powers in moments 
of crisis (article 16). These powers represent a very substantial advance 
on those enjoyed by earlier presidents. Other, more ceremonial powers, 
remain much the same as for earlier presidents, such as the promul-
gation (official publication) of laws, and, if deemed necessary, the 
right to ask parliament to reconsider legislation which it has just passed 
(article 10), the appointment to civil and military posts in the state, 
the signing of ordinances and decrees (article 13), the accrediting of 
ambassadors (article 14) and the prerogative of mercy (article 17). 
Clearly the president of the Fifth Republic is no longer merely a 
constitutional head of state - that part of the executive dealing only 
with ceremonial, what Walter Bagehot would call 'the dignified parts 
of government', but a head of state who is politically active as well -
a key figure in the 'efficient parts' of government. 
As the president of the republic's powers have increased, so the 
role of parliament has been reduced, having suffered under the Fifth 
Republic what has been described as a 'constitutional assault'.3 Very 
precise measures were introduced into the constitution to ensure 
that the political parties (and, hence, parliament) should no longer 
hold supreme political power. It is stated in the constitution, for 
example (article 34), that parliament votes the law, which is then 
defined in detail. This has a limiting effect, since anything outside 
the definition given is also outside parliament's competence, particu-
larly when it is made clear (article 37) that matters not comprised 
within the definition of 'law' have a 'caractere reglementaire', which 
means that a minister may deal with them, without the need for par-
liamentary scrutiny. Furthermore, the existence of the conseil con-
stitutionnel with powers to decide whether or not (a) a specific subject 
comes within the definition of 'law', (b) legislation passed by parlia-
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ment is constitutional, and ( c) the election of deputies has been con-
ducted in a proper manner, limits the powers of parliament to conduct 
its own affairs. 
Although in formal terms the government is still responsible to 
parliament, that responsibility has clearly been attenuated by the 
provisions of the constitution - representing an unequivocal endeavour 
by de Gaulle and his advisers in 1958 to reduce the extent of ministerial 
instability which had bedevilled the coalition ministries of the Third 
and Fourth Republics. A new prime minister, appointed by the 
president, seeks a vote of confidence from the assemblee nationale, on 
his political programme. As for censure motions, it is explicitly stated 
that a censure motion must be signed by at least one-tenth of the 
members of the assemblee, and the vote takes place forty-eight hours 
later. The only votes counted are those which support the motion 
(i.e. abstentions are counted as being favourable to the government), 
and there has to be a majority, not merely of those voting, but of all 
members of the assemblee nationale. Those who signed the motion 
may not sign another in that same parliamentary session. The prime 
minister may also ask for a vote of confidence on a specific text, 
which is considered as adopted unless a censure motion is proposed 
within the following twenty-four hours and a vote taken thereon as 
already indicated. It is clear enough that considerable obstacles are 
put in the way of any assemblee nationale wishing to bring down 
a government: the very precise nature of the procedure to follow, 
the required lapses of time, the requirement that ten per cent of 
deputies sign the motion, that they may not sign another in that 
session, all this means that the opposition, by definition more likely 
to oppose government policies, and also by definition in a minority, 
would have to be careful not to fritter away its numbers in vain at-
tempts. The success of this in terms of governmental stability is that 
only one censure motion has ever been passed in the twenty-year 
life of the Fifth Republic - on 5 October 1962, when G. Pompidou's 
government was brought down over de Gaulle's decision to put to 
referendum the proposed election of the president of the republic 
by universal suffrage.4 
In the Fifth Republic's constitution, we have seen that a very 
decided (and successful) attempt was made to cut down the powers of 
the parties. It may be asserted that, in support of this, an attempt was 
also made to deal with what was viewed as the excessive number of par-
ties at source in the electoral legislation. During the Fourth Republic a 
form of proportional representation obtained. This system, thought to be 
too favourable to the existence of numerous parties, was altered in 
1958 to one in which voters, instead of voting for several candidates, 
could vote only for one. If a successful candidate has an absolute 
majority (i.e. more than the total votes gained by his rivals), he is 
elected depute. If, however, the majority is only relative, then there 
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is a further vote in which those candidates who have gained votes 
totalling a minimum of 12.5 per cent of the number of registered 
voters, may stand again for election. In this election, a relative majority 
is sufficient to be elected depute. It is at this point that parties in 
alliance may agree on a policy of desistement, whereby one unsuc-
cessful candidate may stand down in favour of another and encourage 
his supporters to cast their votes in the latter's favour. One further 
innovation is the requirement that each candidate supply himself 
with a suppleant, to take over the depute's seat in parliament, in the 
event of death, or resignation, thereby preventing by-elections. How-
ever, the principal reason for this innovation was the constitutions's 
insistence on the incompatibility of the office of minister and that 
of depute. Any depute acceding to ministerial office must give up 
his seat in parliament to his suppleant. Such a constitutional require-
ment is the logical consequence of the separation of legislative and 
executive powers, and, while it may shed a vivid light on the nature 
of the Fifth Republic's government, it causes no little inconvenience 
to the professional politician who, when giving up office, must either 
wait until the next general elections, or prevail upon his suppleant 
to resign in order that a by-election may be held, which virtually 
nullifies the principle of incompatibility. 5 
While the electoral system as put into effect under de Gaulle was 
clearly designed to control the power of parliament, later changes have 
put that design into some doubt. The first, under Giscard, was the law 
of 7 July 1977 which provided for elections of the French representatives 
to the European parliament to take place on the basis of proportional 
representation. It has been suggested by J. Hayward that had Giscard 
chosen to bring in proportional representation also for the legislative 
elections, his chances of reconstituting the centre alliance would have 
been greater, and his own position strengthened thereby. However, he 
chose not to do so, and it was not until the Mitterrand presidency that 
further proportional representation was introduced for municipal elec-
tions in towns with a population of 3,500 inhabitants or more. This 
tendency to return to proportional representation makes it more likely 
that in due course this electoral system will also be reintroduced for the 
legislative elections. There has been a good deal of discussion about 
such a possibility, which is not now likely to be brought in before 1986 
(i.e. before the end of the present parliament). Yet such a change could 
have very significant consequences for the party system which at present 
obtains in France. 
The provisions of the constitution, together with the electoral 
law, make parliament a much less powerful body than in the past. 
As a consequence, the nature of the regime is a matter for a great 
deal of discussion, as to whether it is essentially parliamentary or 
presidential. The views of the opposition (the left) have been con-
sistent in condemning what they see as the anti-parliamentary nature 
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of the regime (see, for a typical example, pp. 150-2 of the Programme 
commun, Paris, Editions Sociales, 1972). The principal architect of 
the constitution, Michel Debre, denies this categorically: 'Si les gaul-
listes . . . condamnent le regime representatif, ils ne sont pas hostiles 
au regime parlementaire ... les constituants de 1958 ont voulu renover, 
en France, le regime parlementaire.'6 It has however been suggested 
that the election of the president by universal suffrage, approved by 
referendum in 1962, marked a profound change in the nature of the 
regime. Nevertheless the change, in his view, does not mean that the 
prime minister, whose duties are defined in article 21, is strippetl of 
power, but rather that a dyarchy (rule of two) is created - an opinion 
roundly denied by de Gaulle in his press conference of 31 January 
1964 where, in describing the respective duties of president and prime 
minister, he implied that while the former indicated the outlines of 
policy, it was the latter's task to put this into effect. However, if we 
look at the way in which the president appoints and dismisses the 
prime minister, it may be possible to establish the relative powers 
of each, and hence the nature of the regime. In a purely parliamentary 
regime, the choice of prime minister is, as a rule, a very straightforward 
one: either he is the elected leader of the majority party (in a two-
party system), or else he is the accepted leader of a coalition (in a 
multi-party system, either by presidential choice, thereafter ratified by 
parliament, or simply by an agreement between the parties concerned). 
The prime minister in the Fifth Republic is only very rarely the 
party leader (as in the case of J. Chirac, who became leader of the 
Gaullist party while prime minister, but resigned the post with the 
explicit approval of the president). He is, as a rule, one of the party's 
leaders - possible exceptions here being Pompidou and Raymond 
Barre, the latter chosen more for his economic expertise than for his 
influence in any party. Since the Gaullists were the majority party ( with 
or without allies) for over twenty years, it should theoretically have 
been possible {barring death or other incapacity) for the same in-
dividual to have held the post of prime minister for the whole of that 
time. This would be technically feasible in a parliamentary situation 
if one party remained in the majority throughout, and should, on the 
face of it, be equally possible in the Fifth Republic. Article 8 of the 
constitution concerning the appointment of the prime minister is 
couched as follows: 'Le president de la Republique nomme le Premier 
ministre. Il met fin a ses fonctions sur la presentation par celui-ci de 
la demission du gouvemement. Sur la proposition du Premier ministre, 
il nomme les autres membres du gouvemement et met fin a leurs 
fonctions.' A strict reading of this text implies that the president 
of the republic merely receives the prime minister's resignation, but 
does not provoke it. The only reference to the cause of a resignation 
is to be found in article 50, which indicates that if a censure motion 
is passed, or if there is formal disapprobation by the assemblee nation-
120 The political framework 
ale of government policy, then the prime minister and his government 
must resign. The theoretical inference, in strict terms, is clear: only the 
assemblee nationale can bring down a government. Furthermore, during 
the elaboration of the constitution in 1958, on 8 August, de Gaulle 
categorically denied that the president of the republic could dis-
miss the prime minister (see Avis et debats du Comite consultatif 
constitutionnel, Paris, Documentation franc;:aise, 1960, p. 118). It is also 
a fact that proposals tending to permit the dismissal of the prime 
minister were not accepted. By 1964, however, de Gaulle, in his press 
conference, made it perfectly clear that the president could not only 
choose the prime minister, but change him when necessary (press 
conference, 31 January 1964), and a similar line was taken by President 
Pompidou during his term of office. 
The practice of dismissing prime ministers has tended to follow 
the 1964 rather than the 1958 pattern. The exchange ofletters between 
president and premier makes it clear that if one sticks rigidly to the 
texts, the following points emerge: that the resignation of M. Debre 
was the result of a 'gentleman's agreement' arrived at beforehand 
between president and prime minister; that General de Gaulle dis-
missed Pompidou but wished it to appear as if he had not done so; 
that Chaban-Delmas was dismissed by the president; and, finally, that 
Chirac felt that he had insufficient powers to carry out his task and 
therefore asked to be released from office. 7 In none of these cases 
was parliament in any way involved. It is noticeable, on the contrary, 
that in the case of Chaban-Delmas, the prime minister had been at 
pains to obtain a vote of confidence from the assemblee nationale; 
noticeable also that a successor was appointed during the summer 
recess, and that parliament had no opportunity to discuss the change 
until the beginning of the next parliamentary session. 
It must be evident from these instances therefore, that although 
the prime minister may be said to have a formal and limited responsi-
bility to parliament in the Fifth Republic, the bulk of his responsibility 
is towards the president who appoints and dismisses him. Clearly 
common sense would indicate the difficulty, in practical terms, of two 
men working closely together if one is uncongenial to the other; but 
it is not a problem which must be reckoned with in parliamentary 
government, where the head of state must put up with wl!atever the 
majority sends him. It is indeed an indication of how far the regime 
has travelled since 1958. 
The government, as a consequence of the incompatibility principle, 
must depend much more on the support of the president than on that 
of parliament. Those who become ministers may have been deputes 
but, in certain fields, are just as likely to be 'technocrats', for example 
in foreign affairs, where career diplomats have frequently been ap-
pointed (MM. Couve de Murville, Sauvagnargues, de Guiringaud) and 
in education, where academics with a career in administration have 
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been appointed (R. Haby, A. Saunier-Sette). This can be looked upon 
as a new departure, a step into the technocratic age, or as one more 
link with tradition (either pre-Revolutionary or Bonapartist), where 
experts were very often chosen to act as ministers and to aid the 
sovereign. 
One further point must be mentioned, since it is furiously debated 
prior to every general (legislative) election. What happens if the 
president of the republic and the parliamentary majority are of dif-
ferent political persuasions; in other words, which expression of public 
opinion is to be taken as predominant? De Gaulle's answer to the 
problem was straightforward - the threat ( or promise) of his resig-
nation if he did not receive adequate support. Pompidou's response 
was rather more drastic in his press conference of 21 September 1972 
(see Le Monde, 23 September 1972) where he made it clear that in 
the event of an electoral victory of the unified left, he would not call 
upon its leaders to form a government, and that if the government 
which he chose (presumably a minority one) were overturned, he 
would dissolve the assemblee nationale. V. Giscard d'Estaing's answer 
to the problem has been decidedly more subtle, namely to indicate 
that he would fulfil his term of office and put into effect the program-
me of the majority, a position which has. been described as a coup 
d'etat, in comparison with the attitude of his predecessors.8 
The position of F. Mitterrand in relation to the role of the presidency 
is a curious one. His general attitude while in opposition was invariably 
critical of the Fifth Republic's institutions, to such an extent that one 
commentator has described as 'une sorte d'aversion viscerale envers le 
style et les moeurs gaullistes' (P. Valadier, 'Fran9ois Mitterrand - des 
idees politiques pour prendre le pouvoir' in Projet, no. 170, December 
1982, p. 1176). Since coming to power, however, he is on record as 
having stated that he would exercise to the full the powers accorded to 
him by the Constitution (see Le Monde, 2 July 1981). Thus it is that in 
the matter of relations between presidency and parliament, he has 
adopted a more Gaullian stance than his immediate predecessor. This is 
most clearly evidenced in the dissolution of the assemblee nationale by 
Mitterrand as soon ashe assumed office (22 May 1981), in the (fulfilled) 
hope of obtaining a majority sympathetic to his political programme, 
which, given the scope of the reforms already initiated and of those still 
in preparation, he undoubtedly needed. 
The use of article 12 by Mitterrand in this instance makes it as clear as 
ever that in the.event of a disagreement between president and parliament, 
the former still has the whip hand, since he can dissolve the assemblee 
nationale if he so chooses. While it may be true, therefore, to say that 
the constitution of the Fifth Republic may be read as a parliamentary 
one, it could equally be suggested that this has scarcely been the case in 
reality as yet. From 1958 up to the time of writing, parliament and 
president have been fundamentally of the same political persuasion, and 
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there has as yet been no opportunity to find out how the machinery of 
the constitution would function if the president and the majority in the 
assemblee nationale and in the senat were to be politically opposed. On 
the other hand, another interpretation would indicate that the reliance 
of successive presidents on a sympathetic parliamentary majority makes 
clear where a substantial degree of power still lies. 
As well as ambiguity in practice, there is clearly a good deal of 
ambiguity in the very text of the constitution itself, which makes a 
conclusion on its nature difficult to arrive at. The case of article 8 has 
already been mentioned. Ministerial responsibility (to parliament), al-
ways the hallmark of a parliamentary government, is only mentioned in 
relation to its very limited application of articles 49 and 50. The president 
of the republic, however, is said, by virtue of article 68, not to be res-
ponsible for actions committed by him during his term of office - except 
in the case of high treason. The political irresponsibility of the head of 
state is again the characteristic of a parliamentary government, but, as 
we know, in the Fifth Republic the president has wide powers bestowed 
upon him, and, in eight cases (articles 8, 11, 12, 16, 18, 54, 56 and 61) 
acts without the need of ministerial counter-signature. What is the 
reason for this ambiguity, which is to be found in the constitution's 
text rather than in its practice? The answer seems to have been one 
of political expediency in 1958, since, although at that time the con-
stitutional ideas of de Gaulle were paramount, and those of Debn: 
exceedingly influential, there were other parliamentarians who played 
a part in the discussions.9 It can therefore be assumed that, although 
many of them wished to see the establishment of a more stable govern-
ment, they might have considered de Gaulle's ideal regime as going 
too far in the anti-parliamentary direction, and that consequently a 
certain amount of 'masking' of de Gaulle's ultimate intentions was 
necessary. 
Certains d'entre nous dans les premieres annees de la ye Repub-
lique, se sont parfois etonnes, devant le general de Gaulle, de ce 
qu'il ait accepte une Constitution plus traditionnellement parle-
mentaire que ce qu'auraient normalement comporte ses prises de 
position anterieures et sa volonte bien actuelle d'affirmer l'auto-
rite du President ... les explications donnees tournaient toujours 
autour de deux poles: les milieux politiques y auraient vu du bona-
partisme et le pays n'aurait pas compris. (B. Tricot et al., De Gaulle 
et le service de l'etat, p. 148) 
Apart therefore from analyses of stronger presidential and weaker 
parliamentary powers, the controversial use of article 11 in 1962, 
the subsequent election of the president by universal suffrage, de 
Gaulle's admission allows us to put aside the 'Orleanist' interpretation, 
even for the period of 1958-62. It can be said that a substantially 
wider suffrage (notables plus parliament = 80-100,000 electors) 
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represents a step towards universal suffrage; but, more crucially, as 
Leon Blum foresaw, the logic of the 'Bayeux system' meant inevitably 
a recourse to universal suffrage to elect a president de la republique, to 
whom such wide powers would be given (see Le Populaire, 21 June 
1946) - much wider powers than those enjoyed by even an 'Orleanist' 
constitutional monarch. The comparison which springs inevitably to 
mind is that between the president of the Fifth Republic and Napoleon 
III, as he would have been, had the Liberal Empire of 1870 not been 
swept away by the Franco-Prussian war. Provision was made specifically 
for responsible ministers, but the emperor still retained the right to 
appeal to the people via a plebiscite. Thus we may consider the Fifth 
Republic an undoubted descendent of the authoritarian/plebiscitarian 
tradition rather than· of parliamentary government. 
One further possibility has been suggested: 
Les constituants (of 1958) ont voulu que la Constitution puisse faire 
l'objet de plusieurs 'lectures' differentes. En fonction de la person-
nalite du President de la Republique et de celle du Premier Ministre, 
de la composition politique de l'Assemblee nationale et meme du 
Senat, de la concordance entre la majorite parlementaire et la majori-
te presidentielle, la Constitution etablit un regime qui peut etre soit 
plutot presidentiel, soit plutot parlementaire. (J. -L. Debre, La Con-
stitution de la ve Republique, p. 327) 
The very fact that the constitution of the Fifth Republic apparently 
lends itself to so many interpretations, is in itself a factor of arbitrari-
ness and hence a link with the authoritarian tradition, since the 
president may decide as he sees fit how he will interpret the consti-
tution's description of his powers. Far from being a factor of stability, 
such a situation could, in the long run, prove to be a danger at the 
moment when one interpretation supersedes another, possibly giving 
rise, not merely to theoretical controversy, but to political and civil 
strife in a country which easily accepts the legitimacy of revolution 
and the rise and fall of governments. 
(2) Aspects of central government 
The foregoing conclusion, arrived at almost exclusively on theoretical 
grounds, may be considered, for that reason alone, suspect. Since an 
interpretation of the theory suggests that the Fifth Republic is es-
sentially presidential rather than parliamentary, more concrete proof 
ought to be adduced as well. This section will therefore attempt to 
focus on areas of the governmental machine which indicate this 
tendency. 
It is perhaps worth noting in this context the fact that the deputy 
is no longer regarded by the general public as the all-powerful figure 
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that he had been in the Third and Fourth Republics. (P. Birnbaum, 
Les Sommets de l'etat, p. 79) 
Like the simple deputy, parliament also has been stripped of power. 
The constitutional restrictions on her role have already been noted, 
but there are other practical restrictions which have been imposed by 
government regulations. For example, parliamentary sessions, two per 
year, now have a maximum life of ninety days each, which in fact 
means that there is invariably insufficient time to cope with legislation; 
this leads to undue haste and poorly drafted texts. The government 
decides on the day's business in both houses, the ordre du jour, with 
the opposition having no say in the matter; and it may also force on 
the assemblee nationale a single vote on the text which it has proposed, 
together with such amendments which it has suggested itself, or of 
which it approves. This reduces the power of both houses of parliament 
materially to affect government proposals during their legislative 
passage. Parliament's power of amendment is also restricted by article 
40 of the constitution which disallows any amendment tending to 
reduce public resources (i.e. taxation) or implying the creation or 
increase of public expenditure. The idea behind this provision was 
clearly to deny deputies the possibility of demagogic gestures designed 
to appeal to their constituents, as well as to embarrass the government. 
While a measure of this kind could possibly be viewed as an aid to 
efficiency in the dispatch of government business, its interpretation 
may give rise to restrictions of the most ludicrous kind.10 
Proposed legislation must be debated not only in parliament as a 
whole, but by one of six permanent committees: commission des 
finances; commission des affaires etrangeres; commission de la defense 
nationale; commission des lois ( dealing with legiµ and administrative 
questions); commission des affaires culturelles, familiales et sociales; 
commission de la production et des echanges. This system is unsatis-
factory, since the committees are too large, some of them having 
well over one hundred members. Also, parliament is required to debate, 
not the draft legislation as amended by the appropriate committee, 
but the government's original version, which makes a mockery of the 
committee's labours. In the case of the budget also, parliament's rights 
are restricted: if the budget has not been passed in seventy days, the 
government can enact it by ordinance. Again, the amount oflegislation 
to be dealt with in the short parliamentary sessions, makes proper 
parliamentary supervision impossible. 
Yet with the maintenance, albeit in reduced form, of the govern-
ment's responsibility to parliament, there must still be at least a 
measure of lip-service paid to that concept. Consequently, the govern-
ment must keep parliament informed of its activities, either by state-
ments to parliament, or by the method of parliamentary questions, 
whether oral or written. The use of questions requiring written answers 
is extensive, but the possibilities of parliamentary power in question 
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time have not been exploited. As V. Wright has indicated (p. 138), 
deputies seem resigned to the fact that government pays little heed to 
their queries, and they themselves do not react firmly enough when the 
government acts in a way which improperly reduces parliamentary 
control over government. This, together with the legitimate methods 
used by government to restrict parliament's powers, is quite sufficient 
to engender in the deputies 'desaffection et desengagement a l'egard du 
role national' (see J.-C. Masclet, Un deputepourquoifaire?Paris,PUF, 
1982, pp. 181-6). 
Many of these problems arose, however, as a result of the long pre-
dominance in parliament of the Gaullists and their allies. Slightly more 
heed had to be paid to parliament during the presidency of Giscard 
d'Estaing. Some of his reforms suffered as a result of this, notably the 
imposition of a capital gains tax. Furthermore, the power of parliament 
to set up ad hoe commissions of enquiry (commissions d'enquete or 
commissions de contrtJle) has performed a necessary service in bringing 
various types of malpractice into the open. Since the advent of Mitter-
rand, the situation has reverted more to what it was under the first two 
presidencies. If anything, the tendency has been towards an increase of 
presidentialism. 
In this respect, there is little if any fundamental change, and it is clear 
that the executive continues to enjoy wide powers which have resulted 
in a corresponding reduction in those of parliament. Even within the 
domain of law, as defined by article 34 of the constitution, the voting 
of lois cadres (laws indicating tendencies and principles) is often couched 
in the most general of terms. These can only be put into effect by the 
use of ministerial decrees which provide in detail instructions as to how 
the law is to be implemented, and consequently leave to the government, 
in the person of the appropriate minister, substantial interpretative 
powers as well as the faculty to choose when ( or if) the law should be 
brought into effect. The complexity of the budget has given rise to an 
analogous process of debudgetization, which has taken certain areas of 
public spending out of the budget and consequently away from parlia-
mentary surveillance, such as it is. 
The government, thus, is powerful in relation to the body to which, 
in theory, it is responsible, and which has only once succeeded in 
overturning it, according to the terms of article 49. What must now 
be considered is the extent to which anything resembling cabinet 
government exists, i.e. to what extent there is any ministerial soli-
darity or cabinet responsibility, which is assumed to exist in any 
British government (leaks and political memoirs apart). 
The first point to consider is how ministers are chosen. In theory, 
the president of the Republic appoints the prime minister, who then 
chooses his ministerial team. In practice, the prime minister may well 
have imposed upon him by the president individuals whom he personally 
would not have selected. A notable example here is that of Mme Frarn;:oise 
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Giroud, who, having made no secret of her support for Mitterrand in 
the presidential elections of 1974, was asked personally by Giscard to 
take on the post of secretaire d'etat a la condition feminine in J. Chirac's 
government. The counterpart of this direct presidential involvement in 
ministerial appointments has been seen under Mitterrand with the re-
moval of J .-P. Cot as ministre delegue aupres du ministre des relations 
exterieures, charge de la cooperation et du developpement on 9 December 
1982 by the simple expedient of the Elysee spokesman's declaration that 
the post was vacant, without apparent reference to the prime minister. 
Equally, cabinet reshuffles may well take place on presidential instruc-
tions. Under Mitterrand's presidency, the need has also been felt to 
ensure that all political currents within the PS (not to mention the PCF) 
should receive some representation in the government (very much as in 
the days of Giscard, when various centrist groups would be represented). 
In political terms therefore, there is no principle of unity which 
obtains. With the principle of incompatibility between the position of 
deputy and that of minister, the prime minister is no longer obliged to 
choose or appoint deputies or senators, and there has always been in 
the Fifth Republic a percentage of ministers without parliamentary 
experience at the time of their appointment, although they may attempt 
to have themselves elected thereafter.11 
Consequently, the solidarity of the government as a whole is not 
great. While the prime minister is usually at the very least primus inter 
pares, there have been cases where specific ministers have been known 
to be influential, over and above their ministerial role, as in the case of 
M. Poniatowski, when he was interior minister in the Chirac cabinet. An 
analogous situation could be said to exist in the Mauroy government, in 
two forms: (a) with the existence of so-called 'super-ministries' such as 
that of the economy, finance and the budget, at present occupied by 
J. Delors, and (b) by the presence in the cabinet of a minister enjoying 
the confidence of the president in the presentation oflegislation, however 
controversial. A case in point here is that of A. Savary, education minister 
(see chapter 6 for his proposals for private and higher education). Under 
the first three presidencies, the importance of the cabinet meeting seems 
to have been slight. There was apparently little discussion - a prerequisite 
for decision-making. It was possible for ministers to intervene outside 
the area of their own competence, but few did so. F. Giroud's own 
description of cabinet meetings makes them sound unutterably boring.12 
She also indicates that when ministers had proposals to make, these had 
to be submitted to the prime minister, to the president, and to any 
relevant minister, in advance. Where texts were to be considered, or 
read out, these too were invariably handed out in advance. This seems 
to have changed for the better since 1981, with freer discussion and more 
participation by all ministers. Yet all ministers do not automatically 
attend cabinet meetings; since 1977 the secretaires d'etat are briefed by 
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the garde des Sceaux on the proceedings. 
However, there are other meetings, which may be clearly regarded 
as organs of decision-making. Apart from the regular meetings between 
president and prime minister·, the former has similar sessions with the 
other senior ministers, of external relations, finance, and interior. 
There are also three further types of meeting: (1) interdepartmental 
committees, attended by senior civil servants from the ministries and 
chaired by one of the prime minister's own officials; (2) interministerial 
comn;ittees, with the prime minister in the chair, composed of ministers 
and possibly some senior officials, plus representatives from the presi-
dent's own staff; (3) interministerial council or conseil restreint, chaired 
by the president of the republic, where the principal decisions are taken. 
These states are progressively used, if agreement has not otherwise been 
reached at an earlier stage. Such a system also means that it is possible 
for a prime minister to leave out a colleague whose presence is not 
thought desirable at certain meetings. 
United, the ministers would seem to enjoy little influence on general 
lines of policy; within their own ministries, and at the head of their 
own civil service, at the centre and in the provinces they are relatively 
powerful figures. The minister is a member of the government, and as 
such he must make the needs of his ministry known to the president, 
as well as parliament. He is also at the head of his ministry, aided by 
his own personal collaborators (cabinet). 
Powerful though he may seem, the decentralization legislation of 
1982-3 (see below, chapter 3, part 3) is in process of stripping the 
minister of part of his power. The services exterieurs - ministerial field 
services - will pass in due course to the control of the commissaire de 
la Republique (the prefet's new title, taken from the revolutionary tra-
dition of 1848, but a title which is never used). Equally, the change in 
the role of the pref et, whose executive powers in turn pass to the elected 
presidents of the conseil general and conseil regional, are intended in 
theory to reduce centralization, and in so doing, to cut down on the 
power of the ministers in the provinces. 
There are other areas too where the power of all ministers is limited, 
by their financial means, and their wishes are often blocked by the 
finance ministry, known until April 1978 as the ministere de l 'economie 
et des finances. The problem relates specifically to the budget, over which 
many conflicts have arisen between the finance ministry and the spending 
ministries, for example education and agriculture. The preparation of 
the budget is a lengthy process, carried out initially by the directorates 
of forecasting and the budget (directions de prevision et du budget). 
In the budget directorate, work on the budget begins over a year 
earlier in November, the calculations being based on the previous 
year's budget, and on the one actually in operation. The forecasting 
directorate begins its preparation about the same time, and the first 
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phase of its operations lasts about three months, during which it 
considers all possibilities, relating to the international situation as 
well as the state of the national economy. Both directorates present 
their findings to the minister in March, which gives him the material 
necessary to begin the first discussions on the contents of the finance 
bill. Once the government's priorities have been established, there 
follows possibly the most difficult period, between April and July, 
when discussions are held between the finance minister and the various 
spending ministries over running costs. It is at this stage that disputes 
may well have to go to the arbitration of the prime minister, if of-
ficials cannot solve them. The outstanding problems then go before 
the prime minister, the finance minister, and the relevant spending 
minister, and the prime minister's decision is final, although an appeal 
may be made by either side to the president of the republic. In the 
vast majority of conflicts, it is the finance minister's case which 
prevails. 
While the finance ministry has been accused of inordinate con-
servatism, which has caused many proposals of reform to be still-
born, its position has perhaps been less assured during the Fifth 
Republic than under the Fourth. The reason is not hard to find; 
although de Gaulle may not have been interested primarily in economic 
and financial matters, they were always of interest to Pompidou; the 
same can equally well be said of Giscard as a former finance minister, 
and of Barre, who was chosen as prime minister by the president 
specifically for his economic expertise. Yet J. Hayward13 suggests that 
the finance minister had regained a considerable part of his former 
powers because of the emphasis between 1963 and 1966 on the need 
for a balanced budget. It is true that every ministry has within it an 
official appointed by the finance minister, whose task is to exercise 
a preventive control over the ministry's expenditure. This is beneficial 
as far as 'good housekeeping' is concerned, but has caused the finance 
ministry to be considered as inordinately rigid and excessively con-
servative. 
This was the position when, in April 1978 after the legislative 
elections, with the formation of Barre's ministry, the finance ministry 
was split in two, one part becoming the ministere du budget, under 
M. Papon, and the other, the ministere de l'economie. under R. Monory. 
The size of the ministry seems to have been one of the reasons behind 
the change, since the number of principal directorates within the ministry, 
twelve in number, increased the possibility of blocking proposals either 
before their realization, or once work was in progress. The other reason 
for dividing the finance ministry may have been also to render it more 
vulnerable to pressure from the prime minister, Raymond Barre, whereas, 
as a single ministry, it was able to wield more influence. The present 
rearrangement conserves something of the division: J. Delors is now 
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minister of the economy, finance and the budget, but there is a secretaire 
d'etat, at present H. Emmanuelli, who has specific responsibility for the 
budget. This latter post is an important one, since it comprises within it 
four powerful directorates: direction du budget, direction generale des 
douanes et droits indirect, direction des imp6ts, and direction de la 
compatabilite publique (public accounting). Up to now, this arrangement 
has not necessarily resulted in a unified ministry, and the ministry did 
not speak with a single voice on economic matters, where Delors and 
L. Fabius (Emmanuelli's predecessor) were by no means always in full 
agreement in their public pronouncements. 
Two other bodies whose existence tend to shed doubt on the parlia-
mentary nature of the Fifth Republic are respectively the conseil 
d'etat and the conseil constitutionnel. 
The former of these is a Napoleonic creation of 1799 - a renewed 
version of the pre-revolutionary conseil du roi. It had not only adminis-
trative and judicial functions in this early period, but also a legislative 
one, since it was consulted on the drafting of proposed legislation, 
and was responsible for the drafting of all the organic laws, as well 
as of the code civil. 
The present functions of the conseil d'etat are essentially of two 
kinds, consultative and judicial. The consultative functions are under-
taken by the administrative sections - finance, interior, public works, 
and a section dealing with social questions. There is also a general 
assembly comprising all members, who meet at least once a week 
to consider and take a decision on the texts of draft bills, regulations, 
ordinances, as well as matters on which a separate section feels that 
further consideration is desirable. The consultative aspect of the conseil 
d'etat is completed by the existence of a commission permanente 
which may pronounce on draft legislation in exceptional circumstances. 
While the conseil d'etat could be viewed as a body allied to the 
government whose powers impinged on those of parliament, the 
relations between it and the government were by no means cordial. 
De Gaulle was highly displeased with its ruling on his decision to use 
the referendum in 1962 to bring about a change in the election of the 
president of the republic, which he describes in his memoirs as 
'abusive', since it permitted itself to pronounce a political judgment 
on his actions, instead of merely considering the appropriateness of 
the text itself. (It is also worth noting that it took the same line on 
de Gaulle's referendum in 1969.) The conseil d'etat too may be seen 
as the protector of civil rights. Again, it incurred de Gaulle's wrath, 
when its judicial section pronounced the annulment of the military 
court which had been established in 1962 to try rapidly members of 
the OAS. One of these, M. Canal, was condemned to death by the 
court, and sought the ruling of the conseil d'etat. The ordinance of 
1 June 1962, setting up the military court, stated that there was to be 
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no appeal against its ruling; it was for this reason that the decision 
of the conseil d'etat was arrived at. In spite of de Gaulle's anger, there 
seems no reason to doubt that this was a totally unpolitical ruling on 
a matter of civil rights, and many of the judicial rulings of the conseil 
d'etat deal with matters of this kind. 
The creation of the conseil constitutionnel is a complete innovation, 
its essential task being to rule on the conformity of legislation to the 
constitution. It is composed normally of nine people - three appointed 
by the president of the republic and three each by the presidents of 
the two houses of parliament. Fonner presidents of the republic are 
members ex officio. 
An appeal to the conseil constitutionnel for its decision (saisine) 
is provided for in the constitution, where it may be obligatory or 
voluntary, according to circumstances. Cases where an appeal is obliga-
tory include regulations of parliament (by presidents of the (wo 
houses), organic laws (by the prime minister), the use of article 16 
by the president of the republic, irregularity in legislative elections, 
where the matter may be taken up either by the justice minister or by 
the bureau of either house of parliament. Voluntary appeals to the 
conseil constitutionnel are concerned with ordinary legislation, and 
may be made by the president of the republic, the prime minister or 
the presidents of the national assembly and the senate. In 1974 this 
right was extended to groups of sixty deputies and senators, who now 
have also the right to query the constitutional propriety of legislation. 
Initially, the decisions of the conseil constitutionnel were thought 
to be excessively timid, and orientated in favour of the government. 
Unlike the conseil d'etat, it declared in 1962 that it did not have 
the competence to pronounce on de Gaulle's decision to put the 
election of the president of the republic to a referendum. Yet sub-
sequently, its decisions were by no means pleasing to the government -
notably on the question of modifying the arrangements for deputies 
and their suppleants, which failed since the conseil invariably maintained 
the principle of incompatibility existing between the position of minister 
and that of deputy. 
Under Giscard's presidency, however, there were still criticisms made 
of its pro-government stance, notably in the matter of irregularity in 
elections. While the conseil constitutionnel has always declined to 
pronounce on the intervention of the president of the republic on the 
grounds that the head of state is responsible only to the haute cour de 
justice, it does have competence to decide on electoral irregularities 
committed by candidates or their supporters, and consequently it could 
be alleged that there is inequality as between government and opposition. 
Such was the view of Mitterrand himself (see Le Monde 20-l August 
1978), who wrote that he would prefer to see a non-political supreme 
court in charge of these matters. His criticism of the political tendency 
The political framework 131 
of the conseil was undoubtedly a fair one, the root cause being the lack 
of alternance between 1958 and 1981. Since nomination of members 
had for so long rested with the right, the political complexion of the 
conseil must inevitably seem suspect to the left, whether the question 
related to political questions of a controversial nature, such as the law 
on nationalization, which it considered twice, and which was modified 
in consequence, or to the propriety or otherwise, of an election. Yet 
even this situation is to be viewed as less invidious than that of the 
Fourth Republic, where parliament verified the legislative elections itself. 
In the light of this cursory examination, is it possible to assess the 
tendency of the Fifth Republic? There is clearly no doubt as to the 
power of the state, particularly at the centre; whether the state will 
continue to wield power in the provinces remains to be seen. Further-
more, the state has at its service (and has had for two centuries and 
more) groups of highly trained officials, technocrats, capable of passing 
from one aspect of government to another, whether it be conseil d'etat, 
or the central administration of a ministry. Equally, a large number of 
politicians have the same type of training, whether it be as members of 
the inspectorat des finances, cour des comptes, or other grand corps. 
We may therefore be justified in speaking of a political class which, by 
virtue of the grandes ecoles and the concours, may be largely regarded 
as self-perpetuating. 
If this is so, how may the Fifth Republic be regarded as presidential? 
It has been suggested, and rightly, that the president of the republic is 
not able to achieve all his policies, and that the state apparatus is by no 
means unified.Precisely the same comment could be made, for example, 
about the supposedly absolute monarchy of the Ancien regime, or the 
Second Empire, whether in its authoritarian or in its liberal phase. 
Another point which is regarded as significant, is that while the prime 
minister's staff is a relatively large one (at present over fifty persons), 
the president's is relatively small (forty-two, both civilian and military). 
Yet it should be remembered that initially the prime minister's task was 
to carry out in detail the policy outlined by the president. Even this 
emphasis has changed, however, and presidential involvement with 
specific policies and decisions is much more in evidence - inevitable 
when it is remembered that the present president and his two immediate 
predecessors have all had considerable ministerial experience. However 
it is possible to suggest that in the case of Mitterrand, the presidentialism 
of the regime has been further strengthened whether in relation to a 
weaker and more subordinate prime minister, or in terms of greater 
presidential control over the majority party (it is perhaps not without 
significance that L. Jospin, the PS secretary, is a regular attender of 
presidential breakfasts). It is clear that the stated wishes of the president 
take precedence over other legislative matters, which gives to him an 
initiative in this field hitherto the prerogative of the prime minister and 
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the members of parliament. (See H. Portelli, 'Les Socialistes et l'exercice 
du pouvoir', in Projet, no 168, September-October 1982, pp. 922-31.) 
This being the case, there can be little doubt that political responsibility 
rests essentially with the president. 
It is true that among the reforms which are at present either being 
debated or already in process of realization, there are a good many which 
could well be thought liberal in their inspiration. Yet it is perhaps worth 
noting that no attempt has been made to reform the constitution of the 
Fifth Republic (unless Mitterrand's stated preference for a single presi-
dential mandate of seven years can be counted as a statement of intent). 
Possibly the scope and the controversial nature of much of the legislation 
render presidential authority even more necessary in the eyes of the 
government, in order that the changes be effected as soon as possible. 
Yet while it can be alleged that Mitterrand is not only continuing, but 
even increasing the presidentialisrn of his predecessors, the criticisms 
levelled against the Fifth Republic, under their auspices, will continue 
to be made during the Mitterrand presidency. 
As well as political and administrative institutions at the centre and 
a network of personnel spreading over the whole of the country, the 
French state has a further string to its bow, in the shape of the use 
it can make of the mass media. This matter could well be regarded 
as a kind of appendix to the constitution, since, just as much as the 
latter, it confers power on the state - a power which regimes in the 
previous century did not enjoy - namely to communicate information 
and views immediately to the mass of the population. Such a tech-
nological advance may also subject the state to the temptation of 
abuse, of propaganda, hitherto impossible on such a vast scale. The 
use ( or abuse) of these powers may provide yet another indication 
as to the essential nature of the Fifth Republic. 
Censorship of the means of communication has a long history in 
France, dating back to the Ancien Regime. During the nineteenth 
century it existed to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the 
strength or tolerance of successive regimes. Yet the mass media have 
for long been subject to some control by the state. Before the Second 
World War, while a state monopoly existed in theory, private radio 
stations were allowed a measure of freedom to operate on a temporary 
basis. During the war all radio stations, whether privately run or state 
controlled, or, as in the occupied zone, taken over by the occupying 
power, suffered from their financial dependence on the authorities; 
in order to survive, they gave proof of their total docility by the 
constant broadcasting of propaganda. Such an experience was unfor-
tunate for future developments, since it clearly indicated to postwar 
governments the political possibilities inherent in broadcasting, which 
they were consequently reluctant to let out of state control. 
In 1945 the Radiodiffusion-television franraise (RTF) was estab-
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lished by decree which provided for a state monopoly responsible to 
the prime minister and the ministry of information. The RTF was 
headed by a directeur general appointed by the cabinet, and in practice 
was answerable to the information minister. Clearly, such a frame-
work, together with financial dependence, and a lack of coherence 
in the administrative organization, meant that the RTF was very 
vulnerable to political pressure. Various attempts to reform the system 
were made during the Fourth Republic, but to no avail. However, 
the political pressures did not begin to make themselves felt until 
the Algerian war, when broadcasters came under strong pressure, if 
they advocated a political standpoint on the issue, which was hostile 
to the government. The broadcasting of news suffered, inasmuch as 
items relating to the Algerian war which were deemed embarrassing 
to the government, tended to be omitted. 
It was evident that reform was necessary if broadcasting was in 
any way to revert to its role of honestly informing the public. The 
problem arose as to what mechanisms might ensure broadcasting 
integrity. One method might have been to authorize commercial 
broadcasting, which might have ensured genuine freedom of inform-
ation, but was subject to other pressures which would not necessarily 
be calculated to maintain either a high standard of entertainment or 
the ideal of public service. This possibility was therefore not con-
sidered when a reform was introduced by ordinance in the early days 
of the Fifth Republic (4 February 1959). 
Reform might indeed be regarded as too forceful a description, 
since the changes introduced were moderate. The RTF was hence-
forth to be a state establishment of an industrial and commercial 
nature, enjoying financial autonomy, since it would have its own 
budget. Yet the control of the state was still strong, as the RTF still 
came under the authority of the minister of information. It was, 
as before, to be headed by a directeur general, appointed by the conseil 
des ministres. While he was assumed to have charge of the organization 
and its personnel, he could not appoint his deputy, nor the directors 
of the various services, who were, like himself, appointed by the govern-
ment. Political influence was equally evident in the two bodies set up 
to assist the directeur general. The conseil superieur was made up of 
representatives of various ministries and the presidents of the special-
ized programme committees; the comite de surveillance, wherein were 
to be found parliamentarians and officials, only met at the request 
of the minister. 
The involvement of the state became more evident in the early 
1960s, when the numbers of people owning television sets began to 
rise (60,000 in 1954; one million in 1959; three millions in 1963), 
with the possibility which this factor bestowed on the government 
of exercising political persuasion over a substantial part of the 
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population. De Gaulle himself was on the whole a notable television 
performer, and used his skill to the detriment of his political opponents 
and to the enhancing of his own relationship with the electorate. 
Television also provided him with yet another means of by-passing 
parliament, since important matters of policy could be announced 
directly to the nation, or to that portion of it that could afford tele-
vision. 
The problem which state control over the media provoked was 
that, with the Gaullists in power, the media were geared almost ex-
clusively to the presentation of the Gaullist viewpoint, to the detriment 
of any equity or objectivity. While more autonomy for the RTF might 
have helped to correct the balance, there were financial and adminis-
trative difficulties. A further attempt was therefore made to reform 
the system by the law of 27 June 1964. Its main innovations were 
the transformation of the RTF into an office, no longer under the 
authority of the information ministry, but merely under its aegis 
(tutelle) and that of the finance ministry, and the setting up of a 
conseil d 'administration, with half its members representing the state 
and half representing listeners, viewers, the press, and people working 
in the ORTF; they were to serve normally for a three-year period. 
They would elect a president and vice president from amongst their 
number. The tasks of the council were to define general policy, discuss 
the budget and see that it was put into effect, ensure the maintenance 
of quality and moral content in programmes, objectivity and accuracy 
of news and, in general, freedom of expression for the main tendencies 
of opinion and thought. As before, the men at the top, the directeur 
general and his deputies, were nominated by the government. 
In terms of freedom of political expression, the reform changed 
nothing. The views of the government were still presented to the 
virtual exclusion of others, and journalists continued to lose their jobs 
because of their political views. Yet the political dangers to the ruling 
party itself do not seem to have been apparent until the presidential 
election of 1965. De Gaulle's poor performances at the first ballot 
clearly came as a shock to him. All candidates were allowed two 
hours' time on television in the fortnight before the elections, and 
some of his opponents, notably J. Lecanuet, proved more adroit than 
had been expected. De Gaulle, forced to descend from his Olympian 
approach of the first ballot, used all of his television time in the second, 
and adopting a different technique, he went on to win an adequate 
victory (55 per cent of the vote at the second ballot). Television, as 
well as being a new factor in electioneering, also proved a significant 
one in that, with a modicum of equity in television time for all candi-
dates, it aroused political interest and helped to maintain a high 
standard in the electoral campaign. 
Yet it was not until well after the events of May 1968 that further 
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changes were made. After the strike of ORTF journalists, many were 
sacked or put in much less prominent positions. J. Ardagh suggests 
that attempts to stifle opinion had by this time become much more 
subtle, in that anything which could offend the susceptibilities of any 
important group, political or religious, was avoided; which gave rise to 
self-censorship. However, some positive changes were brought in, 
notably the abolition of the information ministry, as the consequence 
of a promise by Pompidou in his presidential campaign of 1969. That 
some further changes were still necessary, was clear from the so-called 
clandestine advertising scandal that broke in 1971. 
The problem was this: commercial radio and television in France 
was not acceptable to the government, but the persistent financial 
difficulties suffered by the ORTF brought a measure of advertising, 
under state control, into the media. There had been since 1960 what 
was known as publicite compensee, that is, advertising for a type of 
goods, but not for a specific brand; this was paid for by commercial 
companies. In October 1968 advertising of specific brands of goods 
was permitted, to the tune of two minutes per day and by 1972 this 
had increased to nineteen minutes. However, in 1971 it was revealed 
that there were very close links between ORTF and an advertising 
agency and that these were being put to improper use. The names 
of specific brands of goods were brought before the public in tele-
vision programmes, allegedly for pecuniary gain on the part of private 
individuals. The solution for this type of malpractice was felt to lie 
in decentralization, but such a solution would not have given the state 
the same hold over broadcasting. A further ominous note was the 
resurrection of the minister of information under a slightly different 
name - secretaire d'etat de la fonction publique et des services de 
l'infonnation - in the person of P. Malaud, who was given the job 
of producing a draft bill on ORTF reform which, in due course, became 
the law of 3 July 1972. Its main innovation was in the creation of a 
president-directeur-general, still appointed by the government for 
three years; he not only headed the ORTF but also presided over the 
conseil d'administration, concocted as before. While the ORTF was 
still under the aegis of the prime minister or his delegate, one change 
seemed to be of very slightly liberal tendency, namely the right of 
reply, where an individual felt that his or her honour, reputation or 
interests had suffered as a result of the content of any broadcast. 
At the same time, however, another provision gave to the PDG powers 
to decide who, in the case of strikes, was to be regarded as essential 
for the continuation of the public service, and who was not - i.e. 
who could strike and who could not; this was inevitably viewed as 
as attempt to curtail the right to withdraw one's labour. 
All in all, this did little to bring about the fundamental changes, 
for which successive reports (by Diligent in 1968 and Paye in 1970) 
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had pressed, notably in the area of decentralization. Nor was the 
appointment of A. Conte, a UDR deputy, particularly reassuring. 
Yet less than two years later, Conte was to leave his post, making his 
reasons completely clear. In October 1973, Malaud had demanded the 
removal of two broadcasters for their political views, stating that unless 
this was done and unless France-Culture (which, he said, was a hotbed 
of communists and cegetistes) was reorganized, there would be no 
increase in the ORTF budget. In due course, Conte was sacked in what 
P. Viansson-Ponte described as 'une forte odeur d'autoritarisme' (Le 
Monde, 24 October 1973) and Malaud moved to another post, although 
not disavowed by the government. 
Up to this point, it can be stated that the authoritarian tendency, 
inherited partly from Vichy and partly from the desire of the left-
wing resistance to have no truck with commercial values and to rely 
on the democratic state for fairness and freedom of expression, had 
scarcely been modified over nearly forty years. With the arrival of 
V. Giscard d'Estaing as president of the republic, the format changes. 
Pompidou had had no doubts on the official role of the ORTF and its 
broadcasters. 'Qu'on le veuille ou non, le journaliste de la television 
n'est pas tout a fait un journaliste comme un autre. Il a des respon-
sabilites particulieres ... Qu'on le veuille OU non, la television est 
consideree comme la voix de la France, et par les Frarn;;ais et par 
l'etranger' (Le Monde, 23 September 1972). 
While the views of V. Giscard d'Estaing were less clear cut, it was 
likely that he would not share those of Pompidou. (His brother, 0. 
Giscard d'Estaing, was a prominent supporter of commercial radio.) 
By August 1974, a law had been prom'ulgated which disbanded the 
ORTF altogether, and reorganized television and radio in seven bodies: 
three television companies, one radio company, a company to produce 
films and plays, another to maintain equipment, and an audio-visual 
institute. It should be made clear that the state is the only shareholder, 
so that such competition as exists is simply between one state organiz-
ation and another. 
Opinions vary as to the success of the reorganization; for some, 
the experience of working in a smaller group of people after the im-
personal ORTF system is beneficial; for others, it has brought about 
a lowering of cultural and artistic standards (see D. Korlin, 'Quelle 
nostalgie de l'O.R.T.F .?' in Le Monde, 24-25 April, 1983). 
In one sensitive area, some benefit seems to have been reaped - free-
dom of political expression. Political parties and trade unions now have 
not only the right to broadcast on FR 3's Tribune libre, but also the 
main political groupings have a right to four party political broadcasts 
per year on the other two channels. 
Yet initially, it did not seem as if much would change with the left, 
with a number of resignations from radio and television under govern-
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ment pressure, and their replacement with people more sympathetic to 
the views of the new majority. Then on 29 July 1982 a law was passed 
dealing with radio and television, and laying down the principle of free-
dom of the media. To ensure their independence a haute autorite de la 
communication audio-visuelle was established, to which they would be 
responsible. Its duties include the regulation of party political broadcasts, 
and programmes dealing with electoral campaigns, and the right of 
reply to government communications. Other responsibilities cover the 
protection of children, the maintenance of equality for women and 
men, the defence of the French language, but also support for regional 
languages and culture. More specifically it appoints at national and 
regional level the presidents of the radio and television companies. 
Whether these new arrangements will give the media greater freedom 
from state intervention remains to be seen. 
In another area too, equally sensitive, the haute autorite has an 
important part to play. If the exclusive involvement of the state in media 
broadcasts seems oppressive, it must be remembered that it is viewed by 
some as the one bulwark, already weakened by the 1974 law, against 
commercialization.14 
There was, in the last five years of Giscard's presidency, an upsurge 
in the number of private radio stations, which proved very embarrassing 
to deal with. Tough legislation was introduced in 1978, but when the left 
came to power, a decision was taken to authorize some of these, even 
before the establishing ofthehauteautorite, whosetaskthishas become. 
There are now officially twenty-two authorized radio stations in Paris, 
and by the end of 1983, there were approximately one thousand through-
out France. Commercialization, however, is still banned, and it is 
thus difficult to see how these private stations will survive. 
The state's relations with the press are in many ways equally am-
biguous if, perhaps, less tortuous. Freedom of the press has formally 
been recognized by the state since 1881, and the problem has been 
since how the state may best nurture that freedom. 
The main danger in the post-war period was felt to come, not 
from the state, but from commercial interests. The ordinances of 1944 
banned any papers which had appeared during the occupation, which 
effectively left the field clear for the clandestine publications of the 
resistance, since only the resistance groups were permitted to publish. 
A stricter definition of the entreprise de presse differentiated it from 
other types of publication in that its productions appearing at least 
once a month were essentially informative, yet not solely scientific, 
artistic, technical or professional. The directeur de publication had 
to be either the owner or the principal shareholder, or the editor of 
the company. It was hoped, in this way, to prevent the setting up of 
large press empires, yet in the main it must be admitted that the spirit 
of the ordinances has not been maintained, since the press groups still 
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exist, the newest and largest being that of R. Hersant, which now 
owns not only the Parisian dailies France-Soir, Le Figaro and /'Aurore, 
but fourteen regional daily papers as well. 
Yet if the anti-monopoly aspects of the 1944 ordinances have not 
been successful, the provision of state assistance which they initiated 
has undoubtedly helped to keep many papers alive - the principle 
behind these provisions being to maintain competition among news-
papers and periodicals, and at the same time to guarantee a measure 
of equality to all these organs. State aid is essentially of two kinds: 
direct assistance in the shape of subsidies for the purchase of printing 
material, for export aid, or direct payments to the railways for trans-
porting of newspapers, and to the PTT for the cost of telephones; 
indirect help, in the shape of reduced rate for postal charges, telegrams, 
etc., reduction in VAT, exemption, whole or in part, from other 
forms of taxation such as the patente (see below). In 1976 and 1977 
this system was increased to take in not only daily papers, but weekly 
publications also, which have to have a national distribution and also 
be of such a nature as to enlighten their readers on national and inter-
national news, and as such, be in the public interest. 
Over all, the aid received by the press from the state in France is 
higher than in any other western country, totalling in 1983 over 5,200 
million francs in direct and indirect aid. This gains for the country, in 
theory, a press which covers a wide range of political opinions and con-
sequently a genuine freedom of opinion. However, without considering 
here the problems of censorship as applied to books or films, it is clear 
enough that the state has that power if it chooses to exercise it, and 
state-aided as it is, the press is ill-equipped to stand against the state if 
this should ever become necessary. 
The present situation of the national press in France is not good. Over 
the past ten years, the circulation of national daily newspapers has gone 
down by some three million copies. Even a prestigious newspaper like 
Le Monde is in financial difficulties, having lost 14 per cent of its 
readership in the past two years. The weakness of the press is clearly 
a weakness for the democratic principle in France, should the state choose 
for any reason to exercise its powers against the press. 'Newspapers 
which accept help from the state, in money or in kind, are inhibited 
from keeping a cool watch on the state's performance which is among 
their main obligations.' 15 
A case in point is the legislation at present before parliament. It will 
provide for more selective, and thus it is hoped, more effective aid to news-
papers. However the main aim of the draft bill is a far more controversial 
one - namely to limit the number of newspapers which may be held by 
one individual or group, in order to preserve what is called la transparence 
financiere et le pluralisme, and essentially to reactivate the ordinances 
of 1944. The essential provisions are as follows: no one individual or 
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group may own either a national daily paper plus a regional one, or more 
than three national dailies having in total over 15 per cent of the national 
daily readership, or an undetermined number of regional dailies, with 
the same percentage total of readership. It is also proposed to establish 
a commission to ensure adherence to these provisions. Since these 
proposals seek only to put into effect what should have been adhered 
to since 1944, it could be said that the measure is a healthy one -
assuming it to be practicable. The problem is that there is virtually only 
one press empire which stands to suffer is this legislation is enacted, that 
of R. Hersant. Hersant makes no secret of his right-wing views, and 
hence of his opposition to the present government. It is therefore rather 
unfortunate that these proposed measures appear so obviously to attack 
one man, which allows scope for suspicions that the government is 
simply seeking a means to attack a powerful political opponent, who 
has a stranglehold on a very important part of the media. 
If Hersant has to choose between his national or his regional papers, 
then the government will have achieved its aim. What it might also achieve 
is the disappearance of yet more national papers - not perhaps the long-
term objective which is intended. 
(3) Central government and local government 
(i) Structures 
The relationship of local and central government inevitably brings one 
to the terrain of myth. The problem is often posed from two contrasting 
viewpoints - Jacob ins and decentralizers. The Jacobin archetype, 
suspicious of the reactionary provinces and seeing Paris as the sole source 
of leadership, technique and consequently of material and cultural 
benefits for the people, confronts his decentralizing opponent, for whom 
Paris is arrogant and remote, if not to say tyrannical, taking its decisions 
without knowledge of local realities and desires.For the Jacobin, Parisian 
leadership is the sine qua non of national unity: any weakening of it is 
the prelude to national fragmentation; for his adversary, Parisian tyranny 
will in the end, unless power is developed, produce so much discontent 
on the periphery that the nation may well break up anyway. 
Jacobins justify their case with an ideology of the 'general interest' 
and a series of impersonal rules which are supposed to cover adequately 
any conceivable problem. Decentralizers delight in pointing out the in-
numerable delays, inefficiencies and examples of bureaucratic obstruc-
tion that the system seems to secrete. So the opposing cultures argue. 
Behind this clash of stereotypes lies a more complex reality. It is 
true that the Jacobin and Napoleonic founders of the modern system of 
local government wanted to restrict local autonomy as far as they could, 
and by a barrage of legal and constitutional means at that. But it is also 
true that local politicians have long since adapted fairly comfortably to 
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this Procrustean bed and are able to have a fair degree of power and 
influence within the system. What follows is an outline of the different 
layers of sub-central government prior to the 1982 changes, in terms of 
structures, responsibilities and resources, plus an attempt to grasp their 
real relationship to Paris. The lowest level is the commune (36,433 in 
1983), dating from 1789 and based on the parishesoftheAncienRegime. 
Above it is the departement, created in 1790; there are ninety-six in 
metropolitan France. Each of these is sub-divided into arrondissements 
which in turn split into cantons: but neither of these levels now has 
either elected authorities nor provides services. Above the departments 
stand the twenty-two regions, each of them grouping a number of 
departments. 
All communes elect a municipal council ( often referred to as 'la 
municipalite'); these are elected six-yearly, the system varying according 
to the size of the commune. Councils number anything from 9 to 163 
(Paris}: they are obliged by law to carry out certain services (gas and 
water supply, roads, etc.) and can expand into other fields unless specifi-
cally forbidden. The dominant figure is the mayor, elected by his col-
leagues after taking office and who cannot then be dismissed by them. 
He is the representative of the state as well as head of his commune. In 
his first capacity he thus performs duties such as marriages and electoral 
registration; but in his second, he represents his commune in dealings 
with other bodies (especially the prefect), assures its security and clean-
liness, appoints its staff, draws up its budget and executes its decisions. 
Each department has a conseil general, whose members are elected 
on a territorial basis (one per canton). The size varies from 17 to 163 
(Paris again, for it is both commune and department). The council serves 
for six years, half of its members being elected at three-year intervals. 
Although it had an elected president (usually a figure of national stand-
ing), its executive was an appointee of the interior minister, the prefect. 
He it was who prepared agenda and budget, and implemented decisions. 
Like the commune, the department is obliged to provide some services 
(roads, school buildings, some social security services) and may expand 
into other activities, legal and financial possibilities permitting. An 
important part of its work was to give financial support to communes 
within it. 
The region was not a full tier oflocal government, so it had no elective 
authorities. Its role was one of economic development, which it fulfilled 
in association with its constituent communes and departments, mainly 
by proposals and participation in state projects with its rather limited 
resources. It had three elements - an economic and social council, com-
posed, like its national equivalent, of delegates from local interest groups, 
whose role was largely consultative; a regional council, of deputies and 
senators for the region plus nominees from communes and departments, 
which voted a budget and debated the allocation of central grants, and 
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the executive, a regional prefect who drew up the budget and agenda, 
and who also doubled as prefect of the main department within the 
region. 
The Defferre Act of March 1982 and its successors of January and 
July 1983 were an attempt to decentralize power (i.e. place it in the 
hands of local elites), as opposed to deconcentrating it (removing the 
effective locus of decision from Paris but placing it with the prefect or 
other local administrators). In the commune thus the mayor is now 
only subject to a-posteriori tutelage; his decisions are immediately 
implemented and it is up to the prefect to challenge them if he thinks 
fit, either in the administrative courts or, in the case of alleged financial 
impropriety, in one of the new regional courts of account that the act 
sets up. The mayor also receives new powers, especially in housing and 
town planning (it is now he who grants building permission). He has 
more latitude for intervention in the fields of employment and economic 
enterprise generally, being able to support firms with public money 
{within limits) and even take over certain kinds of enterprise. Although 
la tutelle was often exaggerated in its importance and in any case had 
been weakened legislatively by previous governments, the above changes 
are more than symbolic. They certainly place more responsibility on 
mayors, as Wright observes, thus making it harder for them to blame 
Paris or 'le pouvoir' for their inadequacies. 
At departmental level the prefect loses his executive power to the 
president of the assembly, which also gains new powers, particularly 
in transport, housing and social services. Again tutelage is exercised 
a-posteriori. The prefect retains overall control of field services, which 
continue to be available for use by the department and its communes. 
In time some of these services will be transferred to departmental control 
so as to enable the department to discharge its new responsibilities. This 
process of transferring powers and services will go on in a fairly piecemeal 
way through 1985. In order to better co-ordinate their new tasks and 
their new assets, some departments have taken on the virtual equivalent 
of the chief executive of an English borough, i.e. a senior administrator 
of high calibre and experience. Many of these are, unsurprisingly, ex-
prefects, often Giscard supporters fallen on hard times after May 1981. 
Their job is to support and advise the departmental leader in his dealings 
with their ex-colleagues in la prefectorale. 
The region is now a full tier of local government, which will now 
elect its council by universal suffrage (Corsica and the overseas regions 
have already done so and France will probably follow after 1984). As 
with the department, the prefect loses his executive role to the president, 
and his tutelary power also. The advisory Economic and Social Council 
has had its composition changed to give more weight to working-class 
interests. The region's powers will be increased especially in economic 
development, housing and vocational training, and it will presumably have 
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to create some services to this end. In some ways the idea of the region as 
a level of decision-making involves questions beyond the scope of local 
government stricto sensu, and we shall return to this in conclusion. 
(ii) Dependence or autonomy? 
Local authority finance comes from three main sources - local taxes, 
central government grants and borrowing.16 These resources may be 
supplemented by the bigger or more fortunate communes with revenue 
from their own assets, either industrial or commercial. In 1981 the 
great mass of communes (with a population below 10,000) derived 
their income as follows (if the big towns were included, there would be 
more grants and less borrowing). For their recu"ent expenditure (staff 
overheads, maintaining equipment and paying off debts) they found 
12.6 per cent out of their own assets, 34.3 per cent from government in 
the shape of the dotation globale de fonctionnement or DGF (see 
below), and 46.2 per cent from local taxes. The other part of their 
income, which goes on capital expenditure (mainly new investment on 
infrastructure, some 77 per cent of which is done in France by the 
communes) was made up out of previous surpluses (28.1 per cent), 
grants from government and from the departments (27 per cent) and 
miscellaneous sources (9.7 per cent). The remaining 35.2 per cent was 
borrowed.17 Communes and departments may raise local taxes, two-
thirds of which go to the former, one-third to the latter. Three of these 
are based on property values and the fourth, the old patente (now re-
baptized as taxe professionnel/e) on business activity; many regard the 
latter as arbitrary and rather unjust in the way it was levied. 
It does however bring in over half of the total local tax receipts, so it 
cannot simply be scrapped as some of the business community would 
like. Local taxes have risen sharply in the last decade, outstripping both 
national tax rates and the growth of GDP, as communes strive to meet 
expanding demands for services from a growing population. As elsewhere 
in Europe governments are glad enough to let local authorities assume 
the heavier responsibility, but less keen when it comes to handing over 
additional resources.18 
All told, government transferred to the local authorities in 1982 some 
hundred billion francs, half of it through the DGF. This replaces income 
lost to local authorities through the disappearance of obsolete taxes, 
and its financing is guaranteed because the government puts into it a fixed 
proportion of receipts from VAT. It has an inbuilt corrective mechanism 
(prerequation), whereby poorer communes receive proportionally more 
than better-off ones. Thus within the unavoidable limits of size, natural 
resources, etc. some effort at ironing out discrepancies is made. 
Finally communes need to borrow (35 billion francs in 1982). Two-
thirds of this is done through special public banks, mainly the Caisse des 
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Dep6ts, which are usually able to offer interest rates below commercial 
ones. This is partly·due to government's ability to persuade the public 
to subscribe heavily to local authority saving schemes (e.g. Livret A): 
certainly the response seems better than in the UK. 
The overall financial position of local authorities is, then, one of 
increasing need for resources. Often the choice seems to be between 
increasing taxes (within parameters set at the centre), with all the diffi-
cult political choices involved, or trying to extract more from govern-
ment, which may involve numerous political compromises. It is a familiar 
dilemma in Europe today. 
This scheme hides much of the real centre-periphery relationship in 
France. Does the legal and financial muscle exerted by the centre mean 
that local autonomy is inexistent? An examination of the forces involved 
suggests that the answer should be a nuanced one. 
The prefect is often set up as the embodiment of Parisian tyranny. 
His formal powers are great: he is the state's representative in his depart-
ment (hence the elaborate uniform he wears on official occasions). He 
is appointed by the head of local government in France, the interior 
minister, and as such exercised supervision, la tutelle, over all local 
authorities. He could dissolve councils (though he never needed to, in 
fact); he could veto a budget; he has the last word on law and order (so 
can prohibit demonstrations, etc.); he is the 'eyes and ears' of the 
government, expected to pick up and pass on the views of politically 
important (or dangerous) people to his superior in Paris. He was helped 
in his task by field services (services exterieurs) of ministries in his 
department, which will have office staff and a direct labour force also. 
The most important are from the ministries of finance, infrastructure, 
labour and agriculture; the prefect was supposed to be overall co-ordi-
nator of these services in his department ( except for those of justice, 
labour and education, which have their own heads). Prefects will also 
participate, along with their own expert staff and heads of the field 
services, in the regional administrative conference, where important 
decisions about regional planning are effectively taken. 
In practice there were limits to this power even before 1982: some 
of the prefect's formal powers (e.g. a priori control of budgets) had 
been cut back; he has probably never had a great deal of control over 
the field services, which may well deal with Paris or local notables behind 
his back. The prefects' career structure is another source of weakness: 
they are moved frequently, whether as a reward or as a punishment. 
Above all, the prefect has never managed to shake the hold oflocal not-
ables in his department, some of whom will be parliamentarians or 
ministers; they are thus powerful figures whom a prefect will annoy at 
his peril. Such figures often obtain various favours for their departments 
(building grants, the location of job-creating public or private enterprise, 
etc.) over the prefect's head, which gives them at least as strong a local 
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clientele as the latter. J. Chirac was reputed, for instance, during his 
premiership to have a full-time staff in Matignon, channelling resources 
busily into the Correze, where Chirac is deputy and general councillor. 
In fact the prefect has long been a 'Janus', facing two ways. On one 
hand, he must try to implement the will of Paris; on the other, he finds 
himself increasingly the advocate of the local grievances and demands 
to which he must listen every day. Recent studies have dwelt on the 
similarity of the prefect and the mayor, both in the sandwich-position 
between grass-roots pressure and Parisian imperatives, and hence very 
much objective allies, despite the potential for conflict that their relation-
ship contains. Small wonder that the prefect's is a difficult task; yet the 
profession still attracts men ( there were no women prefects before 
1981) of the highest intellectual and political skills, remaining one of 
the most prestigious 'grands corps' of the French administration. 
The other main pressure for centralization is alleged to be the atomized 
structure and the financial dependence of local authorities. The financial 
structure has already been described, and whatever the ability of notables 
to channel resources into their departments, dependence on central aid 
remains a powerful check on local autonomy - and not just in France, 
one might add. As regards the existing levels of local government, there 
are again some unpalatable facts for the defender of local autonomy 
to digest, starting with size. Ninety per cent of all communes have fewer 
than 2,000 inhabitants; 50 per cent fewer than 300. Some 996 have fewer 
than 50 people, even. But at the other end of the scale, some 73 per 
cent of the total population live in a mere 12 per cent of the total com-
munes. Now all communes are supposed to be equal: i.e. Paris has the 
same legal status as a hamlet in the Lozere with 120 people. In practice 
there is a huge disparity between big communes like Lille or Marseille, 
with considerable revenue of their own, and small rural villages which 
raise precious little revenue. Many big towns are famous for their urban 
planning, their business enterprise or their cultural activities; many rural 
communes are too poor to put tarmac around the telepone box, assuming 
that there is one. Autonomy, then, is proportional to resources. A big 
town can afford its own specialists and finance much of its development 
plans; its small 'equivalent' might have one part-time official (probably 
the primary school teacher) who does municipal business one evening a 
week. Clearly, such communes are at the mercy of the prefect for 
resources and technical expertise. Of late, attempts have been made to 
palliate such fragmentation by encouraging communes to merge, more 
by offers of financial inducement than by legal pressure. But local pride 
and fear of losing office have meant resistance. In the seven years 
following the 1971 act on mergers, only 2,179 of these had occurred. 
One way forward which sacrifices comparatively little civic pride, is via 
the various forms of inter-communal co-operation: a syndicat a vocation 
unique, when they combine for one particular purpose, such as bussing 
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school-children; syndicats a vocation multiple, for any number of 
common services. In big city suburbs there are districts, which group 
local communes for several services and where the communes pool 
much of their finances. Nine big towns have gone even further with the 
communaute urbaine, which takes over compulsory services from its 
member communes and has its own council of nominees from the latter. 
It seems then that French communes fall into two categories - the 
small and fairly dependent ones which have, however, great civic pride 
and interest on the part of their citizens, and a minority of big and 
powerful ones. Government has generally moved only slowly to change 
this imbalance. At the end of Giscard's septennate the government was 
considering projects, such as reductions in VAT, better time off and 
pay for mayors, an improved career structure for local officials, increased 
technical aid, a guaranteed minimum income for communes and changes 
in the reviled professional tax. 
The Defferre reforms clearly aim to give more responsibility and 
freedom of action to local elites. Yet there are gaps in the framework 
which might prove hard to fill. Firstly, there is still some uncertainty as 
to la repartition des competences (which level carries out which functions 
and with which resources). The eventual shape of this will result from a 
lengthy struggle between the interested parties - prefects, local officials, 
ministries and parliamentarians. Secondly, there is the problem of career 
structure. Most mayors and their adjoints are short of time and expertise. 
For the reform to work properly, there will need to be a full definition 
of their status, covering such issues as remuneration, time off and legal 
and technical training. Similarly a revised pay and career structure is 
needed for local government officers if this branch of the public service 
is to recruit good people to fill the new posts. At present it is the poor 
relation, compared to a career in a Parisian ministry: certainly few 
enarques would be happy to make a career in provincial prefectures. 
The most serious gap remains the financial one. Although the law 
pledges government not to transfer responsibilities without commensur-
ate finance, there is as yet little sign of a reform of local finances, and 
the situation of local authorities here is still one of relative dependence. 
( iii) Elections 
Local elections have become more party-political oflate and are becoming 
even more so; yet it is unwise to underestimate the electoral pull of a 
popular conseiller general in the countryside or a dynamic town mayor 
who might choose to hide his political feelings behind an ideology of 
'service to the commune' or technical expertise. The electorate does 
tend though to use such elections as a test of the government, often 
voting against it in mid-term as a 'warning'. 19 Such has been the fate 
of the present government which faced cantonal elections (for the 
146 The political framework 
departmental assemblies) in March I 982 and municipal ones a yearlater. 
In the former category, out of 2.014 seats to be filled, including 166 new 
ones, the RPR gained 146 and the UDF 69: their right-wing allies gained 
a further 51. The PS lost 5, the PCF 44 and their Radical and other left 
allies some 50. This meant in terms of the control of the new depart-
mental executives that the right now controlled 60 and the left 36. 
Ironically the new powers were going to be first used by those who had 
spent much of their time opposing them. 
A similar trend emerged from the municipal polls of 1983 where the 
right waged a very hard campaign, stressing national issues rather than 
local ones and harping much upon law and order and immigration. 
Some of its candidates in big towns went beyond limits which civilized 
people would find acceptable. The usual index of performance in these 
contests is the vote in the 227 towns of over 30,000, as smaller and 
especially rural communes tend to have many candidates difficult to 
classify politically. 
The government had prepared these elections by changing the voting 
system, combining proportionality and majority weighting in a clever 
attempt to reconcile representativity and efficacity in terms of govern-
ment. In communes of 3,500 and over, each party presents a list (one 
name for each seat on the council). Electors vote for lists en bloc. If a 
list gets over 50 per cent at the first ballot it wins half the seats plus a 
percentage of the remainder in line with its own percentage of the vote. 
Otherwise there is a second ballot. For this, any list that won over 10 
per cent may stand again but the usual procedure is to bargain with 
whichever of the two leading lists is closest to you and thereby obtain 
good places on it. The second round is thus usually a two-horse race in 
which of course one list is bound to obtain over 50 per cent, with seats 
distributed as above. This weighting is very fine in fact, meaning that a 
slim majority in votes gives a big lead in terms of seats. Thus in the second 
ballot at Chfilon-sur-Saone, the RPR list took 12,105 votes (50.21 per 
cent) against the outgoing PS 12,003 (49.78 per cent). This is a narrow 
lead, but on the new council there are 34 RPR and 11 Socialists. But at 
least there is now an opposition in the town halls compared with the 
previous winner-takes-all system where 50.01 per cent of the votes 
meant 100 per cent of the seats. Judging by the grudging way in which 
the winning lists welcomed the opposition into the mairies, however, 
cheerfully denying them office space, briefing papers and facilities in 
general, it seemed that traditional triumphalist attitudes would not 
change overnight.20 
An added refinement was introduced for Paris, Lyon and Marseille. 
The latter is a socialist stronghold; the other two are never likely to be. 
In the hope of gaining some foothold here, however, the socialists 
created, rather furtively it must be said, a new tier of administration, 
the conseil d'arrondissement. Elected simultaneously with the full town 
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council, these bodies were to have limited resources and some say in 
housing and use of amenities; in short they were the means to creating 
a socialist clientele in the right-wing fortresses. The tactic blew up in 
their faces as the right made a clean sweep in Paris and Lyon and came 
very close to unseating Defferre in Marseille. 
Elsewhere in the towns of 30,000+ the left lost a net total of 30 (in 
1977 it had gained over 40), and remained in control of 127 of the big 
227 (66 PS, 59 PCF, 2 MRG). These figures needed adjustment in the 
light of several re-run elections in the autumn, called because the conseil 
d'Etat disqualified a number of victorious PCF mayors for electoral 
fraud. Nearly all these elections were lost. 
(iv) Regions 
The very idea of the region as a level of decision-making involves problems 
of a different nature from those of commune or department. In many 
cases it brings in a political or cultural dimension, where the identity of 
those in the region is perceived as being opposed to or at least not 
synonymous with the national identity, as incarnated by the capital and 
its officials. It is wise to remember Hayward's remark that 'France is a 
unitary state superimposed on a multinational society' .21 Historically 
France spread out from the Paris region, absorbing such peripheral 
peoples as Alsacians, Basques and Bretons: but this assimilation has 
never been entirely successful. There are in fact many possible causes of 
alienation on the periphery and these causes are often complex and 
interlocking. 22 It is certainly true that regionalist feeling is not exclusively 
inspired by economic decline, whereby the regions are exploited by an 
acquisitive centre which impoverishes them while enriching itself ( cf. 
Hechter's thesis of 'internal colonialism'). In some cases there may be 
some truth in this accusation; in others it may be that those on the 
periphery believe it to be the case, even though statistically the argument 
can be disproved. In the areas of militant nationalist or even separatist 
feeling, the main factor is cultural, i.e. Paris is seen as trying to destroy 
a local culture ( often symbolized by its language) by normalizing the 
region so as to make it like the rest of France. It would seem that when 
cultural resentment and a perception of economic decay coincide then 
militant regionalist arguments gain their best audience. 
Of equal complexity and variation also are the possible responses 
which the centre can make to a discontented periphery. In recent years 
peripheral demands have grown in volume, and they range from demands 
for increased financial and administrative power for the twenty-two 
regions to fully-fledged nationalist demands in the case of some regions 
with a strong historical sense of differentiation (notably Brittany and 
Corsica): though such demands are still very much a minority phenom-
enon. 
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The state has in fact chosen different responses to regionalist demands, 
the main one being to develop the twenty-two regional structures, from 
their initial formulation as economic planning units in the 1950s to the 
1982 law which put them on a par with existing units oflocal government. 
The logic of this approach (which Hayward usefully describes as func-
tional regi.onalization, in contrast to the regi.onalism of peripheral groups) 
was to concede resources where necessary, but as little as possible in the 
way of powers. 23 Thus the regionalization of the 1960s meant using the 
regional prefect as the pivot of the economic development effort. By 
channelling funds he would, it was hoped, enlist the co-operation of 
local notables in modernizing their areas, thereby making them forget 
any illusions about the usefulness of such notions as 'regional power'. 
Another key policy instrument was DATAR (Delegation a l'amenage-
ment du territoire et a /'action regi.onale), basically a high-powered team 
of economic planners with funds at their disposal and access to the 
prime minister's office, whose task was to speed up the process of job-
creating investment in the provinces by by-passing much of the traditional 
administrative procedure. The strategy was not wholly successful: local 
elites did not co-operate fully, fearing a diminution of their influence 
and DAT AR for its part was able to get some firms to move out of Paris, 
but mainly into the west or the Paris basin. Thus the struggling depart-
ments in the south-west or the Massif Central missed out. The notables 
helped defeat de Gaulle in 1969, and when Pompidou 's regional law 
was passed in 1972 it recognized their influence. Thus the regional 
councils were not elected by universal suffrage, were not fully-fledged 
units oflocal government, had minute tax-raising powers and were obliged 
to use the regional prefect as their executive. Grants still tended to be 
doled out piecemeal by prefects to rural mayors (le saupoudrage). 
Town mayors' tended to try and bypass this system either via DATAR 
or via their contacts in Paris. Above all, no alterations were made to 
existing regional boundaries, either on cultural grounds ( to please 
regionalists) or economic ones (many planners wanted eight or even five 
regions). Giscard's governments did not alter these arrangements signifi-
cantly, as even their special plans for different regions (south-west or 
Massif Central) were centralized exercises, done with an eye to electoral 
advantage. Thus when Mitterrand arrived in 1981 it could be said that 
there was some scope for a new initiative in the regional field. 
The post-1982 regions suffer in fact from a number of weaknesses. 
Although now a full level of local government with its own executive 
(the president of the council and his bureau), not subject to tutelage 
and able to raise its own taxes and create its own services, although its 
council will be elected by universal suffrage, the region is far from being 
the state-within-a-state which M. Debre claimed to detect when, in the 
National Assembly debate, he accused the socialists of trying to turn 
France into a federal state. No concessions have been made to cultural 
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regionalists, as the twenty-two regions remain mere agglomerates of 
existing departments, deliberately cutting across traditional provincial 
boundaries. Many of them show grave economic imbalances. The 
structure of tax-raising is still not clear, nor is that of staffing. More 
seriously, as Sadran shows, some powers have gone to the departments 
which could usefully have been given to the regions.24 The departmental 
assembly with its overrepresentation of rural areas is traditionally, as 
Hayward observes, a locus of immobilism and precisely where the no-
tables gather in strength. Many socialist parliamentarians who have won 
local office are in fact becoming a new generation of notables in their own 
right, and they can be expected to try and keep the departments strong. 
Hayward is doubtless correct when he says that the only way to put 
teeth into the regions is to attack the cumul des mandats and bring 
forward a new sort of local elite without Parisian connections.25 But it 
is a moot point whether this will be done. 
Against those who believe that regional power is best able to deal with 
local economic or cultural problems, there is still a persuasive Jacobin 
literature. Wright argues shrewdly that regional authorities might be 
taken over by obscurantist elites bent not on growth but on thrusting 
the values of obsolete cultures down the throats of local inhabitants, 
who may well desire to escape just such a fate.26 Not all Scotsmen like 
the sound of bagpipes, as he remarks: and it may be that the protection 
of liberties, generation of growth and redistribution of its fruits are best 
guided from the enlightened centre. Against this, regionalists would 
doubtless claim that in several centuries Paris has still not succeeded in 
performing adequately these very tasks. Clearly this is an argument 
which will go on long after the laws of the Mitterrand presidency have 
begun to take effect. 
Mention must be made briefly of two regions with autonomist ten-
dencies. If Breton autonomism seems stagnant with the failure of the 
UDB (Union democratique bretonne) and its right-wing rivals to break 
into electoral politics in a significant way, then Corsican autonomism 
has undergone an upswing during the last decade. It has been fuelled 
by rising unemployment and high land prices, leading to increased emi-
gration by young people, plus resentment at the fact that the better-off 
seemed increasingly to be from the mainland. As the local notables, or 
the clans as they are often called (they belong usually to old-established 
families with wide ramifications), proved unable to assuage discontent 
by their traditional methods of clientelism ( they secured benefits from 
Paris in return for votes for them), particularist and nationalist ideas 
gained more hearing. By 1981 at least two strands were competing for 
nationalist support: the moderate UPC (Union du peuple corse) led by 
E. Simeoni, which aimed at a sort of home rule (with defence and 
diplomacy left to France), and the partisans of armed struggle in the 
FLNC (Front de liberation nationale corse). Giscard's reply was the 
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time-honoured one of the hand-out: thus a second department (i.e. an 
appreciable number of jobs) was created, grants and transport subsidies 
stepped up. In 1982 the socialists went for a bold and imaginitive solution, 
trying to · conciliate local feeling on the island with the need to keep 
control of national unity. Thus a Corsican Act was passed whereby the 
island gets its regional assembly early but one with slightly increased 
powers (notably to create agriculture and transport boards and to 
provide extra schools): suitable acknowledgment was made of 'la 
personnalite corse' but it was clear that the island was still part of France. 
In the August elections the autonomists did well in a very fragmented 
poll, with 7 seats out of 61. But so did the clans, working through the 
traditional parties. Under its president P. Alfonsi, a pragmatic notable 
willing to govern with the help of the autonomists and the left, the 
assembly began its difficult task.27 But as violence increased through 
1983, some of it is due to the operations of rival squads of secret police-
men working unbeknown to one another, the prospects of rule by 
consensus seemed to recede. In September 1983 the government dissolved 
the nationalist groups CCN, generally regarded as a front for the FLNC. 
Sub-central government in France is clearly in the throes of a poten-
tially far-reaching reform. Clearly there are gaps to be filled in the law, 
notably the crucial one of finances. There is a clear will to develop 
more initiative and to reduce the feeling of dependency on Paris. But it 
is too soon to say what the results will be. We may guess that those 
most able to use the new powers, i.e. urban mayors and presidents of 
strong departments, will probably make full use of them. But such 
people will not be in a majority, and for the mass of rural mayors little 
will change. 
Above all it seems hard to imagine that the secular relationship 
between technocrat and notable, prefect and mayor will alter overnight. 
The new arrangements still call for much co-operation between the 
representative of Paris at the head of his services and the notable, 
articulating his local interests. Their sometimes frictional but unavoid-
able collaboration will last for some time yet. We may agre~ with Wright 
that they are 'condemned to live together in a chaos of surreptitious 
bargaining, illicit agreements, hidden collusion, unspoken complicity, 
simulated tension and often genuine conflict'. Plus ra change, plus c'est 
la mtme chose ... 
Chapter 4 
Political forces 
(1) The French party system 
Parties are nowadays deemed essential to the workings of a democratic 
political system. Their functions are complex; but their prime one is 
to organize and give coherent expression to the political demands of 
various groups. The latter may be a single class or fraction, or a wider 
grouping. Although the origins of most parties are clearly traceable 
to different class fractions, the nature of a party may well change 
over time; in particular, it may well come to attract support from 
other class fractions than those on which it was first based, thus 
qualifying for the title of a 'catch-all' party. Such a process is usually 
a long and oblique one, and in general it is safe to say that the way in 
which parties mirror (or deform) class interests is a complex one. 
At any rate, parties aim to capture political power or a share thereof, 
so as to translate their demands as far as possible into public policy. 
Much of their activity will consist, then, in mobilizing supporters; 
and such mobilization need not be restricted to electoral competitions, 
though the latter obviously occupy a privileged place in the ac;.tivity 
of most parties. A final function of parties is to produce elites who 
will be able to govern. In other words parties are essential to the upkeep 
of what is often called the political class. 
In democratic systems, parties always function alongside each 
other. The way in which they relate to each other, the party system, 
is thus crucial for understanding the politics of any country. In the 
UK or the USA, politics are dominated by two large, stable and ap-
parently unshakeable parties, with no really crucial differences between 
them; commentators contrast this stability, which they see as reflecting 
or maintaining a widespread consensus about the nature and objectives 
of Anglo-Saxon society, with France, where the party system -seemed 
for a long time to offer a model of acute instability. 
Under the Third and Fourth Republics, governments were coalitions 
whose member parties were divided on a number of bases: class dif-
ferences were important, but so were ideological ones and plain 
sectional interests. It has been suggested that this division gave an 
artificial and exaggerated image of French society, i.e. that underneath 
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the rhetoric of party professionals there was a high degree of consensus 
as to the nature of the society that suited France most. But the con-
sensus never made its way into party politics. Parties remained 
numerous and divided. Even the rise of a relatively well-structured 
socialist party, and later on a communist one, did not really affect 
the fragmentation of the party system. Neither of the above was able 
to enlarge its audience beyond a certain point; and when their initial 
militant ardour had cooled, they too were admitted from opposition 
into the coalition system. The older parties of the right never developed 
much of an organization, but they never needed to, managing even 
after the advent of universal suffrage to maintain hegemony within 
French civil society and stop the left from gaining too much support. 
By 1958, then, France had a party system of coalitions between 
parties which could agree provided that little positive action were 
taken, but not if urgent action were needed, and which could in fact 
quarrel bitterly about seemingly trivial issues. This contributed of 
course to the debacle of 1958. 
Since then there has been something of a mutation. New parties 
have appeared; old ones have been forced to tighten up their organiz-
ation: and all have been forced into durable alliances, with the result 
that France seems to be moving towards a two-block party system 
('bi-polarization'). The Fifth Republic enjoys widespread legitimacy, 
but its system of government displaces power away from parliament 
(the natural terrain for parties) towards the head of the executive, 
the president. This means that their ability to influence policy is 
lessened. At the very least, a party wishing to influence government 
must have presidential endorsement in elections, i.e. it must already 
accept a number of common policies or objectives. The president, 
on the other hand, needs a sympathetic majority ( of one or more 
parties) in the lower house; for if his 1 legislation were consistently 
refused by a hostile lower house, his constitutional position could 
become untenable. Hence the majority in the national assembly must 
be disciplined; and so also must any opposition hoping to supplant 
it. Thus there are considerable pressures towards tighter party organiz-
ation and alliances arising from the presidential function itself. 
The president himself, though claiming to rule only in the national 
interest and to be 'president of all the French', could never win his 
election in the first place without the help of party machinery. The 
very existence of the second ballot, which is limited to two candidates, 
forces parties to line up in two conflicting blocks. So far as legislative 
elections are concerned, one should note the system of scrutin d'ar-
rondissement (single-member constituencies), with two ballots again. 
Seats are rarely won at the first ballot ( over 50 per cent of the votes 
cast being needed), whereas a relative majority suffices at the second. 
Parties have thus a clear interest in making alliances for the second 
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ballot with those nearest them, and not getting in each other's way. 
What usually happens is that the principle of 'republican discipline' 
(as the left calls it) obtains, and the best-placed candidate on left or 
right benefits from the withdrawal (desistement) of the candidate 
closest to him; the result is usually a straight right-left duel (this was 
the case in 96 per cent of the seats in March 1978). In some cases 
withdrawal is automatic, because in order to reach the second ballot 
candidates require the votes of 12.5 per cent of the registered 
electorate, i.e. probably over 15 per cent of the poll. Now, the parties 
which benefit least from such a system are ones with a strong identity, 
especially the communists; this is so because 'at the first ballot the 
voter chooses, but at the second he eliminates'. This also means that 
there is no connection between the percentage of votes obtained in 
the first ballot (the truest index of a party's audience) and the per-
centage of seats which it will win in the end. 
Here is an example of the system: 
Eure 3 (Louviers), March 1978 (main candidates only) 
First ballot: Montagne (UDF) 20,431 Loncle (MRG) 14,775 
Desbordes (RPR) 6,164 Binay (PCF) 11,820 
Between ballots Desbordes withdraws in favour of Montagne, and 





Montagne thus wins by 122 votes, illustrating perfectly the importance 
of a good alliance. 
It is also suggested that many other factors which made for party 
fragmentation in the past are disappearing. Thus economic moderniz-
ation, the drift from the land, the beginnings of a relative affluence 
and the decline of religious observance, plus an increasing consensus 
on the merits of the Fifth Republic are all adduced to explain the trend 
towards a two-block system. One could suggest limits to how far 
these processes have gone. As regards the consensus on the regime, 
it would seem better founded if the regime had passed the acid test, 
i.e. what happens when presidential and parliamentary majorities no 
longer coincide? It might also be true that modernization, far from 
solidifying voters into blocks, actually increases the centre mass of 
'floating voter&' without strong allegiance to left or right. In fact the 
main pressure towards bipolarization is almost certainly institutional; 
electoral systems always have a greater effect on political behaviour 
than is immediately apparent. 
Today, then, two blocks of parties confront each other in France. 
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They are referred to here as left and right - terms which might appear 
more ideological or polemical than the 'opposition' and 'majority' 
currently preferred by government and media. For years now it has 
been fashionable to say that the terms are meaningless: that left govern-
ments have behaved like conservatives and that many of the right's 
policies have been progressive. Whatever the truth of such assertions, 
the great majority of French people seem to identify with the terms; 
for many they bear a strong emotional, if not irrational charge. They 
are part of the political culture, in fact. Historically of course the 
left has stood for change and the right for resistance to change, hence 
the tags of 'movement' and 'order' which some analysts use. Clearly 
the content of the terms has varied from the Revolution, when they 
were first coined (in the Revolutionary assemblies the most radical 
elements sat in the high benches on the speaker's left). Thus to be in 
favour of the republic and universal suffrage in 1815 was to be well 
on the left; whereas to demand no more today would place one equally 
firmly on the right. None the less the movement/order polarity exists 
in France as elsewhere, and today it is not difficult to identify its 
content. The parties of the right are those which accept the broad 
social and economic structures of French capitalism. The left in 
contrast is composed of those who aspire to structural change in the 
direction of socialism. It follows from this that the room for manoeuvre 
of any centre force is slight; it can only define itself negatively, 
occupying such terrain as left and right leave to it. Of late this has 
become so slight as to be non-existent; bi-polarization has forced the 
centrists to choose sides and most of them are now firmly aligned 
with the right. 
A final curious point concerns vocabulary. Unlike politicians of the 
left, who revel in the title, those of the right never like to be described 
as such. They have always preferred a label such as modere, inde-
pendant or even centre-gauche; only the very muscular right likes 
to call itself /a droite. Such a curious practice is puzzling only to those 
who, as Remond remarks, have not yet plumbed the depths of French 
political vocabulary; but it does show the odd mystique which political 
concepts can sometimes take on. 
Before examining the parties in detail, it is necessary to make some 
remarks, necessarily brief, about political behaviour. At its most basic 
level (voting) or at more sophisticated levels {being active in parties, 
holding office, etc.), political behaviour is usually analysed in terms of a 
series of classic variables, all of which involve high degrees of speculation. 
For the motives of individuals or groups are seldom as transparent as 
might be suggested by empirical surveys, even when these are subjected 
to strict statistical tests. In many cases those concerned may be ignorant 
as to their 'real' motives or perhaps reluctant to admit these. Subject to 
such obvious limitations we can say that French people are influenced 
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in their behaviour by the classic variables which obtain elsewhere - class, 
age, sex, religion, type of socialization (how they are exposed to cultural 
norms and values) and so on - and that, at the risk of excessive brevity 
perhaps, three traits could be particularly underlined. 
Firstly religion continues to be very important, showing its persistence 
at the expense of class, and this despite the increasing urbanization of 
French society, which as elsewhere seems to have resulted in a decline 
in religious observance. The divide between religious ( even in a vague 
sense) and lai"cs remains one of the lynch-pins of the left/right polarity. 
Even the greater readiness of some Catholics to vote left or even to be 
active in the left parties has only begun to weaken this very deep cultural 
divide, and it is unwise to underestimate its importance. 
A second crucial trend is the growing political awareness of women, 
who now outnumber male voters. The key factor in this seems to have 
been work experience, with women learning the importance of politics 
as a consequence of their experience in the workplace. The emergence 
of an articulate feminist movement testifies to this much more subter-
ranean process of the politicization of women. The long-term conse-
quences of this trend for established political forces are far from clear. 
A final factor is the rise of the salaried middle classes, whose role 
now seems pivotal, with small variations in the behaviour of this category 
apparently crucial in deciding electoral outcomes. Relative newcomers 
on the social stage and lacking the deeply rooted culture and traditions 
of older social groups, they seem more volatile and are increasingly seen 
by political forces as a key target to capture. 
These trends and the influence of the wider political culture into 
which they fit will be seen as we now analyse the workings of the main 
political forces in France. 
(2) Parties of the right 
The parliamentary majority supporting presidents de Gaulle, Pompidou 
and Giscard d'Estaing has increased steadily in terms of parties, even 
if the latter represent a declining share of public opinion. But despite 
being forced into close collaboration by the presidential system, these 
parties have all striven to keep a separate identity; we shall examine 
them in tum (see Table 4.1). 
Gaullism - le Rassemblement pour la republique (RPR) 
Development Gaullism has been the dominant party or 'movement' 
(as the faithful prefer to call it) of the Fifth Republic. It has had 
numerous changes of name. If one leaves aside the Gaullism of the 
Resistance, based largely on personal allegiance to the General as a 
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Table 4.1 Majority parties since 1958 
President Years of office Constituent parties of majority 
De Gaulle 1958-62 UNR + varying numbers of MRP, SFIO 
and Independents (only PCF in outright 
opposition) 
1962-9 UDR+ RI 
Pompidou 1969-74 UDR + RI + Duhamel Centrists 
Giscard d'Estaing 1914-81 UDR (RPR) + RI (PR)+ remainder of 
Centrists (Lecanuet and Servan-Schreiber) 
Mitterrand 1981- PS+ MRG + PCF 
symbol of the will to fight the German invader, then it can be said 
to have entered its organizational phase with the RPF (Rassembl-
ement du peuple franrais) in 1947. Despite a massive initial surge of 
membership and popularity, the movement had broken up long before 
1958, over the question of support for Fourth Republic governments. 
But de Gaulle's return to power in 1958 necessitated speedy rebuilding 
of the Gaullist machinery. The UNR (Union pour la nouvelle repub-
lique) developed into the UNR-UDT (Union democratique du travail) 
in 1962, to be succeeded by the UDV'R (Union des democrates pour 
la cinquieme republique) in 1967 and the UDR ( Union pour la defense 
de la republique) in 1968. This changed to the Union des democrates 
pour la republique in 1971, and in December 1976 the movement 
was refurbished as the RPR. 
Beneath the changing nomenclature, the party grew steadily in 
organization and influence, particularly after 1962 under Pompidou's 
guidance, as it became steadily apparent that de Gaulle's charisma 
alone was not enough to obtain automatic compliance from the 
electorate. During these years it supported presidential policy un-
flinchingly, often being rewarded with favours to be distributed among 
the constituencies on a fairly clientelistic basis - a technique which 
led sarcastic critics to compare the UDR with the other great historical 
masters of clientelism, the Radicals. Gaullism was the biggest party 
in parliament, its ministers were most numerous in government: 
Gaullists were given key posts in ministries and other parts of the 
state apparatus (media, education, public enterprise, etc.). Small 
wonder that by the late 1960s opponents denounced the Gaullist 
'colonizing' of the state and coined the derisive slogan of 'l'Etat-
UDR'. 
The 1973 elections showd a relative decline in Gaullist strength, 
and when the UDR lost the presidency in 1974 its rapid demise was 
predicted. Energetic action by Chirac, making full use of the resources 
of his two-year premiership, revitalized the movement. The RPR 
that he launched in 1976 was already a well-oiled movement, and it 
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was able to win over 22 per cent of the first ballot vote in the 1978 
election, running neck and neck with the socialists for the title of 
France's biggest party. 
Ideology Gaullists like to see their movement as part of a tradition 
that resurfaces 'when France is in danger'. Less indulgent analysts 
usually place it within what Remand calls the Bonapartist right, as 
opposed to the 'Orleanist' right (see below). The Bonapartist right 
is essentially nationalist, populist and, within varying degrees, authori-
tarian. Gaullist nationalism emerges in its foreign policy of indepen-
dence, whereby France is to play as autonomous a role in world affairs 
as is commensurate with her strength as a medium-sized power, resisting 
in particular the hegemony of the USA. In domestic policy, it emerges 
in the doctrine of national unity at all costs; for Gaullists the ties of 
nationhood override, or should override, class or sectional interests. 
Hence inter alia their ready acceptance of the Jacobin state and their 
hostility to anything resembling decentralization. In the Bonapartist 
tradition, national unity also involves clear and firm leadership; hence 
Gaullist dislike of parties and of parliamentarianism in general and their 
preference for personal leadership based on a popular mandate 
(presidential election, referendum, etc.), which they claim will provide 
rational and impartial government in the 'national interest'. Such 
views are often accompanied by strictures on the primacy of law and 
order, and hostility to any attitudes that could at all be described 
as permissive, the whole often being expressed in a commonsense and 
fairly anti-intellectual language. 
For the fairly authoritarian Gaullist conception of the state is 
also a populist one, i.e. it postulates an indistinct mass of peuple 
rather than a society divided into classes or fractions and believes 
that it can satisfy them all. This explains why in economics, the 
Gaullist-Bonapartist tradition keeps its distance from liberal economic 
theory, talking of a 'voluntaristic' economic policy which uses planning 
mechanisms and gives the (neutral) state an important arbitral role. 
Another facet of this economic populism is the various attempts at 
workers' participation, or /'association capital/travail, whereby the 
Gaullist state has tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade employers and 
workers to sink their differences in the name of national unity. It 
is this aspect of the doctrine that also accounts for the persistence 
over the years of left-wing Gaullists, whose influence on the move-
ment has not, on the whole, been great. 
This populism has its limits, however. Gaullism is vocal about the 
sanctity of property and particularly virulent in its denunciation of 
marxism, especially the communist party. 
Given this ideological basis, then, one can see why Gaullism regards 
the Fourth Republic as a kind of Antichrist. For them its impotent 
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multi-party system was the result of putting sectional priorities before 
the national interest; its foreign policy consisted merely of cowardly 
endorsements of American Diktats; and even its social and economic 
achievements, when these are actually recognized, are attributed to 
the good work of de Gaulle's provisional government before 1946! One 
cannot underestimate the importance within Gaullist discourse of the 
ideal antibody, the Fourth Republic, mere mention of which is enough 
to legitimize Gaullist rule. 
None of the above should be taken at face value, of course, 
especially the claim to be above the interests of any one class or 
fraction. Historically regimes d'exception, to use Poulantzas's phrase, 
whether of the gentler Gaullist type or the tougher Napoleonic variety, 
occur when there has been a loss of hegemony, i.e. when dominant 
social forces and their political representatives lose political control 
over society, at least temporarily. Now, so long as there are no social 
forces to challenge them radically (forces which demand a qualitatively 
different society, that is), political equilibrium can only be restored 
by some kind of compromise until the old forces recover or renew 
themselves sufficiently to reassert control. Perhaps Gaullism was such 
a compromise. Its assumption of power came only two and a half 
years after decimation at the polls in January 1956; but in the mean-
time the impotence of the older right, centre and even its allies on the 
non-communist left had been confirmed, notably by the Algerian 
fiasco. It was this crisis which let in Gaullism; the political class, not to 
mention large sectors of the population, wanted a solution. So too did 
certain advanced sectors of French capitalism, for whom re-orientation 
of the French economy was paramount. If the established parties of 
the regime could no longer guarantee the necessary political stability 
for this, then perhaps Gaullism could (whatever reservations one might 
have about some non-economic aspects of Gaullist policy). The Gaullist 
elites, with their ideals of public service and the national interest, 
were in fact quite favourably predisposed to economic modernization, 
and thus ready to perform the task required to speed up the moderniz-
ation of French capitalism. This task consisted in using the power of 
the state to pressure industry, and to a lesser extent agriculture, into 
expansion, mainly by concentrating production into bigger units and 
opening the economy out towards European competition. Such a 
course involved a certain amount of pressure from the state, and this 
the parties of the classical right, especially Pinay's CNIP, had been 
unwilling to exert, even though it was necessary if French expansion 
were to continue. Now, this does not imply that Gaullism is simply 
the tool of 'monopoly capitalism' as the communists have alleged; 
such an analysis does not explain away Gaullist economic and political 
nationalism, for instance. But one can suggest that there was a con-
venient symbiosis between the political needs of Gaullism and those 
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of progressive fractions of French capital, which should perhaps make 
one look with some scepticism on claims to be above class or other 
interest. 
Although it sought, by packing the state apparatus with its own 
people and by bringing government and administration closer together 
(technocratie) to give the state some autonomy from capital, this 
autonomy was in the end only a relative one. Gaullism could in the 
long run only impose its expansionist policies within certain limits; 
sooner or later it would have to make concessions to fractions hurt 
by these policies but who still pulled considerable electoral weight. 
Pompidou's presidency already showed considerable clemency· to 
smaller and medium-sized capital. One might wonder what the future 
of Gaullism could be, once it had closed the colonial question, brought 
political stability and expanded the economy as far as possible. Could 
it retain an identity once these primary tasks had been fulfilled or 
would it, like earlier Bonapartist regimes which had had similar 
cleaning-up operations to perform, simply melt away and allow the 
return of more conventional capitalist forces? Perhaps an examination 
of the movement's structures might shed light on this. 
Structures The RPR has the vertical structure typical of mass parties. 
Its basic unit is the constituency union, though smaller groups may 
meet at the level of the commune or even of the workplace. The 
constituency union elects two-thirds of the delegates to the federation, 
the departmental level of the movement; the other third consists of 
party officials, office holders and ex-officio members. The federation 
can send policy proposals and suggest candidates for office to the 
secretary-general in Paris, but the federation secretary can be elected 
only with the latter's approval. Federations send delegates to the 
national conference (assises nationales) in proportion to their member-
ship and the number of their office-holders. There is another tier of 
activity between federal and national level, the regional councils, but 
these do not seem to be very active. 
At national level four bodies are important. The two-yearly assises 
are open to all members (40,000 attended the inaugural one in 1976), 
though only delegates from federations, parliamentarians and members 
of the Economic and Social Council have voting rights ( there were 
14,000 of these in 1976). These elect the president of the movement 
some 170 members of the comite central which is supposed to run the 
movement in line with policy approved at the assises; the other members 
of this body are, since March 1978, all deputies and also members of 
the conseil politique. This body advises the president and consists of 
the secretary-general (a presidential appointee, currently Bernard Pons), 
ex-prime ministers, the chairmen of RPR senate and national assembly 
groups, and other central committee nominees and co-opted members. 
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If the central committee, is the RPR parliament, then its executive is 
the commission executive. This veritable shadow cabinet, which is an 
oligarchy of presidential nominees, has a dozen national secretaries, 
who specialize in different areas of policy; it includes the best-known 
Gaullist leaders, as well as rising stars such as Alain Juppe and Jacques 
Toubon. 
Today the RPR claims over 800,000 members. We do not have a 
complete sociological analysis of members, but the 230,000 members 
aged under twenty-five which the movement claims have been broken 
down as follows: workers 19 per cent, lower white-collars 16 per cent, 
students 22 per cent, cadres moyens 13 per cent, professions 8 per cent, 
artisans and commer9ants l O per cent, farmers 4 per cent. If this shows 
a preponderance of intellectual categories (which would doubtless be 
corrected if the 'adult' membership were taken into account), it also 
suggests that the popular base of the RPR is far from negligible. Attempts 
to enlarge this base have led to the setting up of workplace branches 
(852 with over 25,000 members claimed in 1983) and efforts to get 
closer to 'moderate' trade unions like FO and CCC (see below). But as 
C. Y smal shows, the main effort has been made towards small employers 
and cadres - precisely the categories tempted by Mitterrand in 1981 
and who may have lost out since.1 In local government, long neglected 
by Gaullism, strenuous efforts have been made to organize RPR sup-
porters, making full use of the facilities of Paris town hall. In 1983 the 
RPR gained from both Giscardians and the left; it now controls 151 out 
of 862 towns above 9,000. Its mayors are organized under the leadership 
of M. Giraud, the dynamic president of the He-de-France region, who 
recently succeeded A. Poher as president of the influential lobby, 
!'Association des maires de France. 
Finance is a crucial ingredient of any political party, both for 
running expenses and for campaigning. A would-be deputy probably 
needs 50,000 to 100,000 NF to conduct a decent campaign; the three 
main presidential candidates in 1974 spent over five million. One 
might be tempted to think that the patronat finances parties of the 
right, but this verdict needs some refinement. While it has often had 
money for certain candidates in the past, and while it still eipploys a 
full-time political staff under M. de Mourgues, whose main task is to give 
logistic and financial support to chosen candidates, there is no auto-
matic collusion between the employers' organizations as a whole and 
any one party of the right. Money tends to come from individuals 
or sectors within the patronat and to be doled out rather reluctantly, 
and very much on the basis of local situations. It is also widely known 
that there is a 'caisse noire' of unspecified proportions in the prime 
minister's office, which is disbursed at election time. 
How, then, do Gaullist finances fit into this picture? As with all 
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parties they are hard to assess. There are probably individuals and 
groups of employers who donate. Crisol and Lhomeau suggest that the 
figure of twenty million NF advanced by the RPR is too low to pay 
staff and other overheads and that Chirac, 'le grand argentier', still has 
access to considerable but unspecified funds.2 
The party press is slight for such an important movement. Local 
efforts apart, there is only really the broadsheet La Lettre de la nation, 
edited by Pierre Charpy, which is rather hard to get hold of. On a more 
intellectual level there are revues such as Etudes gaulliennes or L 'Appel, 
which are not official RPR publications but are run by militant Gaul-
lists, usually of the more ideological kind. 
Compared with the average of the French population, the Gaullist 
electorate (see Table 4.2) seems very masculine and middle-aged. 
Sociologically, there is a high percentage of farmers, retired people, 
petty-bourgeois and top bourgeois. The working class is under-rep-
resented, however. It is also worth pointing out the low number of 
RPR voters who are either irreligious or belong to a union. 
If this suggests that much RPR support is conservative, the hypothesis 
Table 4.2 Electorate of major parties (percentages) in the 1970s 
PCF PS/ CDS/ PR RPR French 
MRG Radical electorate 
CSP 
Agriculteur, salarie agricole 4 8 13 10 12 9 
Artisan, petit commer~ant 3 5 9 8 7 6.6 
Cadres superieurs, professions 
liberales, industriel, gros 
commen;:ant 4 8 17 14 13 9 
Cadres moyens, employes 19 24 18 17 19 20 
Ouvrier 46 31 11 16 20 28.5 
Inactif 24 23 32 35 29 26.9 
Sex 
Male 52 51 57 46 50 48 
Female 48 49 43 54 50 52 
Age 
18-24 17 13 9 9 13 15 
25-34 24 26 8 17 18 20 
35-49 26 26 29 26 25 25 
50--{)4 20 21 28 20 21 20 
65 + 13 14 26 28 23 20 
Source: September 1977 poll by Louis-Harris-France, Le Matin, 6 February 1978. 
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is confirmed when we look at areas of geographical strength -
Alsace and Lorraine, with strong Catholic and nationalist traditions, 
Brittany and the south of the Massif Central. These are all old con-
servative areas. But Gaullism has also done well in more industrialized 
areas such as the Paris region and the north. It has never been very 
strong in the south, with its long anti-clerical and republican traditions. 
All the evidence today suggests that the core of RPR support is 
increasingly conservative. In 1967-8, the structure of the Gaullist 
vote was very near to that of the electorate at large (see Table 4.3). 
Since then it is clear that it has lost much working-class support in 
particular, and the major task for the RPR is to try and win it back. 
Recent polls suggest that the RPR electorate is very close to that of 
the rival UDF. Thus in a test of voting intentions carried out in June 
1983, the two parties ran neck and neck among upper and middle 
management, lower-white-collars and manual workers, i.e. the whole of 
the wage-earning strata.3 The RPR had a fair lead (38 per cent to 27 per 
cent) among industrialists, artisans and commerrants and also among 
the professions, whereas UDF led among the aged and retired. These 
figures suggest that beneath the different ideologies and traditions of 
the right vot&s perceive a common conservative core. 
Politically Giscard's defeat proved just the catalyst that the RPR 
needed. As the organizational fragility of Giscard's support emerged, 
leadership of the opposition swung back to the better-structured and 
Table 4.3 The right's electorate in the 1960s (percentages)• 
France as a whole Gaullists + RI 
(1968 census) 1967 1968 
Age 
21-34 29 29 
35-49 29 26 
55 
50-64 22 26 
45 
65+ 20 19 
CSP 
Cadres superieurs, 
professions 6 5 6 
Commeri.ants 9 11 14 
Cadres moyens, employes 17 16 18 
Ouvriers 32 28 25 
Agriculteurs 12 16 18 
Inactifs 24 24 19 
* Includes the votes for RI candidates standing in alliance with Gaullists. 
Source: J. Charlot (ed.), Quand la Gauche peut gagner, Moreau, 1973, p. 52. 
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tougher-sounding Chiraquians. The RPR has seized its chance. Organ-
ization has been tightened; a team of ex-prefects has been hired to run 
the central office and the older generation of Gaullist 'barons' has now 
been virtually replaced by younger men, often enarques such as Juppe 
and Toubon, or M. Noir and P. Seguin. Decision-making in the party 
does remain a largely personal affair, Chirac working closely with a team 
of preferred advisers, notably C. Labbe (leader of the RPR deputies), 
C. Pasqua ( electoral expert and organizer of mass rallies) and the under-
rated Pons. A less aggressive tone is used towards the Giscardians (gone 
are the days when Chirac could accuse the ex-president of being 'le 
parti de l'etranger' as he did in 1979) and fences have been mended 
with historic Gaullists like Chaban-Delmas, hurt by the abrasive thrusting 
tactics of Chirac. Even left Gaullists such as the UJP youth movement 
have now drawn closer. This smoother style is allied to the clever use 
which Chirac makes of his position as mayor of Paris, visiting and re-
ceiving heads of state and government, and suggesting that he is a world 
statesman (and of course a future president). 
Programmatically the RPR has been affected both by the effects of 
socialist government in France and by foreign imports in the shape of 
Thatcherism and Reaganomics: it now advocates extensive denationaliz-
ation, tax cuts, privatization of health, educational and welfare services 
to varying degrees and reduction of government spending to below 40 
per cent of GDP. But this type of theory is now shared more or less by 
all the parties of the right. So too is the other theme which has figured 
of late, viz. law and order, often linked, and not very subtly, to immi-
gration; here there is clearly a moving towards the themes of the extreme 
right, whatever disclaimers the moderates might make. Much of the 
RPR economic theory stems from Club 89, a think tank close to the 
party run by Juppe. 
Giscardism - le Parti Republicain (PR) 
Development The ancestry of the PR goes back to the notables of 
the early nineteenth century. Representing the post-Revolutionary 
bourgeoisie, these politicians were staunch defenders of economic 
and political liberalism, wanting to restrict the state's role to one of 
mlµIltaining law and order. Originally supporters of a constitutional 
monarchy based on restricted suffrage, these 'Orleanist' liberals were 
able to adapt themselves to universal suffrage and parliamentary 
democracy, merging imperceptibly after 1870 with new political cur-
rents based on the middle and lower bourgeoisie. Such were the origins 
of the moderates or independents of Third and Fourth Republics. 
If by ideology and temperament such groups were loose and ill 
organized, consisting of deputies clustered around one outstanding 
leader and potential prime minister (Ferry, Poincare, Flandin, etc.), 
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their members often held key posts in government. After 1945 the 
Cold War and the break-up of tripartism gave them the chance to re-
furbish a reputation tarnished by the fact that many of them had 
collaborated more or less willingly with the Nazi occupier. They thus 
became a key element of coalitions, especially after 1951 under the 
leadership of A. Pinay. During the Fourth Republic Roger Duchet 
made energetic but only partially successful attempts to federate these 
chronic individualists into something resembling a modern conservative 
party - the Centre national des independants et des paysans (CNIP). 
Most independents were glad to see de Gaulle back in power in 
1958. But while liking his financial orthodoxy, they found his 
presidentialism opposed to their parliamentary mores; and his moves 
towards Algerian independence clashed with their colonialist views. 
There thus ensued a split in their ranks in autumn 1962 (over the 
referendum on the system of presidential election), most of them 
going into the cartel des non and suffering electoral disaster for it. 
Some thirty-five of them followed de Gaulle, however, and they were 
led by the young deputy for Puy-de-Dome, first elected in 1956 and 
widely recognized as a Pinay protege - Valery Giscard d'Estaing. In 
1966 they set up a party of their own, the Federation nationale des 
republicains independants usually known as the RI. 
Until 1974 the RI played a useful secondary role in French politics. 
Always within the majority, they used the Gaullist umbrella to prosper, 
roughly doubling their parliamentary strength. They held some key 
posts (Giscard at the finance ministry, Marcellin at the interior), and 
were fully associated with Gaullist policy during its dominant period. 
Yet they were never Gaullists by temperament, ideology or origins. 
Their position was summarized in Giscard's famous 'Oui, mais .. .'; 
they agreed broadly with Gaullist policy but reserved the right to 
express differing views - notably on European affairs and on questions 
of economic and political freedoms. Needless to say their dissent did 
not go far, except for the referendum of 1969 where their hostile vote 
(Giscard was temporarily excluded from government by the General 
at the time) effectively sealed de Gaulle's fate. Many Gaullists still 
cannot forgive Giscard for this; but it meant his return to power under 
the aegis of Pompidou. The RI were clearly awaiting the end of the 
latter's mandate so as to install their leader in the Elysee in 1976, 
but their wish was granted earlier than foreseen when Pompidou 
died in 1974. 
Since then the RI have struggled to develop a party machine to 
match that of Gaullism, so as to support the actions of their leader. 
Despite the much publicized metamorphosis of their movement into 
the PR in May 1977, it does not seem that they have been too success-
ful. But by the 1978 elections they had managed to unite the non-
Gaullist parties of the right into a loose electoral organization, the 
UDF (Union pour la democratie franraise), very much under PR 
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hegemony. In the new parliament the UDF deputies formed a group; but it 
was too early to say if this meant the beginnings of a new non-Gaullist 
mass party of the right. 
UDF's problems loomed large after May 1981 when its inspiration 
and to some extent its raison d'etre lost office. As UDF recovered from 
the traumatic loss of half its deputies, its fissiparous tendencies became 
apparent. The Radicals talk increasingly of reuniting with the MRG (see 
below); CDS stresses its christian-democrat identity more, and the direct 
members of UDF who do not belong to one of the constituent parties 
seem rather lost. Symptomatic of these difficulties is the organizational 
wrangling which led to the sacking of UDF secretary-general M. Pinton 
(admittedly not the most adroit of politicians, for all his enthusiasm). 
Lecanuet and a team of four vice-presidents took over his functions on 
a basis that seemed temporary. But the ultimate future of UDF depends 
of course on wider factors than mere internal ones. 
Ideology Today's PR is characterized above all by its style, which 
could be described as one of moderation. Its spiritual leader, Giscard 
d'Estaing, is urbane, aloof and coolly intellectual - the very opposite 
of Chirac, who cultivates an image of hardworking and uncomplicated 
directness. The style of the parties matches that of their leaders. The 
RPR goes for what it thinks is a plain man's language, full of appeals 
to 'common sense'; it is never afraid of polemic and at times positively 
welcomes noisy public dispute. PR discourse is a more subtle affair, 
resting on carefully calculated appeals to different categories and 
not so much on muscular denunciations of 'collectivist' opponents 
(though these are not to be ruled out in extremis). These differences 
in style conceal a number of characteristic ideological themes. 
First among these is an appeal to individualism against what is 
seen to be the all-encroaching power of the state - 'donner a l'epanou-
issement individuel priorite sur !'organisation de l'Etat.4 This theme, 
a constant of liberal thought since the early nineteenth century, con-
trasts with the more Jacobin view of the Gaullist right, which tends 
to sublimate individuals into the framework of the nation. In the 
economic field this involves a greater commitment to free enterprise, 
with no talk of the voluntaristic planning dear to Gaullism; indeed the 
PR recommends hiving off sectors of nationalized industry to private 
capital. The PR has something to offer small businessmen and farmers, 
promising support to those wishing to set up on their own; but it 
also admits the necessity of rationalizing further both agriculture 
and industry, speaking of 'une politique industrielle selective', so as 
to increase exports. In other words it attempts, somewhat uneasily, 
to reconcile the claims of big and smaller capital. 
Individualism also characterizes the PR view of social relations, 
where the accent is put on participation and decentralization of 
responsibilities. This contrasts with the RPR, which the Giscardians 
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like to present (usually more by implication than by direct statement) 
as being further to the right' than theip.selves. The PR sees society 
not as a homogeneous block, and not in terms of class cleavages either; 
rather it is a loose agregate of groups, with the middle groups between 
the very privileged and the very deprived becoming steadily more 
numerous. These middle groups can, the PR hopes, be won over. To 
structure this society, and to ensure greater participation by individuals 
in decision-making, the PR counts, like its ancestor Tocqueville, on the 
corps intermediaires - voluntary or public bodies situated between 
citizen and central government. The PR proposes to give greater powers 
to voluntary organizations, but there are limits to how far decentral-
ization and participation will be taken: on the level of sub-central 
government, for instance, the PR, although it claims that it will abolish 
the tutelary powers of prefects, refuses the creation of regional 
authorities with proper powers. In the field of industrial relations, 
while it promises cadres a significant say in decision-making inside the 
firm, it offers workers merely an increased {but quite unspecified) 
say in the organization of conditions on the shop floor. 
Finally, on the level of foreign policy, the liberal tradition has 
always been less nationalistic than its Bonapartist rival. Thus, Giscard-
ism has always been more f .. vourable to European political integration 
than Gaullism. The PR programme wants increased co-operation between 
the developed capitalist democracies - 'une comrnunaute de peuples 
libres' - in an unspecified way; but the tone of this proposition is in 
stark contrast to the Gaullist stressing of French priorities. The PR is 
also characterized by a definite lack of the anti-American feeling which 
was and is an important emotional constituent of Gaullism. 
Structures Despite the presence of its moral leader in the Elysee 
and the sophistication and ubiquitousness of its publicity, it should 
not be thovght that the PR was a particularly well-structured organiz-
ation. When Giscard came to power in 1974,-he was in roughly the 
same position as de Gaulle in 1958 - he had supreme power, but in 
order to use it fully, he needed an adequate party machine. The old 
RI fell a long way short of requirements and it is not certain how well 
today's PR fits the bill. 
At local level the significant unit is probably the departmental 
federation, with its centrally appointed secretary; constituency 
associations would seem to be fairly weak. At national level the net-
work of committees that ran the old RI has been reduced to two -
a bureau politique and a secretariat national. These are appointed by 
the secretary-general, himself elected by the three-yearly party congress 
The secretariat contains eighteen persons who are responsible for dif-
ferent areas of policy and are in effect PR spokesmen on these topics. 
The bureau politique is a more powerful body, 'le veritable executif du 
PR', and it determines the main outlines of policy. Chaired by the 
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secretary-general, assisted by his two national delegates, it contains 
twenty-four people, all of thet:11 notables. The PR programme has m"!}ch 
to say about listening to grass-roots initiatives, but with the long intervals 
between congresses, the wide powers of appointment accruing to the 
secretary-general, the PR would seem to be a centralized machine, 
especially if, as Y smal claims, party leaders have a monopoly of the 
congress platform anyway.5 A generation of ambitious young deputies 
are currently on their way up the hierarchy and could expect office in 
any future government where Giscardians figured, notably F. Aubert, 
A. Madelin and F. Leotard (presently secretary-general). 
Little is known about PR finances; the proportion of gifts from 
companies and individuals is probably high. Campana recounts the 
unsuccessful attempts of V. Chapot, a senior PR organizer and very 
close to Giscard d'Estaing, to raise some finance from industry after 
1974 by the device (which most political parties in France use) of floating 
a company which is largely fictitious but whose services can be paid for 
generously ( and legally).6 The PR probably relied heavily on government 
for loan of ministerial staff and also for financial support when in office. 
Clearly since 1981 its resources will have been somewhat strained. 
In terms of press the PR is badly served, not managing to produce 
a regular journal. The cynical would no doubt point out that the 
radio and television in France did a more than adequate job in propa-
gating Giscardian ideals. There are also a number of weeklies, notably 
Le Point, which, though having no organic connection with the PR, 
present Giscardian views in an intelligent and readable way. 
As regards membership, the PR claimed 90,000 in March 1978 -
an improbable figure. Some of these will also be members of the 
youth movement Autrement (previously Generation sociale et liberale ), 
which claims 15,000 members and which Wright describes aptly as a 
movement for well-bred youths. More important are the clubs 
Perspectives et realites who claim 20,000 members; under Fourcade's 
chairmanship these clubs are 'think-tanks' which contribute policy ideas 
and more importantly, attract and groom suitable candidates for local 
and national office from among the educated and better-off sectors 
of the population. 
The PR is proud of the youth of its membership ( one-quarter under 
twenty-five, 69 per cent under forty-five) but rather more cautious 
about its sociological composition; it uses an analytical breakdown 
that does not correspond to the normal system of CSPs. Thus some 11 
per cent of members are listed as fonctionnaires, which could cover 
anything from a train-driver to a chef de· cabinet ministeriel. One or 
two features do stand out, however; there are relatively high 
proportions of lower petty-bourgeois (18 per cent of employes) and of 
retired or non-working people (over 16 per cent). Workers represent 
a mere 8 per cent of the total, suggesting that the militant audience of 
Giscardism at least has not penetrated far below the petty-bourgeoisie. 
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The PR electorate is of interest as it is very close to that of the 
Gaullists. If one compares the answers given by both sets of voters to 
various questions (limitation of the right to go on strike, role of the 
family within society, opposition to structural changes within society), 
one sees that the difference between the two is minimal.7 One can say 
that the PR and the RPR are fighting for the loyalties of the conservative 
Frenchman ( certainly the PR does well in areas of conservative tradition 
- Normandy and Brittany, the east, the Alps). It may well be that in 
the first ballot local considerations and personalities decide which party 
does best; but in the crucial second ballot there is almost an automatic 
transfer of Support both ways. Conservative voters seem able to recognize 
that agreement on essentials runs deeper than argument about lesser 
details. 
Giscardian allies 
These are the CDS ( Centre des democrates sociaux ), plus some minor 
groups. CDS is by far the most significant. 
Development CDS has a long history, inseparable from that of the 
church. The reader is familiar with the long antagonism of church and 
republic since the Revolution; but with the consolidation of republican 
democracy, the church decided to come to terms with the inevitable 
and encourage Catholics to participate in republican politics, so as to 
conserve as much influence as possible. The result is christian democ-
racy. Never having much of an audience or organization before 1939, 
it owed its dramatic start in 1945 to the upheaval of the occupation 
years and the part played by Catholics in the Resistance. These were 
the people who launched the MRP (Mouvement republicain populaire) 
at the liberation. It was to become a key party of the Fourth Republic, 
attracting on occasions up to 28 per cent of the vote and sitting in 
most governments, sharing power first with the left, then with the 
right. 
This thankless position in the centre of French politics reflected 
the fundamental contradictions of the MRP, torn between a reformist 
leadership often close to the socialists on some points (notably social 
policy and European union) and a conservative electorate. The latter 
voted for it only because (a) it was Catholic and (b) older conservative 
parties were discredited by their record during the occupation, and 
Gaullism was not yet available as an alternative. The revival of both 
these forces after 1947 took support from MRP, which moved steadily 
to the right in an attempt to regain this. The MRP was really in a cleft 
stick; if it supported traditional Catholic demands, such as state aid 
to church schools, it fell out with the left. But if it turned against 
conservative vested interests (e.g. that of the home distillers' lobby, 
responsible for much of the alcoholism in France) it stood to lose 
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votes in vital seats. By 1958 its stock had shrunk steadily, and being 
identified with the Fourth Republic it shared the opprobrium generally 
incurred by the regime. Although the MRP supported the arrival 
of Gaullism and shared in government till 1962, it broke with the 
General over Europe and the presidential election question; the 
November election dealt it a death blow, much of its support going 
over to Gaullism. 
After momentary thought about reviving the old alliance with the 
socialists, the rump of the movement decided to go it alone. It ran a 
candidate, J. Lecanuet, in the presidential election of 1965 and he 
scored over 15 per cent on the first ballot. Convinced that there was 
still a solid bedrock of christian-democrat support in France, he 
launched a movement, the Centre democrate, in December 1965 to 
canalize this (the old MRP was wound up in 1967). This 'opposition 
centrism' fought elections (as the Centre pour le progres et la 
democratie moderne) and formed a parliamentary group; but their 
opposition lacked conviction, to say the least. Some of them joined the 
majority of G. Pompidou in 1969, under the leadership of J. Duhamel, 
leaving Lecanuet still in opposition. He joined with another rump-
party, the Radicals of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, in 1971 under 
the umbrella of Les Reformateurs. This coalition scraped together 
enough deputies to form a parliamentary group (a minimum of thirty 
is required) in the 1973 elections, but only thanks to Gaullist with-
drawals at the second ballot. Giscard's campaign in 1974 was the 
signal for Lecanuet to abandon his opposition, and he supported the 
eventual victor right from the first ballot. The reward was a generous 
share of ministerial portfolios for himself and his friends. It now 
remained only to unite the two halves of the old CD, as both were 
now in the majority. This duly took place at Rennes in May 1976, 
the new formation taking the title of CDS. We can thus summarize 
its rather untidy evolution in diagrammatic form: 
/Lecanuet"" 
MRP - CD - CPDM CDS 
""Duhamel/ 
Ideology The CDS has retained much of the character of the main-
stream MRP (the members of that organization who took its progres-
sive aspects seriously having long since departed to various parts of the 
non-communist left). It makes as much as possible of its centrist title, 
implying that it occupies a happy medium between a 'collectivist' 
left and a hard, inflexible right (read Gaullism), which is incapable of 
change. It implies that it is the left wing of the right, as it were, and 
thus that it is best able to pull Giscardism towards a policy of reforms 
and even one day (for politics is sometimes made of dreams) serve as 
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a link between Giscardism and the socialists. Lecanuet often casts 
himself in the unlikely role of siren, attempting to lure the socialists 
away from their communist partners. CDS discourse is suitably 
moralizing, and it borrows a lot from a humanistic type of vocabulary 
developed by the MRP: words like 'justice' and 'responsibility' figure 
prominently. Yet this is usually mixed with a fairly elementary anti-
communism which is certainly cruder than that of the PR. The CDS 
is clearly reformist, i.e. it does not seek to change the structures of 
French capitalism but believes that these can be improved by legislative 
measures, such as income redistribution through the tax system or 
participation for workers in the workplace (in which they might 
perhaps go further than the PR). A characteristic theme is the CDS 
view of the family as the matrix of society and their wish to shape 
social policy around the family. This and the humanistic discourse 
are the surest signs of the CDS catholic origins, though the movement 
denies strenuously that its christian appeal is limited to anv one 
denomination. Politically, CDS favours greater decentralization. Above 
all, CDS is committed to European political unity. This has long been its 
major trademark (and the main source of Lecanuet's opposition to the 
regime before 1974). CDS leaders can be heard to remark in private that 
the idea of an independent foreign policy is a myth, although naturally 
their public pronouncements are more nuanced. A proof of the Euro-
peanism of the CDS is its membership of theParti popu/aire europeen, an 
international grouping of christian democrat parties. 
Structures Apart from traditional Catholic areas (Brittany, Alsace, 
Auvergne ), organizations at constituency level are weak. Departmental 
federations send delegates to a two-yearly national congress, which 
elects a president and secretary-general; but in the interim, power 
resides with the top committees. These are, first, the conseil politique 
composed of departmental delegates and parliamentarians, and 
theoretically responsible for overall policy guidelines. It also elects 
thirty members to a comite directeur, who sit with various co-optees 
of the president and secretary-general. Within this latter committee 
lies the real locus of power, the bureau politique, which meets monthly 
and is composed of president, secretary-general and assistants, treasurer 
and six others. 
Power is thus concentrated in a few hands, mainly those of parlia-
mentary notables; this is an adequate structure for a party whose 
task is not to put on massive displays of militant activity but to rally 
the bien-pensants of provincial, and mainly petty-bourgeois, France. 
The personality of its godfather, J. Lecanuet, senator and mayor of 
Rouen, looms large over CDS, though his hegemony is now under threat 
from a generation of rising stars such as P. Mehaignerie ( agriculture 
minister) and J. Barrot (commerce minister) up to 1981. Mehaignerie's 
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election as CDS president by two-thirds of the vote against B. Stasi 
(regarded as the leader of the party's 'left') shows the continuation of 
Lecanuetist orthodoxy and probably the limits to any possible opening 
towards the left. 
If relatively weak in terms of deputies, CDS has a strong base in 
local government with its 4,000 mayors and 355 departmental council-
lors, 13 of whom chair their conseil general. The CDS also boasts a 
youth wing, the JDS (Jeunes democrates sociaux ), which probably 
contains most of the real activists; some of them confess disappoint-
ment at CDS support for the austere policies of recent governments. 
There is also a women's movement which claims 4,000 members and 
which, while by no means militantly feminist, is still very critical of 
the inadequate life-chances which are offered women in French society. 
Membership of CDS as a whole is estimated at 35,000, no socio-
logical analysis of membership being made. 
Lack of militants on the ground is compensated by an excellent 
publicity machine, the best of the right parties. In addition to 
numerous broadsheets produced by local groups and federations there 
is a very competent weekly Democratie moderne, which sells 25,000 
copies. Commune moderne is a specialized review for local councillors: 
and there is the more theoretical periodical France Forum. The ably 
produced election manifesto Une Autre Solution sold 22,000 copies. 
The remainder of the Giscardian alliance is made up of random 
elements, starting with the Radical party, whose history will be 
recounted at greater length in the following section. It has shrunk 
sadly from the days when it was the pivot of the republic; today it 
lives on only through its local councillors and its handful of senators 
and deputies (most of whose seats are secured by some very subtle 
electoral alliances); there is also the financial backing of Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiber (JJSS). Little remains of the old Radical spirit except 
rhetoric and nostalgia. Lately the party has benefited from the general 
revival of the right's fortunes. It claims 10,000 members and has 29 
mayors in towns of over 9,000. Its future progress depends on electoral 
reform: if some kind of proportional system is introduced, it might 
escape from the logic of bipolarization and figure anew as the centre-left 
pivot in a looser multi-party system. For this reason rapprochement 
with the MRG (who split off in 1971) is vital; the question is whether 
to do it now or to wait until MRG deserts the left, as many believe will 
happen. The battle for the party presidency in 1983 was fought on just 
this question, and A. Rossinot, defending the second tactic, beat 0. Stirn, 
an unconditional unitaire. But electoral change does not depend on the 
Radicals, and without it their future looks bleak. 
Of slightly more significance is the CNIP, that relic of the Fourth 
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Republic which confounded many who had believed it to be dead 
by doing quite well in the 1978 elections. The CNIP is really the last 
stand of the notables of earlier republics, very much the representatives 
of an earlier phase of capitalism, when the small and medium-sized 
businesses still weighed heavily in the economy. They are too individual-
istic to join either Chirac or Giscard d'Estaing. In their numerous bro-
chures and their monthly journal, the independents propound a rugged 
liberalism. They have never really accepted the welfare state, any kind 
of government intervention in the economy, women's rights, or moral 
liberalism; church and family are still very important to them, and most 
of them regard Giscard as a crypto-socialist. Their anti-communism is 
the most uncompromising of all. Presided over, curiously, by an enarque 
(P. Malaud), CNIP was alleged by 1983 to be a convenient link between 
the respectable parliamentary right and the extreme right which prefers 
battles in the street to duels at the hustings (see below). 
(3) Parties of the left 
These are essentially the socialists and communists, which are assumed 
to be on the left because they seek to transform the structures of 
capitalist society, instead of reforming or managing it. Since 1972 
these parties have been combined in a left union, along with the left 
Radicals (a small left-over from previous republics, which will be 
discussed briefly). Stimulated by the common programme of govern-
ment (CPG), which committed its signatories to a precise legislative 
programme if elected, the union progressed well in terms of popular 
support until September 1977, when the renegotiation of the CPG 
broke down, resulting in a drastic deterioration of relations between 
the partners and the loss of the 1978 elections by the left. But the left 
union, though at a low ebb, is not dead; the two main partners still 
claim to be committed to it, and it is hard ·to see how in the foresee-
able future either could find a realistic alternative alliance. For this 
reason, we shall insist somewhat in this section not just on an analysis 
of the separate components of the left, but also on their inter-relation-
ship in all its conflictual dynamism. 
Socialism - the Parti socialiste (PS) 
Development In 1905 a number of marxist and near-marxist fractions 
united to form the SFIO (Section franraise de l'internationale 
ouvriere ). The new party was an unstable mixture; its revolutionary 
marxist rhetoric belied a leadership much more inclined to reformism 
and the conquest of power through parliament. This contradiction 
was plastered over, brilliantly, in the theoretical writings and the 
political action of Jean Jaures, the effective party leader until he was 
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murdered in 1914. By this time the party's one million votes showed 
that it had a solid working-class base and was also making inroads 
into the lower petty-bourgeoisie and peasantry. 
A revolutionary party in theory, aiming to establish social owner-
ship of the means of production, the SFIO excluded collaboration 
with bourgeois governments - at least to the point of joining one. 
But this temptation grew stronger between the wars under the leader-
ship of Leon Blum, especially as the party was challenged for the 
working-class vote by a new and intransigent movement, communism. 
Pressure came to a head in 1934-6, with the worsening international 
situation. The threat posed by fascism persuaded communists (with 
the blessing of the Soviet Union), socialists and radicals in several 
European countries to join together in Popular Front alliances, the 
object of which was not to promote socialism but to shore up the 
wavering capitalist democracies for what seemed an inevitable war 
against fascism. In France the Popular Front alliance scored a clear 
win in the 1936 elections, Blum forming a government with communist 
support, but not participation. Though short-lived, the government 
implemented a number of changes (forty-hour working week, paid 
holidays, representative status for trade unions) which have retained 
a nostalgic, almost mythic odour for people on the left; they are 
seen as an example of what the left can do when united, and in an 
odd way 1936 marks a peak of left unity that has never been achieved 
again. 
If its first spell as dominant partner in government had been 
reluctant, the SFIO was to find itself a frequent member of Fourth 
Republic coalitions, sharing power first with communists and MRP, 
later with MRP and Radicals of various hues in the 'third force' type 
of government - this despite having committed itself in 1946 to a 
rigorous marxist doctrine under its new secretary-general Guy Mollet. 
The SFIO record up to 1958 was not brilliant; if it could point with 
pride to its share in setting up the welfare state institutions of the 
liberation period and the beginnings of economic recovery, then it had 
also presided over wage freezes and brutal strike-breaking, as part 
of the policies demanded by French capitalism for its post-war 
consolidation. Most of all, in colonial policy, the Mollet government 
of 1956-7 was responsible for the decisive escalation of the Algerian 
war. It undertook the disastrous Suez expedition, allowed the forces 
of repression a free hand in Algeria and made a steady erosion of civil 
liberties at home. In other words it contributed decisively to that 
weakening of government authority that in the end killed the Fourth 
Republic. By 1958 the electoral and militant support of SFIO had 
sunk as low as the prestige of a regime of which it was now a pillar. 
It gracelessly admitted defeat and helped de Gaulle to power. 
The 1960s were spent exploring various alliances to try and revive 
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the machine. In an early phase it was hoped to revive the old centre-
left or third force alliance (MRP to SFIO), an idea particularly 
associated with G. Defferre, who hoped it could be the platform for 
a presidential campaign of his own. Lack of enthusiasm by Lecanuet 
(and also by the communists, who were shut out of this deal) ensured 
that the idea was stillborn. The mid-1960s saw then a dwarf version 
of the centre-left alliance called the FGDS (Federation de la gauche 
democrate el socialiste ). This embraced the SFIO, the Radicals and a 
group of near-Radical remnants from the Fourth Republic clustering 
under the leadership of F. Mitterrand known as the CIR (Convention 
des institutions republicaines ). This alliance did reasonably well in the 
1967 elections, with Mitterrand emerging as a leader of national 
dimensions, but failed to withstand the electoral disaster of 1968. 
Since, then the logic of bi-polarization has told, and the socialists 
have been pushed back towards the communists. The rapprochement 
of the two had been getting under way as early as 1962, in fact, when 
the communists withdrew a number of second ballot candidates in 
favour of the SFIO. In 1965 the communists took the dramatic initiat-
ive of not running their own presidential candidate and supporting 
Mitterrand as the united left candidate. In 1967 they again stood down 
in the second ballot for FGDS candidates and in February 1968 signed 
a joint declaration with the FGDS in which both partners listed policy 
points on which they agreed and disagreed. There seemed to be the 
possibility of a common programme of government emerging as the 
basis of a united left campaign. But the electoral defeat of 1968 and the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, condemned by the communists 
with no great enthusiasm, again drove a wedge between communist 
and non-communist left. 
The division was not to be durable, though. During 1969-71 the 
SFIO rebuilt itself, becoming the PS and formally absorbing 
Mitterrand's CIR and some smaller groups. The unification congress 
of 1971 at Epinay-sur-Seine elected Mitterrand as first secretary. As 
well as changing· its name, the PS changed its leaders and its ideas: 
its 1972 programme Changer la vie leaned markedly in the direction 
of the political philosophy of autogestion (see below). Visibly taking 
on new life, the PS felt strong enough to talk to the communists 
again; in July 1972 a common programme-was actually signed. Fighting 
the 1973 elections with the CPG behind it, the PS did almost as well 
as the communists. After Mitterrand's narrow failure in 1974, the 
party drew in new blood in the shape of several thousand members 
of the PSU at the assises du socialisme of October 1974. 
From then to the defeat of 1978 came a steady flood of new members 
and election wins. But the 1977 quarrel with the PCF and the failure 
to win in March 1978 posed some questions about the inevitability of 
PS progress. 1978-81 were very sticky years for the party, marked by 
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factional strife, pivoting on the Rocard/Mitterrand rivalry for the presi-
dential nomination. This personality clash did have ideological and 
political foundations (see below), and the unhappy display of internecine 
strife at the Metz congress of 1979 led to some talk of splits. The 
campaign efforts and the 'divine surprise' of Mitterrand's win, followed 
by enjoyment of the spoils of office and the difficulties of governing, 
have healed wounds remarkably. The party is by no means solidly 
united (it is the nature of democratic socialist parties not to be so), but 
it is once more a major force. 
Ideology If so much space has been devoted to the history of French 
socialism, then this is no accident. First, the politjcal and social analyses 
made by the PS are properly historical, as befits a socialist organization. 
Second, its own view of itself and its relations with other forces is 
heavily coloured by memories of its past. The PS sees itself as 
continuing and extending the old republican tradition, with its attach-
ment to democracy and civil liberties. But it is also a socialist party, 
believing that capitalism is based on exploitation of the majority and 
that full democracy and freedom can only be achieved under socialism, 
when private control of the means of production and exchange is 
ended. Today the conditions for such a transformation exist: recent 
monopolistic trends in French and international capitalism have 
increased exploitation and redrawn the map of society, pushing down-
wards strata of petty-bourgeois who were previously in a fairly 
comfortable position. These can be won over, along with the working 
classes and that part of the petty-bourgeoisie which is employed by 
the state (and which was for a long time the main activist base of the 
SFIO), in a 'class front'. This front would seem to involve less of the 
middle bourgeoisie than the communists' 'anti-monopolist alliance'. 
Aware of the poor governmental record of the SFIO, the new PS 
refuses the label of social democracy (managing capitalism without 
trying to change its structures, but at the same time trying to re-
distribute a few social advantages). But it is equally critical of the 
Soviet type of one-party socialism, with its evident lack of democracy. 
It has thus developed a third model, le socialisme autogestionnaire. 
Its keynotes are decentralization and responsibility. So far as possible, 
in any area of activity, power will be brought nearer to the grass roots 
- whether in the workplace, the school or university, or the local 
community. The key area of activity, the economy, will be brought 
progressively under workers' control, starting with the public sector, 
and extending, it is hoped, into the domain of private capital; inter-
mediary structures between state and private sector, such as self-managing 
co-operatives, will be encouraged. The risks of economic fragmentation 
will be avoided by a revitalized and more democratic form of planning, 
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with inputs coming in from the self-managing firms rather than from 
central ministries. 
The PS believes that the transition to autogestion can be sponsored 
by a government based on the left alliance to which it remains 
fundamentally committed and that it can be done without revolution. 
It also believes that such a project has more chances of success on a 
European scale than on a French one, hence its attachment, warts and 
all, to the EEC and its wish to implement common European socialist 
policies agreed across national frontiers. 
PS programmes are criticized for their utopian character. It is true 
that autogestion is a vague and open-ended ideology, but it does have a 
clearly libertarian tinge which distinguishes its protagonists from the 
PCF and helps the PS to appeal to the numerous new middle classes. 
Moreover, the PS can be very pragmatic or even opportunistic if need 
be; thus it has changed from supporting unilateral nuclear disarmament 
to enthusiastic endorsement of French deterrence in response to what 
seems to be enduring public support for this. Its economic strategy ( cf. 
chapter 1) was again designed pragmatically, appealing to notions of 
efficiency and greater material benefits. In other areas, the party can be 
overtly traditionalist if not archaic, cf. its attachment to the doctrine of 
laidte, which helps tie in to the party categories for whom this concept 
is central ( e.g. teachers in state schools). It is this mixture of idealism 
and pragmatism in policy choices that helps explain the party's rise, as 
it gets through to such different publics. 
Structures Basic units (sections) exist at workplace or residential 
level; their delegates attend the departmental federation, which in tum 
elects to regional and national bodies. The most important of these, 
constitutionally speaking, is the two-yearly national congress, where 
delegates are sent by federations in proportion to membership. 
Federations also elect delegates to the national convention, which 
meets twice yearly and which is supposed to check that the sovereign 
decisions of congress are being upheld by the party executive, the 
comite directeur. This is elected by congress and supervises in the 
interim the party's office-holders, members and press outlets. 
Places on the CD are allotted proportional to votes cast by members 
for general policy motions presented to congress. Each of these bears a 
list of signatures in order and is effectively sponsored by one of the 
fractions or courants (see below). Thus congress is the moment when 
the rapports de force between fractions are measured, and it is of course 
fraction leaders who take the seats on the CD. Thus at the Bourg-en-
Bresse congress of 1983 motion I (Mitterrandists + Mauroyites + Rocard-
ians) got 77 per cent of the votes, Motion II (CERES) 18 per cent, and 
Motion III ('dissident' Rocardians led by Alain Richard) 5 per cent. 
Seats on the 135 member CD were thus alloted as follows: I - 102 seats, 
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II - 23, III - 6. 
The CD delegates responsibility for day-to-day-running of the party 
to a smaller nucleus the bureau executif (BE) whose twenty-seven 
members meet at least weekly. Again it is elected proportionately. But 
the real locus of power and initiative inside the party lies inside the BE, 
in a body called the secretariat (currently fifteen full and fifteen part-
members). This is a sort of inner cabinet, with each secretary in charge 
of one policy area; the first secretary (L. Jospin) is thus a sort of party 
prime minister. Usually the secretariat is the exclusive preserve of the 
majority fraction, unless it does a deal (la synthese, in party jargon) 
with the sponsors of rival motions, in which case the latter are offered 
secretarial posts in return for signing a revised, unitary motion (whose 
content can sometimes be quite contradictory!). When there is no syn-
these, then the BE and CD are like a parliament to the secretariat's 
government, i.e. it has to get its initiatives past their scrutiny or oppo-
sition. But this it can usually do as it has a majority. From 1979 to 1981 
the party was governed by a Mitterrand-CERES axis against Mauroy 
and Rocard. 
The fractions (les tendances, as they are pejoratively called) have now 
become central to the party's functioning in a way that few can have 
imagined in 1971; indeed rule 4 of the party statutes specifically forbids 
their existence! Yet exist they do with their own internal structures, 
resources, premises, and publications; they have all the trappings of 
parties within a party. Usually formed out of groups that pre-existed 
the rebirth of the party in 1971, they have maintained and consolidated 
their identities, ensuring that the party is a place where ideas circulate 
and debate is vigorous, albeit at the risk of that sectarian infighting 
which, if taken too far, can destroy a party electorally. Such was the 
experience of the British Labour party in 1983, whose fractions are 
ironically much less organized. Apart from the 1979 to 1981 period, 
the fractional leaderships have usually known when not to prolong their 
disagreements, and the Bourg congress was a perfect illustration. Here 
the CERES motion criticized the government for its austerity policies 
and its foreign policy (seen as too anti-Soviet), but in the end CERES 
accepted a synthese with the pro-government motion of J ospin when 
the latter made them some concessions. 
Fractions are sometimes hard to identify, amid a welter of sub-groups, 
some of which in turn split from time to time into further sub-groups. 
Also some of them remain underground, as it were (i.e. they keep their 
organization intact, but refuse to present motions and hence to 'stand 
up and be counted'). Thus the Rocardians have signed Mitterrandist 
motions ever since 1981 (on humiliating terms, as a rule). But most 
analysts discern four abiding fractions: 
(a) the Mauroyites: mainly ex-SFIO members, based on municipal 
bastions in areas like the mining and textile zone of Nord-Pas-de-
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Calais and parts of the Midi rouge. Despite marxist language, fairly 
pragmatic reformists, near to North European social-democracy, 
and pro-Europe. 
(b) the Rocardians: strongly influenced by 'new left' ideology. Mis-
trustful of the state and traditional parties as means of social and 
economic change, relying more on voluntary and co-operative 
institutions in civil society. Anti-communist and lukewarm on 
laidte; probably more Catholics here than elsewhere in PS. Derided 
by rivals, especially CERES, as liberal wolves in socialist sheeps' 
clothing. Probably the fraction least at-home in the party. 
( c) CERES: marxist left fraction. Sees party as necessarily revolution-
ary, and determined to make it so. Socialism to result from a 
fusion of vigorous government action and mass pressure in street 
and workplace, canalized by party. Most attached to union with 
PCF, which it sees as transforming both parties. Deliberately 
nationalist, anti-American and anti-German. Long considered auto-
gestionnaire and open to Catholics, but the struggle with Rocard 
brought it back to its dirigi,ste and laidste roots. Exceptionally 
obstinate and able leader in J.-P. Chevenement. 
( d) the Mitterrandists: the lea~ cohesive group. Includes Mitterrand 
loyalists (J oxe, Mermaz, Laignel, etc.) often from a Radical culture 
with a veneer of marxist economics. Also classic marxists like the 
sect which follows the ex-PCF notable J. Poperen. Plus a majority 
of new members from the 1970s without previous experience, in-
cluding many careerists. Generally the most sectarian lafcs (which 
has facilitated rapprochement with CERES on occasions); claim 
attachment to left unity, but mainly on electoral grounds. Divided 
on foreign affairs between Atlanticists and the more independent-
minded. Mitterrand's skill and presidential personality was the 
real cement of this fraction in opposition: since his elevation to 
the presidency, fear of Rocard and the power of government 
patronage have been adequate substitutes. 
It is hard to judge the exact weight of each fraction, as lately only 
CERES has had the courage to put up its own motion. But the percent-
ages at Metz were as follows; Mitterrand 40 per cent, Mauroy 14 per 
cent, Rocard 20 per cent, CERES 14 per cent. These seem to have served 
as a rough guide to Mitterrand when he composed his governments, for 
the different posts were distributed with remarkable subtlety between 
fractions, a procedure known as dosage. 8 
The fractions exist thus with all their differences under the banner 
of the autogestionnaire philosophy which they all in theory share. They 
are not just launching pads for the presidential ambitions of various 
leaders, though that is one of their roles,9 but genuine ideological com-
munities which group the faithful under their particular version of the 
true creed. As such they give the party a suppleness shared by few of its 
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colleagues in the Socialist International. 
PS electoral support has undergone a similar evolution to that of 
successful democratic socialist parties elsewhere. Beginning as a narrow-
based workers' and small farmers' party, it has spread to the point where 
it takes votes across the whole social spectrum (see Table 4.4) functioning 
as a 'catch-all'. Its membership can best be understood as a series of 
concentric rings: the nearer you are to the leadership bodies of the party, 
the higher up the sociological scale you will be .10 Thus if there are still 
manual workers and lower white-collars among the 213,000 members 
claimed in 1983, federal and national elites will come increasingly from 
the new middle class, especially its intellectual components and among 
these, especially public sector teachers and lecturers; right at the top, 
graduates of the grandes ecoles abound. The weight of these public 
sector intellectuals is reinforced by the absence of a feature common to 
North European social democracy, viz. organic links between the party 
and the labour movement, especially its trade unions. This gap, which 
makes it very hard for working-class people to rise up through the PS, 
is such that in the view of some theorists (H. Portelli, A. Bergounioux) 
the PS and its Latin neighbours should not really be called 'social demo-
cratic'. The one organic though unofficial link that the PS has with a 
union is with the teachers' union FEN (see below), whose input in terms 
of membership, finance, and last but not least, ideology should not be 
underestimated. 
In regional terms, the party still does best in old republican regions, 
mainly south of the Loire ( especially Burgundy, the Rhone valley, the 
south-west and Languedoc) and in the old mining and textile areas of 
the Nord and Pas-de-Calais; it has grown of late in the conservative east 
and west, even in 1981 to the point where there are seats to show for it. 
Finance comes from classic sources. Local and national office-holders 
pay in a part of their emolument, and members' dues are supposed to 
amount to 1 per cent of disposable income. In fact they are usually 
banded in broad categories according to income; thus in 1983 a lecturer, 
say, would pay around £15 per month (as compared with £6 per year 
to the British Labour Party). The party's town planning advisory service 
Urba conseil is a useful source of income, and clearly office has meant 
that the party gets staffing and doubtless financial help from government. 
In the past, reformist employers, often friends of Mitterrand, helped 
out. 
The PS has some interesting press outlets. Le Poing et la rose is a 
compact monthly for members, and the weekly Unite~ under the 
astute editorship of C. Estier, publishes party documents as well as 
news and analysis. There is also the Nouvelle Revue socialiste, ten 
times yearly, which aims at a more cultivated public. But the most 
interesting papers are those with the least formal connection with the 
PS. Apart from provincial dailies such as Le Proven9al ( owned by 
Table 4.4 Electorate of major parties, June 1981, first ballot 
N.B. The columns total 100% horizontally, i.e. the figure in any box is the percentage of that category which voted for a particul!u: party 
PCF PSU + far left PS + MRG + allies UDF RPR other right Ecologists 
Total Electorate 16 1 39 19 21 3 1 
Men 17 2 39 20 20 1 1 
Women 15 1 38 18 22 4 2 
Aged 18-24 18 2 44 14 17 3 3 
25-34 17 2 46 16 15 1 3 
35-49 17 2 37 18 23 2 1 
50-64 18 1 42 19 16 3 1 
65+ 10 1 27 27 30 5 
Agriculteur: salarie 6 2 32 28 32 
agricole 
Artisan: commeri;ant 10 35 19 31 5 
Cad. sup; profn. liberale: 7 2 38 19 28 3 3 
industriel; gros commeri;ant 
Cad. moyen: employe 16 2 45 18. 14 3 2 
Ouvrier 24 1 44 15 14 1 1 
retraite; inactif 16 1 29 23 26 5 
Source: Nouvel Observateur, 4 July 1981 
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Defferre) which support the party, there is the Parisian daily Le Matin 
which achieves the difficult synthesis between readability for a mass 
audience and reasonably sophisticated political analysis. There is a stream 
of lively theoretical reflection from reviews like the CERES L 'Enjeu, or 
the Rocardians' Interventions. 
Communism - the Parti communiste franc;ais (PCF) 
Development Like most of its sister-parties in Europe, the PCF 
began as a split from an existing socialist movement, in the aftermath 
of the First World War and the Bolshevik revolution. Thus the SFIO 
congress at Tours in December 1920 saw admirers of the Russian 
revolution leave 'la vieille maison' to form a new party, the PCF. 
Accepting the rigorous twenty-one conditions for membership laid 
down by Lenin, the PCF was admitted to the Third International 
(Comintem), and for a long time carried the sub-title SFIC (Section 
franraise de l'internationale communiste ). If its founders were 
enthusiastic about Leninism, however, they had still much to learn 
about the theory and application of that doctrine. It would take over 
a decade to 'bolshevize' the new party and make it something like the 
disciplined instrument demanded by Leninism. During this period the 
PCF remained a marginal force in French politics. 
Its future depended, then as now, on its relations with socialism. 
Until the mid-1930s it would attack the SFIO with the slogan of 
'classe contre classe', stressing the necessity of a revolutionary break 
with capitalism and denouncing the reactionary nature of the SFIO 
for implying that this could be achieved without a vanguard party 
(like the PCF). In this it was faithful to the policy laid down by the 
Comintem, the co-ordinating body for all communist parties under 
firm control of the Soviet Union. When the Comintem made its famous 
tactical 'tum' of 1934, however, and recommended the adoption of 
Popular Front tactics, things changed rapidly for the PCF. Its new 
tone of social consensus for class-struggle, patriotic nationalism for 
working-class internationalism and defence of parliamentary democracy 
instead of denunciation of 'bourgeois freedoms' gave it huge gains 
in membership, parliamentary seats and trade-union support - a 
base which it has never lost since, in fact. 
A good resistance record (especially after the Nazi invasion of 
Russia in 1941) helped the party's reputation, and it shared power 
from 1944 to 1947 with SFIO and MRP. During this time it made 
every effort to preserve political and social stability in France and to 
boost production, succeeding so well that de Gaulle acknowledged this 
in a letter to the widow of Thorez (PCF leader) on his death in 1964. 
This was the party's peak period for electoral and militant strength. 
But the Cold War brought its eviction from government and the return 
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to a ghetto from which it has tried to escape ever since. Permanently 
shut out of government, despite holding a steady fifth of the popular 
vote, the PCF could at first only retreat into a doctrinaire shell, with 
the occasional flexing of its industrial muscle as sole response to its 
isolation. But by the early 1960s the start of de-Stalinization in 
Russia, the end of the Cold War and the logic of bi-polarization were 
all leading to a situation where alliance with the non-communist left 
might seem more feasible. The slow genesis of the 1972 alliance has 
already been described. But it was always a conflictual one, and from 
1974, when it was clear that the PS was the major beneficiary, the 
conflict worsened to the point where the PCF was ready to weaken 
the alliance and in effect lose the 1978 elections. But in so doing it 
held back socialist growth and kept intact most of its own positions 
in terms of votes and seats. 
This on-off relationship with socialism, characterized by mutual 
need but equally strong hatred, has hardly changed at bottom over 
six decades. It raises the question: what sort of party is the PCF? 
Ideology Marxism sees historical development as workini; through 
class-struggle: a new type of society only comes into being when a 
ruling class is supplanted, probably violently, by a rising one. Under 
capitalism the rising revolutionary class is that of the workers: only 
it could destroy capitalism and establish a social order not based on 
exploitation. Lenin added to this proposition a significant rider, namely 
that, left to itself, the working class would probably develop no more 
than a reformist consciousness. For it to become revolutionary (i.e. 
to see its situation clearly and to realize the task awaiting it), it needed 
guidance from an external factor, the party. Formed of those who had 
acquired a Marxist understanding of history ( and thus an organization 
which placed a premium on quality rather than quantity) the party 
would organize the class for the seizure of power, the dismantling of 
the bourgeois state apparatus and the building of socialism. 
The party must thus be disciplined. In Leninist language it would 
practise 'democratic centralism' - democratic because the party 
hierarchy is freely elected and preliminary policy options freely dis-
cussed, but centralized because, once policy has been decided, it must 
be implemented by the base without question. The existence of 
organized tendencies inside communist parties has been forbidden since 
1921. How democratic centralism operates in the PCF will be seen 
shortly; but such was the Leninist concept which marked it from 
its outset - hierarchized, disciplined and dedicated to revolutionary 
class-struggle under the aegis of the Soviet Union. 
Over the years a number of factors have eased the PCF away from 
its purist origins. The evident shortcomings of Soviet socialism: the 
fact that conditions under French capitalism have never been 
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catastrophic enough to drive huge sectors of the population into the 
PCF's arms: the division of Europe into two spheres of influence, with 
France firmly in the capitalist one - all these have led the party to 
reconsider its role and to move, along with the Italian and Spanish 
parties notably, towards what is rather sloppily called 'eurocom-
munism'. For the PCF at least this means that there is no universal 
model of socialism, certainly not the Soviet one; France must invent 
its own. Moreover, such a socialism is now considered attainable by 
non-violent means: electoral victory of the PCF and its allies will usher 
in a period of 'advanced democracy' where economic and social reform 
will create conditions for a later stage, socialism, whose characteristics 
are not specified. The basis of this analysis is the theory of state mon-
opoly capitalism (SMC); it is held that the high degree of interpen-
etration between the state apparatus and vast industrial and commercial 
concerns has raised productive capacity to a high level, but only at the 
cost of increasing hardship and deprivation for many sectors of the 
population - all, in fact, except the very top layer of bourgeois, 'une 
poignee de milliardaires insolents', as G. Marchais is wont to put it. 
This means that an electoral alliance of all the deprived is feasible, 
'l'union du peuple de France', under PCF hegemony, of course. The 
PCF is so committed to the idea of a French socialism that it has made 
its own the Gaullist notion of independence in foreign affairs, even to 
the point of accepting the French nuclear deterrent which it opposed 
for years. 
This theoretical revision explains a number of points conceded 
by the PCF of late. It now admits the possibility of political pluralism 
during the phase of socialist construction or even of power returning 
to the right after a period of socialist-communist government; 
previously it had held to the theory of proletarian dictatorship (which 
meant in practice irreversible one-party rule), but this was struck off 
the statutes at the twenty-second congress in 1976. The PCF proclaims 
its attachment to civil liberties and the necessity to extend these; 
previously it tended to regard them as 'formal' (i.e. not worth very 
much). On numerous occasions it has criticized the Soviet Union, 
timidly at first ( cf. the mild reproaches over Czechoslovakia in 1968) 
but with growing firmness ( cf. its obtaining the release of the dis-
sident Plyutsch or its approval of an underground film condemning 
labour camps in 1976). But this has by no means cleared up the party's 
problems of identity, either for itself or for others. Perhaps this will 
become clearer if we examine PCF structures. 
Structures The PCF hierarchy is as follows: 
Paris Congress (elects Central Committee, which elects 
bureau politique (BP) and secretaries) 






Federation conference (elects federal committee, 
which elects bureau and secretaries) 
Section conference (elects committee, which elects 
bureau and secretary) 
cell (has own bureau and secretary) 
The national congress is the sovereign body of the PCF; its authority 
is delegated to the two-monthly central committee, which leaves day-
to-day affairs to the bureau politique. In 1983 the CC had 145 members 
including 24 substitutes; the BP had twenty-two members, seven of 
whom enjoyed the rank of secretary. G. Marchais is secretary-general. 
The organigram shows a pyramidal structure which appears un-
exceptional in that the lowest level elects delegates to the next level, 
and so on upwards. Thus the national leadership, vested in the BP, 
should be an emanation, albeit indirect, of the grass-roots, and thus 
amenable to its ideas and proposals. If anything, the reverse is true; 
it seems that the leadership (and some would even claim the secretary-
general) is able to decide changes in policy or tactics ( cf. the volte-
face over the nuclear deterrent in May 1977) and have them executed 
by an obedient membership. Revolts do occur in the lower echelons 
(e.g. after the Soviet crushing of the Budapest insurrection of 1956, 
or after the electoral disaster of 1978): and in the past, purges were 
used to restore order. Probably two features explain the relative ease 
with which the BP runs its machine. One is the party's vertical system 
of communication: there are no sideways links between cells, which 
effectively prevents grass-roots discontent from gaining momentum. 
The second is the hold exerted by Les permanents (full-time party 
employees, hence unlikely to cross the leadership) who occupy key 
positions in the apparatus, notably at the level of federal secretary. 
Although they are elected, their candidacy has to be approved by the 
candidates' commission of the CC; in other words they have to have 
BP approval. Hence this system of filtering ensures that only loyalists 
win office; and they are expected to 'bien tenir' sections and cells 
below them. Thus compared with the PS or the parties of the right 
- although we have seen that one can exaggerate the extent to which 
the grass-roots influence policy here also - the PCF seems to have 
perfected a watertight system whereby a small professional elite decides 
and imposes policy. 
Several other features characterize the PCF as a party 'pas comme 
les autres'. Its strength in the workplace is well known - 9,922 cells 
in late 1977, with a very strong presence in the public sector. Linked 
to this is its symbiotic relationship with the CGT (see below). In 1978 
eight out of sixteen of the CGT leadership were communists, as were 
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eighty-eight out of ninety-six federal secretaries. It is customary also 
to remark on the party's influence over other associations in civil 
society, professional and voluntary alike. The main secondary and 
higher teachers' unions, the SNES and SNESup, are led by PCF 
militants; so too is the small farmers' union MODEF. The party's 
influence spreads across bodies such as the Mouvement de la paix, 
!'Union des femmes de France and even ex-soldiers' associations. In 
all these bodies, communists attain hegemony not because they are 
'submarines' or infiltrators, but by hard graft and dedication - qualities 
for which there are no substitutes in politics. 
The party is also important in the publishing world. Its Editions 
sociales produce an impressive range of marxist work at fair prices. 
There is the party daily L 'Humanite (claiming sales of 240,000) and 
three dailies based on provincial towns. The weekly La Te"e, aimed at 
farmers and passionately opposed to enlargement of the EEC, is very 
readable. The main theoretical review is Cahiers du communisme, which 
often has important party texts. PCF economic theory is treated in 
Economie et politique, now more popularized, and the more difficult 
Issues. The weekly Revolution, a fusion of two previous publications run 
by vaguely dissident elements, has lost the dynamism of both its pre-
decessors. In this connection one should mention the immense effort 
that the PCF puts into education; as well as running many levels of 
schools for its activists it has a permanent research institute, the Institut 
de recherches marxistes. 
A good deal is known about party finances. In 1981, 84 million 
NF were collected in dues and from office-holders (who tum over 
their salary to the party and are paid back the wages of an OP); a 
further thirteen millions came from collections, donations and fetes. 
This would not suffice to pay the wages of the several hundred full-
time officials which the party uses in Paris and the provinces. The 
PCF has thus developed a commercial sector of some importance, 
involving up to 300 firms and solidly competing with capitalist enter-
prise. Its activities include property, printing and agriculture, especially 
the Interagra export company directe9 by the 'red millionaire' J .-B. 
Doumeng. Commentators show some smugness in criticizing the PCF 
for possessing this veritable capitalist empire; but as, unlike its rivals, 
it receives no help from government or private capital, it must finance 
itself somehow. It can hardly be expected today to rely on handouts 
of 'Moscow gold', for which it was stigmatized in the 1930s. Writers 
like Montaldo still insist that the party is funded by the USSR but their 
case is not proven. 
In February 1982 the PCF claimed 710,000 members in 27,700 cells; 
these are believed to tum over at a high rate (maybe 15 per cent p.a.), 
leaving a relatively stable core at the centre of, say, 50,000 activists 
who are really the heart of the party. Nugent gives the following figures 
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for 1979 to describe their sociology :11 farmers 3 .4 per cent, artisans/com-
merrants 4.1, lower white-collar 28, intellectuals 13 and manual workers 
51. Although the weight of the latter categories may be exaggerated, 
there is no doubting the strong popular base of the PCF. And it is true 
that with rare exceptions it is working-class people who rise to the top 
of the party, in a way unthinkable in other parties: a typical career 
begins with union work in the CGT, followed by responsibilities at cell 
or section level, then, after following courses at a party school, perhaps 
office as a federal full-timer and so on to eminence in late middle age 
as a member of the central committee. Nowadays the party is more 
feminine (35.7 per cent women) and seems readier than others to give 
responsibilities and winnable candidacies to women. It is also young, 
half the members being under forty. 
The PCF vote held steady at 20.6 per cent in 1978. Its bastions 
are where one would expect them to be, among the working class -
Paris suburbs and those of other big towns, Nord and Pas-de-Calais, 
Lorraine steel area, Bouches du Rhone. But the party has grown in 
audience in the poorer departments of the south-west, Limousin and 
Languedoc-Roussillon, thanks to its diligent espousal of the small 
farmer's cause. Its weakest areas are, unsurprisingly, Alsace and 
Brittany. 
The 1981 elections were a disaster, as many supporters seemed to 
sanction the PCF's retreat to more sectarian positions. The presidential 
poll brought 15.3 per cent and the parliamentary one 16.2 per cent. A 
quarter of the vote had gone. More seriously, only 24 per cent of the 
working class now voted PCF, compared with 44 per cent PS; and other 
popular categories showed a similar loss of support. These trends con-
tinued through the municipal polls of 1983, as seen in the loss of several 
'red belt' suburban towns, very much the bastions of the party and long 
considered impregnable. This suggested that 1981 was more than a 
passing accident. 
The left Radicals - Mouvement des radicaux de gauche (MRG) 
The MRG is heir to a proud tradition. Radicalism was a major force 
of earlier Republics, notably the Third, where it was in the vanguard 
of the struggle for parliamentary democracy and the secular state. 
Perhaps the peak of its achievement was in 1905, when both could be 
said to have been achieved. Radicalism was based on the petty-bour-
geoisie and parts of the peasantry of the provinces: its typical notable 
was the small-town professional man, usually well-entrenched as mayor 
or deputy and operating on a fairly clientelistic basis, distributing 
favours obtained from Paris in return for electoral support. The slow 
rate of change in pre-war France meant that such categories remained 
important long after the movement had achieved its political aims. 
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Hence it could only become conservative, winning elections on the 
strength of its progressive rhetoric and then governing in a timorous 
way, often in alliance with the right. This led to the joke that a Radical 
was someone whose heart was on the left but whose wallet was on 
the right. 
The revival of 'third force' politics after 1947 enabled the Radicals 
to continue this performance under the Fourth Republic, the only 
exception being the energetic premiership of P. Mendes-France in 
1954-5. This capable and far-sighted leader cut several Gordian knots 
in foreign policy before his appetite for reforms aroused the hostility 
of the more cautious Radicals and split the party into two. The decline 
continued through the Fifth Republic and the movement split yet 
again in 1971, some following JJSS into alliance with Lecanuet (and 
later Giscard d'Estaing), others joining the left alliance and signing the 
CPG. These, under R. Fabre, set up a separate party, the MRG. 
MRG discourse continues the republican, 'humanist' tradition. 
For free enterprise (but against its logical outcome, big capitalism), 
for private property (so long as it does not become 'gigantisme 
industriel'), against bureaucracy and for civil liberties, the MRG 
emerges as what it has always been - the champion of the small man. 
It likes to suggest that it is the salutary leaven in a dough consisting 
of doctrinaire communism and socialist adventurism - so much so that 
one wonders why it ever signed the CPG. The answer is that MRG 
deputies need communist votes on the second ballot. 
The 1981 presidential elections vindicated MRG's decision to field a 
candidate, M. Crepeau, both in terms of votes won and rewards after-
wards, in the shape of ministerial office for Crepeau and others. But 
survival remained a problem, as in late 1981 two MRG deputies switched 
to the PS. The election of J.-M. Baylet (whose family owns the famous 
old radical newspaper la Depeche) as party president in 1983 hinted 
that the search for unity with the other Radicals might be about to 
begin seriously, as MRG doubts about the left's chances in 1986 grew. 
(4) Fringe parties 
On the left 
The most notable of these is the Parti socialiste unifie (PSU). It began 
life in 1960 as a refuge for those disgusted with the established left, 
its early militants including leftish catholics, communists driven out 
by the rigidity of the PCF, socialists repelled by Molletism and 
Mendesists alienated from the stagnant Radical party. Always prone 
to faction-fighting, its role was to gather and to stimulate debate. 
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Its electoral weight was slight (a handful of deputies, Rocard's defeat 
of Couve de Murville in a by-election in 1969 and his 3.7 per cent of 
the first-ballot vote in the presidential election of that year); but 
electoralism was never a PSU priority. It aimed to create a new socialist 
movement, neither social-democratic nor Leninist. In particular it 
helped to develop and vulgarize the theory of autogestion: Though 
critical of the CPG, the PSU supported Mitterrand's 1974 campaign -
a sign perhaps that some. members felt the PS to be moving towards 
their policies. Confirmation of this came in October 1974 when Rocard 
took 3,000 militants with him into the PS after the assises du socialisme 
meetings. But the pur et dur minority remained active: in 1974 C. 
Piaget was the inspiration of the work-in at the Lip watch-factory. 
The PSU presidential campaign in 1981 was disappointing, but it has 
given critical support to the government since. History was made in 
1982 when Huguette Bouchardeau accepted the post of environment 
minister, becoming the first PSU member to enter a government. Typi-
cally the party was badly split on the issue, fearing that it would be 
exploited as a fig-leaf to cover Mitterrandist austerity. Increasingly, as 
well as providing critical ideas for the left in general, the party's future 
would seem to lie in its ever-closer involvement with movements in 
French civil society, outside the ambit of formal party politics. Hence 
its leading role in the French equivalent of CND, CODENE (Comite 
pour le desannement nucleaire en Europe.) 
France also boasts a plethora of organizations of the classic extra-
parliamentary left, viz. Trotskyists and Maoists. Of the latter, the 
best known is probably the PCMLF (Parti communiste marxiste-
leniniste de France), which publishes the paper L 'Humanite rouge. 
French Trotskyism is marked by the mutual suspicion and internecine 
sentiments which characterize Trotskyist movements elsewhere. Of 
particular note are the Ligue communiste revolutionnaire, of which 
A. Krivine is the best-known spokesman. Lutte ouvriere is probably 
associated for most people with Arlette Laguiller, bank clerk and presi-
dential candidate in 1981, where she took one vote in forty on the first 
ballot. 
Small but committed, the far left organizations put most of their 
energy into campaigning - for conscripts, for women's rights, for 
tenants, for immigrants, against nuclear power stations. Often they 
discover themes which are 'recuperated' by the official left for electoral 
purposes. They also provide many young people with their first 
experience of active politics and introduce them to a marxist analysis 
of society - both of which acquisitions may well be put to use later 
on within the parties of the official left, when revolutionary ardour 
has cooled somewhat. As such, the far-left organizations may well 
play within the political system a role somewhat different from that 
which they intended. 
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On the right 
Like most of her neighbours, France has not been spared from fascism. 
In the 1930s, a number of semi-fascist 'leagues' flourished, and under 
Vichy genuinely pro-Nazi elements eventually came to the fore. After 
1960 there was a revival of fascism with the OAS, which did not 
flinch from terrorism in its resolve to keep Algeria French at all costs. 
The economic recession of the seventies, with its unemployment and 
tendencies towards economic nationalism, has given fascists in France 
and elsewhere a new target, the black immigrant worker. In France 
today there are still people who preach the traditional themes of 
fascism - the 'strong state', seen as the only barrier to marxist 
collectivism, total commitment to nationalism, and racialism. The main 
groups are the PFN (Parti des fo~ces nouvelles) run by people close to 
the newspaper Minute, and the Front national of J.-M. Le Pen, ex-
Poujadist deputy and OAS supporter. 
Although it was widely believed that the far right represents less than 
1 per cent of electoral opinion, it has undergone an upswing of late. In 
the by-elections of late 1983 the FN, exploiting themes of insecurity and 
unemployment, which it blames with brutal simplicity on immigrants, 
had several scores of above 10 per cent, some in working-class suburbs. 
At Dreux it was offered places on the victorious list led by an RPR 
sympathizer, and Le Pen's fame grew to the extent of being interviewed 
on BBC television. Part of this revival is due to the fact that the official 
right has started using these themes; and indeed it seems that the far right 
has striven hard to infiltrate the moderate parties, especially CNIP .12 It 
is too early to say whether this collusion will establish the FN as a 
serious political force or whether ( as happened in the UK in the 1970s) 
its new-found support will drift back to the conservative parties as they 
adopt some of its themes and vocabulary. Indeed there is already tension 
in these latter parties as they argue about the nature and extent of 
possible alliances with the hard right. 
Associated with this latter but not synonymous is the new right, a 
group of intellectuals concerned not with party organization but with 
the ideological renewal of the right.13 To this end they have updated in 
a new language some very old themes, appealing to biology to demon-
strate the truth of what they see as inevitable natural inequality, and 
stressing the superiority of Western Christian civilization over what they 
call the totalitarianism of the Soviet system. This highly Parisian mode 
is well publicized in the media (especially Figaro-Magazine): it would be 
hard to say how influential it has been in the ideological development 
of the established right-wing parties or in their convergence with the 
extreme right. 
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Ecologists 
This new force cannot yet be classified in traditional terms. They 
made a spectacular impact in the 1977 elections (270,000 votes: more 
than 10 per cent in Paris and other big towns). The burden of their protest 
is familiar - the waste and probable exhaustion of natural resources 
by industrialized societies, the social ills which result from pollution 
and other nuisances, the dangers of nuclear power. But it is not clear how 
ecologism fits into existing political structures. Is it just a self-interested 
pressure-group, of the type that does not want a motorway in front of 
its own garden, but has no objection to one in front of someone else? Or 
can it become a .new political movement, traversing existing parties and 
creating a new politics on the basis of its particular problematic ( the use/ 
misuse of nature)? Alternatively, will the movement be 'recuperated' by 
existing parties, all of whom are rapidly straining to develop an ecological 
dimension?14 Ecologists themselves are a heterogeneous collection, as 
shown by the existence of candidates from two movements (a radical 
one and a more 'apolitical' one) in 1978, and voting behaviour in the 
second ballot (some ecologists voting on the right, some on the left). 
Despite Lalonde's success in 1981, the ecologists remain bedevilled 
by personal rivalries and conflicting ideological and strategic options. 
The 1983 municipal elections showed a loss of half the vote from 1977, 
due to division among ecologists ( some of whom were on right-wing lists 
and some on the left) and in some cases clever absorption of certain 
demands by established parties. The 1984 European elections were a 
chance to present a united list and hence to work towards a unified 
movement (in 1979 the ecology list almost broke the 5 per cent threshold 
necessary to elect representatives). 
It is hard to place the Mouvement des democrates, led by M. Jobert, 
once Pompidou's foreign minister. They are basically left Gaullists, 
alienated by what they see as Chirac's betrayal of traditions. This small 
formation contests elections and it supported Mitterrand in 1981. J obert 
was rewarded by appointment as minister of foreign trade but resigned 
after two years in protest at apparent lack of government will to protect 
French industry. Typically this enigmatic figure had no real alternatives 
to suggest. Politically he has always claimed to be neither on the right 
nor the left but 'ailleurs'. In 1983 it looked as if 'ailleurs' really meant 
'nulle part'. 
( S) The parties today 
On the right it is clear that the Chiraquian RPR has staged a remarkable 
comeback. After 1974 it was predicted that Giscardism with its control 
of presidential patronage would weaken or even absorb its rival. This 
Political forces 191 
was to underestimate both the strength of ideological traditions and of 
party apparatuses; thanks to the 'premeditated treason' ofMay 1981 the 
RPR has turned the tables. Its organizational superiority and the growing 
sophistication of Chirac make it the leader of the right; and Chirac must 
start favourite in the 1988 race for the presidency. 
The UDF suffers from organizational fragility and from the fissiparity 
inevitable when different political traditions are hastily ground into an 
electoral machine. Its future depends on its ability to overcome these 
handicaps and present a unified and plausible liberal alternative to the 
populism of Chirac. 1988 is the crucial date but there are three stages 
on the way. First are the direct elections to the European Assembly in 
1984. If UDF joined a united list, it would have to take the terms offered 
by Chirac, which might be seen as a sign of weakness. If it ran separately 
and finished behind the RPR, that too would imply weakness. The 
choice will again have to be made at the 1986 parliamentary elections, 
where the UDF must decide if there are to be one or two right-wing 
candidates at the first ballot. But whatever it does then, the UDF must 
stand up and be counted in 1988; for the presidential competition is 
where real power is allocated, and no serious party dare shun it. But 
there are problems here. Giscard now seems stuck with the tag of loser 
and would probably be seen as a liability. The logical alternative, R. Barre, 
for all his intelligence, suffers from severe handicaps. One is his over-
weening arrogance, which frightens even his close supporters, and the 
other is that he was after all jointly responsible for the policies - and 
failures - of the last septennate. 
For these reasons there is growing talk, including in the moderate 
left press, of a bid by Simone Veil, popular former president of the 
European Assembly and ex-health minister under Giscard. This liberal 
and humane figure might be better placed than others to pull votes from 
the floating centre ground. UDF thus faces some hard choices. Yet it will 
survive, even if its constituent parties do not knit any closer together. 
It may well be that programatically the right-wing parties are today 
closer than ever: to a greater or lesser extent they are all in favour of 
denationalization, tax cuts, reduction of public spending and privatiz-
ation of welfare services. In foreign policy they are all born-again Cold 
Warriors, yet apprehensive about the reliability of the USA and aware of 
the need for greater European self-reliance in defence. Their divergences 
are comparatively minor ( e.g. length of the presidential term of office). 
Sociologically and indeed on most political or ideological questions, 
their electorates are very close. But none of this means that France will 
end up with a single conservative party, for two factors pull strongly 
against this unitary pressure. One is the weight of tradition and history; 
movements with a long past and a record of achievements do not easily 
lose identity, especially as their activists sustain themselves with a myth-
ology which pivots on their own distinctness and exclusivity. The other 
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factor is more material; parties are apparatuses aiming at state power. 
They contain leaders and supporters able and willing to fill posts in the 
state so as to implement their policy goals. Supply of such places is 
limited and demand great; and the mechanism which allots them is at 
bottom the party. So the parties will continue their separate ways. UDF 
will have to convince voters that it is sufficiently like RPR to be trusted 
with the running of a conservative France, but sufficiently different as 
to justify voting for it. RPR will be trying to do exactly the same. Dif-
ferences will be stressed but always within the fundamental parameters 
of conservatism. This process will last a long time yet. 
The break-up of September 1977 did raise acutely the question of the 
conflictual relationship of the PCF and PS. 
The PCF's desire to break was prompted by simple considerations. 
It was not simply that the PS was prone to reformism and hence 
potentially disloyal to the CPG (this was as true in 1972 as it was in 
1977); behind PCF allegations of a socialist 'virage a droite' and 
readiness to strike a bargain with Giscardisni., lay the unpleasant truth 
that the PS was benefiting more from union than the PCF. The PS 
was growing and appealing to the better-off workers and lower petty-
bourgeois, but the PCF seemed incapable of extending its appeal 
beyond the 20 per cent of its hard-core support. It thus faced the 
prospect of entering government as a junior partner, with slight 
influence; it might find it difficult to get the CPG implemented, never 
mind extended ( especially as economic growth, on which the CPG 
was predicated, had been less rapid since 1974). The PCF thus needed 
either to get extensive guarantees from the PS (which were not forth-
coming in the re-negotiations) or failing that, to make sure that the 
left failed to win. For marxists, power is not worth having unless one 
is able to use it to make significant change. 
What does the PCF stand for, then, and how does it see its role? 
Today it has moved further away from the Soviet Union than ever 
before; but it has still made no detailed analysis of the shortcomings 
of that system (perhaps because this would involve questioning the role 
of the Soviet communist party, hence of itself). There are several 
views of the party: a revolutionary Bolshevik party, still: a rallier of 
the exploited and discontented: a potential party of government: or 
even, as Kriegel claims, an 'alternative society' with its own life-style 
and values. Perhaps the PCF is all of these at once; what is sure is that 
it is still a Stalinist party, albeit, as Kriegel says, a degenerate one. 
By this is meant that it is still a blunt instrument, wielded according 
to the calculations of an entrenched leadership. 
In fact the PCF has been in acute discomfort since 1981. It has min-
isters, but in a sense is half in and half out of government. The ministers 
do their job with impeccable cabinet solidarity, while the party press 
and the CGT snipe at the policy outcomes, especially in economic and 
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foreign affairs. Periodically Jospin calls the PCF to order, and commen-
tators pit their wits as to when it will leave government, either voluntarily 
or by eviction. Realistically the party can only hope that the Mitterrand 
experiment is enough of a failure to drive 'les de9us du socialisme' back 
into its arms. Readers will probably think that this is not much by way 
of a political project. 
Yet this relationship with the PS probably remains the main determin-
ant of party behaviour. In a sense these Siamese twins are competing 
for the same ground, even if in a good period the PS can stretch its 
support further to the right. No one knows if the recent electoral erosion 
of the PCF is definite; but it must start quickly to regain its working-class 
support as well as that of the middle strata, especially technical and 
intellectual, which some see as the groups which are hardest for it to 
attract.15 Paradoxically it is one of the party's greatest strengths which 
makes the widening of its appeal most difficult. 
This strength is its real working-class identity. It is not just that its 
activists and supporters are workers; the party has helped foster a pro-
letarian culture or way of life which stresses the profound differences 
between workers and the rest. This implies a sort of angry pride in 
belonging to the class and 'le parti qu'elle s'est donne'. And this culture 
is maintained. by the activity of the PCF through all its antennae and 
institutions. Many believe that the unattractive features of the party (its 
mechanical Stalinist structure, its dogmatism and its attachment to 'real 
socialism') are somehow part of this identity .16 At any rate it seems hard 
for the party to abandon them in an attempt to please middle groups 
who might not be attracted anyway. Yet in the long run the PCF will 
have to change itself to some extent if it is to avoid ghettoization as the 
representative of a traditional and declining working class. It cannot go 
on forever purging people who ask awkward questions, such as J. Ellein-
stein or H. Fiszbin. 
The real problems of the PS will begin when it loses office, and the 
inevitable recriminations set in as to whether there was too much or too 
little &ocialism. This is when the full potential for conflict which the 
party's fractional structure implies will be released. But the PS will 
probably prove resilient enough to show tl}.at it was no mere flash in the 
pan which could cobble together an alliance of the new middle classes 
and workers temporarily alienated from the PCF long enough to win an 
election, but nothing more. In terms of votes and seats it is bound to 
descend some way from the high point of 1981. By the end of the 
decade its ideological discourse will doubtless be as maximalist as ever 
and as strident. But by then people will be able to see it better for what 
it is, namely an inter-class, reforming party of a type which historically 
seems necessary to occupy the middle ground in the sociologically 
diverse industrial states of the developed world. 
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Figure 4.1 Seating arrangements of deputies in the national 
assembly, 1981 
Source: Le Matin, 8 July 1981 
( 6) Interest groups 
Political parties compete for power in the hope of translating their 
supporters' demands into public policy; besides them one finds, in 
pluralistic societies, interest groups. The aim of these is more modest; 
bringing together people with common objectives ( economic, ideo-
logical, etc.) with a view to furthering such objectives by common 
action. When they try to influence public policy in this direction 
(i.e. by trying to influence decisions within the state apparatus) they 
are termed pressure groups. 
France has her share of these, but observers have always been 
struck by the much looser relationship that they enjoy with the state 
than in, say, the Anglo-Saxon countries. In the latter, some groups 
appear so well integrated into the process of political decision-making 
as to be almost parts of the state apparatus. Much has been written 
on French groups, and the current debate has been so well summarized 
by Wright that only a few remarks need be made here.17 Basically, 
there is no single model which covers adequately all the possible 
relationships between the French state and groups. The latter are not 
always natural enemies of the state, prone to violence so as to extract 
concessions from a rigid bureaucracy. Nor are they passive clients, 
'recuperated' by the government so as to implement its policies more 
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Table 4.5 Main political forces during the Fifth Republic, 
performance in general elections* 
Election date 
Nov. Nov. March June March March June 
1958 1962 1967 1968 1973 1978 1981 
Communists 
A 18.9 21.8 22.5 20 21.3 20.6 16.2 
B 10 41 73 34 73 86 44 
Socialists 
A 15.7 12.5 19c 16.5c 20.7e 24.7e 37.5e 
B 44 66 116 57 101 114 283 
Radicals 
A 11.5 7.8 
B 40 39 
Christian 
democrats 
A 10.8 16.8a 17.9a 10.3d 13.tf 
B 57 55 41 33 64 
Independents 
A 19.9 21.5g 19.2g 
B 192 137 62 
Gaullists 
A 17.6 37.7b 37.7b 44.7b 36.4b 22.6 20.8 
B 206 268 245 360 238 148 85 
* The percentages in every case do not total 100, as the scores of minor formations 
are omitted; A = percentage of first-ballot votes; B = number of seats eventually 
won. 
a combined total of MRP and opposition independents. 
b combined total of Gaullists and Giscardian RI. 
C combined total of SFIO and Radicals allied as FGDS. 
d centrists' group, CPDM. 
e combined total of PS and MRG. 
f 30 of these were centrists elected in alliance with the majority: the total also 
includes those Radicals allied with Lecanuet as les Reformateurs. 
g combined total of UDF (PR + all remaining centrists). 
easily. Nor are they so strong as to dictate policy to certain ministers -
although one could easily find examples of all these situations. There 
are in fact an infinite number of possible relationships between state 
and groups, and the extent to which groups can extract concessions 
depends on several variables: their organization, finance, capacity for 
publicity, access to decision-makers and so on. One point that most 
observers would concede is that the groups' targets have shifted some-
what; today access to ministers or the Elysee is much more important 
196 Political forces 
than access to deputies - a far cry from the deputy-centred republics 
of old. 
Another factor which is sometimes forgotten is that there are 
obvious limits to what any state can concede within the framework 
of a capitalist economy. The state's function in such situations is 
to ensure that accumulation of capital proceeds as smoothly as possible. 
Now, there is never one unambiguous way for this to occur; there are 
always strategic and tactical choices to be made ( concessions to big 
capital or to small? or to skilled workers at the expense of unskilled?). 
Equally there are certain choices which mu~t be ruled out, because 
they would be damaging to capitalism as a system. One of the 
interesting aspects of French groups is that some of the most powerful 
are militantly anti-capitalist. 
Bearing this parameter in mind, the next pages will outline concisely 
the major economic pressure groups, while trying to suggest by what 
means and with what effect they influence policy. 
Working-class unionism 
Development Modern unionism dates from the Second Empire with 
its modest surge of industrialization. Prior to that the labour movement 
had known the fate of its counterparts in other countries which 
experienced industrialization, viz. legal and physical repression. The 
law of 1864, passed by a regime looking for support among a growing 
working class, went halfway towards granting freedom of association 
and was completed by the law of 1884. 
A working class that was still small, scattered and divided, both 
ideologically and in terms of the size of workplaces, might be expected 
to evolve differently from the UK, where industrialization and urban-
ization were much quicker. At any rate, in 1895 when the first major 
national grouping of unions was set up with the title of CGT (Con-
federation generale du travail), it had as its doctrine the theory of 
revolutionary syndicalism. Largely inspired by skilled workers with 
a high lt:vel of political consciousness, this ideology presumed a high 
degree of technical and political competence among workers: so much 
so that they were now able to run the economy and society for them-
selves, the bourgeois class becoming redundant. Not that the latter 
would hand over control peaceably, however; a short period of violence 
triggered by a general strike would be necessary to expropriate them. 
The syndicat (union branch) was seen as the basic political unit, both 
for the seizure of power and for political and economic decision-
making afterwards. Political socialism (the SFIO) was despised as 
irrelevant or reactionary. Such were the tenets of revolutionary 
syndicalism, which failed to survive World War I as a living force, but 
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which marked French unionism powerfully. Its most notable legacy 
is the famous apolitisme, enshrined in the CGT's Amiens charter of 
1906, which insists on the total independence of the union movement 
from all political parties; in a different way, the ideology of autogestion 
also owes it something in the way of theoretical ancestry. 
Between the wars the CGT was the arena of a struggle for control 
between socialists and communists, which ended in the victory of the 
latter; the decisive phase was probably the occupation where the 
outlawing of the unions by the Vichy regime put a premium on the 
qualities of resolution and leadership which the communists possessed. 
By December 1947 the 'moderates' (SFIO sympathizers) were ready 
to split off; they were helped financially by the American unions and, 
it was later discovered, the Central Intelligence Agency. The result 
was a new union CGT-FO (Force ouvriere). Since then CGT and FO 
have gone their separate and antagonistic ways. 
The third major union began life in 1920 as the CFTC (Confeder-
ation franraise des travailleurs chretiens ). As its title shows, it was 
for catholic workers and was long characterized by extreme deference 
(at one point it had an advisory council of clergy). Inevitably its 
militancy increased as members learned that catholic employers are 
still employers. After 1945 the movement became more politically 
conscious, developing a theoretical reflection in which themes of 
class-struggle and socialism became prominent. This led in 1964 to a 
retitling of the union as the CFDT ( Confederation franraise democra-
tique du travail); the minority for whom religious convictions remained 
paramount continuing as the CFTC maintenue. The CFDT was heavily 
involved in 1968, which helped its radicalization no end; it has been 
in the forefront of the autogestionnaire movement and has probably 
done the most to awake interest in this notion. Yet it has avoided 
becoming an appendage of the PS; with its radical socialism and its 
syndicalist mistrust of political parties it seems very much the enfant 
terrible of French unionism today. 
It is clear, then, that the French labour movement is heavily 
politicized; and this is logical. For unions always have a political 
dimension, whatever their members may think to the contrary. This 
is so for many reasons. Often members are direct employees of the 
state; even when working for private capital, their everyday demands 
(wages, holidays, etc.) will have a direct effect on government economic 
policy. This explains the increasing state involvement in wage-bargain-
ing at all levels. So even when people join unions for non-political 
reasons Gob protection, better rewards, etc.), they are joining bodies 
that have a political role to play. Now French unions are well aware 
of this. It is true that they carry out the normal bargaining which 
members expect of them; but they have also thought deeply about 
the kind of society they wish to see ( a socialist one) and the means to 
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attain it. Clearly at the heart of any such analysis will lie the relation-
ship between unions and political party, to which we shall tum shortly. 
But let us first examine union structures. 
Structures The following structures are those of the CGT and FO: 
with slight variations, they are valid for all major unions. 
The basic unit is the syndicat, organized as far as possible on the 
basis of one big industry (thus the federation des metaux would group 
syndicats of workers ranging from general labourers to very skilled 
steelworkers, who in Britain would probably be in specialized unions 
of their own). The organization of the union is both vertical and 
horizontal, or to put it another way, both geographical and profes-
sional. Professionally, the syndicats are part of a federation (a national 
grouping of all syndicats in that particular industry) and the different 
federations are then joined in a confederation. But geographically 
they are linked at local, departmental or regional levels with syndicats 
from other industries which share the views of the confederation as a 
whole. These geographical levels are represented on the national 







At national level the sovereign body is the national congress ( two- or 
three-yearly), which delegates power in between to other bodies. 
First of these is the comite conf ederal national, which is elected by 
federations and departmental unions and which between its six-monthly 
meetings passes on power effectively to the commission executive 
and bureau executif (from within the latter's ranks). Thus the CCN 
is roughly the union parliament, and the CE and bureau its executive. 
The situation in the CFDT is similar, although the names of the top 
bodies are different. 
In general unionization in France is low, compared with similar 
industrialized countries; it is rated at below 25 per cent of the work-
force. Union membership is always difficult to assess in any country, 
for numerous reasons, but the following estimates give some indication 
of strength. 
In late 1982 the CGT (secretary-general H. Krasucki) claimed two 
million members. Its strengths lie in mining, the metal-working 
industries, building, chemicals, printing, electricity and transport, 
and it is weaker in the tertiary sector. The CFDT (secretary-general 
E. Maire) claims 960,000, with special strengths in metal, oil, rubber, 
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textiles, banking and insurance. FO (secretary-general A. Bergeron) 
numbers around 1,100,000 and is strong in non-industrial sectors - banks 
and insurance, transport, commerce and the lower ranks of public em-
ployees in general. The CFTC has some 250,000 members, under the 
leadership of J. Bornard. 
All these figures show a sharp drop over the last four or five years. As 
the crisis generates unemployment and demoralization, unions find it 
hard to hold existing members, let alone recruit. At the same time em-
ployers go on the offensive, increasing procedures such as fixed-term con-
tracts and part-time working, which make it harder for unions to defend 
workers. Such practices are currently estimated to apply to a quarter of 
the workforce.18 The loss in membership has hit especially at those 
areas predicated on traditional industries like engineering or textiles. 
It may be that of late overpoliticization has weakened the more 
radical unions. The CGT is known to have suffered for pushing members 
to support Marchais's presidential campaign, and earlier in 1978 CDFT 
decided that even its always critical support of the Left Union was 
detracting from basic union tasks in the workplace. Hence its adoption 
of recentrage'(forsaking electoral politics in favour of day-to-day union 
struggles in the workplace). But neither union seems able to halt its 
erosion. 
In terms of resources, Reynaud believes French unions to be the 
weakest in Europe, along with Italian ones. Most syndicats fix dues 
at 1 per cent of members' salaries, varying parts of which are taken by 
the higher levels of the union. Unionists who are members of the 
Economic and Social Council usually turn in their salary, but this 
represents a small amount (700,000 NF out of a budget of 21 million 
for the CGT in 1975). There is little advertising revenue from union 
journals and although the government gives a certain amount in the 
form of training and research grants, the CGT and CFDT both believe 
that their more moderate rivals obtain a higher proportional share than 
is justified by their membership. Also, the grants could be bigger 
(they covered 19 per cent of the CGT's 1975 budget). This means 
inter alia that strike funds are low and that in prolonged disputes 
unions must rely on collections and other manifestations of solidarity. 
Unions devote an important part of their resources to publicity. 
There are abundant publications, ranging from local broadsheets to 
work aimed at specific categories (e.g. papers for immigrants in their 
own languages). At national level, the most important are the CGT 
weekly Vie ouvriere (in a popular style which sells 200,000 copies) 
and the more theoretical Peuple. The CFDT issues the weekly 
Syndicalisme (55,000 copies) which has important confederal texts 
as well as practical advice for active unionists and discussion of current 
problems. There is also the more advanced CFDT aujourd'hui. FO 
publishes the essence of its views in FO Hebdo. 
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Unions deal with the state in various ways. It recognizes only the 
four major industrial unions, plus the specialized CGC and FEN (see 
below) as representative. This entitles them to the aid described above 
and to seats on the Economic and Social Council, its regional 
equivalents and some public companies. Unions also help to manage 
a number of bodies in the field of social affairs (vocational training 
funds, unemployment benefits) and also the comites d'entreprise. 
Since 1968 they have had the right to set up branches openly in large 
firms, with time allowed for meetings and other business; though 
there are still large firms where bona fide unions are kept out by 
violence and intimidation. To some extent, union influence can be 
measured in terms of their performance in the elections for the above 
bodies, where in the first ballot representative unions have a monopoly 
of candidacies in theory. 
Union strengths are given in Table 4.6. They must be read with 
caution, as for each type of institution the electorates, conditions of 
participation and of course tum-out are different. But they do show 
that the major centres are widely representative, as well as indicating 
their strength relative to each other. Of late 'moderate' unions have 
gained at the expense of more radical ones. 
A further interesting feature is the way in which the regional strengths 
of unions parallel those of the political left. CGT thus does best in the 
older industrialized regions of northern France and in those parts south 
of the Loire where there is a long socialist or communist tradition. CFDT 
strengths lie more in Normandy, Brittany and Alsace, areas which of 
course have markedly Catholic electorates.19 
A more significant measure of strength perhaps is the way in which 
Table4.6 Union strength in elections to social institutions, 1945-83 
Social security Comites' 
Funds d'entreprise Prud 'hommes 2 
1947 1955 1962 1983 1978-9 1979 1982 
CGT 59.3 43 44.3 28.3 36.7 42.4 36.8 
CFDT 26.4 20.9 21 23.5 20.5 23.1 23.5 
CFTC 8.5 3 6.9 8.5 
FO 16.2 14.7 17.8 10 17.4 17.8 
CGC 4.7 9.6 6.3 5.2 9.6 
CSL' 1.2 2.8 1.7 
1 When vertical columns do not total 100, the remaining votes went to non-union 
lists. 
2 The conseils des prud-hommes are arbitration tribunals,jointly run by employers 
and workforce. 
3 Confederation des syndicats libres: so-called independent unions, largely kept 
alive by certain big employers. 
Source: adapted from Le Monde 10 December 1982 and 22 October 1983. 
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negotiations are conducted. As regards private employers, these are 
hardly ever conducted nationally, the employers being strong enough 
to keep negotiations to the level of the branch, region or even the 
firm. Only in the public sector have unions managed to sign national 
agreements since the premiership of Chaban-Delmas, but this practice 
is by no means universally established. And only in two areas - part of 
the newspaper industry and the docks - is there a closed shop. There 
are clearly limits to what the unions can obtain from the state or 
from private capital. 
Certainly - with the exception of teachers' and farmers' organizations 
(see below) - there is nothing like the corporatism alleged to flourish in 
the UK and northern Europe. By this is meant arrangements, largely 
informal, whereby unions take part in the elaboration of economic 
policy along with government and private capital. In return for being 
allowed an input into the policy process they are then expected to 
'deliver' their members into acceptance of the final package, possibly 
even becoming involved in the administration of this. The arrival of the 
French left in office has not heralded any such development. If socialist 
attitudes and legislation are obviously sympathetic to organized labour, 
the government cannot count on uncritical support by any means, even 
if by the end of 1983 the unions had given it, by British standards, an 
easy ride. 
Ideology The unions' discourse reveals the double nature of their 
preoccupations - on the one hand, defence of everyday interests and, 
on the other, long-term political goals. We shall concentrate especially 
on the latter. 
The CGT is predicated on revolutionary class struggle and aspires to 
socialism. What such socialism would be is uncertain; if the CGT has 
recently begun to talk seriously about autogestion instead of sneering 
at it as 'utopian', its own view of socialism would probably ceatre 
on what it calls 'gestion democratique', i.e. a fairly centralized economy 
with some power of decision devolved to plant level, where the union 
would pay a key role. This obviously involves looking at the relation-
ship between union and party (a socialist government\vould obviously 
be based on the left parties), and confronting the charge that the CGT 
is merely a conveyor-belt for the PCF. This charge is indignantly 
refuted by both, in the name of union independence; but it is well 
known that most of the departmerltal secretaries are communists 
and so are half the BE. Le Guen and Krasucki are on the bureau politique 
of the PCF. Ross has shown plausibly how the PCF has tried to use 
the CGT in an aggressive or consensual way over the years, according 
to its current policy needs; but there are limits to such a process.20 
Any active member of a union knows that members cannot be brought 
out on strike at the drop of a hat, or even cajoled back to work if they 
are in dispute; May 1968 was ample proof of that. 
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If the CGT still appears in some respects to hanker after eastern 
European practices, then the CFDT presents a frankly leftist image. 
Although it agrees about extending the public sector, the CFDT wants 
neither a bureaucratic state capitalism nor an improved private one. 
Its self-managing socialism aims at a decentralized economy, with 
authority in firms exercised by works councils, elected by the whole 
of the workforce, who would elect and supervise management boards. 
The latter would negotiate with the national plan, which the CFDT 
wishes to democratize a la PS by placing greater emphasis on inputs 
from local units. Even the CFDT's immediate demands, such as 
reduction of all differentials to a scale of one to six have a radical ring 
about them which distinguishes them from British or American 
demands. The CFDT stresses intensely the importance of union 
autonomy from political parties. This explains its refusal of an organic 
relationship with the PS, which it has long fuelled with militants and 
ideas, and its refusal to sign the CPG, although it obviously supported 
the left union. 
FO by contrast has no project for a socialist society, although it 
occasionally talks about class-stmggle. Its outlook is pragmatic and 
reformist; it sees its task as to extract as much as it can from manage-
ment and state. It is reluctant to take industrial action and has staked 
much of its reputation on signing agreements in the public sector 
(where a good half of its members work); if this policy were to prove 
impracticable through government austerity, FO could have trouble 
with its members. FO pays the ritual lip-service to union autonomy 
from parties, and mixes it with some fairly stiff anti-communism, 
directed at the CGT; this is logical enough, given its origins. A final 
ideological flourish is provided by FO's keen support for European 
integration: Europe is seen as a framework that can solve problems too 
vast for individual states to cope with. 
French labour unions are thus divided politically and ideologically, 
as well as by normal competition for members. One can appreciate union 
pluralism in that it offers workers a choice, keeps debate alive and the 
union apparatchiks on their toes; but undoubtedly it also means that 
the employers face a weaker challenge. 
Employers' unionism - the Conseil national du patronat franc;:ais 
(CNPF) 
Employers' organizations in France are as old and as complex as workers'. 
The CNPF dates from 1946 in its present form, being really an umbrella 
organization which tries to co-ordinate the activity of employers from all 
fields (except agriculture, the professions, the artisanatandsomeofthe 
public sector). Its organization is both horizontal and vertical; in other 
words, it groups geographical organizations embracing more than one 
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economic activity and also the local, departmental and regional organiz-
ations of any one individual activity. Individual firms do not join, mem-
bership being by geographical or professional bodies. It is estimated that 
over 80 percent of these do belong to the CNPF, whose national structures 
are crowned by an executive council and president (Y. Gattaz), assisted 
by a number of full-time staff. 
This is not to suggest that the CNPF is particularly homogeneous. 
It has numerous internal tensions, the most important being that 
between large and smaller capital. The latter has its own organization, 
the CGPME (Confederation generale des petites et moyennes entre-
prises), founded and led for many years by L. Gingembre, and which 
has representation inside the CNPF. The smaller employer tends to see 
himself as being a real boss, closer to the daily realities of the firm, 
in contrast to the remote and 'technocratic' head of a large corporation. 
Another split is between reformists and traditionalists, the latter 
preferring repression of or confrontation with the unions, whereas 
the reformists are prone to dialogue and consultation (within limits). 
Many of them are to be found in the Centre des jeunes dirigeants. The 
actions of the CNPF are in the main discrete; it provides services to 
members ( expertise in fields such as management techniques or export 
markets, and also information on unions or political parties). It also has 
a more public role in that it publicizes heavily the virtues of capitalist 
enterprise, employing to this end. some twenty staff whose task is to 
insert the employers' viewpoint into as many newspapers and other 
media as possible. This operation is conducted with increasing success, 
if one recent analyst is to be believed.21 
As regards direct influence on government, it would be naive to 
think in terms of the latter being teleguided by a clique of employers 
with clear-cut interests. The reality is more complex than this 
conspiratorial vision suggests. It is known that the patronat disliked 
some Gaullist policies 'of the 1960s and that Giscard d'Estaing was 
for a long while mistrusted by them. But there are limits to political 
action set by the logic of the capitalist system, from which no right-
wing government dare depart, and also certain broad objectives which 
will suit all fractions of capital. Within these parameters, the CNPF 
functions as an effective lobby. The reader is familiar with its staff 
of political experts under M. de Mourgues; one of its functions is to try 
and influence legislation at the committee stage and to supply deputies 
with employers' viewpoints. 
Since 1981 CNPF's task has been harder. While avoiding total oppo-
sition to Mitterrand, it has campaigned hard against the Auroux Acts (it 
dislikes their cost, insistence on annual negotiations and the fact that 
they encourage unions at all) and against attempts to stiffen wealth 
taxes, with some success.22 
The most militant employers' opposition has come from a sub-group 
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of the organization the SNPMI (Syndicat national de la petite et moyenne 
industrie), led by G. Deuil, a self-confessed admirer of the late Marshal 
Petian. In the prud'homal elections of 1982 this Poujadist type of for-
mation scored well, illustrating the fears of many small employers. 
At the end of 1983 as the working-class unions flagged, and the 
government moved increasingly to conciliate employers, Gattaz set out 
CNPF demands with increasing clarity: wages to be held below the rate 
of inflation; prices to rise freely; costs and taxes to be cut; firms to be 
freer to lay workers off. The sophisticated rhetoric of CNPF can conceal 
some familiar realities. 
The self-employed: the Comite d'information et de defense - Union 
nationale des artisans et des travailleurs independants (CIDUNATI) 
The long slow decline of small commerce has already been referred to, 
as have the sometimes violent reactions of the disgruntled small 
businessman. Poujade canalized much of their discontent in the 1950s, 
but in the 1970s his mantle has fallen on to the shoulders of G. Nicoud 
and the CIDUNATI. The movement was a fusion in 1970 of groups 
dissatisfied with the work of their traditional professional associations 
(which are grouped in departmental chambers of commerce), with 
regard to government policy on tax and social security. The movement 
soon made a name for itself by a series of energetic demonstrations, 
including raids on government offices and seizure of records. Although 
Nicoud was imprisoned it was not long before the government was 
engaged in dialogue with CIDUNATI, showing that a delinquent group 
is still able to frighten Paris into giving something away. 
CIDUNATI caters for the small, essentially family business; though 
members may own up to three or four shops, and there has been an 
influx of small industrialists also. It is above all for activists, who 
feel their business threatened and who want safety by all means, even 
legal ones, as the tag has it. 'Le commen;:ant ne se rue dans les brancards 
que quand il se sent le couteau a la gorge': thus did one regional 
organizer put it, in the down-to-earth idiom typical of the movement. 
CIDUNATI has a distinct ideology, which stresses the virtues of the 
small 'independent' man - his hard work, his professional knowledge 
and care for the customer ( compared with the anonimity and shoddy 
quality of the big supermarket). It is rather impatient with normal 
legislative procedures, seeing deputies as weak-willed creatures, 
manipulated by faceless technocrats in the finance ministry. Its basic 
demands are three: to pay less tax and suffer less interference (read 
tax inspections: CIDUNATI newspapers often carry stories of honest 
shopkeepers hounded to suicide by odious tax-inspectors): to have 
a simpler and more comprehensive system of social security: and 
most of all, to stop 'unfair competition' from big capital in the shape 
of the large supermarket or hypermarket. 
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The movement's muscular actions have wrung a number of con-
cessions, mainly in the pensions and insurance field, but also including 
the Royer law of 1973 directed against big supermarkets. Royer is the 
one commerce minister {the member of government who has the thank-
less task of appeasing small businessmen) who has at all pleased the 
militants; but the movement is characterized by a perpetual mistrust 
of all governments. It knows how to use its political weight, however, 
and its votes are solicited by all parties. 
CIDUNATI membership is hard to assess, as it deliberately publishes 
no figures. But it could well be over 200,000. There is an impressive 
new headquarters in the Isere, Nicoud's department (a gesture typical 
of the provincial flavour of the movement), and two journals with a 
style all their own. CID UNA TI claims to have few permanent staff, 
relying on voluntary work at all levels. The national leadership seems 
dominated by Nicoud, a waiter turned cafe-owner, and very much a 
self-made man; by origins and temperament he is an ideal spokesman 
for his followers. 
In 1981 Nicoud supported Mitterrand; but probably only about a 
third of the artisans/commer9ants vote on the left. 
Of late the movement has been quiet, having also suffered from 
splits. It is hard to say when or if it ( or a similar phenomenon) will rise 
up again. Certainly les petits seem to have been frightened by the left's 
win and some have spoken of a 'crisis of confidence' in this sector.23 It 
may well be as Gresle states,24 that this 'petty-bourgeois populism' for 
all its verbal violence has limited aims, i.e. getting more protection from 
government. But so long as the small men feel that the latter is backsliding 
in its duties towards them, a resurgence can never be ruled out. 
Managerial unionism - the Confederation generate des cadres {CGC) 
If the traditional petty-bourgeoisie has its own organizations like 
CIDUNATI, then this is also true of the newer, wage-earning variety. 
Since 1946 cadres have been organized in the CGC. There is some doubt 
as to who is a cadre (one who has a position of managerial authority), 
the CFDT claiming for instance that proper cadres are relatively few in 
number; the CGC recruits its 320,000 members over a rather wide range 
of white-collar jobs, however, from senior managers and engineers down 
to foremen, and including such disparate categories as commercial travel-
lers and nurses. The problem, for real cadres or sundry white-collars, is 
however the same one of identity. On one hand they are put off by the 
mass industrial unions, whose style and image are very much that of the 
skilled worker; indeed they are encouraged to think of themselves as being 
different from these. On the other, although culturally they may feel 
nearer to the employers, they themselves are decidedly not employers; 
rather their function is to secure compliance with the latter's decisions 
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from workers. CGC unionism reflects the discomfort, in many ways, of 
this median position. Strictly apolitical, it has no vision of society other 
since 1974). The CGC was not militant. It saw the economy as an arena 
of 'concentration', i.e. reasonable bargaining between moderate partners, 
with satisfaction on both sides. 
In the late 1970s many felt that CGC was at last being forced to 
change under the weight of the crisis. Its seemingly greater firmness 
towards employers and willingness to speak even to working-class unions 
suggested that it might be about to become what it had never been 
before, 'un veritable syndicat des classes moyennes salariees'.25 This 
flicker of militancy, symbolized by the election of J. Menu as president, 
helped a crucial fraction of cadres to vote Mitterrand in 1981. But since 
then enthusiasm has cooled rapidly as cadres feel themselves to be victims 
of socialist financial policy. Menu and the combative P. Marchelli were 
among the first to attack Mitterrand systematically; there have been 
three major CGC demonstrations of late (previously unheard of) and 
the leadership is rumoured to be close to RPR. 
Today with its 320,000 members and over 40 per cent of the vote in 
the cadres' college at professional elections, CGC is clearly the main 
managers' union. But like many white-collar unions it still hesitates 
between being a real trade union and providing an uneasy lobby for the 
aspirations of those who feel superior to the shop-floor but who know 
in their hearts that few of them will make it to the summits of the 
bourgeoisie. 
The CGC is for cadres happy with their position between worker 
and employer. Some cadres have joined the special sections of the 
CGT or CFDT, however, which are called the UGITC and UCC 
respectively. This means that they have made a political choice, seeing 
their fate as a class-fraction to be linked to that of the working class. 
Such a choice clearly involves accepting that in a socialist society the 
role and privileges of cadres might well be changed; they would have to 
learn, as Maire put it, 'la richesse des relations egalitaires'. For the 
moment, though, the CGC undoubtedly commands the loyalty of 
the majority. 
Farmers' unionism - the Federation nationale des syndicats 
d'exploitants agricoles (FNSEA) 
Farmers' unionism reflects many of the contradictions in French 
agriculture. Chronic peasant individualism and the slow rate of 
economic development ensured weak and fragmented farmers' 
organizations, until the depression of the 1930s forced some unity. 
The Vichy regime with its heavy rural and traditionalist bias attempted 
to organize and discipline farmers into its peasant corporation. This 
was not particularly successful, but the idea of a single national farmers' 
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union was revived by the left-wing governments of the after-war period 
in the shape of the CGA (Confederation generale de !'agriculture). 
Within a few years the FNSEA, which was merely one of the 
constituent elements of the CGA, had become so strong as to supplant 
it; in other words, farmers did not want a leftish union imposed from 
Paris. This clearly tells us something about the character of the FNSEA. 
Under the Fourth Republic, it liaised closely with the CNIP group in 
parliament, and from 1951-6 the agriculture minister was always one 
of its nominees. Since 1958 its contacts with the regime have been 
at least as intimate; the agriculture minister has weekly meetings with 
the FNSEA, which is recognized as the only representative farmers' 
union. 
Today the FNSEA claims 850,000 members (some would say 
750,000). 
Long under the leadership of M. Debatisse, it incorporates depart-
mental chambers of agriculture, producer groups (for specialized 
products, e.g. beef, lamb, etc.) and related bodies like the CNJA 
(Centre national des jeunes agriculteurs), source of many ideas and 
capable leaders. It is dominated by the big farmers of northern France, 
its congress being effectively controlled by eighteen departments, 
because delegates are elected in proportion to dues paid, thus 
privileging the richer areas. This control explains perhaps the existence 
since 1959 of the MODEF, more or less under PCF hegemony and 
claiming some 200,000 members, especially among the small farmers 
of the south-west. There are also smaller movements of leftish and 
rightish complexion, but they cut little ice besides FNSEA; in the 
elections to departmental chambers of agriculture in 1976 it obtained 
65.11 per cent of the seats, compared with 17.47 per cent for MODEF 
and 5 .97 for the rightish FF A. 
As Keeler shows, the FNSEA is a classic case of corporatism, indeed 
a largely state-created 'official union'.26 In return for securing members' 
compliance with government policy it is rewarded in various ways. These 
include: inputs into policy formation, notably at the annual conference 
where prices are fixed; extensive subsidization, open and covert; privi-
leged representation on the various boards which administer grants and 
land transfers; virtual capacity to replace prefectoral administration on 
certain matters and, last but not least, repression of rival unions by the 
state. By these means FNSEA has often taken 90 per cent of votes in 
elections to departmental chambers of agriculture and reconciled 
members to policies which it has largely helped to shape. Even if results 
have not always matched rhetoric (e.g. in terms of prices or incomes 
obtained) farmers clearly feel that a more traditional, market-oriented 
unionism might have defended them even less well. 
In 1981 the new agriculture minister, Edith Cresson (whose appoint-
ment was a bold innovation in a milieu renowned for its sexist values), 
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switched government strategy by recognizing the smaller, usually leftish 
unions. This was part of a PS analysis which sees farming as very much 
divided between the big (who control FNSEA) and the small and ex-
ploited (whom the party has courted diligently). FNSEA under its new 
leader F. Guillaume was furious and not even mollified by such gestures 
as the socialists' Gaullian defence of the wastemaking CAP or their stead-
fast refusal to admit Spain and Portugal (highly competitive in wine and 
vegetables) into the EEC. Sensing the problems of governing against such 
powerful vested interests, the new minister, M. Rocard, was at the end 
of 1983 taking steps to undo the representativity of the small unions. 
Corporatism is a difficult dragon to slay. 
Teachers' unionism - the Federation de l'education nationale (FEN) 
Teachers have by far the highest rate of unionization of any profession 
in France. Their profession has always had close links with the 
republican state, which looked towards the teacher, especially in the 
primary school, to propagate democratic ideals and form the citizens 
of the future. Public sector teachers have thus long been part of a 
republican, secular tradition. The counterpart of their loyalty has 
been higher prestige, better rewards and better conditions than those 
enjoyed by their colleagues, at least in the UK. After a long struggle 
for existence (because the republic was not so keen to grant the right 
of unionization to its own employees as it was to other categories 
of workers), teachers' unions were incorporated into the CGT. When 
the latter split in 1947 the teachers avoided the brutal choice between 
communism and the SFIO by creating a separate organization, the 
FEN. 
Today this 'state within the state' numbers 559,000 members, led 
by J. Pommatau. The FEN is in fact an umbrella organization for 
teachers of different levels. The bulk of its troops are, as always, primary 
school teachers (320,000) and some 99,000 secondary school teachers, 
organized in the SNI (Syndicat national des instituteurs) and SNES 
(Syndicat national de l'enseignement secondaire) respectively. Teachers 
in France are radical in their views; a poll in Le Monde de I 'education in 
February 1978 showed that 59 per cent considered themselves to be on 
the left, and 21 on the centre-left. Thus within the FEN as a whole, 
factional struggles are between different shades of left. The movement 
has officialized tendencies, dominant among which is that of Henry, 
probably best described as moderate PS or social-democratic; it easily 
beats off the challenge of communists and extreme leftists. Within 
SNES, however, the PCF is held to be prominent. 
Outside the FEN all the other main unions have their teacher 
branches, from CGT to CGC; and there are independent unions, 
especially in the private schools. But their membership is to be counted 
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in tens of thousands, and they cut little ice besides FEN. It is accused 
of corporatism, i.e. of accepting a consensual role within the state 
apparatus, in return for rewards given to its members. The claim is 
only half true. The FEN is recognized as the one representative 
teachers' union, and the state in practice allows it considerable say in 
matters such as appointment, promotions and transfers of teachers 
(especially in the primary sector). It is also true that it has great veto 
power ( cf. its perennial ability to stop governments from cutting 
school holidays, and its resistance to the Haby reform and its pre-
decessors). 
In 1981 A. Henry, FEN leader, became minister ofleisure. This was 
a sure sign of the movement's strength and of the PS debt to it, both 
ideological and financial ( the latter extending far beyond the gift to the 
party of its headquarters in rue Solferino ). Today FEN is a financial 
empire as well as a teachers' union. Active in property, health care, 
pensions and insurance, retail co-ops and travel, it offers members services 
in the~e areas, from cradle to grave, at very keen prices. It employs 
thousands and has assets worth ten billion francs.27 Such affluence has 
not weakened its republican and lai"card idealism; that flame is kept 
very much alive by the control of the SNI over the movement and its 
strong links with organizations such as freemasonry and the main secular-
ist lobby CNAL (Comite national d'action laique). 
FEN is not without contradictions, notably between the SNI, which 
wants to bring secondary teaching into the orbit of its (underqualified) 
members and SNES, which naturally seeks to prevent this. It remains a 
strange mixture of successful semi-corporatism and left-republican 
ideology a l'etat pur. 
Chapter 5 
External relations 
(1) Values, purposes and organization 
The external relations of a contemporary society such as France are 
greater in scale and complexity than at any time in history. Their 
importance for individuals varies according to class, occupation or 
sub-cultural grouping, but no one can be immune from their impact 
in an age when energy resources, food, clothing, equipment at work 
and in the home, cultural and recreational activities, are all more or less 
dependent on foreign imports and influences. The increase in scale of 
external relations can be analysed quantitatively by using statistics on, 
for example, mail and telecommunications, foreign travel or inter-
marriage; qualitative change is harder to analyse but undoubtedly it 
has made life both more vulnerable and more fascinating. 
A society's external affairs relate either directly or indirectly to its 
political, economic and social systems. Politically there is a basic 
need for security in peace or success in war. Economically there is 
a need to ensure supplies of essential food, energy and raw materials; 
depending on the size and character of the economy there might be 
further needs, such as foreign financial investment or vital military 
supplies. Within a capitalist society there are influential groups seeking 
particular benefits from external relations; for example banks and 
insurance companies profit from external financial exchanges and 
large companies profit from facilities abroad for creating new branches 
or market outlets. Finally, the values of a social system, its images 
of itself and of its place in the world, will influence attitudes to 
foreigners and preferences for relations with other societies having 
perhaps a similar language, a similar politico-economic structure, or 
an historical tradition of friendship .1 
History has a great influence on France's image of herself and her 
role in world affairs. It is less than five hundred years since the 
emergence of the modern nation-state international system. For about 
half that period, while Europe was predominant in world affairs, 
France had the largest population, the largest standing army and the 
greatest cultural influence in Europe, French being the international 
language. After a period of relative decline in the nineteenth century, 
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French primacy was revived briefly by victory in the First World War. 
Experience from the age of Louis XN to very recent times, therefore, 
has convinced French people of their political importance in the world. 
There have been differing interpretations, however, as to which 
were the most important international influences emanating from 
French society. The Revolution of 1789 was the origin of modem 
French nationalism, with the attempt by Jacobin patriotism to extend 
France to the 'natural frontier' of the Rhine and to extend principles 
of republicanism to other societies. Subsequently Bonapartism under-
took to export the revolution in a bastardized form. The French, 
moreover, made significant contributions to the ideology ofnineteenth-
century liberalism, for instance by introducing universal manhood 
suffrage in 1848 before other European societies. From another stand-
point the French experience in the commune of 1871 was an important 
stage in the international development of socialism. A different 
experience, derived from Monarchist and Bonapartist traditions, had 
laid emphasis on the values of hierarchy rather than equality, the 
general will of the nation rather than the interests of individuals and 
groups within it, centralization rather than particularism, the state as 
actor rather than arbitrator. Such diverse elements in the French 
tradition have influenced not only Europe but the world at large 
through the impact of the former French empire. 
French nationalism has been particularly self-conscious owing to 
recurrent struggles for identity in the face of defeat, partition and 
occupation by enemies during the past two hundred years. Defeat in 
war or weakness in the face of an external threat has invariably led to 
a change of regime. Conversely, each new regime has proudly pro-
claimed its ability to restore national honour, to recreate a sense of 
security and to defend national interests effectively. 
Thus, the Third Republic after 1875 believed that it would re-
generate France and her empire with strength derived from liberal 
principles and ~ossibly persuade Germany to renegotiate the peace 
treaty of 1871 or, if not, get revenge in battle whenever an opportunity 
presented itself. By the 1890s many Frenchmen were protesting that 
the regime had failed to uphold the national interest, but were soon 
to be proved wrong by the victorious outcome of the First World War. 
The Fourth Republic emerged from the disasters of the Second World 
War with a surge of ambition: to reorganize western Europe in such a 
way that there would be neither the urge nor the opportunity for 
Germany to attack France again. Whatever its moderate success in 
Europe, however, failure to deal effectively with problems in the 
empire led to the Fourth Republic's replacement by a new regime 
claiming ability not only to reorganize the French community on a 
new footing, but also to re-establish French national independence 
in the face of foreign pressures. Before long, however, the Fifth Republic 
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too was being subjected to bitter accusations that it was failing to 
uphold vital French national interests in its foreign relations. 
Thus the French experience of insecurity, together with political 
instability, has resulted in patriotic feeling becoming inseparable from 
the support or rejection of a particular political system. The state is 
seen as having a specific role to play in world affairs and is always 
on trial; to put it another way, it is never a neutral but always an ally 
or an enemy in the eyes of different sections of French society, 
depending on the way it represents French national interests. Some 
may judge it according to its pursuit of certain economic or military 
interests; others may demand that it should uphold a certain ideological 
tendency; and then there are the simple patriots, lacking political 
commitment or opportunity for personal profit, who will derive 
satisfaction nevertheless from the exercise of any kind of French 
influence in the world. It is important to recognize, therefore, that 
assessments of the success, or otherwise, of French foreign policy will 
always vary according to the optics of diverse politico-economic 
interest groups in French society. 
In the perennial pursuit of security from enemy attack, French policy 
assumptions underwent an agonizing reappraisal following the 
disastrous experience of defeat and occupation in the Second World 
War. Traditionally, ever since 1870 when Germany had become the 
dominant land power in Europe, France had depended on allies to 
restore the balance. This policy had worked well in the First World 
War when Russia, Britain, and ultimately the United States, helped 
France to achieve victory and to recover lost territory. The same 
policy was pursued in the period leading to the Second World War, 
but in 1940 France had to face the German onslaught with Belgium 
and Holland trying to preserve neutrality, Britain giving token 
assistance, and the United States and Soviet Union remaining studiously 
neutral. Since the bitter disappointment of 1940, therefore, French 
policy has consistently tended to seek independent means to achieve 
national security - a policy of 'France first'. Nevertheless the harsh 
realities of the post-war world, a devastated society requiring Marshall 
Aid for reconstruction and the division of Europe into hostile Soviet 
and American armed camps, requiring a choice as to which bloc France 
should join, combined to make France more than ever subject to external 
constraints and dependent on allied support. 
This ambivalent collective attitude towards allies was held and 
articulated most strongly by de Gaulle, who had struggled in exile to 
recreate French national identity and unity between 1940 and 1944. 
He found it easier to win the support of various resistance organizations 
in France than that of the United States, who refused to recognize 
his provisional government until a very late stage in the liberation of 
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France in the autumn of 1944. As for the British, in spite of his doubts 
about their interest in a French recovery, his dependence on outside 
support led de Gaulle to propose to Churchill on 13 November 1944:2 
que I' Angleterre et la France s'accordent et agissent ensemble dans 
les reglements de demain, elles peseront assez lourd pour que rien 
ne se fasse qu'elles n'aient elles-memes accepte OU decide ... L'equi-
libre de l'Europe, la paix garantie sur le Rhin, l'independance des 
Etats de la Vistule, du Danube, des Balkans, le maintien a nos cotes, 
sous forme d'association, des peuples que nous avons ouverts a la 
civilisation dans toutes les parties du monde, une organisation des 
nations qui soit autre chose que le champ des querelles de l'Am-
erique et de la Russe, enfin la primaute reconnue dans la politique a 
une certaine conception de l'homme en depit de la mecanisation 
progressive des societes, voila bien ... ce que sont nos grands in-
terets dans l'univers qui s'annonce. Ces interets, mettons-nous d'ac-
cord pour les soutenir de concert. Si vous le voulez, j'y suis pret. Nos 
deux pays nous suivront. 
The proposal was abortive, for Churchill and his successors preferred to 
pursue a special relationship with the United States, but it articulated 
poignantly the frustrated ambition of de Gaulle and that of other 
post-war French leaders who were later to see Britain remain aloof from 
the European Coal and Steel Community and the treaty of Rome. 
Despite the success of socio-economic reconstruction in France 
by the mid-1950s, the sense of a relative decline in political power 
in world affairs became increasingly painful. The impact of the Cold 
War not only forced France to become a satellite of the United States 
by joining NATO in 1949, but also to accept the rearmament of West 
Germany within NATO by 1955. Equally unexpected crises in the 
French empire led to defeat in Indo-China by 1954, subsequent with-
drawal from Morocco and Tunisia by 1956, and even the loss by 
1962 of Algeria, which had always been regarded as an integral part 
of France. These reductions in power were made even more intolerable 
by the reluctance of French allies to treat these crises as part of the 
Cold War, and by their refusal accordingly to provide sufficient allied 
help to ensure a French victory. Perhaps the most bitter blow was 
at Suez in 1956 when American opposition to European colonial 
ambitions in the Middle East thwarted an Anglo-French military 
expedition. French decline seemed to be the will of allies and enemies 
alike. 
French leaders had a marked awareness that their interests did not 
coincide to any great extent with those of the super powers, the United 
States and the Soviet Union. When the latter reached a state of dead-
lock in the 1962 Cuba crisis, followed by a period of detente, there 
was a corresponding sense in France that the time was ripe to pursue 
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long-repressed national ambitions. Hence the articulation in the 1960s 
of a philosophy of national independence.3 
What were the forces in French politics and society behind the 
pursuit of an independent foreign policy? Some analysts have tradition-
ally attached excessive importance to the personal influence of de 
Gaulle (e.g. Newhouse), as if he were able to impose an eccentric 
policy on a reluctant society. There was, of course, his 'certaine idee 
de la France ... (qui) n'est reellement elle-meme qu'au premier rang',4 
a conception developed into a fully-fledged philosophy of indepen-
dence by 1965 in one of de Gaulle's histrionic television broadcasts. 
After a preamble summarizing the problems involved in the French 
transition from being 'un peuple colosse' to 'un peuple affaibli', de 
Gaulle proclaimed a total contrast between acceptance of what he dis-
paragingly called the 'sirenes de }'abandon' before 1958 and the pursuit 
of independence since his return to power. A policy of independence, 
he postulated, must fulfil certain rigorous conditions - political, military 
and economic and in his view France was managing to fulfil these 
requirements. 
In international politics, he said, while maintaining friendship with 
the United States, the emphasis in French policy had been to reassert 
European interests by seeking real solidarity among the six members 
of the EEC, while also reviving historical links with eastern European 
states, in so far as they freed themselves of their 'ecrasantes contraintes'. 
The ultimate ambition was: 'retablir d'un bout a l'autre de notre 
continent un equilibre fonde sur !'entente et la cooperation de tous 
les peuples qui y vivent comme nous'. This vision contrasted, by im-
plication, with an alternative Atlantic community, or an integrated 
community confined to western Europe. As for the world at large, 
de Gaulle's view was opposed to hegemony, intervention or repression 
by one state in relation to another, and favoured instead the indepen-
dence of each nation, free from restrictions and able to receive outside 
help without being forced into obedience in its policies. On these 
grounds French policy condemned the American war in Vietnam, while 
supporting the development of South American and African states, 
and forging friendly links with China. This, de Gaulle claimed, was a 
distinctively French policy, formulated in Paris. 
Military security, he argued; required that in the nuclear age France 
should have adequate weapons to deter a possible aggressor so that, 
while not disrupting alliances, France could ensure that her allies did 
not hold her fate in their hands. Such a military force, he claimed, France 
was creating by her own efforts. This project necessitated considerable 
re-equipment but would cost no more than contributing to the NATO 
integrated military force which, in any case, would not afford such a 
secure protection if France remained merely a subaltern member. Thus, 
de Gaulle contended, France was reaching the point where no power in 
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the world could inflict death and destruction on her without suffering 
a similar fate in return, and that was the best possible guarantee of 
security. 
In the economic sphere, according to de Gaulle, independence 
implied maintaining activities essentially under French administration 
and direction. France must keep up with competitors in the key sectors 
essential to an advanced economy. If it were advantageous to share 
inventions and projects with another country, France must combine 
with one that was unlikely to have the power to dominate her. That was 
why, in his view, financial stability was important in order to avoid the 
need for foreign assistance. French stability was upheld by, for instance, 
changing into gold the surplus dollars imported as a result of the 
deficit on the American balance of payments. He proceeded to list 
economic successes that met the above conditions. In recent years 
research investment in France had increased sixfold; a common in-
dustrial and agricultural market was operating jointly with Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg; France and Italy had joined 
up to build a tunnel under Mont Blanc; the Moselle canal was being con-
structed with the Germans and Luxemburgers; France had joined with 
Britain to build the first supersonic transport aircraft in the world 
and there was the possibility of further Franco-British co-operation in 
civil and military aviation; France had recently concluded an agreement 
to set up her colour television system in the Soviet Union. To sum up 
he used a homespun image: however big a glass others might offer, 
France preferred to drink from her own, while amicably clinking glasses 
with those around her. 
De Gaulle argued that, although the Americans had been discon-
certed by French self-assertion, a time would come when they would 
appreciate the valuable friendship of a France able to stand on her 
own feet. Now that she had re-emerged as a nation with full sovereignty, 
the world game begun at Yalta, which seemed to be confined in-
definitely to two players, had obviously been transformed. In that 
world divided between two hegemonies the principles of liberty, 
equality and fraternity counted for nothing. It was therefore in the 
interests of peace that a new equilibrium, a new order, should prevail. 
Who was better able, concluded de Gaulle, to maintain such a new 
order than France so long as she was true to herself?5 
De Gaulle's philosophy of international relations clearly favoured 
a diffuse system of nation states rather than a polarized system of 
integrated alliances or blocs, according to Holsti's definition of 
different types of international systems. The rejection of the post-war 
hegemonies of the two super-powers reminds us, not merely that de 
Gaulle was born in 1890 and was perhaps fond of the 'good old days', 
but also that the three fundamental rules for conducting relations 
between states, namely political sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
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legal equality, originated in the sixteenth century. The rules have been 
broken with great frequency but remain the conventional practice even 
today thereby lending substance to de Gaulle's contention that the 
nation-state is more important than integrated alliances or international 
ideological forces.6 
One of the best known French analysts of international relations 
tended to support the Gaullist view regarding the importance of the 
nation-state and the primacy of political over economic relations 
between states. Raymond Aron was rather sceptical towards arguments 
that EEC economic integration, for example, would prevent a recur-
rence of Franco-German political rivalry. He further suggested that 
pursuit of higher status and independence by middle-sized powers 
like France would tend to have multiple effects in detracting from status 
and willingness to assume world responsibilities on the part of a super-
power, perhaps driving it to adopt policies of isolationism. 7 The American 
setback in Vietnam and the failure to maintain a stable currency in the 
1970s, lent weight to an interpretation that the US hegemony was in 
decline. But an alternative interpretation was that such setbacks were 
merely minor adjustments leading to the exercise of power by more 
effective methods, and that super-power hegemony was likely to prevail 
indefinitely. 8 Sharing this view, Waltz argues that the activities of a 
middle-sized power like France serve merely to illustrate a chronic in-
ability to change the stable bipolar balance of power. Indeed, the fact 
'that American policy need not be made for the sake of France helps to 
explain her partial defection', for example, from NATO in 1966; and 
attempts to challenge American power by states like France are thus 
seen as utopian and doomed to failure.9 But analysts such as Wallerstein 
believe that there is a process of power redistribution in the world that 
offers prospects of promotion, implying that the adoption of an am-
bitious policy by France and other middle-sized states is both inevitable 
and practicable.10 De Gaulle's articulation of French ambitions struck a 
chord in harmony with public opinion over many years; over half those 
people consulted in opinion polls consistently expressed the view that 
France should be neutrally independent of Soviet-American rivalry. 
Why were many non-Gaullist voters and their political spokesmen 
attracted by the ideology of independence? To the left of the Gaullists 
there was a revival of centrist groups by the mid-1960s, who were 
much more enthusiastic than de Gaulle about European integration 
in the EEC. One of their principal motivations was that a large 
accessible market in Europe would stimulate growth and maximize 
business opportunities and general prosperity. This belief involved a 
particular brand of anti-Americanism that envied the high living 
standards in the US and resented the profits US companies tapped from 
branches that had penetrated the European economy. Hence the urge 
to pursue independence but at a European level, because it was felt 
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that a national economy would be too weak to resist American in-
fluence and competition. Centrists like Lecanuet, and independent-
republicans like Giscard d'Estaing, went along with de Gaulle's anti-
Americanism, but rejected his view that an independent France was 
worth more than an independent EEC. Their philosophy of dynamic 
economic modernization was articulated in a best-selling book, Le 
Deft americain, brought out in 1967 by Servan-Schreiber, a publicist 
who became leader of the Radical party. Describing American 
investment as a bird of prey feasting on the European economy, he went 
on to argue that to regain control would require a new awareness among 
Europeans that must transcend mere economic nationalism in order to 
strengthen the economic and political sinews of the EEC. 
To the left of centre in French politics, some socialists held to a 
philosophy that social reform would be most easily achieved as a by-
product of rapid economic growth which in tum would be most attain-
able through European integration. They tended to share the resent-
ment of centre-party politicians towards American influence, as well 
as sharing their enthusiasm for the EEC as a vehicle for politico-econ-
omic progress. Typical of this group were Andre Philip and Claude 
Brudain. More left-inclined socialists accepted the EEC while insisting 
on the need to direct it in the interests of the working class. 
Paradoxically the politicians further left had views that had more 
in common with Gaullism than with those of the centrists. Naturally 
there was hostility towards the US as the capitalist Mecca. Then there 
was suspicion that the EEC was serving big business interests and 
operating beyond the control of French politicians in the national 
assembly, a view which sympathized with de Gaulle's resistance to 
further integration in the EEC. Moreover some socialists, and 
particularly communists, regarded the EEC as an economic reinforce-
ment of western Europe within NATO and therefore as an organization 
perpetuating the division of Europe into hostile blocs. This too was a 
view that chimed in with de Gaulle's pursuit of a diffuse international 
system and an end to polarization so that European links could be 
forged beyond the confines of the EEC.11 
Some fundamental requirements of the French economy worked 
in favour of de Gaulle's independence policy. First and foremost was 
the need to secure markets for surplus agricultural produce; this was 
achieved through the EEC common agricultural policy which became 
firmly established in 1966 as a system protected against competition 
from the US and other world producers. It made it expedient for de 
Gaulle to keep France within the shelter of the EEC. Another vital 
need was a guaranteed supply of oil to fuel rapid industrial growth 
in France. At first Algeria met the need, but firstly the expense of 
extraction then nationalisation without compensation in 1971 led 
France to look to alternative sources in the Middle East. Good relations 
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with oil-supplying Arab states were created and maintained in the 
teeth of American and some European support for Israel. 
Finally, there was an obvious cultural motive for the pursuit of an 
independent foreign policy that would consequently win the support 
of most French people. The relative importance of the French language 
and culture had declined considerably during the previous century 
and by the 1960s only about 12 per cent of the world's population 
used French for everyday or business purposes, compared with over 
50 per cent who used English. Even if the French community had 
by then shrunk to only seven member-states, there was a compelling 
reason for the French government to maintain numerous links as closely 
as possible with the French-speaking world by means of the operations 
of the franc zone and a foreign aid programme that had especially large 
educational and cultural elements quite apart from profitable military 
and economic components. The counterpart to this policy was a sustained 
effort to restrict the penetration of the French-speaking world by the 
English language.12 His enthusiasm for francophonie and the rayonne-
ment of French culture generated for de Gaulle a considerable ground-
swell of political support. 
Conjunctural conditions for the independent foreign policy of de 
Gaulle to flower fully occurred after 1962 when the end of the Algerian 
war left him free to concentrate attention on foreign affairs having 
created a firm political power base including acceptance in France of 
a presidential policy sector. Moreover, the outcome of the Cuba crisis 
of 1962 freed de Gaulle of Cold War constraints by revealing that the 
Soviet Union at least did not intend to push super-power rivalry to the 
point of nuclear war. In an atmosphere of detente, France had scope 
for divergence from the USA. De Gaulle proceeded with a series of 
independent initiatives to create links with West Germany, China and 
the Soviet Union on the assumption that those powers would enjoy 
as much as he did the freedom and flexibility of a diffuse nation-state 
system. 
De Gaulle discovered, however, that the insecurity of West Germany 
in relation to eastern Europe first of all made her unwilling to diverge 
economically or militarily from the US, and furthermore it made her 
anxious to explore the possibilities of detente, not through France 
as an intermediary but directly through her own Ostpolitik. He also 
discovered that China's interest in containing the power of the Soviet 
Union made her anxious that not just France but the whole of the 
EEC should support her policy against Moscow, and ultimately China 
looked to the United States to use leverage on her behalf against the 
Soviet Union. Like West Germany, China was looking for a reliably 
structured system of international relations rather than an unpredict-
able diffuse arrangement with France. But the most severe blow to 
de Gaulle's policy came from the Soviet Union, who attached such 
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vital importance to her integrated alliances with eastern European 
states that she organized military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 
August 1968 to ensure that a totally loyal regime should replace one 
subject to doubt. For a time there was fear that Warsaw Pact military 
operations might escalate into confrontation with NA TO and de 
Gaulle was impelled to co-operate to a very considerable extent with 
NATO for the purposes of French security, combining operations, 
for instance, of the French navy with the American fleet in the 
Mediterranean to monitor the movements of Soviet ships. There were 
residual trade links with Russia and other communist states but other-
wise French bridge-building policies directed towards eastern Europe 
were in jeopardy when de Gaulle fell from power in 1969. 
If the Czechoslovakian crisis had revealed significant French military 
dependence on the United States, events in France in 1968 destroyed 
the financial stability essential to his policy of economic independence. 
Inflation, and speculative attacks on the franc in world money markets, 
forced de Gaulle to borrow massive credits from the United States and 
other powers in his desperate attempt to maintain the value of French 
currency. A combination of international crises and domestic political 
problems therefore recreated serious constraints on de Gaulle's foreign 
policy during his last year in power .13 
His successors at the Elysee, Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing and Mitter-
rand, had to endure a long period of even greater financial instability 
exacerbated by the quadrupling of oil prices following an Arab-Israeli war 
in 1973, and by the doubling of prices in 1979 during a second oil crisis 
associated with a revolution in Iran. Combined with more profoundly 
structural economic problems, the two oil crises drove the world into a 
major economic recession. At the same time there were political up-
heavals: American withdrawal from Vietnam was followed by a long 
war in Kampuchea; Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique and 
Angola led to widespread armed conflict in southern Africa, and Spanish 
withdrawal led to conflict in the western Sahara; super-power moves 
towards detente gave way to mutual suspicion and a spiralling arms race 
that led to widespread speculation about the likelihood of a third world 
war. Political instability and economic upheavals in all parts of the 
world, in a climate of mounting violence, intensified external constraints 
on French foreign policy to the point of becoming a force majeure. 
As a middle-sized state in a world crisis French interests and activities 
were subject to three principal interpretations. The classical liberal view 
emphasised the need for France to react flexibly to unpredictable forces 
and events in order to keep upright while awaiting a new world equilib-
rium. The reformist liberal view emphasized French links and compari-
sons with other states, 'le plus faible des forts et le plus fort des faibles' 
as the 1981 Bloch-Laine commission's economic report put it, needing 
actively to seek unrestricted co-operation with all parts of an inter-
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dependent world to derive mutual benefits of peace and prosperity. The 
marxist view emphasized the need for France to adopt a competitive 
but circumspect role befitting an intermediate position in a world 
structurally divided between dominant, semi-dependent and dependent 
states.14 With a liberal perspective, Pompidou accepted realities such as 
US predominance but looked to European co-operation for greater 
influence than was available to France alone: 
11 n'est pas question, bien entendu, de faire ce qu'on appelle la guerre 
au dollar, car une crise du dollar serait une catastrophe pour tous les 
pays d'economie liberale.Ce qu'il faut,c'est d'une part,que le gouv-
ernement americain prenne toutes les mesures necessaires pour .. 
rendre le dollar reellement stable et c'est, d'autre part, que les 
nations europeennes, a commencer par la France, essayent ensemble 
de creer ... une certaine union monetaire qui fasse que les pays 
europeens puissent, en quelque sorte, equilibrer par leur masse 
economiquele dollar ... Le probleme de la cooperation, c'est precise-
ment de se rencontrer, de discuter, de s'informer, de se rapprocher, 
pour aboutir un jour a ... une confederation europeenne, ... le jour 
ou on aurait une union politique europeenne, a coup sur l'Europe 
peserait d'un grand poids dans le monde ... 11 faut done beaucoup 
de patience, mais il faut aussi la foi. Patience et foi, c'est ma devise, 
si vous voulez.15 
Pompidou insisted that a Europe conscious of its own destiny would 
not set out to oppose other powers, especially the US. But, while wel-
coming moves towards detente between the super-powers, he saw dangers 
in a rapprochement that might end in condominium, neutralising or 
effacing a Europe that must therefore defend its identity .16 If Gaullism 
required the effective pursuit of major national interests then Pompidou 
could argue that they were best pursued through European co-operation. 
His liberal policy of opening up the French economy did allow American 
investment to double between 1968 and 1971, but that was outstripped 
by EEC investment which quadrupled during the same period. Giscard 
d'Estaing adopted a more reformist' liberal policy, taking initiatives to 
promote co-operation in Europe and among the world's major capitalist 
powers, but also calling for a new international economic order to help 
the !third world'. He insisted that worldwide problems required world-
wide solutions. France, with a global presence and wishing to be a 
friend of all nations, had adopted 'une politique mondialiste et de con-
ciliation'. Giscard's foreign minister, J. Fran9ois-Poncet, later admitted 
that the international environment had deteriorated considerably but 
insisted that with courageous and imaginative measures France could 
master her difficulties so long as she remained open to the world and 
affirmed her international presence as a great power." 
By the early 1980s the internationalization of France's economy in 
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pursuit of dynamic growth had created serious problems. Unable to 
compete directly with the US or Japan, France directed 51 per cent of 
her trade towards EEC partners and 25 per cent towards the 'third 
world', areas where her bargaining position remained significant; but as 
world trade contracted in 1982 France had a trade deficit with all EEC 
states except Greece and only kept a surplus with developing states by 
dint of export credits to them costing 20 billion francs. Moreover, 
foreign penetration of the French market had risen from 12 per cent in 
1966 to 19 per cent in 1973, 23 per cent in 1978 and 16 per cent by 
1983. Mitterrand gave priority to economic revival, renaming the Quai 
d'Orsay the ministry for external relations as a sign that it would augment 
internal policy by improving world conditions. Some of his socialist 
colleagues recommended a marxist policy of competitive protectionism; 
but he opted eventually for a reformist liberal approach by March 1983, 
calling for American and European co-operation with the 'third world' 
and keeping the economy relatively open while introducing austerity 
measures in France to enforce adjustment to world trading conditions. 
This policy enabled France to borroyv 25 billion dollars in 1982 but, 
while over half that sum was used to credit 'third world' trading partners, 
France was becoming one of the world's leading debtors.18 Mitterrand's 
awareness of the French position as a middle-sized power with limited 
freedom of action led him to emphasize co-operation with allies rather 
than independence. He maintained Giscard's rearmament policy begun 
in 1976, but dispensed with his search for an East-West convergence of 
interests in favour of a balance of power approach that involved en-
couragement to US rearmament and installation of Cruise and Pershing 
II missiles in western Europe to counter perceived Soviet advantages. 
Although Mitterrand could take a strong line on military security, for 
example when stating on 14 July 1983 that French national indepen-
dence and territorial integrity was decided not in Moscow, nor in 
Washington, nor at Geneva, but in Paris by himself, his foreign minister, 
C. Cheysson, spoke later in more cautious terms of a diplomatic 'marge 
de manoeuvre'. 19 And however laudable the efforts to make heard the 
voice of justice and reason, at least one analyst wondered whether 
Mitterrand was reaching the point beyond which 'verbal diplomacy is 
no longer sufficient to compensate for the loss of prestige due to the 
weakening of the economy'.20 Whatever the persistence of traditions 
gaulliennes, it was necessary for France in the 1980s to relate her objec-
tives very clearly to her resources. 
A remarkably wide range of political opinion accepted the govern-
ment's decisive choice in March 1983 of a strategy combining austere 
deflation at home and co-operative Atlanticism abroad. Although social-
ists resented the dollar's being used as the oil currency and supported 
by high interest rates, so that it had risen 25 per cent against the franc 
in little more than a year, they were nevertheless able to give virtually 
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unanimous support to the government's policy at the annual PS confer-
ence in October 1983. The CERES group on the left merely argued that 
deflation should be defined as 'une logique de /'effort' necessary for an 
effective independence policy. The PS leaders received some criticism at 
their meeting with communist partners in government on 1 December 
1983 to verifier their original agreement of 23 June 1981 though there 
was no question of a rupture; the communists looked for a contribution 
to East-West detente, for example by allowing French weapons to be 
taken into consideration to facilitate a disarmament agreement, and 
they hoped for an early withdrawal of French troops from the Lebanon 
in case they served US interests at the expense of Syria instead of merely 
keeping the peace. Among the opposition parties there was considerable 
satisfaction with government policy abroad. The Radicals supported a 
strong defence policy though calling for efforts with European partners 
to build 'le pilier europeen' of the western alliance; this call was echoed 
by the CDS who proposed the creation of a European security council. 
The PR of Giscard d'Estaing looked for better consultation between 
Europeans and Americans and new structures for effective partnership 
to discourage pacifism in Europe and isolationism in the US. The Gaullist 
RPR accepted the policy of Atlantic co-operation to cope with what it 
saw as the risk of domination by international communism, and even 
attacked the government for not approving American intervention in 
Grenada in October; on the European level the RPR sought 'une 
reflex ion approf ondie pour e/aborer une politique de defense etroite-
ment coordonnee et modernisee', and when Chirac visited West Germany 
to propose on 17 October an improved association between the two 
countries in communal security questions, even on the nuclear level, it 
became clear that Gaullist foreign policy was in a state of profound 
mutation. Opposition criticism of the PS government was specific rather 
than general, urging greater efforts on armed forces to make possible a 
more energetic intervention in Chad and elsewhere, but at the same 
time recognizing budgetary problems and especially the risk of costly 
embroilment in disputes overseas.21 
By the 1980s, France was permanently represented by ambassadors 
or consuls in 160 different states in the world. The responsibilities for 
the policies they had to implement were defined by the Fifth Republic 
constitution as follows: article 5 makes the president the protector of 
the nation's independence, its territorial integrity, its treaties and 
community agreements; articles 13 and 14 state that ambassadors and 
envoys are appointed in the council of ministers and are then accredited 
to foreign powers by the president; article 15 makes the president 
head of the armed forces and chairman of the higher councils and 
committees of national defence; article 16 gives the president full 
powers in a state of emergency arising, for example, from a threat to 
the independence of the nation or to the integrity of its territory; 
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article 20 states that the government decides and directs national 
policy and is served by the administration and the armed forces; article 
21 makes the prime minister responsible for national defence with 
power to appoint to a number of civil and military posts; article 35 
gives parliament the power to authorize declarations of war; articles 
52 and 53 give the president power to negotiate and ratify treaties 
except for peace treaties involving international organizations, financial 
obligations, or modification of territorial possessions, which have to be 
approved by act of parliament; article 86 allows for states to be 
members of the community while being totally independent. Although 
articles 5, 15 and 52 give the president extensive powers, there is no 
mention of a domaine reserve and his powers are clearly subordinate 
to those of the prime minister under articles 20 and 21 while parlia-
ment has important powers of decision under articles 35 and 53. The 
hybrid nature of the constitution could not be better illustrated than 
in the field of foreign and defence policy. 
Nevertheless the experience of the Algerian war, the personality 
of de Gaulle, and a docile national assembly combined to establish 
a convention by which the president determined the direction of 
foreign policy as part of his domaine reserve, while the prime minister 
made it possible to carry out the policy within the context of general 
government programmes and priorities (in particular the prime minister 
would have to ensure a majority vote in the national assembly regarding 
treaty laws or questions of confidence or censure). It was then the 
responsibility of the foreign minister to carry out the policy in dealings 
with representatives of foreign powers, a recognizably standard role 
on the same lines as in other countries. 
It is worth looking a little more closely, however, at the role of the 
prime minister and his office and at their influence on French foreign 
policy. Although the convention is for the president to have the last 
word on policy, served by a small group of personal advisers at the 
Elysee palace, the important process of co-ordinating different issues 
and policies usually takes place in the prime minister's office at the 
Hotel Matignon. The principal official in the prime minister's office, 
the secretaire general du gouvernement, prepares the agenda for weekly 
meetings of the council of ministers, takes minutes and keeps a record 
of decisions taken at those meetings. The rest of the staff in the prime 
minister's office, particularly the chef de cabinet, play a large part 
in co-ordinating negotiations between ministries which precede and 
follow each meeting of the council of ministers. This process of 
negotiation is often conducted between relevant ministers in the 
presence of the prime minister. The latter's close relationship with his 
colleagues contrasts with that of the president who has weekly meetings 
with the ministers for foreign affairs and finance separately and never 
sees the two ministers together except in the presence of the prime 
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minister. Negotiations also take place among officials from various 
ministries, but again the initiative for convening and presiding over 
these meetings comes from the Hotel Matignon. This system gives 
considerable potential influence to the prime minister in various spheres 
of policy including foreign affairs. A final point about the traditional 
system of government established under de Gaulle is that neither prime 
ministers nor foreign ministers appointed after 1958 could be deputies, 
and consequently they were unlikely to have an independent power 
base apart from presidential favour. 
During the presidency of Pompidou, the organization of government 
underwent significant modifications which affected foreign as well as 
domestic policies. For most of the period 1969 to 1974, the prime 
minister, Chaban-Delmas, was a leading Gaullist party politician who 
was therefore a potential rival to Pompidou quite apart from coolne.ss 
in their personal relations. The result was that the prime minister was 
virtually cut out of policy-making in various fields including foreign 
affairs ( on one occasion he simply wanted to attend an England-France 
rugby match at Twickenham but was prevented from going in case 
he became involved in talks on British entry into the EEC, an issue 
which Pompidou was determined to handle personally). Normally 
during this period the president worked with his foreign minister in a 
tandem relationship, and the Elysee staff took over the work of co-
ordinating foreign with domestic policies, thus reducing the importance 
of the prime minister's office. The secretary-general at the Elysee under 
Pompidou was Michel Jobert, who, for example, personally arranged 
a series of Franco-British negotiations regarding the EEC. After the 
defeat of foreign minister Maurice Schumann in the March 1973 
elections, Jobert was appointed foreign minister by Pompidou, whose 
illness, leading to death in the spring of 1974, incapacitated him to such 
an extent that in practice Jobert assumed personal control of French 
foreign policy and had significant influence, for instance, on a re-
surgence of anti-Americanism in France at that time. 
Under Giscard d'Estaing, after 1974, power to direct policy still 
lay with the president but Giscard's interest and sense of purpose in 
foreign affairs was more superficial and intermittent than those of his 
predecessors. His book Democratie franraise gave very little attention 
to world affairs and had a bias reflecting his earlier career as finance 
minister. He replaced Jobert at the Quai d'Orsay with a career diplomat 
and personal follower, Jean Sauvagnargues, who was not very able and 
appeared even less so as a result ofGiscard's tendency to improvise during 
press interviews and policy statements without consulting his foreign 
minister whose ignorance led to a series of gaffes. (It was not always 
Giscard's fault - on one occasion the muddle-headed Sauvagnargues 
greeted the great pianist Artur Robinstein as 'monsieur Toscanini' and 
was evidently in the same league as President Ford of the United States, 
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who once greeted the then Egyptian leader, Anwar Sadat, as 'President 
of Israel'.) Evidence of incompetence mounted and in August 1976 
Sauvagnargues was replaced by the able and more reliable Louis de 
Guiringaud, a diplomat respected for his work in the 'third world' and 
as French representative at the United Nations. Although conscientious 
and loyal to the president, Guiringaud had a dour, colourless personality 
subject to depressions that were eventually to undermine his career. 
Meanwhile Giscard had leant heavily on the services of his Elysee staff, 
particularly his secretary-general and confidant, Jean Fran9ois-Poncet, 
who came from a family famous in both business and diplomacy. 
Fran9ois-Poncet replaced Guiringaud at the Quai d'Orsay in November 
1978, thus emulating his predecessor, Jobert, and proving to be the 
most effective of Giscard's foreign ministers. Nevertheless, his appoint-
ment reaffirmed the importance of the Elysee and the personal grip of 
the president on the making of foreign policy. The prime minister from 
1976 to 1981, Raymond Barre, was also finance minister and during 
the economic crisis had little time to involve himself in foreign affairs, 
apart from prime ministerial responsibility for defence .22 
Mitterrand made it clear when elected president in 1981 that he 
would retain the conventional domaine reserve in order to decide 
personally on matters of foreign and defence policy. His authority 
was reinforced by the way in which the PS majority in the National 
Assembly was elected in June on the platform of his 110 propositions 
in the presidential election rather than on the agreed 1980 party pro-
gramme. He had less experience of foreign affairs than his predecessors, 
and his concern for domestic issues was clear when he renamed the Quai 
d'Orsay the Ministry for External Relations to reflect that priority. What 
experience he did have related to the 'third world'. His interest in Africa 
brought him into close contact during the Fourth Republic with rising 
politicians like Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, and as interior 
minister in 1954 he had responsibility for Algeria at the beginning of 
the civil war. He also had an interest in Latin America, particularly the 
writings of Che Guevara. Mitterrand's own writings showed a deep 
attachment to the French language and culture which he was eager to 
strengthen at home and abroad. While in opposition his most notable 
foreign policy action had been to vote against leaving NATO in 1966, 
and as president he soon made clear his commitment to the Atlantic 
alliance. 
Mitterrand made up for any lack of experience on his part by 
appointing a team of ministers that was arguably the strongest since 
the beginning of the Fifth Republic, and he allowed them exceptional 
freedom of action while reserving the right to redefine or take control 
of policy whenever he saw fit.23 As minister for external relations he 
appointed Claude Cheysson, a trained diplomat who learned the political 
ropes as chef de cabinet to Mendes-France in 1954 and later experienced 
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multilateral diplomacy in the EEC and the 'third world' as the commis-
sioner in Brussels who masterminded the Lome I and II association 
agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific states in the 1970s. 
Serving under him at the Quai d'Orsay from 1981 was a ministre delegue 
for European affairs, initially Chandernagor then from 19 December 
1983 Roland Dumas, who had won the Perigueux seat for the PS and 
could understand south-western French problems in the EEC; there was 
another ministre delegue for co-operation and development (francophone 
states overseas), initially Cot then from 8 December 1982 Christian 
Nucci, mayor of Beaurepaire, born in Algeria and educated in Morocco 
before moving to France, who was therefore ideally suited to his 
ministerial responsibilities. Other ministers particularly concerned with 
external relations were at Defence, where Hernu was the PS oracle, and 
at Finance, where Delors brought considerable banking experience as 
well as political experience as adviser to Chaban-Delmas when he was 
prime minister. Mitterrand's prime minister, Mauroy, was energetic in 
organizing government business and relations with parliament and the 
party; he took seriously his responsibility for defence and often paid 
visits abroad. 
The perennial question as to whether the president is in total command 
of foreign and defence policies can be answered affirmatively in principle 
but with reservations in practice. Mitterrand's Elysee staff, which 
includes foreign affairs advisers such as Guy Penne for Africa, Hubert 
Vedrine for liaison with the Quai d'Orsay, Regis Debray for the 'third 
world' in general, Jean Saulnier for liaison with the armed forces, and 
Franyois de Grossouvre for the secret services, is slightly larger than 
Giscard's staff but with about forty advisers in all, however energetic, 
it is quite incapable of acting as a parallel government. The staff have 
varied backgrounds and overlapping responsibilities (chevauchements de 
competences) so that Mitterrand has available the widest possible range 
of information and opinion. The views of his leading ministers are 
sought at least once a week; and his staff make frequent direct contacts 
with ministries suc!J. as external relations. The Quai d'Orsay has reorgan-
ized itself in recent years to provide structured advice from a centre 
d'analyse et de prevision, created in 1973 and now headed by Gergorin, 
and from directorates for world regions, created between 1976 and 
1978; the department employs four times as many personnel (6,600 
including one-third in France) and handles fourteen times as many 
telegrams (1,400,000 a year) compared with the late 1940s. But this 
has not resulted in increasing influence.24 
Everything depends on what is considered to be high policy, under 
presidential control, or low policy, under the control of ministers and 
officials. In high policy-making much depends on who has the presi-
dential ear and eye. Mitterrand allowed his ministers exceptional freedom 
subject to his authority, and he kept very open ears and eyes, so that 

















Figure 5.1 Influences on external relations 
Interest 
groups 
obseivers had difficulty in identifying his imprimatur and the specific 
influences that lay behind it.25 
(2) Defence policy: purpose and structure 
A peaceful world does not depend on a sudden change towards 
benevolence in human nature. It depends rather on methodical 
procedures to control and reduce tensions before they lead to ex-
plosions. In a world where the privilege of some relates directly to the 
deprivation of others, there must be scope for anger, hostility and 
violence to show the limits of tolerance. Failure to indicate such 
limits merely conveys indifference. Anger, hostility and violence are 
costly, however, and sometimes increase with expression; they there-
fore need to be controlled and directed at particular causes of tension 
in order to bring relief without harmful side-effects. To achieve success-
ful management of tense situations, anger, hostility and violence must 
be accepted as inevitable and expressed so that the other party will 
make amends; this may require an explanation of the interest or 
attitude that gives rise to anger. To cultivate co-operation, sympathy 
and responsibility in others, feelings and requirements should be made 
clear without insulting or alienating them. If crisis management fails, 
owing to the determination of the other party to refuse co-operation, 
an escalation of violence may have to be considered while balancing 
likely risks and costs against the importance of the need to remove the 
particular causes of stress and hostility. 
Such is a typical contemporary psychologist's approach (actually 
that of H. Ginott, University of New York) to friction and violence 
in civil society and international relations. It is perfectly in tune with 
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the 200-year-old dictum of Clausewitz that war is nothing more than 
the continuation of politics by other means. The French experience 
of major wars and invasions over the past two centuries had led them 
to attach vital importance to their security and to the need for armed 
forces to back up their policies. In the recent history of France the 
army has been at the centre of passionate debates dividing public 
opinion almost as much as the schools. It is not possible in France 
to discuss military questions with sole regard to their technical 
specificity. Any definition of defence policy automatically relates to a 
system of political values. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the revolutionary 
experience had created a view according to which the soldier was the 
defender of liberty, and it was among republicans of the left that 
militarism was most pronounced. Half a century later, however, having 
witnessed the crushing of the 1848 revolution and the coup d'etat to 
establish the empire of Napoleon III, public opinion regarded the 
soldier as serving order rather than liberty. After the defeat of 1870 
there was more consensus on the need for a strong army, and by a new 
system of universal conscription the politicians of the Third Republic 
sought to reconcile military strength with political reliability: it was 
to be a nation-in-arms that would be primarily citizens rather than 
soldiers, abjuring authoritarianism at home and irresponsible 
adventurism abroad, but generating an irresistible patriotic dedication 
to defend the soil of France against an invader, thus following in the 
tradition of the triumphant levee en masse of 1793. 
The Dreyfus Affair split French opinion once again over an issue 
that appeared to demonstrate the incompatibility of justice and 
military discipline. Consequently one group of Frenchmen regarded the 
army as incarnating the values of patriotism, social order and respect 
for hierarchical authority; others saw it as a force for reaction, hostile 
to the progress and liberty of civil society. These stereotypes of 
militarism and anti-militarism influenced controversies over military 
organization. When the socialist leader, Jaures, argued in 1905 in his 
book L 'Annee nouvelle that conscription could be reduced to six 
months and still provide an army perfectly capable of defending French 
territory, he was more concerned with making the army politically 
reliable than with its technical efficiency. In practice a system of three 
years' service was used at the time of the First World War and proved 
its value by providing vast reserves of trained manpower. Victory in 
1918 ensured the retention of the nation-in-arms philosophy so that 
proposals for change such as those in de Gaulle's book in 1934, Vers 
l'Annee de metier, were rejected owing to their elitist, apparently anti-
republican tendencies, irrespective of the military case for highly 
trained units using technically advanced equipment that might have 
been more effective in battle. 
External relations 229 
In spite of the French defeat in 1940, the same system of con-
scription prevailed after the Second World War, partly owing to the 
influence of resistance leaders and partly because conscription had 
the advantage of being cheaper during a period of perennial budgetary 
difficulties. By the 1970s a changing French role in world affairs 
revived controversy as to whether the existing system of conscription 
for twelve months, possibly even reduced to six or eight months, was 
more appropriate to French needs than a professional volunteer force. 
But the debate was still as much concerned with the political sig-
nificance of military organization and its purposes as with its technical 
efficiency. Raoul Girardet summed up this persistent French tradition 
(in Defense nationale, April 1977, pp. 21-7) with the proposition that 
the nature and composition of an army are always closely correlated 
with the social and political structure of a nation. 
One of Mitterrand's presidential election campaign commitments in 
1981 was to cut conscription from one year to six months, in keeping 
with the precepts of Jaures. But defence minister Hernu hesitated and 
then kept it at twelve months, while introducing in 1983 the option for 
some conscripts (up to 15 per cent) to volunteer for specialized training 
for sixteen to thirty-six months. Opposition criticism of unfairness and 
weakness over the number of conscripts exempted was rejected with 
statistics indicating that over 105,000 exemptions in 1974 had declined 
to 88,000 in 1982, and only 0.5 per cent of conscripts were conscientious 
objectors. Thus 76 per cent of Frenchmen did their service compared 
with 57 per cent of Italians, 54 per cent of West Germans and only 10 
per cent of Chinese. 'Dieu merci!' exclaimed one deputy. Much more 
concern was voiced over a decision to reduce numbers in the forces by 
35,000, mostly from the army whose chief of staff resigned in protest 
over inadequate personnel and equipment. Hernu was thus economizing 
and reducing the unemployment figures while maintaining the nation-
in-arms system as was to be expected of a stalwart of the Club des 
Jacobins. 26 
As we have seen, successive French governments since the Second 
World War were concerned to create an adequate instrument of 
defence, operating in relation to allied forces but not dependent on 
allies for vital security. De Gaulle defined an independent policy in 
April 1965 as one by which France herself should have the capability 
of deterring a possible aggressor; and in the nuclear age this meant 
having a nuclear force capable of retaliating against any state in the 
world that might attack France. How far has France achieved that 
• ? aim. 
Table 5.1 shows the resources and military power of France 
compared with those of several other states, revealing the nature of 
her status as a middle-sized power and the gap between her and the 
super-powers. After 1962 the French armed forces were organized in 
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three sections: the force nucleaire strategique, the forces de manoeuvre, 
and the defense operationelle du territoire. The nuclear force, 
commonly known as 'la force de frappe', consisted in 1983 of five 
nuclear-powered submarines each carrying sixteen ballistic missiles 
(these vessels had M-20 missiles with a range .:>f 1,800 miles and war-
heads about ten times as powerful as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima 
in 1945). A sixth nuclear submarine, L 1nftexible, equipped with new 
M-4 missiles each with six warheads, would enter service in 1985; and 
the other five submarines would also be refitted with M-4 missiles. 
Construction of a seventh submarine, the first of a new generation, 
would begin in 1988 so that it could enter service in the early 1990s. In 
addition there were two squadrons each with nine S-3 surface to surface 
missiles based on the Plateau d'Albion in Haute-Provence. To complete 
the strategic nuclear force there were thirty-four Mirage IV A bombers 
carrying bombs about five times as powerful as the one dropped on 
Hiroshima. Then there were the tactical nuclear forces including two 
Mirage III E squadrons, three Jaguar squadrons, and a fleet of Super-
Etendard planes based on aircraft carriers, quite apart from the Pluton 
surface-to-surface missiles ( see below). Research and development relating 
to the neutron bomb (l'arme ti rayonnement renforce') had not reached 
the point of decision on production. 
Among the operational forces, the army was partly restructured 
from 1979.27 There were by 1983 eight armoured divisions, each com-
prising 8,000 men divided into two tank regiments, two mechanized 
infantry regiments and two artillery regiments; there were also some 
four infantry divisions, each comprising 6,500 men - divided into 
three motorized infantry regiments, one armoured-car regiment and 
one artillery regiment (a fifth infantry division was also scheduled). 
In addition there were several specialized Alpine, marine and parachute 
divisions; and five regiments equipped with thirty Pluton surface-to-
surface missiles for 'tactical' use, each carrying one 20-kiloton warhead 
equivalent to the power of the Hiroshima bomb. A number of other 
regiments were equipped with Hawk and Roland surface-to-air missiles. 
The deployment of the army in 1983 was as follows: 48,500 in 
West Germany, plus another 2,700 in West Berlin; 3,520 at Djibouti, 
2,911 in Lebanon in Multi-National United Nations Interim Forces; 
1,170 in Senegal; 3,000 in Chad; 450 in Gabon; 900 in the Ivory Coast; 
another 16,500 men from all services were deployed overseas in 
Antilles-Guyana, South Indian Ocean, New Caledonia and Polynesia. 
The remainder of the army was based in France. 
The navy was growing steadily in 1983 and it was expected that 
by the early 1990s France would be able to match Britain as a 
world naval power. To the existing eighteen submarines five more 
would be added soon; to the twenty destroyers five more would be 
added; and to the twenty-five escort ships three more would be added. 
Table 5.1 Defence force comparisons, selected states 1982 
France United Kingdom German Fed. Repub. USA USSR 
Population 54,270,000 55,965,000 61,600,000 234,516,000 271,800,000 
GDP 1982, estimated in$ 537.4 billion 4 73.4 billion 659.2 billion 3,011.6 billion 501.0 billion 
roubles 
Defence expenditure 1983 $17.93 billion $25.17 billion $18.934 billion $240.5 billion 17 .05 billion 
(Fr. 132.22 billion) (£15.987 billion) roubles 
Military service 12 months voluntary 15 months voluntary 24 months 
Personnel: 
Total armed forces 492,850 (inc. 320,623 495,000 (inc. 2,136,400 3,500,000 
253,200 236,000 
conscripts) conscripts) 
army 311,200 (inc. 159,069 335,500 (inc. 780,800 1,800,000 (inc. 
195,000 185,000 1,400,000 
conscr.) conscr.) conscr.) 
navy 68,000 (inc. 71,727 36.400 (inc. 569,000 460,000 (inc. 
17,500 11,000 (plus 19 5 ,000 350,000 
~ conscr.) conscr.) marines) conscr.) ... 
air force 100,400 (inc. 89,827 105,900 (inc. 592,000 360,000 (inc. <I> .... ;:s 
38,500 40,000 220,000 i::, -conscr.) conscr.) conscr. .... <I> 
approx.) !:i" ... 
Paramilitary 85,000 gendarmes 20,000 border guards 152,000 450,000 5· 
Combat aircraft 522 620 501 3,700 5,950 
;:s .. 
Major surface combat 
vessels 46 64 20 213 315 t,..) 
Submarines 18 27 24 95 276 w 
Source: Compiled from The Military Balance 1983-1984, London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1983 
232 External relations 
Apart from normal deployment of vessels in the Atlantic and Mediter-
ranean, one-sixth of the French navy was deployed in the Indian 
Ocean (the largest allied fleet there, according to Admiral Lannuzel, 
commander-in-chief of French naval forces). 
The air force possessed 522 combat aircrafts in 1983. It was divided 
into a tactical air force comprising seventeen fighter-bomber squadrons 
equipped with 135 Mirages and 120 Jaguars, and a number of recon-
naissance and conversion squadrons; an air defence command with 
164 Mirage fighter-interceptors, twelve missile squadrons and four 
communication squadrons, then an air transport command and a 
training command. 
Figure 5.2 shows the decision-making structure for French defence 
policy. The president exercised overall command of the armed forces, 
assisted particularly by the Conseil superieur de la defense nationale, 
the Comite de defense and the Comite de defense restreint which 
formulated directives for the president's approval. But there was the 
unwieldy constitutional arrangement by which the prime minister 
was responsible for national defence and was served by a number of 
bodies, notably the Secretariat general de defense nationale, which 
were quite separate from the president and his military advisers. The 
only institutional liaison, as clearly revealed in the figure, was in the 
council of ministers when the president and prime minister met. 
Otherwise, co-ordination among relevant ministers was achieved in the 
Conseil de la defense nationale which met approximately once every 
two months under the chairmanship of the prime minister; it was 
essentially a forum in which other ministers had the opportunity to 
react to the proposals of the minister of defence. Under de Gaulle's 
presidency defence policy was separated from other aspects of govern-
ment, particularly from economic policies. But after de Gaulle, budget-
ary problems had considerable effects on defence policy by upsetting 
programmes for military spending during the 1970s. For example, 
the fourth military programme from 1977 to 1982 had set out to 
raise defence spending to 20 per cent of the budget by increasing con-
ventional equipment even faster than the nuclear sector; but in practice 
a combination of economies, inflation and technical hold-ups hit the 
conventional sector hardest and thus defence remained at about 17 per 
cent of the budget and its rise from 3.6 to 3.9 per cent of GNP enabled 
the nuclear programme to keep its privileged position.28 Table 5.2 
indicates projected spending under the fifth military programme, 
intending to emphasize equipment rather than other sectors and keeping 
nuclear spending at about 30 per cent of the total for equipment. But 
the inflation allowance was only 6.2 per cent for 1984 and 5 per cent 
after that. If sacrifices had to be made the conventional sector was most 
vulnerable and the plan for a Rapid Action Force of 47,000 might also 
be affected.29 
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Table 5.2 Defence expenditures, 1984 to 1988 (millions of current francs) 
1984 1985 1986-8 Total 
Section Commune 34,492 36,648 125,632 196,772 
Section Air 30,350 32,354 117,846 180,550 
Section Terre 37,887 40,309 143,224 221,420 
Section Marine 26,097 28,205 102,353 156,655 
Section Gendarmere 13,274 13,984 47,345 74,603 
Total 142,100 151,500 536,400 830,000 
Titre III 75,500 78,500 261,000 415,000 
Titres V et VI 66,600 73,000 275,400 415,000 
- Equipements 
nucleaires 21,742 23,810 85,913 131,465 
- Equipements 
classiques 44,858 49,190 189,487 283,535 
Source: Assemblee nationale, Rapport, 18 May 1983, no. 1485, p. 168 
The problem of increasing armaments expenditure without creating 
budget deficits and domestic inflation could be overcome to a 
considerable extent by the export of war materials to other countries. 
By 1978 France had become the third biggest arms exporter after the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Table 5.3 indicates the rapid 
increase in French arms exports, particularly after 1972 when arms 
sales tripled within five years. It was estimated that one-third of 
armaments industry production was directed towards the export trade, 
and arms sales in 1975 represented 3 per cent of total external trade. 
This needs to be seen in the context of global arms sales: between 
1965 and 1974, for instance, the United States sold 49 per cent, the 
Soviet Union 29 per cent, France 4 per cent, and Britain 3 per cent. 
Nevertheless, French arms exports were the result of an official policy 
to maintain independence in defence and foreign policies; arms sales 
were intended to serve the political purpose of guaranteeing an auton-
omous defence structure and extending French influence in Europe 
and the world. The continuing success of the policy in an expanding 
world armaments market could be seen from calculations of sales in 
billions of dollars: 1.388 in 1974, 1.934 in 1975, 2.436 in 1976, 
2.994 in 1977, 3.819 in 1978, 4.807 in 1979 and 5.775 in 1980. In 
1981 orders from abroad for French arms were about 40 billion francs, 
and in 1982 orders rose to about 53 billion francs. But in the first half 
of 1983 orders dropped 27 per cent back to the 1981 level, though this 
decline was reversed by a Saudi Arabian order at the end of 1983 worth 
35 billion francs. 
In the 1960s French arms sales were directed as much to developed 
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Table 5.3 Exports of war materials from France (millions of francs) 
Year Air Land Sea Electronics Total 
1965 1,912 600 50 250 2,812 
1966 2,540 320 129 250 3,239 
1967 1,686 360 187 380 2,613 
1968 2,823 615 143 495 4,076 
1969 1,990 400 41 140 2,571 a 
1970 5,242 605 1,055 386 7,288 
1971 5,219 1,500 79 324 7,122 
1972 3,688 300 80 650 4,734b 
1973 5,470 2,421.2 234.3 1,310.7 9,436c 
1974 9,987 5,701 2,224 1,831 19,743 
1975 9,210 20,000 
Sources: a Le Monde, 28 February 1970; b Le Monde, 23 December 1973; 
c Les Informations, 9 December 1974. 
as to developing states; but during the 1970s there was an increasing 
bias towards the latter, amounting to 90 per cent by 1980. The Middle 
East and North Africa took 79 per cent of all French arms sales in 
1980, Europe and North America 7.5 per cent and Latin America 7 per 
cent. The world recession made the market volatile and in the first half 
of 1983 the Middle East and North Africa only took 62.5 per cent 
while Latin America and the Caribbean took 25.6 per cent of French 
arms sales. The most important components of sales were aircraft, heli-
copters and tactical missiles, making up 59 per cent in 1979. Relevant 
sections of French industry became export-dependent; in 1970 arms 
production for foreign markets was only 14.8 per cent, but it rose to 
38.1 per cent by 1977 and was still at that level in 1983.30 
Success in arms markets not only offset costs incurred by energy 
imports but also reduced the cost of arms production, research and 
development and made it possible for France to maintain the military 
independence underpinning the philosophy founded by de Gaulle. That 
philosophy was one of dissuasion, or deterrence, by which any attack 
on France and her allies would incur massive retaliation from the 
force de frappe. This was carried to its apogee by 1967 when the 
then chief of the general staff, General Ailleret, proclaimed a defence 
strategy of tous azimuts, a multi-directional system that would be 
valid against attack from any part of the world. De Gaulle endorsed 
the strategy in 1968, but politico-economic problems related to the 
events of May that year made it unlikely that France would have the 
resources to create a credible multi-directional nuclear force. Moreover, 
the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968 
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renewed the polarization of the Soviet bloc as a possible threat to 
western security just at a time when Franco-American relations began 
to improve. Both before and after de Gaulle's fall from power in 1969, 
French strategy reverted to a specifically anti-Soviet posture in liaison 
with NATO. By 1974 General Maurin was chief of the general staff 
and was speaking in terms of engagement in battle in the framework 
of the alliance and in consultation with NATO leaders, rather than 
independent French action. 
During the 1960s French strategy was to use the force de frappe for 
three variable purposes: first, to threaten an attacker with unacceptable 
levels of damage; second, to act as a 'trigger' to ensure use of American 
nuclear forces in a situation where there was doubt about their commit-
ment in a crisis; third, to obstruct American plans for a 'flexible 
response' to aggression in Europe by which ce5nventional forces would 
be used initially in the hope of preventing escalation to the level of 
nuclear warfare without sacrificing vital interests (the French fear was 
that the Soviet Union might be tempted to attack in the hope that 
some areas of western Europe would not be regarded as of vital interest 
to Washington). Many American and European analysts criticized the 
French force de frappe for involving dangerous proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and for being prone to obsolescence owing to the apparent 
inability of middle-sized powers to keep up with super-power 
technology. Nevertheless, some French analysts believed the force de 
frappe would have sufficient credibility to act as a deterrent to an 
aggressor, if only on psychological rather than military grounds, 
regarding deterrence as a matter of risk rather than certainty .31 The 
political debate involved opposition from the left on the grounds that 
a French nuclear force increased proliferation and the risk of war and 
that it wasted resources needed in other fields, opposition from the 
centre on the grounds that the French force should be integrated in a 
European or Atlantic force, and support from Gaullists and their 
allies on the grounds that it increased French political prestige and 
military security, while also having spin-off value in raising the general 
level of French technology. Variations of opinion in France in the 
1960s settled into a consensus in favour of maintaining the force 
de frappe in the 1970s; to reverse policy by scrapping it would 
involve waste of many years of national investment. Moreover it 
had two attractive political advantages: first, it ensured a French 
superiority over the growing power of West Germany, and second, 
it apparently offered some possibility of independence from the 
United States. 
In the 1978 general election campaign, not only had the left ceased 
to dismiss the force de frappe as 'la bombinette', but the communists 
were even advocating renewal of the tous azimuts strategy in order to 
make it possible to adopt a neutral stance between the Soviet Union 
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and the United States. There was considerable communist criticism 
of Giscard d'Estaing for not maintaining de Gaulle's policy of indepen-
dence by means of an appropriate nuclear strategy. This view was 
expressed more forcefully, of course, by Gaullist diehards.32 
French government interest in developing conventional forces 
was in response to criticism that a strategy of massive retaliation 
reduced freedom of choice, and therefore independence, in a war 
crisis involving French allies. Was there not a similarity between the 
force de frappe and the Maginot line of 1940 in that they both left 
France without alternative means to influence hostilities beyond her 
frontier and involving other kinds of weapons ( cf. the view of J. 
Huntziger, right-wing PS)? Just as France might upset American flexible 
response strategy b,y 'triggering' a nuclear response, so might West 
Germany upset French strategy by engaging in military operations that 
left France the choice between massive retaliation (and suicide) or 
doing nothing. Moreover, developments in Africa revealed a possible 
need for conventional armed forces to operate outside France. Whereas 
de Gaulle had adopted the position that a Soviet attack on West Berlin, 
for example, would automatically meet with massive retaliation from 
France, by 1975 Giscard d'Estaing was asserting French freedom to 
assess a crisis with a view to ensuring 'a tout coup la securite de nos 
frontieres'. It was pointed out to him that, although compatible with 
the Atlantic Alliance of 1949, this attitude diverged from the Brussels 
Treaty of 1948 which required automatic assistance to be given to 
allies; moreover, it would hardly reassure West Germany of French 
reliability in a crisis (see the article by A. Grosser in Le Monde, 17 
November 1975). 
The deplo5'ment of Pluton tactical nuclear weapons from 1974, 
nevertheless, made it possible, even necessary, for France to develop 
a strategy of flexible response to aggression. The 1976 military 
programme indicated the change of strategy; and both General Mery, 
chief of the general staff from 1975, and Giscard d'Estaing explained 
that the use of tactical nuclear weapons s~rved the vital purpose of 
showing the adversary that he had reached the threshold beyond which 
he would incur the threat of strategic nuclear weapons (see article by 
P.-M. de la Goree in Le Figaro, 3 March 1978). By the late 1970s the 
research into a neutron bomb added a new dimension to French thinking 
about tactical counterforce weaponry. In 1981 Mitterrand took the 
view that such weapons might dilute the deterrent value of the strategic 
nuclear force. No decision to produce a neutron bomb was taken but 
tests were continued. By the time Hernu presented his 1984-8 military 
programme he had undertaken to replace the Pluton with longer-range 
Hades missiles by the early 1990s; although he insisted that no decision 
to deploy a modernized tactical nuclear weapon had been taken yet, it 
was clear that neutron bomb development might provide an ideal arm 
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for Hades. Such weapons, together with the creation of a Rapid Action 
Force for use either alongside allies in Europe or independently over-
seas, raised obvious questions regarding security relations with allies, 
and particularly with West Germany where there was much soul-searching 
during the Euro-missile crisis between 1979 and 1984. Both Mitterrand 
and his principal rival Chirac, the Gaullist mayor of Paris, went to 
Germany to discuss improved co-operation in security matters; this was 
no doubt a reflection of the anxious speculation in France at that time 
regarding a possible German withdrawal into neutralism if their allies 
failed to satisfy their security needs.33 
After the onset of the cold war, and even more after the Algerian 
war, a major French preoccupation had been security against com-
munist subversion within French frontiers. To achieve this a number 
of overt and covert activities were regularly pursued. First of all there 
was the domestic intelligence organization controlled by the ministry 
of the interior, called the Directoire de surveillance du territoire, 
essentially the French equivalent of the American FBI. Second there 
was an external intelligence service under the ministry of justice, the 
Service de documentation exterieure et de contre-espionnage (SCECE), 
which was very much the equivalent of the American CIA in that, 
although officially restricted to an external role, there was criticism 
in 1978 that 80 per cent of its work had been within France in recent 
years, including spying related to tax returns - the worst possible 
offence according to conventional French values - and carrying out 
'witch-hunts' against some radio technicians whose membership of the 
CGT was equated with 'communist penetration' of the intelligence 
service. Half a dozen men in the SDECE were replaced by the ministry 
of defence but there was residual public resentment that the organiz-
ation had overstepped its bounds and was extravagant with its large 
budget.34 
There are two more overt organizations active in internal French 
security. First there is the gendarmerie nationale, serving the ministry of 
defence. It had been given an organization in relation to the division of 
France into seven defence zones, seven military regions and twenty-one 
territorial sub-regions, each involving co-ordination of civil and military 
authorities. There were in 1983 85,000 men serving in the paramilitary 
force of the gendarmerie, including 8,700 conscripts. The force was 
equipped with 38 light tanks, 124 armoured cars and 38 helicopters 
(see The Military Balance, 1983-4, p. 34). In April 1977 the director 
of the gendarmerie, J. Cochard, announced the formation of seven new 
pelotons d'intervention rapide, one in each military region, each 
peloton consisting of eighteen men with highly sophisticated equipment 
and a high degree of mobility; the ultimate aim was to provide such a 
peloton for each of the 400 companies of the gendarmerie ( see Armees 
d'aujourd'hui, July 1977). 
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The second internal security force was the Compagnies republicaines 
de securite (CRS), serving the ministry of the interior via the direction 
generate de la police nationale. As distinct from the gendannerie, 
the CRS had the normal right of the police to form a trade union but 
not to strike. The CRS in 1977 had 15,800 men divided into ten groups 
and sixty companies. Their organization by the Minister of Interior 
reflected that just as their numbers were lower than the gendannerie 
they were also less widely dispersed; moreover their equipment was 
limited to individual weapons and two light machine-guns for each 
company. In emergencies, however, such as during the Algerian war, 
they can be specially equipped with heavier equipment and armaments. 
The CRS was essentially a flexible force capable of rapid intervention, 
by order of the minister of the interior, to prevent civil disorder 
effectively without a provocative show of force such as involvement of 
the gendannerie would entail; though the CRS trade union had un-
successfully sought guarantees that in civil disorders where firearms 
were used the gendannerie would be called in rather than the CRS. 
The roles of the two forces were therefore not as distinct as their 
organizations would suggest. In addition to dealing with civil disorders 
such as occurred in· February 1934 and in May 1968, the internal 
security forces would also be expected to organize resistance in France 
to an invasion such as that of 1940; this is the wider significance of 
the division of France into seven zones of defence, so that internal 
and external security forc.es are organized to support the various 
aim_s of French foreign policy. 35 
After coming to power in 1981 Mitterrand tried to improve the 
relationship between the authorities and various dissident groups such 
as Breton and Corsican autonomist movements. He abolished the state 
security court and encouraged his interior minister to bring in legislation 
to create more effective regional assemblies, beginning with Corsica. 
But by 1983 it had become clear that the Corsican FLNC separatists 
had refused to be reconciled with the new institutions. On 29 April, for 
example, there were fifteen FLNC bomb attacks in major French cities 
and on 23 May there were forty-three more attacks in Corsica itself. On 
13 June Mitterrand visited the island ip a vain attempt to restore calm. 
Just at that time Orsoni, an FLNC leader, disappeared and later in the 
summer a government official was murdered in reprisal, and rumours 
began to circulate about a counter-terrorist initiative in Corsica by a 
Captain Barril who had links with the Elysee. On 5 October the Groupe 
d'intervention de la gendannerie nationale (GIGN) was asked to hold 
an enquiry into Barril's activities, and it was significant that at the end 
of October the anti-terrorist cell at the Elysee was reorganized. This 
problem, like that of reorganizing the SDECE to reduce its collusion 
with the American CIA and the Israeli Mossad, illustrated the difficulty of 
combining firm political control with efficiency in the security services.36 
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(3) Main directions of foreign policy 
France has a long tradition of vital interest in relations with both 
super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and has a 
tradition of bridging or balancing their influence rather than becoming 
merely a satellite of one or the other. In the First World War, for 
example, France began with an alliance with Russia which saved her 
from defeat on a number of occasions between 1914 and 1916, then 
she finished up in close association with the United State.s which 
assured victory in 1918. Neither power joined France at the beginning 
of the Second World War, but both played their different parts in the 
eventual liberation of France in 1944; thus, although physically more 
directly attached to the American government and its armies in western 
Europe, de Gaulle hastened to Moscow to sign a treaty of non-ag-
gression with the Soviet Union in December 1944 on behalf of the 
provisional French government, believing that Franco-Russian solidarity 
was in harmony with the natural order in view of the German threat 
and the Anglo-Saxon attempts at hegemony (see C. de Gaulle, 
Memoires de guerre, vol. 3, p. 54). But the 1945 Yalta conference, 
which mapped out spheres of influence in east and west, and the 
ensuing deterioration of the Cold War, detached France from the 
Soviet Union and entrenched her firmly in the western sphere 
dominated by the United States. When a period of relative detente 
eventually began after 1962, de Gaulle had returned to power in 
France and resumed his earlier policy of seeking freedom of manoeuvre 
between the super-powers, thus creating an ideology of independence 
to which his successors have also formally subscribed. What effects 
did this policy have on relations between France and each of the 
super-powers after 1962? 
In pursuit of political independence from the United States, whose 
role according to de Gaulle should be to provide a security umbrella 
for Europe but otherwise to leave her alone, French policy was to 
propose (in the 17 September 1958 memorandum37 ) equal power-
sharing in NATO or otherwise a progressive French withdrawal of her 
forces from that integrated structure under American command. 
This policy, culminating in February 1966, was characteristic of de 
Gaulle's essentially negative achievements during those years; other 
examples were preventing the American 'Trojan horse', Britain, from 
entering the EEC in 1963 and 1967, and refusing to sign the 1963 
treaty sponsored by the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union 
banning nuclear tests on land or sea. American governments during 
that period were constantly frustrated by de Gaulle's blocking tactics 
regarding initiatives not only in Europe but, for example, in the Congo 
or Laos.38 
De Gaulle's concept of political independence, judging by his speech 
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on 27 April 1965, seemed to focus on developing friendly relations 
with West Germany, eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China and 
states in Africa and South America. But his intention to handle the 
German problem in a purely European context was rebuffed by the 
Germans themselves who were the third most important trading partner 
of the United States, and who preferred to trust American security 
guarantees in NATO rather than a less credible protection from France. 
The Franco-Soviet consultation agreement in 1966 did not enable 
France to do anything to forestall the Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 which destroyed French assumptions that a 
free dialogue was possible with eastern Europe; and by the end of de 
Gaulle's rule, France was co-operating with NATO once more against 
a possible Russian threat. Technical problems required French reliance 
from September 1968 on NATO naval surveillance and radar networks. 
In fact this was related to dependence on the United States in advanced 
technology; in spite of de Gaulle's efforts to minimize American 
penetration of French industry he was not very successful as shown 
by the 1963 takeover by General Electric of Machines Bull, the leading 
French computer firm, and the subsequent evasion of de Gaulle's 
obstructive policy by General Motors who built one of the largest 
European car factories in Belgium and were then able to penetrate the 
French market from across the frontier. West Germany was warned 
off joining in de Gaulle's obstructionist policy, and France alone could 
do very little.39 
The fact that de Gaulle's stand for independence merely amounted 
in practice to a 'politique declamatoire' indicates the limitations on the 
freedom of even middle-sized powers to initiate change in the world 
politico-economic system, beyond frustrating initiatives taken by 
others. This is not to argue, however, that the aim declared in-1965, 
to work for the freedom of all nations from outside intervention, 
restriction and domination, was not worth while, but merely that 
France alone did not have the necessary power to fulfil de Gaulle's 
ambition. 
It is often stated that, whereas under de Gaulle foreign policy 
had priority over domestic policy, under his successors the opposite 
priority applied. Although in general this was true, foreign policy 
continued to have great importance for French governments after 
1969 for two reasons: first, that Gaullist politicians, with communist 
support, kept a close watch on any divergences from independence in 
world affairs, particularly vis-a-vis the United States, and second, that 
the pursuit of economic growth in France had internationalized the 
economy to such an extent by the 1970s that foreign economic policy 
inevitably proved to be a major preoccupation. 
Problems for France arising from the events of May and the 
Czechoslovakia crisis in August 1968 brought about an improvement 
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in Franco-American relations. During the 'gold war', France had refused 
to sign a Group of Ten financial proposal to increase international 
liquidity by means of special drawing rights, but eight months later, 
in November 1968, France borrowed two thousand million dollars 
from the Group of Ten. On 5 December defence minister Messmer 
made it clear to the national assembly that there was no question of 
French neutralism and that France was in the Atlantic alliance to stay. 
General Ailleret was killed in an air crash and his successor, General 
Fourquet, accepted in March 1969 the American nuclear doctrine of 
'graduated response' directed specifically at the Soviet Union to the 
east. 
Certainly there was the encouragement for France of a more flexible 
policy in Washington: American forces ceased to bomb north Vietnam 
at the end of March 1968 and on 5 May Paris was chosen as the centre 
for Vietnam peace talks (hardly the most peaceful place to talk at 
that time). The newly-elected president Nixon visited France in 
February 1969; in April de Gaulle attended General Eisenhower's 
funeral in Washington and had a further round of cordial conversations 
with Nixon. When de Gaulle's successor, Pompidou, devalued the franc 
in the summer of 1969, American policy co-operated in helping to 
stabilize the French currency at its new level, while the French 
reciprocated by ending their doctrinaire resistance to US sales and 
investment in France. 
There was a general expectation in Europe that after the Vietnam 
war, which ended in '1973, American foreign policy was likely to be 
more cautious and less domineering. The devaluation of the dollar in 
1971 and its further weakening after 1973, accompanied by persistent 
American balance of payments deficits, all made it clear that successive 
American administrations were in deep trouble, quite apart from the 
Watergate affair in 1973-4 which led to the resignation of president 
Nixon. There was considerable speculation about possible American 
decline from power and withdrawal into isolationism. It therefore 
became much more acceptable to French public opinion to see 
Pompidou and his successor, Giscard d'Estaing, discussing co-operation 
with the American government in efforts to control the effects of a 
major world economic crisis after 1973. 
The immense scale of American power, nevertheless, meant that it 
took only the nervous muscular reflexes of weak government to 
maintain the essentials of world political control. Moreover, the social 
pluralism and diffuse economic dynamism characteristic of American 
capitalism enabled it to recover from excessive dependence on short-
term state contracts connected with the Vietnam war and to expand 
other profitable business interests. Although recession and unemploy-
ment hit some sectors of American industry, such as steel, there was 
remarkable buoyancy in other sectors such as plastics, electronics and 
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even consumer durables; furthermore, profits were maintained through 
manipulation of overseas assets in American multi-national companies. 
The American government preserved its grip on the world currency 
system by means of policy co-ordination between foreign ministries 
and central banks between 1973 and 1976. A set of guidelines for 
indefinitely floating currencies were agreed. France changed her policy 
in December 1974 to agree that currencies would not necessarily be 
linked to gold and that there would be no official international gold 
price; for its part the American government agreed that gold should be 
realistically valued according to market price and made available to 
governments with balance of payments deficits. By January 1976 a 
new international monetary regime had emerged to replace the 1944 
Bretton Woods system: first, floating rates were legalized according 
to a set of conditions over which the United States had a veto; second, 
special drawing rights were made the principal international reserve 
assets in order to reduce the role of gold; third, the International 
Monetary Fund had powers of firm surveillance over exchange rate 
policies and was to lay down certain guidelines; fourth, a trust fund 
was established for poor countries to liberalize credit facilities (the 
caucus of underdeveloped countries made acceptance of the whole 
system conditional on that point).40 This system involved a degree of 
Franco-American co-operation inconceivable in the time of de Gaulle. 
The importance of the dollar remained such that its subsequent de-
valuations were as much an American lever to manipulate world trade 
as a sign of instability or weakness. 
Faced with an unprecedented threat to oil supplies in 1973, the 
United States reacted by forming an International Energy Agency as a 
pressure group against oil producers. France alone among EEC members 
declined to join the Agency, preferring a wider arrangement with 
producers as well as consumers of oil to ensure French supplies. There 
was a brief period of friction between Jobert, acting for the sick 
Pompidou, and Kissinger in 1974; but by 15 December Giscard 
d'Estaing had restored tentative agreement with the United States on 
the desirability of some joint action by oil consumer states. American 
muscle, including a threat to use military action against Arab states 
to prevent any embargo on vital oil supplies, restored the flow of oil 
at more stable prices. 
By 1976 there was increasing speculation about 'eurocommunism', 
a tendency among western European communist parties to seek power 
by accepting fuller integration into local political systems by means of 
liberal democratic methods. Some observers anticipated the possibility 
of communist parties coming to power in Italy, France and Portugal. 
The American government reacted firmly in April 1976 with the 
Sonnenfeldt doctrine to reaffirm that the United States accepted Soviet 
predominance throughout eastern Europe, and at the same time a 
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Kissinger doctrine declaring United States opposition to any communist 
participation in western European governments. In spite of protests 
about US imperialist interference, it was clear that the polarization of 
power in Europe between the two super-powers would continue 
indefinitely. Moreover, France joined with other EEC members to 
reinforce this situation. At Puerto Rico on 27-28 June 1976, France, 
Britain and West Germany reached agreement with the United States 
that international financial assistance to countries such as Italy should 
be conditional on there being no communists in the government.41 This 
represented a threat to the left in France in view of its alliance involving 
the communist party in the common programme of government adopted 
in 1972. The danger of American interference receded, however, when 
the French left split over various issues in the summer of 1977 and sub-
sequently lost the 1978 elections. 
Mitterrand's victory in the 1981 presidential election was a surprise 
to most observers, and the character of his government was provisional 
until after the legislative elections in June. Moreover, his platform had 
been 110 personal propositions rather than the common programme. 
The sweeping PS victory enabled him to choose to bring four communists 
into the government and thereby to present the United States with a 
fait accompli that directly challenged the Kissinger doctrine. When this 
was accompanied by adoption of a reformist liberal, or Keynesian, 
economic policy which contradicted US liberal, or monetarist, policy, 
this appeared to confirm American worst fears; Mitterrand was warned 
that Franco-American relations could not have the same tone or content 
so long as communists were in the government. It may therefore have 
been for self-protection that Mitterrand reassured Washington that 
France would remain a firm supporter of the Atlantic alliance and of its 
December 1979 decision to instal cruise and Pershing II missiles in 
western Europe (though not in France) unless the Soviet Union agreed 
to scrap her new SS20 missiles. While refusing to meet Soviet leaders 
unless they removed troops sent into Afghanistan in 1979, Mitterrand 
met president Reagan three times during his first year in office and left 
a deep impression of his opposition to communism. If there was an 
element of tactical diplomacy in this, there was no doubt of Mitterrand's 
firm conviction of the need for an East-West balance of power requiring 
an American commitment to counter what he saw as a Soviet advantage 
that threatened the security of France and her allies. Thus France 
became the staunchest (non-integrated) member of the Atlantic alliance 
in the 1980s, allQwing the NATO council to meet in Paris in June 1983 
for the first time since the rupture of 1966. 
It is true that Mitterrand's economic policy involved nationalizing 
some French companies under American control; for example CGCT 
and LCT were bought from ITT in October 1982, and in 1983 CII was 
bought from Honeywell. This, following Giscard d'Estaing's decision in 
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January 1981 to sever the link between Framatome and Westinghouse, 
recovered a considerable degree of independence for French advanced 
technology. Such actions, when added to Mitterrand's determination to 
trade freely with the Soviet Union and his election campaign call for a 
reform of the western alliance, could be interpreted as potentially dissi-
dent as regards US leadership.42 Mitterrand even opposed US intervention 
in Central America and the Caribbean, and sold arms to the Marxist 
government of Nicaragua. However, in 1983 French troops joined 
Americans in a Lebanon intervention by a multi-national force, while 
others intervened in Chad in liaison with American action to prevent a 
Libyan expansion there. Giscard d'Estaing's promotion of an EEC 
peace initiative in the Middle East from June 1980 was abandoned by 
Mitterrand who supported the American Camp David approach to piece-
meal Arab-Israeli agreements. Only Giscard's 1978 proposal for a 
European Disarmament Conference was brought to fruition in Stockholm 
in 1984; and even then it was made clear that nothing substantial was 
likely until after the November 1984 US presidential elections. Thus 
were French hopes for a general arms control agreement including the 
super-powers kept alive; but French economic troubles and dependence 
on foreign loans reduced their influence, and it did not augur well for 
American commitment to the conference as a door to detente that the 
official in charge of their delegation was a Mr Goodby. Thus the French 
role was that of a semi-dependent power within the United States's 
orbit rather than the independent middle-sized power that had been the 
ambition of de Gaulle. 
As one would expect, French relations with the Soviet Union were 
the converse of those with the United States. Relations had appeared 
to be good in the 1960s when de Gaulle left NATO and obstructed the 
expansion or integration of the EEC. During the last year of de Gaulle's 
rule, however, French policy retreated from rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union owing partly to the Czechoslovakian crisis, but also 
because a Russo-German dialogue was in progress as part of Brandt's 
Ostpolitik and de Gaulle was finding financial relations with West 
Germany particularly difficult after May 1968 when the franc came 
under pressure. It was the Russian tum to show anxiety in 1969 when 
the newly elected Pompidou showed enthusiasm for integration and 
expansion of the EEC and for improvement in Franco-American 
relations. Nevertheless Pompidou maintained friendly relations with 
Moscow, particularly in the form of trade agreements. As the Soviet 
Union began to develop a policy of detente with the United States 
in the 1970s it began to treat the earlier rapprochement with France 
as a model for relations with other western states. To develop this 
approach Brezhnev paid a state visit to France in October 1971. 
Paradoxically, this was just at a time when France was obdurately 
opposing proposals for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe 
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on the grounds that it tended towards a Russo-American condominium 
at the expense of the Europeans. But the Russians pressed ahead, 
emphasizing the importance of the Grand Commission founded with 
de Gaulle in 1966 to foster trade and scientific co-operation. They had 
since formed similar commissions with other powers including the 
United States. In October 1970 they had persuaded Pompidou to 
create a political counterpart to the Grand Commission, a protocol 
providing for regular consultations on international issues every six 
months and at other times when international tension might develop. 
In October 1971 Brezhnev proposed that they codify the principles 
of their co-operation. Clearly the aim was to make up for the break in 
relations in 1968 and to maintain apparent French determination not 
to re-enter NA TO nor to allow the EEC to become closed to the east. 
But this muted form of rapprochement came to an end in 1973 
when French policy perceived fully the risks involved in a Soviet-
American condominium. It is possible that strident anti-Soviet criticism 
came at the same time as attacks on American oil policy as a result 
of Pompidou's illness and Jobert's impetuous handling of French policy 
during 1973-4. Whatever the reason, Jobert warned the Helsinki 
conference on European security in June 1973 against a 'moral dis-
armament deadening the spirit of resistance, deceiving vigilance, and 
leading to servitude'. This was followed up by the French declaring 
that they intended to keep up their own military development, and 
appealing to the United States to maintain their existing conventional 
and nuclear forces in Europe. At this stage French anxiety regarding 
a super-power condominium was as much directed at the United 
States as at the Soviet Union; thus, on his visit to China in October 
1973 Pompidou resisted the temptation of his hosts to fulminate 
against the Soviet Union. Back in Paris, however, Jobert continued 
to castigate both Washington and Moscow for ignoring European 
interests in the Middle East crisis of that autumn. 
When Giscard d'Estaing was elected French president in 1974 
anxiety increased in the Soviet Union that he was likely to commit 
France to integration in the EEC and to be influenced by colleagues 
like Lecanuet towards Atlantidsm. But Giscard visited Brezhnev ·in 
December 1974, and returned convinced that, on the basis of a Soviet 
wish to avoid war, it was possible to pursue ambitious solutions to inter-
national problems with a mondialiste perspective. Regular Franco-
Russian meetings were arranged, and trade contracts were sought with 
eastern Europe. French successes in East-West trade, however, were 
being more than matched by West Germany. The Soviet will to assert 
world power ambitions clashed with French interests in Africa and the 
Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, Giscard's trust in the limited nature of 
Soviet aims led him to attach little importance to their military inter-
vention in Afghanistan in 1979, arguing that the assets of detente in the 
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form of trade and cultural exchanges between East and West should not 
be jeopardized in order to support anti-Soviet Afghans whom he called 
'rebels' rather than resisters. When he saw Brezhnev to exchange views 
in Warsaw in May 1980 he was derided as 'le facteur de Varsovie' by 
Mitterrand, who sought to exploit the absence of nationalism from 
Giscard's reformist liberal discourse. When Mitterrand came to power 
he ostracized the USSR and relations reached a nadir when he expelled 
forty-seven Soviet diplomats in April 1983. But some views were shared, 
for example on the Middle East, and the Franco-Soviet dialogue was 
revived when Mitterrand received a visit from foreign minister Gromyko 
on 9 September 1983.43 
The idea of European union has a long history related to early ideals 
of Christian unity and to efforts to prevent recurrent outbreaks of 
war which, by the eighteenth century, were already seen to involve 
greater losses than gains. France was involved in the problems of 
Europe as the leading power over a long period and was naturally the 
source of some of the concepts of unification. The prevalence of 
Monarchism, however, prevented the European idea from making 
institutional progress until at least the mid-nineteenth century, by 
which time the emergence of democratic and liberal thought encour-
aged a more systematic approach. Hence Victor Hugo's call for a 
United States of Europe in 1848. But this approach was short-lived 
as the consolidation of nation-states and politico-economic nationalism 
diverted interest in France and elsewhere, from the European idea. 
It took the suffering of two World Wars and the discrediting of 
nationalism to bring the European idea back to the surface. The first 
time it was taken up seriously by a statesman in power was by Edouard 
Herriot in 1924, and his thoughts were developed tentatively by 
Aristide Briand into a plan for European union in 1929. But the onset 
of the depression of the 1930s, fascism and war killed the plan at 
birth. By 1945 not only was nationalism discredited, but also the 
machinery of the nation-state had been smashed. International 
principles involved in communism, socialism and Catholicism, among 
others, had more scope in the immediate post-war period than ever 
before; from another point of view, the development of capitalism as 
a system, and the scale of economic reconstruction problems facing 
Europe, encouraged serious thought on methods of international 
co-operation. American influence encouraged federal concepts, but 
ruled out communism as the cold war set in. Christian democracy and 
socialism were therefore the two principal movements that proceeded 
to promote the European idea. 
Why did France play a leading part in promoting European unity? 
First, the two most important political parties under the Fourth 
Republic were the socialists and the christian democrats. Second, 
French national interests were to create a security system that would 
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remove both the urge and the opportunity for future German 
aggression against France, and furthermore to achieve economic re-
construction in harmony with France's natural trading partners in 
western Europe. So far as timing was concerned, external American 
pressure in favour of German reconstruction and the organized sharing 
of Marshall Aid made the creation of some kind of western European 
institutions a matter of urgency. 
Initially the British were involved, having strong interest in European 
security and stability. The Dunkirk defence treaty of 194 7, followed 
by the 1948 Brussels treaty for mutual assistance against aggression, 
involved the British not only in military matters but also in discussion 
of socio-economic and political methods of co-operation. But French 
policy became attached to the concept of supra-national institutions 
designed to prevent the danger of Germany recovering the indepen-
dence and power to threaten France once again. The federal ideas of 
J. Monnet and R. Schuman proceeded to lead the French government 
to propose the European Coal and Steel Community, and ultimately to 
join the European Economic Community, while leaving out the British 
who gave priority to relations with the Commonwealth and the United 
States for both economic and cultural reasons. The new West German 
state was willing to enter into federal agreements in Europe partly 
because it was shakily built on a divided society, and therefore needed 
outside political support during its early years, but even more because 
firm backing from western Europe was considered essential to avoid 
becoming submerged in the Soviet bloc to the east. 
There were countervailing attempts to adopt confederal methods 
of co-operation between independent states in the 1950s. One example 
was Western European Union, which included the British, with a view 
to improving defence and other systems; but lack of political interest 
on the British side allowed such institutions to remain empty shells. 
When de Gaulle returned to power in France he did in fact favour 
confederal rather than federal methods, as shown by his Fouchet Plan 
launched in 1960; but at the same time he was anxious to avoid 
weakening the EEC in the face of what he regarded as 'Anglo-Saxon' 
hegemony, moreover he found it possible to work in harmony with 
West Germany under Adenauer. The result was a veto on British entry 
into the EEC during a period when de Gaulle otherwise obstructed 
further progress towards federalism and created so much ill-feeling that 
his own confederal ideas made no progress either. 
Quite apart from differences of view in France and Europe regarding 
the form of European unity, there were different conceptions of the 
purpose and role of Europe in the world at large. Socialists in France 
were of widely differing tendencies, but generally regarded western 
Europe as a possible 'third force' developing a distinctive socio-econ-
omic system and pursuing independent political interests from those 
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of the United States and the Soviet Union. The christian democrats 
and many of the Radicals, on the other hand, saw western Europe 
rather as a second western force, co-operating fully with the United 
States and sharing Atlanticist economic and political principles while 
also creating a bulwark against Soviet power and communism. These 
currents of thought and political tendencies converged, however, in the 
belief that a united Europe should maintain and develop close links 
with the under-developed world, thereby sustaining the influence of 
the French empire: 'Eurafrica' was one of the evocative catchwords 
of the 1950s. There was a further point of convergence in French 
opinion, which was appreciation of the importance of the EEC in 
providing an outlet for French agricultural surpluses and as a dynamic 
force for economic and social change. 
By the end of de Gaulle's rule, in 1969, there were two problems 
that were preventing the EEC from progressing as smoothly as 
originally expected. First, there was a deadlock between de Gaulle and 
the other five member-states which had centred on the issue of British 
entry. Second, the fact that there was ,a deadlock at all was an 
indication of the growth of West German power and independence 
since the signing of the treaty of Rome. French policy under Pompidou 
from 1969 undertook to find a solution to both problems at once: 
the British would be brought in to provide a possible counterweight 
to West Germany, but on terms that would prevent her from disrupting 
the EEC organization in any way harmful to French agricultural 
interests. Thus Pompidou proposed a three-stage programme to achieve 
a relance europeenne at the EEC summit conference at the Hague in 
December 1969: achevement (involving completion and consolidation 
of the common agricultural policy, CAP), approfondissement (in-
volving plans for complete economic and monetary union by 1980) 
and elargissement (involving the entry of Britain and several associated 
applicant states). This formula was intended to secure the interests of 
France and the EEC as a whole before British entry. In the event, 
British acceptance of the CAP and agreement to run down the in-
dependent role of sterling as a reserve currency, together with a favour-
able French referendum in April 1972, cleared the way for enlargement 
of the EEC in 1973. Nevertheless, this- was made possible essentially 
by an informal understanding reached by Pompidou and the then 
British prime minister, Edward Heath, at a meeting in Paris in May 
1971, and much of this personal understanding proved ephemeral 
when both men ceased to hold office in 1974. 
Unexpected difficulties were encountered by France and the EEC as 
a result of the world financial and economic crisis which began with 
the Middle East war of October 1973. During the crisis, France, who 
was heavily dependent on imported oil for her energy needs, made 
full use of her special status as a state friendly to the Arabs and 
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consequently received privileged oil supplies; in contrast, Holland was 
denied supplies of oil for a time and received no support from France. 
A common energy policy in the EEC proved impossible to achieve and 
all members except France accepted US leadership in the oil consumers' 
International Energy Agency. Moreover, world financial confusion 
disrupted progress towards monetary unity in the EEC. A 'snake in 
the tunnel' system had been created in September 1972 allowing 
member currencies to move 2.4 per cent above or below a normal 
parity. This was complicated when the dollar was floated freely during 
1973 and France had to leave the system in January 1974, returning 
the following year, but leaving again in 1976. Moreover, Britain, Italy 
and Ireland had even earlier left the 'snake'. Considerable friction 
arose during this period, particularly as the German mark was clearly 
the strongest currency and attracted the envy of neighbouring states, 
including France. Thus, when Pompidou died in 1974, his policy was 
in shreds: although technically completed on a permanent basis, the 
CAP had been severely weakened by financial instability; monetary 
union had been thwarted; and British reactions to the economic crisis 
had tended towards solidarity with the US rather than with the EEC. 
Giscard d'Estaing undertook from 1974 to stabilize and develop the 
French economy within the context of greater European co-operation. 
Disappointed with British policy, with its disruptive demand for re-
negotiation of its terms of EEC membership in 1974, Giscard preferred 
to base his hopes on close relations with the West German chancellor, 
Helmut Schmidt, paradoxically using English as their common language 
and ignoring jibes from nationalists like Jobert that 'ils se tutoient en 
anglais'. Thus Franco-German relations became closer than at any time 
since the early 1960s, proving once again that their harmony was the 
necessary and perhaps even the sufficient condition for progress in the 
EEC. Institutional progress on confederal lines was made by creating a 
European Council to enable heads of government to meet three times a 
year to promote political co-operation. Moreover, it was agreed that the 
European parliament should be directly elected by universal suffrage in 
1979. It had already acquired significant powers to add to the EEC 
budget in April 1970 and these were confirmed in July 1975. Assertion 
of budgetary powers and the right to be consulted on legislation became 
more pronounced once the parliament increased its status through direct 
elections, though even after 1979 it forbore to use its supreme power 
under the treaty of Rome to dismiss the Commission in its entirety and 
remained a subordinate institution. 
Giscard also pursued energetically the drive for monetary union. 
Although the 'snake' system was destroyed by the 1974 oil crisis, dis-
satisfaction with floating currencies, which would have sabotaged the 
CAP but for the invention of more stable 'green' currencies for calculation 
of common prices and monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs) to 
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relate prices to changes in real currencies, led Giscard and Schmidt to 
launch a European monetary system (EMS) in 1979 whose members 
were sufficiently committed yet adaptable to withstand pressures arising 
from the second oil crisis in 1979 and the ensuing world recession. Most 
EEC members felt that the EMS and CAP were beneficial assets derived 
from a budget no larger than 20 per cent of the French budget. The 
oscillations of an oil-based currency prevented the British from joining 
the EMS and they objected to making large net payments into the EEC 
budget. While agreeing to give ad hoe rebates to the British, Giscard and 
other EEC leaders insisted on maintaining the 'own resources' system of 
automatic financing through customs levies and VAT payments created 
in 1969. 
Mitterrand adopted an ambivalent attitude to the EEC in 1981, 
defending it against British attacks and criticising Giscard for his 
agreement to rebates each year, yet attributing to it responsibility for 
increasing disparities between wealthy and poor regions. To protect 
the latter he was more adamant than Giscard that Spanish and Por-
tuguese entry into the EEC would require a long transitional period and 
a Mediterranean policy to safeguard farmers' interests. Even his 1981 
plan for European economic revival caused anxiety in West Germany 
where his Keynesian approach was seen as damagingly inflationary and 
protectionist. After his retreat into a deflationary policy of rigueur 
from March 1983, however, his relations with the new chancellor, Kohl, 
became harmonious and he had valuable West German support for his 
efforts as EEC president in 1984 to resolve serious problems regarding 
new members, an increase in the budget and restructuring the CAP. He 
announced an impressive projet politique at the Hague on 8 February 
1984, proposing a European space satellite programme as part of a wide-
ranging plan for greater economic, political and military co-operation in 
the EEC. But such proposals depended on the outcome of disputes 
which threatened either to destroy the EEC or to make it divisively 
hierarchical according to varying levels of economic development and 
political commitment among its members. 
French relations with the 'third world' were transformed by the 
traumatic experience of rapid decolonization between 1954 and the 
end of the Algerian war in 1962. De Gaulle established an ambitious 
policy of co-operation with independent francophone states and 
encouraged non-alignment among other states in accordance with his 
philosophy of independence for all nations. Thus France maintained 
extensive cultural, economic and military connections with ex-colonies, 
so that up to thirty states in the world continued to use French as their 
official language. Although over half French trade was geared to the 
EEC compared with a quarter to the 'third world', the importance of 
oil and gas imports from Arab states and valuable supplies of minerals 
from Africa ensured that France would maintain an energetic 'third 
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world' policy. Moreover, the poverty and political fragility of many 
ex-colonies ensured that tliey would remain extremely dependent on 
French support. 
French aid to the 'third world' was in three forms: public technical 
and cultural aid, private business and banking aid, and international aid 
through EEC agreements. French aid policy was traditionally more 
ambitious than that of other developed states. In 1963, for example, 
French public aid was nearly one billion dollars, 1.33 per cent of GNP, 
double the British figure. But, in spite of the 1963 Jeanneney report's 
advocacy of 1.5 per cent GNP, France followed other states by gradually 
reducing her aid programmes and shifting the emphasis from public to 
private aid which involved more interest payments and strings. In 1971 
the International Development Assistance Committee asked its seventeen 
most developed member states to commit 0.7 per cent of the GNP to 
developing countries but the average aid actually given in 1977 was 0.3 
per cent of GNP. The national figures were: US$4.1 billions, West 
Germany $1.31 billions (0.26 per cent GNP), Britain $907 millions 
(0.38 per cent GNP), France $ 2.394 millions (0.63 per cent GNP). 
Nevertheless, at least two-thirds of French aid still went to the franc zone 
countries, and the aid figures included grants to overseas departements 
like Reunion which were otherwise supposed to be integral parts of 
France. Furthermore, much of French aid was cultural with the under-
standable intention of maintaining the world-wide influence of French 
civilization; for example, the forty thousand teaching and technical 
assistants sent by France to 'third world' countries amounted to about 
half those sent out by all the developed nations. Then, like most other 
aid donors, France tended to attach strings to aid so that, even if it were 
not repayable with interest, it often required the use of French equip-
ment and personnel. Thus it was hardly surprising that the debts of 
ninety-four developing countries increased from$ 71.7 billions in 1970 
to $216.6 billions in 1976.44 
Responsibilities for aid distribution by the French government 
were divided. The ministry of finance dealt with trading agreements 
and subsidies, though money was often sent out by other ministries 
directly concerned. After 1966 the ministry for foreign affairs 
organized co-operation with all parts of the under-developed world. 
There was a secretaire d'etat dealing with economic aid to the sixteen 
African francophone states. Then there was a directeur des affaires 
techniques et culturelles to organize educational and technical 
assistance to all countries receiving aid from France. Altogether the 
Quai d'Orsay normally spent up to half its budget on co-operation 
programmes.45 Within the French government as a whole there were 
also the activities of the ministre d'etat for overseas French 
departements and territories, and then of course the activities of the 
ministry of defence. In terms of trade there was a tremendous decline 
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in the importance of the franc zone to France over a twenty-five-year 
period: in 1954 about 30 per cent of French trade was with the franc 
zone countries; by 1964 it was down to 17 per cent; and by 1975 
it was down to less than 5 per cent. It was significant, however, that it 
provided France with an increasingly favourable balance; for example 
exports in 1975 were worth over three billion francs more than imports 
from the franc zone and nearly seven billion more in 1979. 
The EEC, from its birth in 1957, organized a number of aid and 
development programmes with the 'third world'. This was important 
to France in helping to support the French empire and subsequently 
the independent states in the franc zone. In 1975 the EEC signed the 
Lome convention with forty-six states in various parts of the 'third 
world'. But the agreement did not improve significantly on the existing 
EEC generalized system of preferences, in terms of tariffs. For example, 
it did not allow for goods to have tariff-free entry unless at least half 
their value was created in the signatory country concerned (thus 
blocking the development of finishing processes in 'third world' 
industry); there was, moreover, a safety clause enabling EEC members 
to block access to 'third world' products if they seriously disturbed 
a sector of their economies. Financial provision to help stabilize 'third 
world' countries' export earnings in the face of world market fluc-
tuations was no more than £50 million approximately in any one year 
for a particular country's commodity (in fact the total aid provision 
under the convention was only £1,500 million approximately over a 
five-year period). The Lome convention was signed by forty-six 
countries, and Lome II in 1979 by fifty-eight needing trade assistance 
in a period of declining levels of aid; and it did encourage a few incipient 
'third world' industries in spite of its general emphasis on trade in 
agricultural products and raw materials. The free trade provision in the 
convention were characteristic of the relationship between an advanced 
and a dependent economy, allowing penetration by the former without 
much risk of competition from the latter.46 
Apart from cultural and economic relations with the French-speak-
ing countries in Africa, France- -had equally extensive military 
connections. Ten years after their independence in 1960 many African 
ex-colonies were beginning to reduce their dependence on French 
military assistance, and president Pompidou had not concerned himself 
about that tendency. But after 1974 Giscard d'Estaing re-established 
close relations with ex-colonies. The third summit of French-speaking 
African states in May 1976 in Paris was attended by nineteen members 
compared with only eleven at the summit in 1973. At the fourth 
summit in Dakar in April 1976, president Senghor of Senegal welcomed 
renewed French interest in Africa, saying that if Europe did not 
appreciate the security risk in Africa other continents would take 
control. This reference to Chinese and Soviet intervention in Africa 
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was echoed by a number of African leaders seeking military aid which 
they very often used for the internal security of their personal power 
base. Whatever the reason, France renewed military pacts with Congo-
Brazzaville, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Cameroun and Senegal; and new 
technical military co-operation agreements were made with Benin, 
Chad and Togo. A force of 5,000 French troops was permanently 
stationed in the new republic of Djibouti, a situation which facilitated 
links with the large French naval force in the Indian Ocean and with 
another military base in Reunion. The most notable French military 
interventions in Africa were in the western Sahara in 1977, to support 
the Mauritanian government against Polisario guerrillas, and in Chad 
in 1976, to support the government ·against Libyan-backed rebels; 
Giscard d'Estaing was given the title 'gendarme of Africa' in April 
1978 when he used U.S. transport aircraft for French para-troops to 
intervene to preserve the government of president Mobutu in Zaire. 
The most significant point is that France was the only one of the 
ex-colonial powers to maintain permanent military bases in Africa.47 
The reason for the importance of Africa to French security was 
explained by the French chief-of-staff, General Mery, in a statement 
of policy on 3 April 1978 :48 
ii existe entre ce continent et la France un ensemble de liens etablis 
par la geographie et l'histoire, que la complementarite de leurs 
economies fondees sur les matieres premieres pour l 'un et sur leur 
transformation pour l'autre, vient encore renforcer. Or, ii regne 
actuellement en Afrique un climat d'instabilite qui ne peut, en 
consequence, nous laisser indifferents et cela pour deux raisons 
principales que je rattacherai aux deux notions de securite et de 
responsabilite. 
La securite de la France ne depend pas, bien silr, uniquement de 
la securite de l' Afrique, mais elle est, me semble-t-il, tres fortement 
liee a celle-ci. Elle l'est, en premier lieu, parce que le territoire 
fran9ais est proche de l'Afrique en Mediterranee, proche aussi dans 
le canal de Mozambique avec Mayotte, et a la Reunion. Elle l'est 
ensuite, parce que 260,000 ressortissants fran9ais vivent et travail-
lent en Afrique, pour l'essentiel en Afriq'ue du Nord et en Afrique 
Occidentale. Elle l'est enfin et peut-etre surtout, parce que les routes 
maritimes qui entourent l' Afrique servent a acheminer la plus grande 
partie du petrole et des matieres premieres dont nous avons besoin 
et sont done vitales pour notre pays. Ces routes passent au plus pres 
du continent africain en plusieurs endroits et sont alors a portee des 
moyens aeriens et navals des pays riverains: a cet egard les zones de 
Dakar, du Cap, de Tunis revetent une importance toute particuliere, 
car elles constituent autant de passages obliges et 'singuliers', plus 
faciles a controler que les longs couloirs du Mozambique ou de la 
Mer Rouge. 
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He went on to speak of military aid agreements with a number of 
African states made by their own request and which involved a 
responsibility France was willing to fulfil in order to contribute to the 
development and stability of Africa. 
Soon after he became president in 1974, Giscard d'Estaing spoke 
of the need for a new international economic order and subsequently 
initiated a north-south dialogue (la conference sur la cooperation 
economique internationale) in Paris from December 1975 until June 
1977. The emphasis of his approach was on the need for new 
mechanisms in world markets to ensure a better balance in world 
trade. His ideal was to remove political and economic obstacles to the 
evolution of a natural economic order in the world. Nevertheless, 
Giscard d'Estaing admitted to the existence of structural imbalance 
in the world economy, and suggested in 1976 a 'Marshall Plan' for Africa. 
American policy under president Carter was sympathetic to this view, 
but its commitment of 0.27 per cent of GNP to aid in 1978 was cut to 
0.18 per cent by 1980 under president Reagan. 
Mitterrand made a clearer commitment to aid than Giscard, planning 
to raise it from 0.57 per cent GNP in 1980 (which included DOM-TOM 
payments) to 0.7 per cent GNP by 1985 (excluding DOM-TOM pay-
ments). This tiers-mondiste policy still involved a bias towards private 
aid with strings attached so that, as Leopold Senghor of Senegal once 
put it, out of every four francs given in aid five went back to France. 
In the Middle East Mitterrand sought to resolve the Israeli and Palestinian 
disputes, but in 1983 was drawn into an American-led multi-national 
force in the Lebanon. Like Giscard before him, he preferred a less 
prominent role within a United Nations force but the UN authority was 
in question. Similarly, Mitterrand sought a solution to the Chad civil 
war through the Organization of African Unity, but its authority too 
was in question and 3,000 French troops were sent in August 1983 to 
defend the Habre government against Libyan-backed rebels, who had 
previously been in power and defended by French troops against Habre! 
Thus France was helping tribes, factions, sects or families in various 
insecure states to preserve artificial frontiers established under colonial 
rule.49 Mitterrand's greatest success was in bringing to fruition in 1983 
the renewed co-operation with Algeria begun by Giscard in 1980. This 
was the cornerstone of Mitterrand's policy of association with the non-
aligned states intended to reduce the world division into two hostile 
blocs. 
France recovered a degree of self-determination after the Second 
World War that varied considerably between the two extremes of depen-
dence and independence. The gradations between those extremes must 
be taken into account to give French external relations meaningful 
analysis. While distinguishing negative forms of independence from more 
positive forms, it is also important to vary the focus from relations with 
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super-powers, in which French freedom is restricted, to relations with 
European partners, in which France plays an influential role, to relations 
with the 'third world' in which France sometimes determines the very 
survival of rulers and governments. In the 1980s serious political and 
economic challenges were met by France with a determination to enjoy 
the freedom and relationships essential to her unique identity. 
Chapter 6 
The education system 
Introduction 
It might perhaps be thought that education is a topic which has little 
to do with politics, yet it is one which, in recent years, has become the 
object of an increased political interest in France (as also in Britain). 
One reason for this is plain enough in economic terms: in a techno-
logical society, such as France, it is no longer sufficient for a worker 
to sell his unskilled labour; if he wishes to command an adequate salary, 
he requires a technical qualification, which only education can provide. 
It has been calculated that in October 1981, out of23,262,701 men and 
women forming the working population, 5,516,657 had no qualification 
whatsoever and 5,003,137 had only the certificat d'education profes-
sionnelle (Collections de l'INSEE, Demographie et Emploi, Enquete 
sur l'emploi d'octobre 1981, INSEE, June 1982). 
At the level of government and the higher administrative echelons 
also, it is higher education which provides the requisite personnel. In 
every respect, therefore, as W. D. Halls says, 'education in modern 
society is about power' ,1 and the distribution of power is the natural 
pre-occupation of political parties. 
This is not to say that there was no realization in the past as to the 
political usefulness of education. Napoleon, for example, laid down 
as one basis of education 'la fidelite a l'Empereur, a la monarchie 
imperiale, depositaire du bonheur des peuples, et a la dynastie 
Napoleonienne, conservatrice de l'unite de la France et de toutes les 
idees liberales proclamees par les constitutions' (Decree of 17 March 
1808, Titre V, art. 38). This endeavour to gain political support via 
education may be viewed as indoctrination. Subsequent regimes do not 
appear to have regarded education in quite such a 'party political' 
light, even though education was considered a means whereby the social 
order might be maintained without violence, by including in the cur-
riculum teaching on morality and on the values accepted by society. 
However, the need to adapt education to republican principles seems 
to have dominated the legislation of the l 880s. 
Yet other opinions on the purpose of education, some going back 
to antiquity, are today not without significance; i.e. the need to bring 
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up good citizens in general, to teach discipline, devotion to duty, to 
provide character training, and also to train individuals of superlative 
ability to serve and lead the state. Such views have exercised a consider-
able influence on the education systems of Europe, and should not 
wholly be disregarded. To these should perhaps be added, particularly 
from the sixteenth century onwards, the more aristocratic concept of 
the man of culture - a concept regarded by many as outdated, narrow, 
and over-literary, but still able to wield some power over the content 
of the curriculum. 
The question of what should be regarded as culture is of particular 
importance. At a time of greater illiteracy when the teacher was the 
sole purveyor of information, he was viewed with greater respect, and 
the information which he had to convey was accepted accordingly. 
Today, in a period of mass communication, the teacher is only one of 
many providers of information, and his is often considered less relevant 
or interesting than the others', and undoubtedly less up-to-date. 
Whereas, in 1954, only 1 per cent of French households possessed a 
television set, in 1976 the figure had gone up 85.8 per cent. By 1981 
93.1 per cent of French households had a television (9.7 per cent of 
that total owning two or more), and 95.7 per cent of the population 
possessed a radio. The printed word, still the most habitual medium for 
the teacher fared less well, a total of 80 per cent of households possessing 
books, and of those, 22.5 possessing more than 200 in 1981.2 Pop music, 
jazz, science fiction, sport, all these have a claim to be regarded as part 
of any national culture, but are not necessarily so regarded in scholastic 
terms. 
In the last few years, too, education has had to face the challenge 
of the computer age. It is therefore not surprising that the education 
system, influenced by age-old theories, adjusting with difficulty to the 
needs of mass society, finds itself criticized for its conservatism and 
narrowness in relation to what it teaches. Since it is now viewed also as 
a means to social advancement it is criticized for its inadequacies, or, 
more accurately, for its success. On the one hand, it is alleged to block 
the access of the working classes to higher education, in order that the 
necessary work force for the capitalist economy should still be available ;3 
on the other, it is held to transmit the dominant culture from one 
generation to another, which in tum ensures not only the dominance of 
the upper classes (from whom the dominant culture proceeds), but also 
the preservation of the established order .4 
In view of the criticisms made of the system, the uncertainties 
surrounding it, and the hopes ( often disappointed) which it arouses, 
education undoubtedly warrants the political interest with which it is 
now regarded. What follows does not claim to be exhaustive, but is 
an attempt to provide a survey of the essential aspects of the subject. 
While French education has undergone major reforms over the last 
The education system 259 
two decades, some elements in its make-up seem hard to shift, or even 
to reform. In this context, not only education at school and university 
will be considered, but also some of the more intractable problems left 
to present-day educators by centuries of history, notably that of 
centralized administration, and of Catholic education in France. 
(1) The centralized administration? 
The organization of French education owes its present framework to 
Napoleon, although centralizing tendencies may be seen at the end of 
the preceding century. If the French Revolution was unable to put its 
reforms into effect, some of the ideas propounded at that time were 
to be particularly influential. For example, Condorcet's proposals for 
reform in 1792 stated that education should be national (provided 
by the state). Its essential purpose was to give to each citizen the 
possibility of developing his talents to their utmost, in order to render 
effective the political equality recognized by the law. The vicissitudes 
of the Revolution made it impossible to implement these views on a 
large scale, if at all, and it was consequently left to Napoleon to 
interpret them as he saw fit. 
Napoleon devised a system which followed one part of the 
Revolution's principles, whilst wholly neglecting the other. A state 
education system was established, but the need to supply education 
for all was disregarded. Between 1806 and 1808 the universite was 
established which comprised the whole of French education at all 
levels. The monopoly was absolute in theory but in practice left 
primary education and women's education to the church; secondary 
and higher education was Napoleon's main concern, but here too, 
it was possible for private secondary schools to exist, if authorization 
were obtained. 
The state 'monopoly', such as it was, may be said to have consisted 
of two elements: the conferment by the universite alone of all qualifi-
cations, at that time the baccalaureat at the end of secondary 
education, the licence ( either in letters, law or science), the first 
university degree and the doctorat, the post-graduate degree, together 
with the obligation for all teachers to obtain the appropriate qualifi-
cation; the surveillance exercised, not by the state itself, but by the 
universite, in the person of its own officials. Such a surveillance, 
extending over primary schools, secondary schools (whether lycees with 
a six-year course of study or colleges with a less extensive programme) 
and the facultes for higher education, required an administrative 
network to cover the whole country, which was divided up into twenty-
seven5 academies, each headed by a recteur, appointed for five years. 
This official was aided by one or more inspecteurs d'academie and a 
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conseil academique, and his task was to supervise all levels of education 
within his academie. He was directly responsible to the head of the 
universite, the grand-maftre, by whom he was appointed. The grand-
maftre, appointed by the emperor, was himself assisted by a conseil de 
l'universite, the members of which were appointed for life, and a 
number of inspecteurs generaux, whose task was, simply, to inspect 
all levels of teaching. He had at his disposal a wide range of patronage, 
since he appointed to administrative and teaching posts, and all matters 
pertaining to the universite were within his province. 
The purpose of this administrative system was to ensure, as far as 
possible, a high degree of uniformity both in pedagogical and political 
terms. Napoleon was very conscious, after the disuniting effects of the 
Revolution, of the need to weld the country together, and education 
seemed to him to provide the means to that end. This meant inevitably 
that the education system was used for political propaganda. Among 
the bases for teaching required in the university were 'la fidelite a 
l'Empereur, a la monarchie imperiale, depositaire du bonheur des 
peuples, et a la dynastie Napoleonienne . . .' (Decree of 17 March 
1808, Titre V, art. 38). Education, for Napoleon, was essentially a 
political aid, one which would provide him with the educated personnel 
to assist him in the running of his empire, and, at a more general level, 
to provide the state with 'des citoyens attaches a leur religion, a leur 
prince, a leur patrie et a leur famille' (ibid.). 
Overall, the administrative system established by Napoleon was 
retained in the nineteenth century and for a good half of the twentieth. 
At some periods, the conseil de l'universite enjoyed more power (July 
Monarchy), at others the minister of education (the subsequent title 
of the grand-mattre) and the administration (Second Empire). In 
spite of criticisms levelled at the universite's centralized administration 
(less strong than criticisms of the prefectoral system), commentators 
seem to have assumed that its authoritarian origins were not incom-
patible with the more liberal fom_1s of government, and that the latter's 
ethos would prevail. 'Ce grand etablissement eut ses vices, ses lacunes, 
temoignage de ce qu'il y avait de vicieux et d'incomplet dans le regime 
imperial ... Enfin les maximes d'autorite et de centralisation absolue, 
qui caracterisaient tout le gouvemement imperial, tenaient la aussi 
une place exageree et necessairement transitoire' (Guizot, speech 
of 1 February 1836, Archives parlementaires, vol. 100, Paris, Im-
primerie et librairie administratives et des chemins de fer/P. Dupont, 
1899, p. 85). Such optimism seems to have been a little misplaced, 
since the administrative system has remained, while parliamentary 
regimes have come and gone. In this context, it is perhaps worth 
noting the attempts made in the 1880s and 1890s to bring to higher 
education an element of decentralization and independence. This 
initiative began with two decrees of 25 July 1885 which re-affirmed 
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the personnalite morale of the faculties, i.e. their right to accept gifts 
and bequests made to them, and also to receive subsidies from towns, 
departments, communes, etc. all gifts and subsidies to be noted 
under a specific heading at the ministry of education, and to be used 
as the faculties thought desirable. In December of the same year, a 
decree provided for the composition and powers of the representative 
bodies of the faculties: the conseil general des facultes, presided over 
by the recteur and comprising the deans of the faculties, and two 
academics elected from each faculty: the conseil de faculte, composed 
of professors, dealing in general with finance: and an assemblee de 
faculte, comprising all teaching members of the faculty and concerned 
essentially with pedagogical matters. In 1890 the faculties were given 
the responsibility of organizing their own budget, within lirnitations.6 
In April 1893 personnalite civile was bestowed on groups of faculties 
within the same academie, and the crown of the edifice was put in place 
with the law of 10 July 1896, which gave the groups of faculties the 
name of universites but this change of title appears to have altered 
little in fact. 7 In the face of a centralized administrative system, 
covering all aspects of higher education not explicitly mentioned in 
the reforms, the latter had little chance of succeeding, given that their 
terms of reference were so limited. At all events, they seem to have 
remained enough of a dead letter for C. Fouchet, then education 
minister, to have stated in 1966 at the colloque de Caen on higher 
education that the texts of 1885 and 1890 provided adequate 
autonomy if the faculties were capable of profiting therefrom. Yet 
Georges Vedel, an academic of great experience, is of the opinion that 
at the level of higher education, centralization was very much less 
than is commonly supposed. 'La decentralisation et l'autonomie ... ont 
existe sous le regime de ce qu'on appelle, chez ceux qui ne l'ont pas 
connue, l'Universite "napoleonienne". Le ministre etait a l'Universite 
ce que la reine d'Angleterre est a l'Etat britannique: ii signait tout 
et ne choisissait rien. Tout s'y decidait entre universitaires dans les 
conseils nationaux et locaux'8 
It is possible that for academics higher education was less centralized 
than it appeared to be. Yet May 1968 is there to give a totally different 
picture of the administrative system up to that time. 'Virtually no 
powers of decision are in local hands; all administrative decisions, 
all budgetary allocations, all staff appointments, are the exclusive 
prerogative of a distant and faceless bureaucracy in Paris. A French 
university ... works to norms ordained by the centre. All 23 univer-
sities in the country are state-run, on rigidly standardized lines, like a 
government department. The local administrative staff is impotent, 
the students resentful, their mutual relations hostile. Discussion is 
pointless seeing that decisions are taken elsewhere.'9 Even if the 
students held totally erroneous views on the degree of centralization 
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(and the consequent lack of participation) which obtained in French 
education, their views would still have to be taken seriously, as the 
image of itself which the system had conveyed. Yet the substance of 
such opinions received indirect backing from a sociological study which 
indicated that students prior to 1968 were by no means well integrated 
in society. There was little in the way of corporate life as between 
students of one faculty or of another, no encouragement from 
the universities.10 Such problems could well arise from a situation 
where a centralized system made the student feel alienated and 
solitary. 
As a result of May 1968, the Loi d'Orientation was pushed through 
Parliament in an endeavour to reform the education system, where it had 
given cause for complaint. In this context, the centralized administration 
of education was one elemen,t considered by E. Faure to be in need of 
reform. 'La conception napoleonienne de l'Universite centralisee et 
arbitraire est perimee.'11 Whatever the successes and failures of Faure's 
legislation, it must undoubtedly be looked on as a watershed - as a 
conscious effort to roll back the traditions of centuries. Such changes as 
there have been in terms of deconcentration, as well as moves towards 
decentralization, have been introduced since 1968 - and not only since 
1981. The Loi d'Orientation and subsequent legislation will be looked at 
in more detail below (see Section 4), but at this stage, it should be 
sufficient to see how far the present post-Faure system (together with 
the changes that are being introduced by A. Savary) can be considered a 
decentralized one. 
At the present time the ministre de /'education nationale (as he has 
again been called since 1981) is placed at the head of a large army of 
employees (1,121,868 persons in 1984 including 109,948 in private 
education) - teachers, administrators, and ancillary staff of all kinds. 
He is responsible for a budget of nearly 169, 333 million francs, which 
is now the highest budget in the state, and which represents 18 per cent 
of the total. The minister's tasks are many: appointment of officials 
(fonctionnaires), which includes teachers, decisions regarding organis-
ation and policy ( this is of particular importance since legislation concern-
ing education tends to be of the loi cadre variety, which indicates the 
general lines to be followed, and leaves the ministry to work out its 
practicalities and interpretations), the signing of official documents. He 
presents and defends his budget and his policies to parliament. He must 
also receive deputations from unions and other organizations, give inter-
views, press conferences and the like. He has, to assist him in his decision-
making, a body which he can consult, the Conseil superieur de 
!'education nationale (CSEN). This comprises a maximum of twelve 
ex-officio members, representatives of the ministry; the unions and 
other interested bodies have at least thirteen representatives, and there 
are twenty-five elected members from the teaching profession and five 
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from private education. While it is a consultative body, although the 
minister is free to reject its advice, it also acts where necessary as an 
appeal court in disciplinary matters. 
The education minister chooses his own immediate advisers (his 
cabinet), which ceases to exist when he himself resigns. The ministry 
received its reorganization in the spring of 1982. There is no longer a 
central directorate by which all other directorates are controlled. As 
before, the inspection generale has direct access to the cabinet, as do 
the various missions. A number of directorates have been made common 
to all parts of the ministry. The emphasis on the unified nature of the 
ministry seems to allow for greater access to the cabinet (see Figure 6.1). 
The one exception to be made here concerns higher education. From 
1974, when it became first an independent secretariat d'etat, and later a 
ministry in its own right, higher education was removed from the orbit 
of the education ministry - at least in theory. It could have been 
thought that this could have reduced the degree of centralization, but 
it simply put two heads at the top of the administrative pyramid, which 
did not necessarily make for efficiency in the event of disagreements 
over policy.12 Higher education was re-attached to the education ministry 
in 1981 (whilst still separate geographically in the rue Dutot), with a 
general directorate overseeing the work of the four directorates and one 
service. 
The education minister may also have a secretary of state, with or 
without clearly defined attributions, as the minister sees fit. In the case 
of the present secretaire d'etat, R.-G. Schwartzenberg, some specific 
duties have been allotted: buildings and equipment at school and uni-
versity level, international affairs, cultural action, and environment as it 
relates to education. There is also a proviso that he may deal with any 
other matter entrusted to him (Decree no. 83-305, 14 April 1983). 
As in the time of Napoleon, an administrative network covers the 
whole of France, which provides for the passing down of ministerial 
directives to all levels. There are now twenty-seven academies (including 
Corsica - a separate academie since 1975) each with a recteur as its 
head (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3). The recteur, appointed by the govern-
ment, is the minister's representative in the academie; he passes on 
ministerial instructions to the relevant areas, and sees that they are 
carried out. He also acts as the minister's informant, as to what 
problems have arisen as a result of decisions implemented; his opinion 
may be sought by the minister, and he may make suggestions to the 
latter when appointments are to be made. It is his task to supervise 
all state schools, and private schools under contract in his academie, 
in terms of teaching, administration and finance. He is assisted in 
his task by inspecteurs d'academie, one for each departement within 
the academie. At academie level, his role is similar to that of the 
recteur, in that he passes on orders from the recteur and the minister. 
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He, too, provides information to his superiors as required. His role 
at primary level is particularly important, where it is his task not only 
to suggest appointments, but also to assess and mark the primary 
school teachers. In this task, he is assisted by inspecteurs departemen-
taux. 
Thus it is that an element of supervision which is organized from 
the centre covers the whole of the education system, and gives to the 
top of the pyramid (the minister) apparently wide powers.13 
In 1976, a measure of deconcentration changed somewhat the role 
of both recteur and inspecteur d'academie. (Deconcentration may be 
defined as the transfer of decision-making from central to local level, 
whereas decentralization implies a transfer of powers and finances to 
elected local representatives.) The recteur was deputed by the central 
authority to decide on the posting of instituteurs, pupil-teachers and 
teachers in the ecoles normales (teacher training institutions), the carte 
scolaire for secondary education. (The carte scolaire - school map - is 
essentially the educational geography of France, whereby the appropriate 
number of school places are provided each academic year, and where 
necessary, in terms of population and environment, extra schools.) It 
was further provided that the following powers should pass from recteur 
to inspecteur d'academie: appointment of instituteurs, and designation 
of teaching posts and supplementary teaching hours in the colleges. 
On the other hand, the powers of the recteur have been modified 
since the Loi d'Orientation in respect of higher education. He has become 
chancelier of the university in his academie. The existence of an elected 
university president has reduced the scope of his activities, but he still 
has powers to alter the university budget if it does not meet with either 
his, or the ministry's approval (see Decrees of 14 June 1969 and 5 August 
1970), although this will almost certainly change with the application 
of the loi Savary of21 December 1983. 
Before going on to describe the attempts to alter this state of affairs 
since 1981, it will perhaps be helpful to indicate some of the conse-
quences produced by more than a century and a half of centralization, 
to show what the present government is up against. 
First of all, the heads of schools, with whom the administration 
communicates, are themselves likely to be as much administrators as 
teachers, if not more so. Administration is considered an essential part 
of their duties which they are not permitted to shirk (see on this point 
Le Monde of 18 May 1978, on the suspension ofV. Ambite,head ofa 
college at Cassis (Bouches-du-Rhone) caused at least in part by his 
unwillingness to act as an administrator. The same thing applies to the 
lycees where the triumvirate of proviseur, censeur and intendant is 
essentially an administrative one. (It is worth noting on this last point 
that the Rapport Prost on the possible reform of the lycees (p. 197) 
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of proviseur for a limited period of time, part of the training to include 
a period of work experience as a censeur. 
This administrative predominance has a considerable effect on 
teachers too. While they may hope to be sent to a specific area and to a 
specific type of school, there is no guarantee that their aspirations will 
be realized (see the example given by S. Citron, L 'Ecole bloquee, p. 22 
and M. Lemoine, 'LEP story' inAutrement, September 1981). A further 
problem, which secondary school teachers (those with the CAPES quali-
fication) have to face is the fact that the post to which they are appointed 
may be very far from home - as much as 600 kilometres. This can 
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cause not only added expense, for travelling and extra accommodation, 
but possible dangers to the family life of those that are married. In conse-
quence, they often end up feeling that they receive harsher treatment 
than those who have fewer qualifications (see Le Nouvel Obsen,ateur, 
25 September-I October 1982, open letter to A. Savary). 
There is also the question of inspection which has of late aroused 
considerable hostility among teachers, for reasons which an outline of 
the procedures applying until recently should make clear. Teachers 
would receive a mark not only from the head of their school (la note 
administrative) for their general attitude, punctuality, conscientiousness 
etc., but also a mark from the inspectorate for pedagogical competence, 
which seemed to many teachers to mean simply the extent to which the 
teacher followed the 'ministerial line'. (See N. Delanoe, La Faute a 
Voltaire p. 20.) The impression was often given that the inspector was 
trying to catch the teacher out by arriving without warning. The long-
term consequences on a teacher's career could be considerable, deter-
mining whether promotion would be fast or slow, and an unfavourable 
inspection could also prove a stumbling-block for any teacher seeking 
work. 
Since the left came to power, the government has to some extent had 
its hand forced on this issue, notably by the SGEN-CFDT. A national 
campaign first to refuse, and in due course to bring about the abolition 
of inspection in its existing form, was begun. The SGEN wished to 
replace old-style inspection with, on the one hand, assessment of teaching 
in groups (equipes collectives) and on the other, self-assessment. The 
minister's reaction (see Le Monde, 12 May 1982) was to admit that 
changes were necessary, that existing arrangements were unsuited to the 
present situation, whilst maintaining them provisionally. The two notes 
would continue to be decisive in promotion and changes of post for 
agreges and certifies ( the most highly qualified of secondary school 
teachers) in 1982. Yet the possibility of a teacher's refusing inspection 
was recognized; those teachers who did refuse would be given a note 
d'attente of 12/20 unless their previous marks were lower, in which 
case these would be registered. Later in the year (28 October 1982) the 
need for change was re-emphasized, and the ministry promised that 
there would be a revision of inspection procedures at the end of the 
year. In the meantime teachers who wished for inspection were to 
request it. One other change to be introduced was a more open form of 
recruitment with candidatures to be sent for consideration to a com-
mission composed of both teachers and inspecteurs-generaux. 
Finally in January 1983 (see Le Monde, 21 January 1983), the 
proposed changes were consolidated. Whilst individual inspection and 
assessment was maintained, it was now to be preceded by visits of the 
inspectors to the school and specific class to gain an overall picture of 
the school's objectives. Teacher would in future have the right to reply 
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to the inspector's report, and there was also the right of appeal in the 
event of a lower mark. Where teachers refused inspection, and no note 
pedagogique could be made, it would adversely affect the total mark, 
and possible promotion. 
Other areas where administrative centralization have intervened not 
wholly successfully, are those of time-table and size of classes. The 
imposition of a fixed number of classes, without reference to the abilities 
of the children concerned led not only to rigidity, but also to unreason-
ably long hours for children.14 Earlier attempts to liberalize this state of 
affairs at ministerial level proved to be both difficult, and ponderous. 
An example of this can be seen in a circular published in the Bulletin 
officiel on l September 1977. The then education minister, R. Haby, 
stated that in future the organization of school work would not be 
decided at national level, provided certain norms were respected, i.e. 
school work should, in term-time, occupy a minimum of five mornings 
per week, a minimum of two and maximum of four afternoons per week. 
This meant that a school head could, after obligatory consultations 
with other school heads and other interested persons, decide whether 
to leave Saturday or Wednesday free of classes. A further innovation 
was the reduction of each lesson from 55 to 50 minutes, the extra five 
minutes to be used by the teacher to become better acquainted with his 
or her pupils. 
The question of time-table is very closely linked with administrative 
norms for class numbers, the so-called grille Guichard, in primary 
schools. Theoretically, primary school classes were not supposed to 
have more than twenty-five pupils, but in practical terms this was not 
so because of the global norms imposed. For example, if a primary 
school wanted to have four classes, it had to have at least ninety pupils; 
if not, one class would automatically be closed. A primary schqol popu-
lation of 120 pupils was necessary in order to obtain a supplementary 
class. The grille Guichard has now been abolished, which should allow 
a greater degree of initiative. Yet this kind of problem is still found in 
other areas, for example, in the lycees, where the norm of forty pupils 
per class still obtains. 
One further effect of the centralized system is an enduring respect 
for the hierarchy of seniority and qualification. It has been alleged that 
in the past, an agrege would invariably gain a better note from the 
school head than a less qualified colleague for that very reason (see 
Delanoe, op. cit., pp. 19-20). Another indication is to be found in the 
difference in salary between teachers according to qualification (see 
Table 6.1), not surprising in itself, but coupled at present with the fact 
that the higher the qualification, the lower the number of hours required. 
The situation thus arises that the lowest paid have the heaviest time-
tables.15 
Up to this point, we have looked at specific questions exemplifying 





Professeur de C.E.T. 
Professeur certifie 
Professeur agrege 
Professeur agrege hors classe ou 
de chaire superieure 
Maftre assistant de 2eme classe 
Maftre assistant de lere classe 
Professeur d'universite de 2eme classe 
Professeur d 'universite de 1 ere classe 




































Complement indicaire maximum lie 
a l'exercice d'une fonction, quel 
que soil le grade de l'enseignant 
Directeur d'ecole 
(nouveau regime): 259,63 
Directeur d'etablissement 
specialise: 588,50 
Directeur adioin t charge 
de section d 'education 
specialisee; 
Principal de college: 
Proviseur de L.E.P.: 
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the problems posed by administrative centralization, together with 
solutions and proposals made by the present government. While there is 
certainly a liberalizing tendency in the action of the government, it 
could not be termed radical. Yet there is no doubt of the government's 
wish to reorganize education on a decentralized basis. One proof of this 
is the report by L. Soubre, produced at the government's request, on 
the decentralization (and democratization) of the education system. 
The Rapport Soubre proposes autonomy in several areas: (1) in that of 
teaching - within the limits imposed by the maintenance of national 
qualifications; (2) administrative and financial autonomy, with the 
removal of a priori financial control from the centre; (3) autonomy in 
terms of organization via three sets of conseils. These are: a tripartitie 
conseil d'etablissement composed of representatives of 'school users' 
(parents, pupils, etc.), of the state, and of elected local authorities, to 
vote on the budget and school policy (projet d'etablissement) amongst 
other things; conseils d'enseignement, where a collective pedagogical 
approach would be worked out, and the conseils de classe. Lycee and 
college pupils would have responsibility, and would be encouraged to 
exercise it. The chef d'etablissement would not necessarily be the 
president of the conseil d'etablissement, and his role would be altered 
in relation to the greater degree of autonomy available to the other 
partners involved. 
These suggestions must also be seen in the light of the government's 
wish to introduce administrative decentralization into local government. 
While the laws of 2 March 1982 and 7 January 1983 lay down respect-
ively the principle of self-government and the transfer of power, it is 
the law of 22 July 1983 which enters into the details of how education 
will be decentralized (not later than January 1986). 
Essentially, it is provided that primary schools will be the concern of 
the communes, colleges of the departements, and lycees and establish-
ments providing specialized education of the regions, whether in relation 
to the carte scolaire, construction, maintenance,financing,orrunning of 
schools. The state will merely provide money for 'educational expenses': 
(machine-tools, audio-visual equipment, and the like). 
As for finances, the region will receive an annual dotarion regi,onale 
d'equipement scolaire, to be apportioned out in relation to the region's 
school-age population; the departement will be treated in a like manner, 
receiving a dotation globale d 'equipement from the interior ministry. 
Neither region nor departement will have the power to create teaching 
posts. Yet the maire will have some power of decision over matters such 
as school buses, school hours and the use of school facilities outside. 
school hours. There will also be created, in each academie and departe-
ment, conseils de !'education nationale, whose tasks and composition 
have not yet been determined. 
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the role of the recteur 
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should change very considerably. From being the decision-maker, he is 
presumably intended to become an adviser and a negotiator between 
the different bodies which will then be in existence. 
Since the education system in this area, as in others, is in a state of 
flux, given the changes in prospect, it is difficult to come to any firm 
conclusion. Yet, where attempts are made to decentralize, there is a 
temptation to create too many bodies, whether decision-making or 
consultative. This case is no exception. It could indeed be asked how 
teaching can be done, how decisions can be taken when so very many 
people must be consulted, and whether the disease of reunionnite ( excess 
of meetings) may not drag the experiment to a halt. 
Nor is it at all clear that all will equally approve of so much power 
being removed from the centre. The FEN, for example, has already 
declared its intention of opposing decentralization as far as it concerns 
private schools - admittedly a special issue (see Le Monde, 7 January 
1984). The possibilities of disputes between differing groups involved 
in the conseil d'etablissement is not unlikely16 (see L 'Ecole liberatrice, 
25 September 1982). 
While there was certainly enough criticism of the old system to make 
it clear that there should be enough good will to enable the new one to 
succeed, there is no doubt that the infant decentralization faces dangers 
on either side. It could fail because of in-fighting between the various 
groups involved in participation; it could fail through the cumbersome 
nature of its institutions. If either of these tum out to be the case, there 
is still a wealth of experience of administrative centralization, and a 
centuries-old tradition, to drag it back in the opposite direction.17 
Finally, it cannot be denied that the initiative of the minister limited 
though it may sometimes be by pressure groups, is still all-important in 
the determination of policy. 
(2) Church and state: Catholic education in France 
This question goes back beyond the Revolution of 1789, to the France 
of the Ancien Regime, when the Catholic church and the French state 
were closely intertwined. One of the former's recognized and tra-
ditional duties was education, of which it had virtually sole charge. 
During the Revolution, this task was taken away from the church, 
which suffered greatly from persecution and eventual suppression. 
The Revolution had laid down the principle that it was the state's 
duty to provide national education, which implied that in the future 
France would be a secular state, with a correspondingly secular 
education. 
Although Napoleon distrusted intellectuals, and felt that education 
could be dangerous, he nevertheless had a clear idea of its value as an 
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inculcator of political values, and of the consequent need of a body 
of suitably trained teachers. 'Il n'y aura pas d'Etat politique fixe, 
s'il n'y a pas un corps enseignant avec des principes fixes' (Napoleon, 
Pensees politiques et sociales18 p. 213). The church was excluded from 
the monopoly which he established in secondary and higher education 
( except for institutions known as petits seminaires in which novices 
were prepared for the priesthood). This is not to say that the church 
had lost all influence; Napoleon was prepared to entrust to it those 
areas which he did not consider important -- namely, primary edu-
cation and the education of women. Yet the whole, paradoxically, 
formed part of the universite, under state supervision. A thoroughly 
secular state however was not established, since the church was useful 
to Napoleon as a factor of social and political stability, even although 
it had been much disorganized and weakened by the Revolution. By 
the terms of an agreement between France and the papacy (the 
Concordat of 1802), the Catholic church was reorganized and re-
integrated into French society. Religion as such was by no means 
excluded from schools; according to the Decree of 17 March 1808 
(Titre V, art. 38), which established the universite, it was required of 
all schools comprised therein that the precepts of the Catholic religion 
should form part of the curriculum. Yet the church, by the terms of the 
Concordat, was placed in a position of subservience to the state, its 
paymaster, the clergy now being salaried state officials. Even then, 
Napoleon still felt that organized religion, in its internationalism, could 
present a danger to his regime. From this deliberate exclusion of the 
church from secondary and higher education, and the church's unwilling-
ness to accept it, was to come a reaction against the state's 'monopoly', 
claiming freedom of education, freedom here meaning not only the 
right of the private individual, but also of the church, to have their own 
schools. 
In spite of the inherent anti-clericalism of Napoleon and of the 
system which he established, the church was not in fact excluded as 
much as he would have wished.19 This situation also applied during the 
Bourbon restoration to an even more marked degree; the same system 
was maintained with some modifications, whilst the church was 
permitted to infiltrate it. "This close alliance between throne and altar, 
redolent of the Ancien Regime, raised such feeling that when the 
restoration fell, the church, its strong supporter, found itself politically 
compromised. 
The July Monarchy saw the first innovation in terms of primary 
education with the Loi Guizot of 1833, which also changed relations 
between church and state in this area. The change lay in the fact that 
state primary schools were to be established. Yet private individuals 
also were allowed to open primary schools if they could prove that 
they were suitably qualified and of good conduct and morality. This 
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law is of interest, for, while on the one hand it represents an inroad of 
the state into primary education, hitherto always regarded as a pre-
rogative of the church, it also marked a departure from the principle 
of state monopoly into the beginnings of dualism, with the co-existence 
of private and state schools. However in all primary education, a 
marked emphasis was put on religious and moral instruction, which, 
in the legislator's view was of great importance. 'Par !'instruction 
morale et religieuse, ii pourvoit deja a un autre ordre de besoins tout 
aussi reels que les autres, et que la Providence a mis dans le coeur du 
pauvre, comme dans celui des heureux de ce monde, pour la dignite 
de la vie humaine et la protection de l'ordre social' (Guizot, Moniteur 
universe/, 3 January 1833). Religion, and hence the church, still had 
a part to play in the maintenance of social stability, and the co-oper-
ation of the cure was necessary for this. The law stated that he or the 
local protestant pasteur should be a member of the comite de surveil-
lance of the local state primary school, which would give him some 
influence in its affairs, and, it was hoped, prevent him from setting 
up his own school in opposition. In reality, the instituteur (primary 
school teacher) tended to be very much at the beck and call of the 
cure (see G. Duveau, Les lnstituteurs, Paris, Seuil, 1961). This compro-
mise did not please the catholics, who had to accept that even at 
primary level, children could not be forced to receive religious 
instruction against their parents' wishes. Morality also was no longer 
wholly the domain of the church, since a form of philosophy, known 
as 'eclecticism' was also taught, which admitted the existence of God, 
but arrived at this concept by reasoning, and not by an acceptance of 
revealed truth; it also professed a number of fundamental truths taken 
from various currents of philosophic thought. Catholics, who con-
sidered such teaching to be atheistic, objected to it. Nor was this their 
only grievance: although they had gained their 'freedom' in primary 
education by virtue of the Loi Guizot, secondary education remained 
out of reach, since it changed little during the July Monarchy. 
The freedom sought by Catholics did not come to secondary edu-
cation until after the 1848 revolution. It then became clear to the 
governing classes that the church provided an excellent means of 
keeping the masses in check, and was therefore a useful ally. The 
outcome. was the Loi Fal/oux of 1850; by its terms, the freedom 
provided at primary level by the Loi Guizot was extended to secondary 
education, which gave Catholics their chance. In other ways too, this 
law provided for greater Catholic influence via academic councils at 
departmental and national level. During the first decade of the Second 
Empire this legislation permitted a substantial expansion in Catholic 
education.20 Although in the second decade it was thought advillable to 
curb this, French education was split in two ways as a result of the Loi 
Falloux, a consequence which was to have its effect later in the century. 
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Yet it cannot be asserted that this legislation was universally 
acceptable to Catholic opinion.21 For the most extreme, it did not 
go far enough, since it did not reinstate Catholic education to the 
exclusion of all else, nor did it allow freedom in higher education. 
This last was not achieved until the law of 12 July 1875 was passed 
the final triumph of the nineteenth-century dualist system. 
Thus, during the nineteenth century the church was viewed as an 
element of social and political conservation, even if its motives were 
sometimes distrusted. Although Catholic opinion contained some 
liberal elements, it was mainly conservative (whether moderate or 
extreme) and consequently tended to support conservative govern-
ments. The Third Republic, in its earlier years, had to face an un-
reconciled church which would have favoured a return to a form of 
monarchy more likely, in its views, to favour Catholic interests. 
An education system, of which a large part was Catholic, represented 
therefore a political threat to the republic, which was already weakened 
by the ideological split fostered by the effects of the Loi Falloux. 
The legislation undertaken by Jules Ferry in the 1880s was the logical 
answer to the republic's problems. This made primary education 
secular, obligatory from age six to thirteen, and free of charge. If 
parents wished their children to receive religious instruction, it was 
for them to arrange this out of school hours, although moral instruc-
tion still was a high priority on the curriculum. The secular principle 
(lai'cite) was thus assured in state education, although teaching orders 
wishing to continue their work in France were required to obtain 
authorization in 1886. Relations between church and state did not 
improve up to the beginning of this century, when, between 1901 
and 1904 all teaching orders were banned, and in 1905, the separation 
of church and state was enacted. This simply did away with Napoleon's 
Concordat (apart from Alsace-Lorraine, which, as a German territory 
in 1905 was not subject to French legislation, and to this day is still 
under the regime concordataire ). The French state was now totally 
neutral as between one religion and another, its only duty being to 
ensure freedom of conscience. The clergy were no longer state salaried 
officials, nor was the choice of bishops in any way the state's concern; 
church buildings reverted to the state but could still be used for 
religious worship. This legislation was hotly contested by Catholic 
opinion, and by the papacy itself, although in the long run it was of 
benefit to the church, and the issue ceased to be politically explosive. 
The issue of Catholic education however remained controversial 
during the inter-war period, with the Vatican solemnly denouncing the 
neutral or secular school as irreligious in the encyclical Divini fllius 
Magistri of 1929. During the Second World War, the Vichy regime 
clearly indicated its support for the church in 1940 by re-introducing 
optional religious instruction in state schools, by lifting the ban 
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(hitherto more honoured in its breach than in its observance) on the 
religious teaching orders, and by the provision of state aid for private 
schools, either via the communes or via grants to pupils from private 
or state schools. The Catholic church's involvement, particularly that 
of the hierarchy, with Vichy 22 was to prove an embarrassment after 
the liberation, since it yet again made the adherence of the church to 
the principle of republicanism suspect, in so far as the church seemed 
once more to have given way to an instinctive predilection for authori-
tarian regimes. However, the precedents set by Vichy in state aid to 
private schools were to have a second birth during the Fourth Republic, 
and were to be politically very divisive. The Loi Marie and the Loi 
Barange of September 1951 provided respectively credits for the edu-
cation minister to award to the most deserving pupils attending either 
state or private secondary schools, with priority for the former, and al-
located a special amount at the treasury for parents with children at-
tending state or private school (1,000 old francs per child per term). This 
legislation was opposed by communists, socialists and some Radicals 
and was supported by Gaullists, some Radicals and the MRP. The 
Loi Barange in particular aroused great hostility, and an attempt was 
made to repeal it in 1956, which failed by only nine votes. By 1958, 
over one and a half million pupils were attending private schools, of 
which the substantial majority were Catholic.23 
The Fifth Republic went further towards a dualist system with 
the Loi Debre of 1959 which offered to private schools a number of 
alternatives, in which aid would be made available (or not) according 
to the choice made. A school could opt: 
(a) for complete integration into the state system - becoming thus a 
state school, and the teachers state employees; 
{b) for the contrat simple, whereby the state not only approves the 
appointment of teachers, but pays their salaries (initially this 
alternative was conceived as a provisional one); 
(c) for the contrat d'association, whereby the state pays teachers, 
and also contributes to the school's running costs, based on the 
number of pupifs (forfait d'externat). A school opting for this 
arrangement had to accept directives about timetable, curriculum, 
etc., as well as supervision in teaching methods and finance from 
the administration; 
( d) for total liberty, in which case no subsidy was provided. 
The law caused much controversy, being opposed by the parties 
of the left and also by the Comite national d'action lai'que (CNAL). 
However, de Gaulle threatened the dissolution of the assemblee 
nationale if the proposed legislation were not passed, and this was 
sufficient to get it through both houses with a substantial majority. 
In spite of secular oppositiop to it, there was something essentially 
ambiguous about the Loi Debre. On the one hand, it gave the state 
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the chance to take over private schools; but on the other, it gave the 
private sector the opportunity to profit financially from state resources 
whilst still retaining its separate identity. In I 965 the Loi Debre paid 
out in teachers' salaries the sum of 1,035,800 NF - a sum far greater 
than that provided by earlier legislation.24 
However, in 1971, G. Pompidou personally imposed a solution to 
the provisional nature of some aspects of the Loi Debre, not only on 
parliament, but on his prime minister, J. Chaban-Delmas, apparently 
more favourable tu secularist views. The cuntrat simple, initially 
envisaged as a temporary measure, was made permanent for Catholic 
primary schools and the contrat d'association in the secondary schools. 
After 1979, the contrat simple was no longer to be permitted to the 
latter. The result of this was that by 1982 98 per cent of prim~ry 
schools were under contract (78 per cent contrat simple, 21.5 per cent 
contrat d'association), whereas all secondary schools now have the 
contrat d'association (see C. Vial in Le Monde, 26 January 1982). It is 
equally worth noting that secular private schools have in the main chosen 
to remain independent. Consequently, when between 9 and 10 per cent 
of the 1984 budget Gust over 18,188 million francs)isdevoted to private 
education under a government committed to its absorption into the 
state system, it is almost exclusively Catholic education which benefits. 
Although over ten million signed the CNAL petition against the loi 
Debre in 1960, a decrease in feeling against the law seemed to go hand in 
hand with a waning of church influence, particularly in the urban and in-
dustrial areas. Yet the parties of the left, the teaching unions in the FEN 
(Federation de /'education nationale) and other pressure groups main-
tained a fairly consistent hostility to the Fifth Republic's subsidizing of 
private schools, with the promise of changes when the left came to power. 
'Le benefice des lois laiques sera etendu a tout le territoire (y compris 
Alsace-Moselle). Des la premiere legislature, les etablissement prives ... 
percevant les fonds publics seront en regle generate nationalises.' 25 How-
ever the left's hostility to private education has given rise, over the past 
eight years or so, to a good deal of political embarrassment. 
The municipal elections of 1977 brought the left to power in many 
areas, and educational policies at local level were re-framed in conse-
quence. In particular, the cutting off of credits required by law for 
private schools (see LeMonde, 17 June and 7 September 1977)26 seemed 
ominously like the shape of things to come, in the event of a left-wing 
victory in 1978. There was also the added embarrassment of the so-called 
Rapport Mexandeau, proposed socialist policy on education, which had 
to be toned down, lest its views on the future of private education 
alienate both party members and the electorate at large. In September 
1977, therefore, the PS issued a directive to all its municipal representa-
tives not to cut off subsidies to private schools without negotiation. 
With the left thus having to 'back-pedal', as it were, on the issue, 
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G. Guermeur, RPR deputy for Finistere, and president of the parlia-
mentary association for freedom of education (APLE), seized his 
opportunity. The law of October 1977 (Loi Guermeur) provides for 
state loans at reduced interest for the building of private secondary 
schools and of workshops required by the reforme Haby; and improve-
ment in the calculation of the forfait d'extemat; financial aid from the 
state for the training of teachers, who would henceforth be the respon-
sibility of the heads of private schools. The state would thus have less 
control than before, whilst paying substantially more. The cost of these 
measures was reckoned at the time to be in the order of 800 million 
francs. 
In spite of the left's low profile on the issue at this time, the law was 
calculated to arouse hostility on the part of the parliamentary parties 
the FEN and the Federation des conseils de parents d'eleves des ecoles 
publiques (FCPE). Its then president, J. Comee, took the view that the 
loi Guermeur was yet another stage in the long war waged by the 
Catholic hierarchy against France's national education (see J. Comee, 
'Libres opinions', Le Monde, 7 July 1977). Neither the FCPE nor the 
FEN have changed their views in the intervening years, in spite of a 
change of leadership,27 and both, together with the CNAL and other 
pressure groups, clearly expected swift changes when the left gained 
power in 1981. However, there was clearly a determination on the part 
of the new government to take no precipitate action, since Mitterrand 
had expressed the wish to bring about a unification of the education 
system but only through negotiation. First of all, the expected choice 
of L. Mexandeau as education minister was not made. Instead the post 
went to A. Savary, regarded as more diplomatic. 
Savary proceeded with caution; it was not until January 1982 that 
he instituted discussions with all the interested parties on the future of 
private education, with a view to bringing about its absorption. These 
consultations lasted about a year, during which there were not only 
public demonstrations both for and against private education but also 
much discussion in the press. 
On 20 December 1982 Savary revealed his plan, composed of six 
main proposals. (1) The private schools wishing to receive continued 
subsidy must accept their own inclusion in the carte scolaire. This would 
mean that a subsidized private school could only in future be opened 
where there was a recognized need for one, and it would be the state 
who would make the appropriate decisions. Any school unwilling to 
accept these arrangements would have its contract annulled, and lose all 
subsidy. (2) Parents with children at state schools would no longer be 
subject to sectorisation, i.e. be compelled to send their children to the 
nearest one. There would thus be a choice for these parents also ( enjoyed 
before only by parents with children at private schools) from amongst 
all the schools, both state and subsidized schools in a given area. (3) The 
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financial arrangements would be the same for both kind of school. 
(4) The incorporated private schools would have an altered legal status, 
becoming either singly or in groups, etablissements d 'interet public (EIP). 
There would be a tripartite conseil d'administration, composed of rep-
resentatives of the state, the local authority, and the association govern-
ing the private school. (5) There would be a measure of autonomy over 
the plan to be drawn up on educational, cultural and religious matters. 
(6) Teachers and some administrators in the private sector in a situation 
not unlike their counterparts in the state system could be assimilated 
into the state categories. This would give them benefits in terms of 
pension and tenure; and both private and state teachers could teach in 
these integrated private schools. 
In many ways, this was not an illiberal set of proposals; it was also 
intelligently engineered to appeal to parents on both sides of the argu-
ment, both of whom could benefit from the freedom of choice provided. 
Yet there was too an element of compulsion, in the sense that schools 
refusing Savary's offer would be bereft of the state help accorded to 
them over the years. Thus it was clearly hoped that there was enough in 
the proposals to appeal to both sides. 
In fact they were satisfactory to very few. Whereas opponents of 
private education felt that the plan, though a compromise one, was 
worth discussing, the leaders of Catholic education, members of the 
Comite national de l'enseignement catholique (CNEC), took the view 
that the proposals did away with freedom in education, and would 
endanger the caractere propre (individuality) of Catholic private edu-
cation. In consequence, on 9 January 1983 they refused to negotiate 
until further guarantees were provided on these points. Savary's response 
to this was to put off negotiations ( 13 January 1983) for the time being, 
presumably to allow time to let the dust settle before the municipal 
elections to be held in March of that year. 
There, to all appearances. the matter rested until October 1983, when, 
after many private discussions, Savary tried again. On this occasion he 
tried a different tack, drawing up a calendar of negotiations with three 
groups of problems, the easiest to be dealt with first, the most difficult 
to be left to the end. These problems, all to be resolved by 1986, were 
to be negotiated on the basis of three principles: equality of educational 
opportunity, freedom of conscience, and freedom of education. It was 
also intended that any reforms arrived at should relate both to state and 
private education, in an endeavour to bring about subsequent harmon-
ization. The Catholics grudingly indicated their willingness to negotiate 
on some of the points, but this time it was the turn of the /ai'cs, the 
CNAL in the van, to refuse, since there was now no clear indication 
that there would in the long run be total absorption, but, rather, a dualist 
solution, and thus a climb-down on the part of the government. 
Savary, however, who is known to have the support of Mitterrand in 
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his reforming intentions (see C. Arditti in Le Monde, 20 December 
1983) announced (21 December 1983) his intention of negotiating on 
concrete proposals most concerning those who were prepared to enter 
into negotiation with him. The fruit of these discussions is a draft bill 
approved by the council of ministers, 18 April 1984, and which will 
shortly be put to the Assemblee nationale. The proposed legislation 
resurects the concept of the EIP to which private schools must belong 
in order to have a contrat d 'association ( the contrat simple ceasing to 
exist) with the State. However there is explicit reference to the need for 
liberty of conscience to be respected, and provision is made for continued 
financial assistance, either by local authorities or the State. It can thus 
be said that the dualist system of education in France is maintained. 
Yet on the other hand, there is a possibility for private school teachers 
to become fonctionnaires, and for teachers from the State system to 
teach in private schools under contract. This matter is of great concern 
to the CNEC since there is a fear that if private school teachers are 
given tenure in this way, they will escape from the control of Catholic 
education, they will be replaced in due course by state teachers, and 
absorption, for being gradual, will be no less real. It is debatahle, in spite 
of Savary's efforts, whether genuine compromise is possible. It should 
be remembered that the three principles on which Savary wished to 
base his negotiations of October 1983 can, if interpreted from the 
standpoint of Catholicism or from that of laidte, be mutually exclusive. 
One thing is sure: those who, a few years ago, were sure that anti-
clericalism was dying out have been proved painfully wrong.28 
The question must be asked as to why this should be? If it is clear 
that Catholicism, as a religious force, is losing ground in France, and 
statistics seem to bear out this assertion,29 what have the /ai'cs to fear? 
A British reader, accustomed to debates on the relative merits of 
comprehensive or grammar schools, might be tempted to take the issue 
out of context, and view it simply as a conflict between the freedom 
of choosing a school, which it is alleged parents should have (freedom 
of education), and the need to avoid a system which maintains a 
privilege which only wealthy parents can exercise (social justice). 
This would partly explain the problem, although it has been asserted 
that in 1974 nearly 30 per cent of pupils in Catholic schools received 
grants, and in some areas the percentage was twice as high. In 1981-2 
there were 195,243 pupils to whom grants were awarded (at secondary 
level) in priv?te schools, out of a total of 1,427,926.30 It is sometimes 
suggested that Catholic schools are merely the instruments of capitalism 
and reactionary employers, but the purpose of Catholic education, 
according to the Roman Catholic church, is totally different: 
'contribuer a la construction d'une monde nouveau nettement oppose a 
une mentalite caracterisee par la recherche du plaisir, de !'obsession de 
l'efficacite et de la tyrannie de la consommation' (Le Monde, 7 July 1977). 
282 The education system 
It could also be said that, although a minority, regularly practising 
Catholics still represent 6 million people, which, when added to the 
4 million who are less regular in attendance, makes up a large conservative 
minority, to be feared by the left. Yet it is in decline, and the left might 
well feel that time is on its side. In the short term, this 'party political' 
aspect may indeed have an effect here. It is possible that Catholic 
schools are more likely to produce, if not practising Catholics, then 
certainly right-wing supporters (see Table 6.2). In an opinion poll pub-
lished in Temoignage chretien (2 March 1978), it transpired that 59 per 
cent of ex-pupils from non-Catholic schools were pro-left and 57 per 
cent from Catholic schools were pro-right. This could in part account 
for the illiberal tendencies to be found on both sides.31 




























Source: C. Peyrefitte, 'Les Choix de 1981 - contrastes du catholicisme', Faire, 
December 1980, p. 48 (adapted) 
There is one more factor, of a practical nature, which may help to 
envenom the issue, the fear felt by partisans of the state system that it 
may be losing custom to its rival. There has arisen an unflattering image 
of state education, which can lead even left-wing activists to sacrifice 
their principles by sending their children to private schools: 'Greves 
trop frequentes, discipline eclatee, violence, resultats aleatoires, et sur-
tout nivellement par le bas: on generalise et on s'affole ... Les parents 
soucieux d'assurer un bon 'ticket' a leur progeniture fuient la supposee 
chienlit du 'public' (D. Granet, 'Ecole: la revanche du prive', inL 'Express 
no. 14 71, 22 September 1979). Yet the statistics do not wholly bear 
out this impression of a 'private take-over'. Since the passing of the loi 
Debre, the overall proportion of school population attending private 
school has declined. From 1958 up to 1976 the percentage of primary 
school pupils attending private school went down from 18.6 per cent to 
15 .9 per cent; and from 1979 to 1982-3 the numbers of popils attending 
private nursery/primary school have gone down by 32,000. It is true 
that this is made up at secondary level: from 1979 to 1982-3, figures 
have gone up by 49,000; and for 1983-4 the figures for all types of 
private secondary education are up on the previous school year from 
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1,060,200 to 1,067,900 (see Le Monde, 8 June 1977, 8 September 
1983). 
Yet the fact remains that the government has a majority; why there-
fore does it hesitate to do what so many of its partisans urge upon it? 
The answer is that these same partisans, however strong their 'gut re-
action'32 are not representative of opinion in the country at large. A 
recent opinion poll conducted by IFOP (see La Croix, 14 December 
1983) makes it clear that 71 per cent of the population is favourably 
disposed to private education, although 62 per cent think ( contrary to 
the Catholic leaders) that it would be normal for private school teachers 
to be fonctionnaires. Whilst 58 per cent and 54 per cent respectively give 
credit to Mitterrand and Savary for trying to bring peace to education, 
only 29 per cent give the same credit to the CNAL. Yet of this same 
group, given the choice of a state or private school near their home, only 
33 per cent would choose the private school. This appears to indicate 
that the French public is favourable to private schools only out of what 
it regards as practical necessity. It further suggests that if more choice is 
provided, and if the state system improves itself and its image, some of 
this support could well fall away. 
In the meantime the government is in a difficult position. From the 
viewpoint of the British onlooker, it might well seem that the vast sums 
of money expended by the state on private education seem hardly fair, 
and that some kind of change is in order. Nevertheless since private 
schools enjoy a measure of national support, it could be thought that 
there are more urgent matters requiring the government's attention. 
Judging by the applause automatically evoked by every reference to 
lafcite at the PS congress held at Bourg-en-Bresse in October 1983 the 
government may find it easier to deal with the Catholics than with its 
own supporters. It is perhaps unfortunate that, of all the large unions, the 
government has closest links with the FEN, which has chosen this 
potentially dangerous issue as its prime consideration. The government 
could almost be said to be a prisoner of its most vociferous partisans 
who force it to make an absolute priority of an issue which cooler 
political calcualtion would undoubtedly put further down the scale. 
(3) Primary and secondary education 
In view of the centralized organization of the French education system, 
the activities of the state have assumed, for well over a century, a 
primordial importance. The French Revolution may be said to have 
laid down the definitive principles for education in France; the sub-
sequent 170-odd years can be viewed as a long, painful and often vain 
endeavour to put them into practice. 
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Initially, it may seem as if little attempt was made in this direction, 
since Napoleon, while adapting the concept of state education to his 
own requirements, neglected the more egalitarian aspects of the 
revolution's educational principles, and his example was followed, with 
some modification, by subsequent governments. 
While it is a fact that the Loi Guizot of 1833 reduced illiteracy ,33 
progress was slow because primary education was not obligatory; nor 
was it free of charge, except for the children of destitute parents. 
This law, apparently of democratic tendencies, was not conceived by 
its author for such a purpose. In his view, education had to be 
appropriate to the social classes; consequently, primary education was 
divided into two parts to suit different strata of society. The first 
level (instruction primaire elementaire) was to be sufficient for the 
lower classes, but the second level (instruction primaire superieure) 
was aimed at 'une partie tres nombreuse de la nation, qui, sans jouir 
des avantages de la fortune, n'est pas non plus reduite a une gene 
severe' (Guizot, speech of 2 January 1833, Archives parlementaires, 
Paris, 1891, vol. 78, p. 465). Secondary education for these strata of 
society, was considered a positive danger, causing many to feel 
dissatisfied with their lot. Its task was to educate the middle classes 
for their role as leaders of society. 'C'est par l'instruction secondaire 
seulement que la classe moyenne peut se preparer aux professions 
liberales, aux industries scientifiques, aux travaux et aux fonctions de 
tout genre qui sont sa vocation naturelle' (Guizot, speech of 1 February 
1836, Archives parlementaires, Paris, 1899, vol. 100, p. 85). 
As long as education was viewed as a positive danger to the social 
order and a source of dissatisfaction, the question of free primary 
schooling was not likely to be a burning issue. The wealthier classes 
could afford to pay, and the poorer classes were not obliged to send 
their children to school. By the end of the Second Empire the idea of 
free education for all had become more widely accepted, and the 
legislation of 1881 was the last step in a series of advances from the 
1860s onwards, when an increasing number of children attended 
school free of charge. This undoubted advance was assisted by the law 
of 1882, which made primary education obligatory for children of both 
sexes from the ages of six to thirteen. There is no doubt that the 
thinking behind these laws was essentially egalitarian, imbued with 
the desire to remove social inequalities by education, which had 
hitherto helped to maintain, rather than reduce, class differences. The 
task before the legislators of the 1880s was, in the words of Jules 
Ferry, the initiator of these reforms, to: 'faire disparaitre la derniere, 
la plus redoutable des inegalites qui viennent de la naissance, l'in-
egalite d'education' (Jules Ferry, speech of 10 April 1870, quoted 
by A. Prost, L 'Enseignement en France, 1800-1967., p. 14). Ferry was 
very much alive to the political consequences of an education system 
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which maintained inequalities since, in his opinion, a genuine equality, as 
opposed to a merely theoretical one, would never be attained without 
the benefit of an adequate education for all. 
Yet the changes brought about by Ferry were not sufficient to 
redress the balance. First of all, while primary education was obligatory 
up to the age of thirteen, and no fees were charged in the state primary 
schools, the parents of any child who wished to continue studying and 
go on to a secondary school had to find the money for school fees, 
since secondary education in state schools was still not free of charge, 
and it was thus more difficult for children of poorer families to benefit 
from further study. The poorer classes were consequently still at a 
disadvantage, however much equality was thought to exist at the 
obligatory primary stage. Moreover, the two areas of education still 
remained distinct, complete in themselves. Each, for example, has its 
own version of the other; primary education had its own type of 
secondary level with the ecoles primaires superieures and the cours 
complementaires, whereas secondary education had its own elementary 
classes - the petites classes of the /ycees. It was not until after the 
First World War that any solution to these problems was envisaged. 
One was financial; between 1929 and 1933, all classes in secondary 
education ceased to be fee-paying. However, this, together with a 
population increase, augmented to such an extent the numbers of 
children wishing to enter secondary education that an entrance 
examination was imposed in 1933-4. 
However, the solution which might have solved the problem of the 
separation of primary and secondary levels was the concept of the 
ecole unique, which proposed a much less rigid barrier between the 
two, either by prolonging the primary stage, or by creating schools 
at an intermediate stage to, as it were, fill the gap. Also, incorporated 
into the concept of the ecole unique was the idea of orientation 
( educational guidance) that a child would receive after primary 
schooling, and before going on to any definitive courses of study. 
Depending on aptitude,· these would be studies in either a lycee, a 
technical school, or workshop. The idea behind these views was demo-
cratic enough: 'Faire en sorte que les distinctions d'origine sociale 
cedent le pas au seul merite, afin que chaque Franc;ais accede a la 
culture sans autre consideration que celle de ses aptitudes.34 
The man who came closest to implementing these views was Jean 
Zay, a Radical, who was minister of education from 1936 to 1939, 
in the government of the Front Populaire and in its successors. His 
proposed reform of 1937 provided for three elements of primary 
education: 
(1) enseignement primaire elementaire 
(2) enseignement primaire complementaire, for those not going on to 
secondary education 
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(3) enseignement post-sco/aire, to be provided for those over fourteen 
years of age attending neither the complementary courses just 
mentioned, nor classes at secondary level. 
The certificat d'etudes primaires (CEP), obtained after examination, 
and normally taken by children aged twelve-plus, could be taken a 
year earlier by those intending to continue their education at secondary 
school, for which it was obligatory. This hurdle overcome, the first 
year of secondary education (6e) was to be characterized by a tronc 
commun (a common syllabus), at the end of which pupils would be 
guided, according to their abilities and to parents' wishes, towards one 
of three courses of study: c/assique, modeme and technique. Since 
the reform also allowed pupils to switch from one section to another 
where this was considered advisable, all three sections had to run 
parallel to each other. 
While the maintenance of the CEP meant that selection was applied, 
this proposed legislation tended to reduce the element of class 
discrimination which had hitherto existed. However, overall reform 
was never discussed in parliament, and Jean Zay was only able to bring 
elements of it into being on an experimental basis, notably the classe 
d'orientation at 6e. 
These innovations had not been forgotten when Rene Capitant 
education minister in the provisional government at Algiers set up a 
commission to consider possible reforms in education. At that time, 
there was a serious preoccupation with the inadequacies of the edu-
cation system as demonstrated not only by the collapse of France in 
1940, but by subsequent collaboration. 
11 semble bien que, si les hommes du peuple, formes par l'ecole 
primaire se sont montres ... admirablement courageux et patients 
pendant la guerre ouverte et la guerre clandestine ... les 'elites', 
compte tenu d'honorables exceptions individuelles, ont montre, 
elles, un manque lamentable de caractere ... Ceux qui pouvaient se 
dire issus des sommets de notre enseignement sont ceux dont la 
lachete a ete la plus eclatante (M. Durry, 'Rapport general sur les 
travaux de la commission pour la reforme de l'enseignement', 
Bulletin officiel du ministere de /'education nationale, I 6 November 
1944, p. 13). 
The paradox of this state of affairs was thought to lie in the nature of 
French secondary education, 'enseignement de caste qui continuait a 
maintenir en France une feodalite de l'argent et des charges' (ibid.). 
However, it is from the report of the Langevin-Wallon commission, 
set up by R. Capitant in November 1944, that the definitive plan for 
a renovated education system was to come. It proposed no more than 
two main sections: second degre (higher education) and premier degre, 
that is, compulsory school education from ages six to eighteen, divided 
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into four stages: 
(a) nursery schooling (ecole matemelle); 
(b) a first cycle for children aged six to eleven, with a tronc commun; 
(c) a second cycle (cycle d'orientation) for eleven- to fifteen-year-olds, 
where part of the syllabus would be for all, and part more special-
ized, relating to individual abilities. There would be, in the later 
years, options leading to differing types of education provided 
in the following cycle; 
(d) cycle de determination (for fifteen- to eighteen-year-olds), sub-
divided into: section pratique, for those whose manual competence 
was greater than their intellectual abilities; section professionnelle, 
for those who were likely to form middle management and were 
less biased towards theoretical studies; and the section theorique, 
for those whose abilities were more specifically intellectual, 
whether scientific or literary, and who would take the baccalaureat 
or its equivalent. 
However, it is perhaps less for its proposals which were fairly general, 
and were never implemented, than for its underlying ideology, that 
the Langevin-Wallon report is significant. Its views on the need for the 
democratization of education, based on social justice, have a strong 
affinity with those of Condorcet. Against the current prejudice in favour 
of intellectual pursuits, it also emphasized the equal importance of more 
practical types of work, including manual labour, in an endeavour to 
bring about a change of approach on this issue, thus going beyond the 
usual scope of educational reforms, in its desire to associate education 
and democracy. 
Le travail manuel, l'intelligence pratique sont encore trop souvent 
consideres comme de mediocre valeur. L'equite exige la reconnais-
sance de l'egale <lignite de toutes les taches sociales, de la haute 
valeur technique. Ce reclassement des valeurs reelles est indispen-
sable dans une societe democratique modeme dont le progres et la 
vie meme sont subordonnes a l'exacte utilisation des competences. 
(Commission ministerielle d'etude, La Reforme de l'enseignement, 
Paris, Ministere de l'education nationale, n.d., pp. 8-9.) 
Perhaps the breadth of vision and the idealism shown by the com-
mission account for the lasting prestige of the report amongst those 
wishing to see far-reaching changes in the education system.35 Conse-
quently, later reforms may be regarded as more or less successful 
attempts to implement some of the proposals of Langevin-Wallon. 
There seems little reason to doubt the good will of the Fourth 
Republic in the realm of education, since several vain attempts were 
made to introduce measures of reform (those of E. Depreux in 1948, 
of Y. Delbos in 1949 and J. Berthoin in 1955). One cause for this 
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apparent stagnation was the inherent weakness of coalition govern-
ment, which did not always give a minister sufficient time to work 
out and propose effective measures. Other difficulties related more 
to the opposition of teachers' unions, who felt their interests were 
threatened by changes. This seems to have been in part the reason for 
the failure of the reform bill proposed by Rene Billeres, education 
minister in the government of G. Mollet. The main aim of these 
proposals was to deal with the class discrimination which obtained as 
between primary and secondary education. This problem was clearly 
indicated by the social origins of children entering secondary edu-
cation of whatever kind. Billeres estimated that 13 per cent of the 
children of agricultural workers went on to secondary level, as opposed 
to 21 per cent of industrial workers, 81 per cent management, 86 per 
cent officials and 87 per cent from the liberal professions.36 To meet 
this flagrant inequality, he proposed to extend obligatory education up 
to age sixteen, and perhaps more importantly, to institute middle 
schools (ecoles moyennes). The purpose of these was to do away with 
the sharp line drawn between primary and secondary education, which 
would permit a greater degree of social mobility in that secondary 
education might become less of a purely middle-class prerogative. 
Two years would be spent in these schools. During the first, the 
programme would be common to all pupils; in the second, it would be 
part common to all and part optional, depending on individual abilities. 
The two-year period in the middle schools was designed to prepare 
pupils for subsequent courses of study, whether practical, professional 
or leading to higher education. 
While these proposals might have gone a long way towards solving 
the problem of the inequality in education, they were received with 
hostility by the unions of secondary teachers who did not wish to see 
any link between primary and secondary, where the latter might be 
reduced, to the former's benefit. Such hostility from the unions made 
it difficult for Radicals and socialists, and the government itself, to 
give the proposals strong support, and they were shelved. Clearly any 
attempt to bridge the gap between primary and secondary would have 
to be less than profound, if it were to have any hope of success. 
Such were undoubtedly the conclusions drawn, in the early days 
of the Fifth Republic, by J. Berthoin, who introduced (significantly, 
by decree) in January 1959 a modified version of Billeres's proposals. 
The school-leaving age was increased to sixteen, to come into effect 
in 1967; and the CEP, giving admittance to the lycee, was suppressed. 
The specially created ecole moyenne envisaged by Billeres was rendered 
down into a two-year period (cycle d'observation) of which one term 
only had a teaching programme common to all pupils - to take place 
in whatever school the pupils found themselves. This meant that the 
erstwhile ecole moyenne could be included in secondary education if 
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the teaching took place in a lycee, or in primary if it took place in a 
college d'enseign,ement general; yet it was indicated in the decree 
(article 8) that the courses of study during these two years should 
be as similar as possible. These provisions had the advantage of not 
upsetting the teaching unions, since there could be no suspicion either 
at primary or at secondary level that either side was poaching on the 
other's preserves. They equally had the disadvantage of rendering the 
'bridging' quality of the genuine ecole moyenne null and void, since 
it now remained in one camp or the other. 
Whatever the defects, 'the reform contained seeds of growth that 
could not be impeded'.37 The fact that both primary and secondary 
teachers were involved in the cycle d'observation gave a greater 
possibility for primary teachers to move into the secondary level. 
as professeurs d 'enseignement general des colleges (PEGC). The certificat 
d'aptitude (CAPCEG) is gained after a course lasting a maximum of 
three years, which qualifies the PEGC to teach in two disciplines of 
literature, language or science. Also the use of conseils d'orientation, 
originally proposed by Billeres, added the counsellor to tre school 
personnel. The greatest extension to the Berthoin reform was put into 
effect under the auspices of Christian Fouchet. In 1963, the two-year 
cycle d'observation, having been found inadequate, was extended to 
four years, and a new form of school was set up, the college d'enseigne-
ment secondaire (CES) with three sections: Modem I (lycee-style 
course), Modem II (CEG-type course) and Transitional III, into which 
were placed those unable to cope with the more academic programmes.38 
The courses in the CES were to last four years - 6e to 3e - which thus 
constituted the first cycle of secondary education to be taken away from 
the lycees. The introduction of the CES met with mixed response. The 
minister claimed, with some justice, that it was an important step 
towards the democratization of education, 'puisque, pour la premiere 
fois dans l'histoire des institutions scolaires franyaises, tous les eleves 
quittant l'ecole elementaire se trouvent reunis dans un meme etablis-
sement' (Ministere de l'education nationale, La Reforme de l'enseign,-
ement, aout 1963-juin 1966, Paris, n.d., p. 2). At all events, this was 
the ideal goal to be reached, and the creation of CES throughout 
France proceeded apace (1968 - 1,500; 1972-3 - 2,426; 197S-6 -
3,040). 
While the CES brought comprehensive education from primary to 
secondary level, it brought also confusion when changes were effected, 
and led ultimately to resentment on the part of both pupils and teachers. 
A further target of criticism was the existence of the differing sections 
in the CES, into which pupils were divided according to ability (stream-
ing). It was felt that those who were not capable of academic study 
were down-graded in every sense, since they would in due course find 
themselves in a subordinate role vis-a-vts their more successful colleagues. 
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Guidance into these sectors could not therefore be viewed merely as an 
academic distinction, but one affecting the individual's place in society, 
and, as a corollary, the salary which he or she earns. In consequence, 
the democratic purpose of the CES was regarded by some as more 
apparent than real. 
A further attempt to improve secondary education came during 
Joseph Fontanet's term of office as education minister. Although his 
reform proposals were nipped in the bud by Pompidou's death and his 
own consequent departure from the ministry, they are worth looking 
at, since they show areas where the Fouchet legislation required amend-
ment. The system of three streams of ability in the first part of 
secondary education, although in theory permitting a pupil to pass 
from one to another, in fact allowed for very little mobility. To add to 
the rigid hierarchy system, the lycee-type stream (I) was taught only 
by agreges and certifies, and the other two streams by PEGC and 
instituteurs respectively. J. Fontanet's solution was to remove total 
streaming, and replace it by a compromise system: certain subjects 
would be taught in mixed ability classes, others in homogeneous or 
partly homogeneous classes, permitting pupils, however, to pass from 
one group to another, depending on progress. The teaching of the 
first part would, in due course, become the province of a specific 
type of teacher (enseignement du premier cycle) to which PEGC 
and instituteurs could accede; the agreges and certifies would in time 
teach only in the later cycle of secondary education. While remedial 
teaching could be provided where necessary, the practice of 
redoublement, i.e. the repeating of a whole year, would be done away 
with, requiring in tum a less rigid organization of classes and time-
table. However, where it was thought that an extra year would be 
genuinely beneficial at the end of the first cycle, this would be allowed. 
After the election of Giscard d'Estaing in 1974, it was the tum 
of Rene Haby to see how he could improve the system. It seems clear 
enough that the guiding principles of the legislation are to be found in 
the views of Giscard d'Estaing - views which Haby undoubtedly shares. 
In his Democratie franraise,39 the former states the importance of edu-
cation in giving all children the opportunity to develop abilities to the 
full. 'La justice ... est de faire en sorte que, quel que soit le milieu 
d'origine, les personnalites de nos enfants puissent se developper et 
trouver dans la vie sociale, a merite egal des chances equivalentes. Une 
democratie sincere doit fixer cet objectif au premier de ses ambitions.' 
In other words, social origins should not prove a handicap to genuine 
ability. In presenting his proposals, M. Haby spoke of the need to create 
genuine equality of opportunity and therefore to ensure that late 
development, often a result of cultural deprivation, was not penalized: 
'deculpabiliser le retard' (see Le Monde de /'education, March 1975). 
The text of the law, as passed by the assemblee nationale on 11 
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July 1975, is, as befits a loi cadre, exceedingly vague; but it seems 
to be egalitarian in tendency. It provides for nursery education, 
which is not obligatory, but which any five-year-old child may attend 
if the family wishes. Nursery education is regarded as having a crucial 
role to play in the removal of disadvantages caused by class differences. 
'Elle tend a prevenir les difficultes scolaires, a depister les handicaps 
et a compenser les inegalites' (article 2). Primary education, with 
five successive levels, although the duration of the initial period may 
vary, remains as before, based on a common syllabus. After primary 
education, all children enter a college (the distinction between CEG 
and CES having been removed) where a further four levels of common 
syllabus are taught; although in the two final levels, more vocational 
training may be comprised in the curriculum for those working towards 
this type of qualification. Further secondary education takes place in 
the lycee, and qualifications there obtained may lead on to higher 
education. The filieres are dispensed with, and decisions taken as to 
the future are arrived at on the basis of observation and assessment, 
due heed being paid to the family's wishes, and with the possibility 
of appeal. 
Alterations in the running of schools are also provided for by a 
measure of parent participation, with the election of parents' rep-
resentatives to the comite des parents and the conseil d'ecole at nursery 
and primary level or to the conseils d'etablissement at secondary 
level; parents' delegates also have the right to be present at the conseil 
de classe, one for each class of children. 
With the total abolition of streaming, certain provisions were made, 
in favour of those who progress either more quickly or more slowly than 
the norm. Further study - activites d 'approfondissement is provided 
for the quicker pupil, and remedial work for the pupil who finds it 
difficult to keep up. 
At this stage, it may be appropriate to give an indication as to 
how the system should function for a child beginning in nursery edu-
cation at the earliest age - two years old. After four years, he/she 
passes into primary school where, in five or six years, he/she passes 
through the stages of cours preparatoire, elementaire and moyen. 
Without any sanction or selection, the child begins a four-year course 
in a college. The first two years are based on a common syllabus; the 
latter two (4e and 3e) may comprise more vocational training, some 
of which may take place away from the college. It is at the end of 3e 
where the final decision as to orientation must be taken; either to opt 
for lycee, baccalaureat and, subsequently, higher education if appropri-
ate; or to opt for the lycee d'enseignement professionnel (formerly 
technical· college) and prepare for the various vocational qualifications 
-- CEP (certificat d'education professionnelle), a one-year course 
without examination; or the more exacting BEP (brevet d'etudes 
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professionnelles) and CAP (certificat d'aptitude professionnelle). This 
simplified description may make it possible to see that, in spite of the 
claims made for the college unique, and a removal of filieres, a measure 
of orientation inevitably takes place at 5e, and more decisively at 3 e. 
Those who are either not considered suitable for the lycee cycle of 
secondary education, or who do not wish to enter it, begin some 
of their vocational training in their last two years of college. It is, 
however, at 3e when many futures are settled; and it appears that it 
is on results gained in mathematics that they turn, since this leads 
to the baccalaureat C, which in tum provides greater chances of further 
success. 'Les mathematiques commandent l'entree des grands concours, 
mais aussi des petits. Les mathematiques ouvrent les etudes de 
medecine, les carrieres de l' Administration. Tous les metiers aux 
debouches assures .. .' (D. Granet, 'La gare de triage de la 3e ', L 'Ex-
press, 13-19 June 1977). 
The Haby reforms have taken a number of years to bring into effect. 
The first secondary class - 6e - received its common syllabus in 1977, 
and this has been introduced successively to subsequent years since 
then. The terminale, the final year of the baccalaureat only received its 
modifications at the rentree of 1983, so that the complete reform has 
only now regulated the education of one generation of secondary school 
children. 
It might have been thought that such a reform, introducing a more 
genuine form of the college unique, with a common programme up to 
3e level, and orientation thereafter, would have been sympathetically 
received by the left, and by the teaching unions. Hostility was strong 
from the beginning; while Haby's purpose was to permit children to 
progress at their own speed, without penalty for late development, this 
purpose was considered to be no more and no less than a sham (see 
J. Chambaz, Le Monde de /'education, March 1975). 
Such was the attitude of the left before the legislation was even 
voted; and union hostility has been maintained ever since, mainly 
on the grounds that selection is maintained even when, officially, 
it is being removed. The remedial help provided by the law was not 
thought to be sufficient (three hours per week) to be of any real 
assistance to backward children, and there is justification for such an 
opinion. Even as early as the cours preparatoire in primary school, the 
rapport (Laurent) Schwartz has pointed at the very least to a lack of 
progress in this respect: 
apres une baisse jusqu'en 1977, les redoublements (repetition of a 
school year) recommencent a progresser. Le pourcentage des eleves 
en retard d'une annee qui etait de 14,6% en 1974-75 avant la mise 
en place de la reforme et qui etait tombe a 12,7% en 1978-79 est 
remonte a 14% en 1980-81. Le total des eleves en retard qui etait de 
15% en 1978-79 est monte a16,4%. (Commission du bilan,La France 
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en mai 1981, vol. 4,L 'enseignement et le developpement scientifique, 
Documentation Fran~aise, Paris, 1982, p. 31). 
The report further went on to state that a large proportion of pupils 
requiring remedial assistance (1 in 5 for French or Mathematics, 52.7 per 
cent for both subjects) came from the underprivileged classes. Selection, 
albeit unintentional, was still evidently present in the system, with the 
middle classes, employers, and capitalism in general being regarded as 
the main beneficiaries. 
Yet it should not be assumed that all criticism attacked the elitism 
of the reforms. The independent union of lycee teachers, SNALC, 
take the view that the refonne Haby is a form of confidence trick, 
designed to lower the standard of education in France, on the part 
of a technocracy (recruited from the bourgeoisie and the aristo-
cracy). 
Pour perenniser une puissance abusive et illegitime, la methode la 
plus sure ne consiste-t-elle pas a mediocriser l'enseignement destine 
a la masse, sous couvert d"egalite des chances'; a empecher la pro-
motion intellectuelle et sociale d'elites potentielles etrangeres a 
l'intelligentsia? (G. Simon, SNALC et la refonne de l'enseignement, 
Paris, Livre Vert, 1976).40 
It is evident that the Haby reforms suit neither the left nor elements 
of the right, and, paradoxically, this may help to explain the approach 
which the socialist government has adopted to school education since 
coming to power. 
The Haby reform provided a reasonable framework for school edu-
cation, if properly applied, it might be thought - in other words, if 
there were adequate financing, and hence enough teachers. (During the 
ministries of R. Haby and of his successor C. Beullac, there was constant 
union pressure for the creation of more teaching posts.) If this were 
done, then the government could put other educational matters higher 
on its list of priorities i.e. decentralization, private and higher education. 
If the successive education budgets of the left are looked at, it will be 
seen that it has made very substantial efforts in this direction alone, 
from very early in its tenure of office. 14,775 posts in primary and 
secondary education were created in the additional finance law to the 
previous government's budget for 1981 (the collectif budgetaire of July 
1981 and in the 1982 budget, 16,828 more.41 The total figure over this 
period, 28,625, represents one third of all posts created by the entire 
government in 1981-2. (For further details, see Cahiers de /'Education 
nationale, no. l ,January 1982, pp. 20-1.) The budget for 1983 provided, 
in a time of economic difficulty, for 8,368 posts, nearly one half of all 
those created by the government as a whole. Yet this had been achieved 
by abolishing extra teaching hours (heures supplementaires) and cutting 
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down on stagiaires, pupil-teachers who provided a certain amount of 
teaching and whose numbers had been substantially raised on the 
previous financial year. In consequence, the real rise in jobs was only 
5,346. Yet another issue which had caused much ill-feeling during the 
Haby and Beullac era was that of the auxiliariat, teachers who were 
employed as the need arose, but who enjoyed no tenure, and were thus 
at the mercy of the rise or fall in pupil population for the maintenance 
or termination of their employment. 14,399 such employees gained 
tenure in the 1983 budget ( see Cahiers de I 'Education nationale, no. 11, 
January 1983, pp. 20-1). Again, in the 1984 budget, half the posts 
created in the fonction publique by all ministries were for education, 
and expenses for the salaries of all employees accounted for 87 per cent 
of the total budget (as opposed to 85.4 per cent in 1982, and 86.5 per 
cent in 1983). In fact there were to be 4,590 extra posts all told.42 
Yet this is not to suggest that no further thought was given to other, 
more fundamental changes in French education. On coming to power, 
the socialist government established a commission du bilan to assess the 
overall situation of the country, and one of the domains under review 
was education. The rapport Schwartz, covering all aspects of education, 
was the result. Thereafter, several reports were commissioned, on more 
specific issues. Reference has already been made to the rapport Soubre 
on decentralization (see above, Section 1), and higher education will be 
discussed in the next section. In the context of school education, the 
two most significant reports are those presided over respectively by 
Louis Legrand on the college, and by Antoine Prost on the lycee. 
The title of the rapport Legrand, Pour un college democratique 
(published in 1983), makes its intentions abundantly clear, and its 
proposals bear them out. Changes are proposed, (1) in the passage from 
primary to secondary education. As a rule, all pupils leave primary 
school at the age of eleven. A commission de passage, comprising the 
college head, the inspecteur departemental, conseiller d'orientation, 
educational psychologist, and, in equal number, primary and secondary 
teachers, and parents' representatives, would discuss all cases, and 
would recommend, where a pupil has difficulties in reading an extra 
year at primary school. However no pupil over the age of twelve might 
stay at primary school. (2) Organization of classes. There would no 
longer be any selection in 6e and Se. Pupils would be placed in mixed 
groups of 106, to be sub-divided into groups of twenty-six. After one 
month's observation, it would be possible to establish homogeneous 
groups for French and for mathematics, and in the second term, for 
foreign language classes. At Se, this same arrangement would operate 
from the beginning of the year. Once every three months, the teaching 
group (equipe pedagogique) together with the conseiller d'orientation, 
and the conseiller d'information, would forgather to discuss progress, 
and alter the composition of the groups where necessary. On the 
The education system 295 
question of orientation, premature selection, hitherto regarded as a sign 
of failure, was to be phased out as soon as possible. Entry at the end of 
Se into the LEP, and in particular into CPPN (classe preprofessionnelle 
de niveau - general education, plus technological initiation into specific 
areas of possible employment) would in future be on a voluntary basis 
only, and the CPPN would be abolished as soon as possible. (3) Role of 
pupils and teachers. It was felt that the foregoing changes would make 
it possible for the pupil to make a responsible choice about courses to 
follow, and to gain the habit of working on his/her own, and of self-
assessment. The changes would be even greater for the teachers. Added 
to the usual duties would be travail en equipe, group working. Crucial 
in this domain would be the projet d 'action educative ,43 which is already 
regarded as an essential in the fight against scholastic failure; assessment 
of the teaching done would also be of importance. Yet the most radical 
change, in a French context, was the proposal to introduce the tutorat. 
Teachers, selected by the pupils themselves, would act as tutor to a 
maximum of fifteen pupils, giving both academic and personal advice. 
Legrand also proposed the abolition of differentiation of teaching hours 
as between categories of teachers. All would now have sixteen hours' 
teaching per week, plus three hours' tutorat, and another three hours to 
be spent in discussion and concerting of work with other teachers. Other 
suggestions related to more technological education, and institutional 
changes, along the lines proposed by the rapport Soubre. 
Inevitably, the report provoked mixed reactions. Whilst the SNI-PEGC 
considered that the proposals were on the whole positive (see L 'Ecole 
liberatrice, no. 15, 22 January 1983, J.-C. Barbarant, 'Un rapport pour 
negocier',), other opinions were mixed or hostile. The SNC (syndicat 
national des colleges) was well-disposed to the idea of both tutorat and 
concertation; it did not like the decentralizing measures proposed by 
Legrand which merely repeated the 'deplorable' Soubre proposals (see 
SNC-Bulletin, February 1983, pp. 10-14). The SNALC inevitably took 
a hostile view, firstly because, in its opinion, the proposals interfered 
with the freedom of the individual teacher (it disliked the 'collectivist' 
approach), but also on the grounds that mixed ability classes - a recipe 
for disaster - were maintained(see Quinzaine universitaire, 15 February 
1983). Yet it is probably the proposed unification of teaching hours 
which is most displeasing to the most highly qualified teachers, and 
which seems to have aroused the strongest protest (see Legrand's open 
letter to protesting teachers in Quinzaine universitaire, 15 October 
1982, pp. 159-63). 
However, this last proposal has not as yet been adopted wholesale by 
the minister. The three points which have been retained at present are: 
the equipes pedagogiques, the reorganization of classes into groupes de 
niveau, and the tutorat. These will be put into operation in volunteer 
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colleges, and here, the PEGC will have their teaching hours reduced (Le 
Monde, 6 January 1984). 
As for the rapport Prost, entitled Les Lycees et leurs etudes au seuil 
du XXJe siecle, no decision has as yet been taken on its findings. While 
in certain respects it was quite positive in its view of the instruction 
provided in the lycees, it also found causes for complaint: over-ambitious 
teaching, too heavy a syllabus, and therefore too heavy a time-table, 
too much information to be imparted, insufficient emphasis on techno-
logical disciplines, and, inevitably, overmuch selection. To combat 
these shortcomings, practical proposals have been made, some of which 
mirror those of Legrand, such as the equipes pedagogiques. In an 
endeavour to encourage lyceens to work independently, either singly or 
in groups, it is proposed to organize the time-table on a weekly basis, 
spread over ten half-days, and over six days in the week, with more 
flexibility. Guidance and assessment of lyceens should be carried out on 
the basis of regular meetings with pupils, so as to have adequate infor-
mation on their main interests and on what they have achieved. Other 
points relate to the relative facility with which a lyceen may pass from 
one section to another, the optimum size for lycees (600-700 pupils, 
and never more than 900), more emphasis on technological studies as 
an integral part of culture. On an institutional basis, reforms have been 
proposed to increase co-operation between lycees, and also between 
other areas of activity, (industry, administration, higher education, etc.), 
allowing greater linkage between formation and job opportunities. In 
this domain also, the need to combat geographical inequalities in edu-
cational facilities and hence in educational opportunity was emphasized. 
These considerations on aspects of secondary education have one 
point in common - namely the need for education less as a cultural 
necessity, and more as a specifically vocational training, which in tum 
means an emphasis on science and particularly, technology. This is not 
a new idea. E. Faure, in presenting his proposed reform of higher edu-
cation in 1968, made the point that forms of education other than 
literature (i.e. scientific and technical) would assume larger proportions 
in primary and secondary. Such a renewal was desirable, given a society 
which was in a perpetual state of flux and which required an education 
more suited to modem life. 'Cette education nationale doit participer a 
la vie de toute la nation comme la nation tout entiere doit contribuer a 
son devenir' (E. Faure,L 'Education nationale et la participation, p. 19). 
Sin.ce, in spite of criticisms, the Loi d'Orientation acquired such 
eminence that all ministers of education have had at the very least 
to pay lip-service to it, we may expect to find, in the decade since 1968, 
changes introduced in line with the spirit of Faure's reform. The 
legislation of 16 July 1971 (three separate laws) is concerned with 
the organization of vocational and technological education, apprentice-
ship, and adult education (formation continue) for employed workers. 
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The first provides for an initiation into technology and economics 
from 4e and 3e onwards. It also requires that adequate information be 
provided on the differing branches of education, job possibilities and 
on 'les perspectives scientifiques, techniques et economiques dont 
depend !'evolution de l'emploi' (article 3). The second, on apprentice-
ship, deals with its reorganization, in apprentice training centres, with 
training lasting from one to three years, and with the possibility of 
proceeding to further study and higher qualifications. These two 
laws clearly represent an attempt to induce a higher esteem on the part 
of the public for these areas of study, as well as an endeavour to provide 
appropriate training for work in a technological society. Yet it is perhaps 
the third law on formation continue which comes closest to the ideals 
of May 1968. This gives a worker in employment the right to have time 
off from work in order to pursue coursc:s of study approved by the 
state, leading to further qualification. As a rule the maximum period of 
absence from work is either one year, or 1,200 hours, depending on the 
nature of the course. This is an innovation which seems to give education 
the possibility of achieving what many think of as its main task, the 
social (and consequently, financial) up-grading of the working classes. 
The socialist government in this area too has shown its willingness to 
improve the content of technical education, as well as the necessary 
equipment; to bring more young people into technical education, and 
to improve the allowances made to them (see Cahiers de !'Education 
nationale, no. 14, April 1983, 'Dossier: la renovation technique'). 
Here, too, the increase in financing is very marked. In 1981,formation 
continue at secondary level cost the state 408.7 million francs, and at 
university level, nearly 9.6 million; private funding totalled 224 and 
129 million respectively (see Cahiers de !'Education nationale, no. 9, 
November 1982, 'Dossier: la formation continue'). There seems little 
doubt that this is regarded not only as a long-term means to social 
advancement, but in the short-term, as a useful weapon against unem-
ployment. This also could be said to mark a change in the left's attitude 
to education, as in the past, there has been perhaps less willingness to 
accept the propriety of gearing education to the needs of the economy, 
and hence of capitalism. 
In spite of the financial generosity of the present government's 
policy in education, it would be unfair if this were portrayed as merely 
unthinking extravagance. On the contrary, a very serious endeavour is 
being made, to make funding available where it is most necessary via 
the zone prioritaire - a concept introduced as early as July 1981. This 
idea p_redates the arrival of the left to power (see B. Schwartz, Une 
autre ecole, Paris, Flammarion, 1977, pp. 111 ff.). It is a departure 
from the usual 'blanket' form of egalitarian measure, regardless of the 
relative prosperity or poverty of those whom it is proposed to assist. 
Basically, extra financing, and hence extra facilities for a limited period 
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of time, would be concentrated in an area where there had been, for 
example, a particularly high rate of scholastic failure. If an area was 
deprived, the children living there would suffer in educational terms, 
and the only way to break out of the vicious circle was to remove the 
deprivation. While the criteria for judging an area to be deprived are 
flexible, some are regarded as particularly important. Thus it would be 
necessary to study the statistics relating to: numbers of children in 
nursery schools relation of pupil numbers at 3e to those at 6e, numbers 
attending CPPN and apprenticeship classes, numbers of non-French 
children in the area, and numbers of children quitting school without a 
qualification, together with the overall social and economic state of the 
area. 
It is too early to tell how successful this programme will be, but it 
does show the willingness of the present government to translate precept 
into reasonable practice. Certainly the policy is now in very extensive 
operation (see Table 6.3, p. 300). 
In generai, it can be said that school education is faciI}.g some very 
profound changes in the desire of the government to achieve a greater 
measure of social equality. The long-term realization, if it is achievable, 
will only be effected by means of vast budgetary resources. When in 
opposition, the left regarded education as the number one priority, and 
it is now so treated. Yet even for the socialists, the public purse is not 
bottomless, and the government's well-wishers may well fear that too 
much is being done too quickly for financing to be adequate. The reason 
behind this haste is clear enough: if the reforms are to be successful 
there has to be a change in mentality, amongst teachers and in s9ciety 
at large, and the sooner that is set in motion, the better. But this solution 
is a political one: to achieve such changes in education, and hence in 
society, the left will need at least as long a period in power as the right 
enjoyed from 1958 to 1981. 
(4)Highereducation 
As with education at school level, so has higher education also been 
the subject of much thought over the last thirty-odd years. This has 
led to reform, and attempts at reform, both before and since the 
events of May. If we look at the higher education system as it existed 
in the immediate post-war period, we find the following elements. 
(a) Qualifications: a baccalaureat giving automatic access to higher 
education: a licence composed, in arts, of four or five certificats (in 
different subjects, with a separate examination for each); three 
certificats were required in science. The licence en droit was not split 
up in this way, and medical studies followed a different pattern again. 
There were also the agregation - a competitive examination taken 
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after the licence, g1vmg to the successful candidate entrance into 
teaching in higher education or into lycee teaching - and the doctorat: 
either a doctorat d'universite or a doctorat d'etat - the ultimate 
qualification in higher education. 
(b) Institutions: the teaching for the university qualifications was 
dispensed in the facultes. Another path into higher education was to 
prepare for entrance into the grandes ecoles, autonomous educational 
establishments providing courses leading to a professional qualification 
of the most prestigious kind. These classes preparatoires, lasting several 
years and leading to competitive examinations for entry, were them-
selves selective. Graduates from the grandes ecoles were expected to 
provide an elite of the highest calibre, whose training would enable 
them to take on duties in many areas of activity, but all possessed of 
considerable influence. Some of these institutions date back to the 
eighteenth century, even before the Revolution, but the tradition of 
providing an elite of administrators was continued by Napoleon and his 
successors. 
This was, in general terms, the system as it existed at the end of 
the Second World War. The most substantial reforms in higher 
education have been introduced since the establishment of the Fifth 
Republic, but some piecemeal changes brought in during the life of 
the Fourth have not been without influence. As indicated earlier, 
secondary and higher education was not thought to have covered 
itself with glory during the Second World War, as a result of the 
activities of many who had passed through the system. It was inevitable 
therefore that changes would be proposed, not only in relation to 
qualifications as such, but also to the training of teachers. 
Among the innovations put forward by the Langevin-Wallon report 
was a year of study - enseignement propedeutique ou preunivers-
itaire, to be undertaken by all bacheliers. It was to have a dual role: 
preparation for further study, and also to provide the necessary help 
and guidance for school-leavers starting a career. Ideally, it should have 
taken place neither in the lycees nor in the facultes. A move in this 
direction, instituted before the publication of this report, provided 
for a propedeutique year in the facultes, which was to prepare the 
hopeful student for higher education, by providing suitable advice 
and guidance as to the type of studies to be undertaken, consolidating 
the knowledge already acquired, and introducing students to methods 
of study appropriate at university level. However, an examination 
at the end of the course acted as a hurdle allowing the successful 
student to prepare for the licence, but preventing the unsuccessful 
candidate (who was left with the baccalaureat as sole qualification) 
from pursuing further study. 
It should also be borne in mind that, in the main, perhaps even 
more in literary studies than in others, the function of higher education 
Table 6.3 Extent of the zone prioritaire policy, 1982-3 
Schools Colleges LEP 
Number of 
Academies zones prioritaires Nursery Primary Total 
1982-1983 in each academie 
% % % % % % % % % % 
Schools Pupils Schools Pupils Schools Pupils Schools Pupils Schools Pupils 
Aix-Marseille 29 19.8 18.0 15.3 18.1 16.9 18.1 30.0 25.0 33.3 27.0 
Amiens 11 5.6 5.5 1.4 '4.3 1.9 4.6 7.0 8.4 
Besan~on 18 10.4 10.7 6.1 13.1 6.9 12.3 15.5 19.3 12.1 10.7 
Bordeaux 13 3.5 6.5 6.7 7.5 6.0 7.3 13.9 13.6 12.0 12.0 
Caen 6 4.5 4.5 2.9 4.9 3.2 4.3 4.7 5.1 
Clermont-Ferrand 11 6.4 8.5 5.2 5.2 5.3 6.0 6.3 7.5 6.3 8.5 
Corse 18 17.6 51.5' 15.0 38.0 42.0 33.0 100.0 100.0 
Creteil 25 7.4 7.6 6.7 9.0 7.0 8.5 8.3 10.0 5.7 6.0 
Dijon 15 10.6 12.0 6.9 9.3 7.7 10.0 10.6 9.2 7.5 7.8 
Grenoble 13 6.0 7.0 4.0 6.0 4.0 7.0 9.0 8.5 6.0 8.0 
Lille 39 7.5 8.5 6.0 7.4 6.5 7.7 14.4 12.l 
Limoges * • • • • • • • • * * 
Ly"n 22 8.7 11.8 11.l 12.7 17.2 16.5 
Montpelier 14 13.1 11.6 17.7 13.2 16.5 13.0 22.2 14.8 17.6 14.2 
Nancy-Metz 22 1.9 9.6 5.0 11.4 4.0 10.8 12.4 16.0 
Nantes 7 11.4 9.0 5.9 8.3 7.3 8.6 3.1 3.0 
Table 6.3 continued 
Schools Colleges LEP 
Number of 
Academies zones prioritaires Nursery Primary Total 
1982-1983 in each academie 
% % % % % % % % % % 
Schools Pupils Schools Pupils Schools Pupils Schools Pupils Schools Pupils 
Nice 7 6.0 6.1 4.0 6.2 4.6 6.2 6.0 6.5 16.0 13.7 
Orleans-Tours 5 4.7 5.3 2.8 5.2 3.3 5.2 5.0 4.8 
Paris 6 18.0 17.8 17.5 19.8 17.8 19.0 13.8 13.4 18.0 18.5 
Poitiers 9 7.0 6.0 2.0 7.0 3.0 6.0 6.0 8.0 12.0 10.0 
Reims 11 7.0 9.5 5.3 8.7 5.7 9.0 9.6 11.1 11.1 14.6 
Rennes 7 3.0 2.4 6.0 5.0 5.2 4.0 13.5 10.0 11.5 10.0 
Rouen 18 11.0 10.0 4.0 7.8 6.0 8.6 22.4 21.7 9.3 12.5 
Strasbourg 5 2.1 6.1 2.2 6.6 2.3 6.4 7.4 8.5 7.5 8.5 
Toulouse 14 10.0 12.0 11.5 12.0 11.0 12.0 13.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
Versailles 11 4.3 6.1 5.0 5.7 
Antilles-Guyane 7 13.3 9.0 12.0 10.4 12.3 10.0 8.7 6.0 14.3 12.0 
Total 363 7.4 9.3 6.3 7.6 8.7 8.7 11.0 10.6 8.8 8.0 
Source: Cahiers de /'Education nationale, no. 16, June 1983 
Note: Theacademie of Limoges has no zones prioritaires as such, but rather. an entire programme, as the region is particularly underprivileged. 
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had traditionally been to provide teachers. The term licence originally 
meant precisely that: a licence to teach. While the agreges were auto-
matically appointed to teaching posts in lycees, the certifies - that 
is, teachers with a licence - were normally expected . to teach in 
colleges, although they too could take up posts in a lycee. With the 
increase in numbers of pupils, more and more of the latter obtained 
lycee posts, and to ensure a maintenance of standards, a further 
qualification was required; from 1952 onwards, a competitive exam-
ination gained for the successful candidate the certificat d'aptitude ti 
l'enseignement du second degre (CAPES). This qualification, based 
on a competitive examination, may be said to typify in this respect 
much of higher education. The problem of numbers caused much of 
the system to seem more and more competitive. While every bachelier 
had the automatic right to a place in a faculte for the first year, the 
propedeutique examination was an obstacle in the path of further 
study. It could also be said with some justice, that while the 
preparation for certain certificats was not unduly onerous, the exam-
ination in other disciplines was neither more nor less than a 
competition, allowing success to a fraction of the total candidates 
who had to pass in both written and oral. It was possible to resit the 
examination, but this was time-consuming, and made what might have 
been a two-year course last between three and five years. The problem 
was exacerbated by the fact that although student numbers were on 
the increase, staff numbers were not, and it was virtually impossible 
for teachers in higher education to give individual guidance and help, 
or indeed to do more than rely on the cours magistral (lecture), without 
any kind of back-up in the form of small-group teaching. Many students 
also were unable to work full-time at their studies, since they needed 
to earn money in order to make ends meet. Some were teaching part-
time in schools which undoubtedly provided useful experience for a 
future career, but postponed the time when they would be fully 
qualified. It was not only the inefficiency of the system which was 
criticized, but also the relevance of the studies which were pursued. 
The country needed people with technological qualifications, but the 
branches of education providing these were much less popular than 
the letters and law faculties; yet job opportunities were less immediate 
in these areas. 
These were, overall, the problems facing C. Fouchet, when he 
became education minister in 1962. We have already seen his en-
deavours to increase the extent of the comprehensive principle at 
secondary level. This was to be crowned by a re-organization of the 
baccalaureat, which was to be divided up into five main sections. 
Although a baccalaureat technique industriel had existed since 1946 
there would now be much less emphasis on literary studies, and a 
correspondingly greater one on science and technology. While Fouchet 
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claimed that the aims of this reform were to preserve the role of 
secondary education as a provider of general culture, as well as to 
bring a more positive content to the concept of orientation by in-
dicating precise possibilities to pupils in relation to their abilities, it 
provided one section for literary studies, one for social sciences, but 
two for science, and one for scientific and technical knowledge 
combined. This last provided for three baccalaureats of a more 
technical nature. 
Another institution of higher education was established, the institut 
universitaire de technologie (IUT) to provide two-year courses for 
the training of highly qualified technicians: 'des cadres et techniciens 
superieurs des activites industrielles et du secteur tertiaire, dont le 
role est de traduire dans le concret les conceptions abstraites ou les 
resultats des recherches theoriques. Ils doivent done posseder une 
formation technique plus profonde et plus precise que celle des 
ingenieurs et, eventuellement, une vue generate des choses plus large 
que celle des simples techniciens' (Ministere de !'education nationale, 
Lq Reforme de l'enseignement, aoat 1963-juin 1966, Paris, n.d., p. 7). 
A qualification was obtained after the two-year course - the dipl6me 
universitaire de technologie (DUT) - and instruction given not only 
by full-time teachers but also by people with practical experience in 
management. 
The organization of the baccalaureat was further changed in that 
the examinations, instead of being staggered over two years, were in 
future to be taken at the end of the third year (classes terminales). 
However, the most important change was perhaps less in the 
baccalaureat itself than in the use which could be made of it. Tradition-
ally the baccalaureat gave unrestricted entry into the facultes, according 
to the bachelier's choice. Fouchet proposed to curtail this freedom by 
tying specific baccalaureats to specific university courses, and, by the 
same token, requiring prospective university candidates to make a firm 
decision as to their choice of discipline much earlier. This did not 
mean that it was wholly out of the question for a bachelier to consider 
pursuing a course to which his bacca{aureat did not strictly entitle 
him; but in that case he would only be accepted by the faculte of his 
choice after consideration of his dossier, or after success in a special 
examination. 
C. Fouchet also reorganized higher education, providing three 
cycles of study. Once the bachelier was duly admitted to a faculte, 
he would, instead of facing the propedeutique examination at the 
end of the first year, prepare for a qualification to be gained after 
a two-year course either in arts (dipl6me universitaire d'etudes lit-
teraires - DUEL), or in sciences (dipl6me universitaire d'etudes 
scientifiques -~ DUES). Study for these diplomas was divided up into 
a number of sections, thought to be particularly appropriate for 
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students preparing for a career in teaching. Once this initial 
qualification was obtained, the student could either seek employment 
or continue into the second cycle, in which one further year of study 
confened the licence ( still required as a qualification for teachers 
in secondary school), and two years further study after the DUEL 
or DUES led to the mattrise (master's degree). The third cycle 
comprised the options of agregation or doctorat. 
The purpose behind the three-cycle system was to provide in the 
first cycle for the acquisition of basic knowledge, in the second for 
specialization, and in the third for research, or, in other words, to 
separate teaching from research work. Hitherto it had been possible 
to pass from teaching in secondary school to teaching and research in 
a faculte, but with the new system and the new qualification of the 
maftrise, this flexibility would be less feasible, with secondary school 
teaching provided for by the licence and CAPES and higher education 
provided for by maftrise, agregation and doctorat. Such a change was 
welcome to scientists, but less so to teachers in the arts faculties. 
A further criticism levelled at the reforms was that, although no 
selection existed in theory, in reality the creation of the IUT could 
well attract only the weaker bacheliers. The question of selection 
was, and still is, of vital importance. In Britain selection of university 
entrants, by a variety of means, is in the main accepted, if not wholly 
approved. Since for many years any bachelier had an automatic right 
to a place in a faculte, any curtailing of that right was inevitably viewed 
as a retrograde and reactionary step, contrary to the democratization 
of education. Unfortunately, the absence of selection at entry operated 
much more brutally, by failure, at the end of the first year. Fouchet's 
first cycle, DUEL and DUES, was an attempt to deal with that 
difficulty; but no attempt was made to deal with the underlying 
problem of a lack of selection, aggravated by the ever-increasing student 
numbers. At the colloque de Caen of 1966 one notable partisan of 
selection, M. Zamansky, then dean of the Paris science faculty, 
proposed a solution; namely to turn the baccalaureat into a genuine 
qualification of secondary education, which the large majority of 
pupils would obtain. Only then would any selection operate, not on 
the basis of failure, but on a positive approach to individual abilities. 
'Au systeme actuel: vous etes bon a ceci OU vous n'etes bon a rien; il 
faut substituer le systeme, vous etes bon a quelque chose et voici a 
quoi' (M. Zamansky in colloque de Caen). However, Fouchet had not 
felt it possible to adopt such a radical approach. It has been suggested 
that all the education reforms introduced by Fouchet were directly 
inspired by de Gaulle; yet in the matter of selection, the latter's 
influence did not prevail. 44 
These reforms were undoubtedly important, and attempted to 
provide for the French economy the greater number of scientific and 
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technological experts which it needed for expansion. Yet the problem 
of numbers was not dealt with, save by the hasty construction of 
extra universities and overspill annexes, such as Nanterre, which within 
a few years were themselves overcrowded. The problems created by 
overcrowding were therefore permanent, and provided one of the 
causes of the dissatisfaction leading to the events of May 1968. 
If the May events achieved no more, they forced the government 
to face up to the question of higher education and the radical views 
expressed as to the purpose of higher education, which could no longer 
be regarded either as the privileged domain of the upper classes, or 
as a high powered sausage-machine, geared to produce an appropriate 
number of managers, administrators, scientists, etc. as required by 
the state, the economy or the consumer society. Consequently other 
criteria had to be established with the participation of all those involved 
in higher education, whether as teachers, students or in some other 
capacity. 
This was the task allotted to Edgar Faure in June 1968 - to produce 
a reform which would take into account the many views which had 
been expressed. His initial move was to intensify the arrangements 
made by his predecessor, F. Ortoli, by the use of charges de mission to 
provide him with information, in co-operation with the recteurs, since 
many universities and faculties had produced proposals for reform. 
His speech to the assemblee nationale of 24 July 1968 gave a clear 
enough indication of his reforming intentions. Society was in a state 
of constant change, and higher education had to keep pace with it, 
which it had hitherto signally failed to do. The old-style universite, 
Napoleon's creation, was out-dated and all traces of it should be 
eradicated, whether in legislation, teaching methods, or relations 
between teachers, students and administration, whether central or 
local. One essential goal to aim for was (yet again) democratization of 
education from nursery school to university, whilst at the same time 
maintaining high cultural standards. In this context there would have 
to be, as well as financial assistance to poorer families, changes in the 
curriculum, in order that there should no longer be an in-built 
advantage to the culturally privileged classes. 
To avoid the feeling of alienation experienced by many students 
at university, numbers should not be excessive. 'Les universites nouvel-
les doivent avoir une personnalite. Chacune d'elles ... doit etre a 
l'echelle humaine, c'est-a-dire accueillir dix mille ou douze mille 
etudiants.'45 A limit of student numbers was also laid down for certain 
types of classes: small groups - 25 maximum; travaux pratiques 
(seminars) - 40 maximum; and no more than 250 students at the 
formal lecture. 
With these very specific indications about suitable numbers in 
classes and in the ideal university it might have been expected that 
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Faure would have embraced selection as a solution to the problem of 
student numbers. Yet a decision was taken not to adopt a selective 
system, the reasons being that the right of bacheliers to enter the 
faculties had been long accepted, and that any selective system should 
not be adopted hastily, merely to deal with an immediate problem of 
numbers; on the contrary, it should be weighed up, and if introduced 
thereafter, very carefully organized. These reasons were doubtless 
important, but there was one other far more powerful: student reaction 
to selection was feared, and with some reason, since the proposal to 
introduce it had been made in April 1968, and had not been well received. 
No one in the government wished to see a recrudescence of the events of 
May, and, whatever else was to be reformed, the open-door policy could 
not be touched. In other words, Faure's task was to produce a law 
which would assist in the shoring-up of a regime which had come near 
to collapse, by radically reforming higher education and conse~ently 
obtaining support from those who felt reforms to be essential. Con-
cessions already made, whatever troubles they might have caused, would 
not be rescinded. 
Some of the most important changes would have to come in the 
administration of education, so much criticized during May 1968 
for its excessive centralization. To bring about these changes, Faure 
proposed, in general, the remedy of participation to all levels and in 
varying ways, in new units of higher education, with a wider range of 
subjects (pluri-disciplinarite) than that encompassed by the out-dated 
faculte. 
After a summer of consultations with all interested parties ( except 
the extreme right and the groupuscules of the extreme left), the law 
came before the assemblee nationale in September 1968, and was 
passed by it on 11 October and by the senat a fortnight later. 
The Loi d'Orientation provided for a complete structural reorgan-
ization of higher education, with the abolition of facultes and the 
introduction of the unite d'enseignement et de recherche (UER) as 
the basic unit of the universite. The UER is governed by an elected 
council, and a director elected thereby for three years. In the same 
way the council of the universite is elected, and in turn, elects the 
president for five years. In each case the councils comprise not only 
teachers, researchers and students, but also non-teaching staff and 
people from outside the academic world. In mixed councils, the pro-
portion of teachers' representatives was to be at least equal to that 
of the students. Student representation was to be related to the number 
of voters. If the latter fell to less than 60 per cent of the total 
registered, then the number of representatives would be proportion-
ately reduced. 
The principle of autonomy was also not wholly neglected. While 
it was stated that the state provides finance for the universite, the 
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latter also may enjoy the use of other resources, i.e. donations, 
bequests, etc. The universite votes on its budget, which, says the law, 
must balance. The organization of teaching and research, again, is a 
matter for each universite, as is the assessment of students' work, by 
examination or continuous assessment. Yet in this area of what is called 
autonomie pedagogique, the awarding of degrees is still the prerogative 
of the ministry of education, for although qualifications from specific 
establishments do exist, they lack the standing of the nationally 
recognized degree or diploma. It also became clear, once university 
institutions began to attempt their reorganization in the light of the 
Loi d'Orientation, that there was only one acceptable interpretation -
that of the minister. Furthermore, one crucial element of the central-
ized system - namely the administration - in no wise came within 
the competence of the law, so that while the new universities were 
re-organized on a supposedly decentralized and participatory basis, 
the administrative framework remained essentially as before.47 
The concepts of participation and autonomy thus may be seen as 
less generous in scope than they seem at first glance. Centralization, 
or, at least, bureaucracy, could be suggested as being greater than 
before. The Loi d'Orientation provided for a Conseil national de 
l'enseignement superieur et de la recherche (CNESER), to replace the 
previous CNES. This is presided over by the minister and has a total 
of ninety members, fifty-four elected university members including 
students, six from other establishments of higher education, and 
thirty representing national interests, i.e. politicians, union members, 
etc. It meets at least twice a year, but maintains a section permanente, 
whose members are elected by the whole council and a commission 
scientifique permanente, with the task of examining university research 
programmes, and teaching at the troisieme cycle and doctorat level. 
The task of the CNESER seems to be essentially consultative; it is 
involved in the planning of higher education and research, in relation 
to the National Plan; it gives opinions as to university curricula, 
requests for credit, and the apportioning of budget resources, on 
national diplomas, and on decisions _by an recteur to suspend the 
proceedings of the universities' councils within his academie. On a 
local level, regional councils have been set up, composed of elected 
representatives from universities and other institutions within the 
region, as well as representatives of regional activities. The task of 
these councils is to co-ordinate higher education and research in the 
region and, again, they have a consultative role on curricula and 
requests for credits from universities. 
Doubtless this seems like an effort towards decentralization, but 
of a very cumbersome kind. 'Such an elaborate apparatus appears to be 
a heavy price to pay for participation' ,48 particularly when the power to 
act, as opposed to the possibility of being consulted, seems so limited. 
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One further institution must be added to the list of bodies to which 
the Loi d'Orientation has, as it were, acted as midwife - namely the 
conference des presidents, which was formally created by the decree 
of 24 February 1971. When the new universities came into being with 
their elected presidents, the need was felt to form a body on which 
every university would have a representative (which is not the case 
in the CNESER). During 1970 regular meetings were held. This body 
has, like the others, a consultative role, giving its opinion on matters 
submitted to it by the minister; yet it also has the right to study 
questions of interest to the universities and to put proposals and plans 
to the minister. With its regular meetings it is a powerful body wielding 
considerable influence. 
E. Faure, in office for scarcely a year, had little time to devote 
to other aspects of higher education. Subsequent ministers have not 
done away with the provisions of the Loi d'Orientation, although 
these may not have been interpreted as widely as he would have wished. 
The two most important changes introduced since 1968 have been: 
(1) the replacement of the DUEL and the DUES, and 
(2) the reform of the second cycle. 
In 1973 J. Fontanet, then minister of education, changed the first 
cycle of university studies by introducing, in place of Fouchet's DUEL 
and DUES, the dip/6me d'etudes universitaires generales, for law, 
economics, economics and social administration, social sciences, letters 
and science, each discipline consisting of a number of sections. The 
courses were to be multi-disciplinary - the principle subject to be 
studied for 60 per cent of the course, and the other 40 per cent to be 
devoted to optional work. The qualification would be awarded partly 
on assessment of work, and partly on the result of examinations and 
would lead either to employment or to further study. The reasons 
behind this change were twofold: to deal with the problems created by 
the existing system, over-specialization, and also wastage, with a good 
half of the students failing and leaving university without a 
qualification. 
It was also thought that the DEUG would indicate the attainment 
of a reputable standard which would be acceptable to employers. 
Neither of these hopes have as yet been wholly realized. The percentage 
of failure is still very high - in some disciplines, 50 per cent, in others 
more than this (see for details G. Herzlich, 'Les chances de succes 
dans chaque discipline', Le Monde de /'education, June 1978). Also 
the continual difficulties of graduates in obtaining suitable employment 
have meant that higher qualifications are demanded than would have 
been the case some years ago. The basic DEUG therefore is insufficient, 
and in many cases the DUT is more immediately attractive to the 
prospective employer .49 
The second major change since the Loi d'Orientation was even 
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more contoversial, the so-called a"ete Soisson of 16 January 1976, 
validated in June 1977 and signed in fact by J.P. Soisson's successor, 
A. Saunier-Sei'te, the second occupant of the autonomous secretariat 
d'etat aux universites, since raised to a full ministry. This measure 
dealt with the licence and maitrise, to take one year each after the 
DEUG. In general the second cycle was to provide 'une formation 
scientifique de haut niveau qui prepare Jes etudiants a la vie active et 
a l'exercice de responsabilites professionnelles' (Arrete 16 January 
1976, article 1 ). The various types of licence and maftrise would 
be authorized as national diplomas by the secretary of state, after 
the consideration of detailed proposals by the various universities, 
by the groupes d 'etude technique consisting not only of academics 
but also people from other professions. The idea behind this was 
to prevail upon universities to provide high-level courses with a 
bearing upon subsequent employment, that is, of a more technological 
nature. It seems hard to believe that there would have been any oppos-
ition to this, had it not been for the fact that as in theory all licences 
and maftrises had to go before the groupes d'etude (which would in-
evitably have a bias towards the more vocational and less purely aca-
demic course), those teaching the more traditional courses felt their 
positions threatened if their second-cycle syllabus were not approved. 
Saunier-Sette not only had to face opposition on the part of students 
but also that of the university presidents. In due course, concessions 
were made, in the sense that the groupes d'etude technique lost a good 
deal of its power, which the CNESER and the president's conference 
gained. 
The opposition of the university presidents may not seem wholly 
surprising in view of the vested interests which required protection, in 
the shape of traditional courses of study, and also in view of some 
clashes of personality. The student position· is, historically, possibly less 
consistent, particularly if we relate this problem to some of the ideas 
of May 1968. It will be remembered that one of the criticisms levelled 
by students at French higher education was that of the irrelevance of 
what was taught, since in many cases the qualifications gained led to 
teaching, and little else besides. While such a view might not commend 
itself to those who feel that a country's ( or a civilization's) cultural 
heritage ought to be protected, cherished, and passed on from one 
generation to another, the unemployed graduate cannot as a rule 
take such an elevated stand on the issue. It might therefore have been 
supposed that changes along these lines would have met with some 
approval; instead they met with hostility, violence and prolonged 
strikes. That being said, it should be borne in mind that eight years 
had passed since May 1968, the students were consequently of another 
generation. Equally, the views expressed then had not been quite con-
sistent since, while on the one hand higher education had been criticized 
310 The education system 
for turning out unemployable graduates, it was also criticized for its 
tendency to assist in the maintenance of a capitalist, consumer society, 
by training the leaders and managers for it. 
Since 1976, however, attitudes have changed again. While it might be 
suggested that the very emphasis put on technological studies has itself 
brought about a gradually less Olympian approach on the part of 
students towards the purpose of study, economic circumstances have 
played an even greater part. The fear of graduate unemployment, so 
much greater even than in 1976, must be the prime factor,50 and as will 
appear,evenaleft-winggovemmentwouldnot be able, or indeed willing, 
to avoid the issue. 
Any student entering upon higher education at this point in time 
would begin with the first cycle, the two-year DEUG. If successful, he 
could then continue his studies into the second cycle, with the licence 
and maitrise as a rule for those intending to enter the teaching profes-
sion. However, with the advent of the a"~te Soisson, he would also 
have the possibility of studying for more vocational maftrises, in three 
categories: (a) maftrise de sciences et techniques (MST), (b) maftrise 
d'informatique appliquee a la gestion (MIAGE), or (c) mattrise de 
sciences de gestion (MSG). On completion of the mattrise he could 
enter the third cycle, where three possibilities present themselves: 
either to prepare for a dipl6me d'etudes superieures specialisees (DESS), 
which, lasting only for a year, would prepare for some form of em-
ployment, with, as part of the training, vocational experience. If on the 
other hand our graduate was of more academic persuasions, he could 
prepare for a doctorat de troisieme cycle (roughly M.Phil.), a three-
year course at most, with a qualification at the end of the first year -
the dipl6me d'etudes approfondies - with initiation into research work 
and, as necessary, laboratory experience. The final stage is still the 
doctorat d'etat, no longer of limitless duration, but to be completed in 
five years, unless any extension is granted. This qualification by thesis 
is still the most prestigious of the purely academic qualifications. 
Yet if we look at the figures of degrees awarded in 1981, at the level of 
the DEUG, it can be seen that the greatest number still come from the 
arts and socialsciences(l 7,627) as opposed to, for example, law (9,502) 
or science (9,441). The same picture is to be found at the licence level: 
law, 9,156; science, 8,371 ;arts and social sciences, 18,569. (L 'Education 
nationale en chiffres, op. cit., p. 35). The trend here shows little sign of 
shifting, and the literary imbalance is far from being seriously corrected. 
This situation could stem from two factors, one that arts subjects, 
possibly easier, or considered so, attracted members of the poorer classes 
who had had more of a struggle to enter higher education, or that the 
prejudice in favour of literary studies has not yet died, and that another 
generation of school teachers may have to pass before a change in attitude 
comes about. 
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One element which is solidly entrenched in the French education 
system is that of competition, whether by marked selection in the 
DEUG or more openly in the concours. This is particularly harsh in the 
competitive examinations for the agregation and the CAPES. For the 
former, in 1982, out of 12,727 who sat the exam (17,430 registered) 
1,251 were successful; for the latter, 29,174 registered for the exam-
inations, with 3,161 posts available (see Note d'information, no. 83-11, 
21 March 1983). Since government policy overall provides for greater 
availability of teaching posts, the ratio of posts to entrants is more 
favourable than it was, but there is still great wastage of energy and 
resources in a system where many will try repeatedly before succeeding. 
Yet this is a system which many French academics find perfectly normal, 
and indeed desirable. 51 
The starkest competition is that which obtains the classes pre-
paratoires, and the entrance examination into one of the grandes ecoles. 
Only those with excellent results at the baccalaureat are admitted to 
these classes, with prepare for three categories: (a) scientific establish-
ments such as the ecole des mines or poly technique, (b) literary, 
essentially the ecoles normales superieures, such as Sevres or Saint-
Cloud, or the ecole des chartes; (c) commercial, the most prestigious 
being the hautes etudes commerciales. The newest addition to these is 
the ecole nationale d'administration, founded in 1945. In this case 
only, the classes preparatoires take place, not as for the others, in the 
fifty most important lycees in Paris and the provinces, but at the 
institut d'etudes politiques, and many graduates from other grandes 
ecoles proceed from there to ENA. 
Even those candidates who fail to enter a grande ecole after the 
classes preparatoires invariably benefit when they enter the universi-
ties, from the training received there. While the standard achieved in 
the grandes ecoles is exceedingly high, and those who come out at the 
top of the examination list at the end of the course have a choice to 
enter directly into, for example, the inspectorat de finances (as often 
happens with graduates of ENA), nevertheless the system 'creams off 
the best brains and guides them away from the universities and a 
possible career in research, and into what are extremely high-powered 
vocational courses. This means that, however democratic the rest of 
the system may become, the process will never be complete while the 
grandes ecoles maintain their system of selection and, it must be 
admitted, their high standard, and while they keep themselves totally 
separate from the rest of higher education. They still may be said to 
fulfil the role for which they were created, to supply the state with its 
leaders, both political and administrative, with results at once beneficial 
perhaps to the planning of the economy, but also harmful to the 
democratic process.52 However, the government has made a beginning 
here to attempt a greater democratization in one grande ecole - the 
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ENA, where the two decrees (82-819, 27 September 1982, and 83-229, 
22 March 1983) provide for an additional concours inteme for the 
admission of people aged forty-one (initially thirty-six) who have spent 
five years as afonctionnaire either for the state, or for a local authority, 
or some other public body. Yet this can be regarded at present as little 
more than a gesture of good will, until the degree of viability becomes 
apparent. 
The reign of A. Saunier-Sette could in certain respects be regarded as 
a clear indication of the suspicion with which Loi d'Orientation was 
regarded by the right. This suspicion is clearly evidenced in relation to 
two matters which were both institutional and specifically political. In 
the first instance, the Loi Sauvage (21 July I 980) required an alteration 
in the conseils d'universite, so that they had to have, in their represen-
tation, 50 per cent of professeurs titulaires de chaires, even although 
this senior category only made up 24 per cent of the university teaching 
staff. By giving this preponderance to senior academics, it was suggested, 
the pre-Faure facu/tes were virtually restored in fact ( as they still existed 
by name). Yet the main purpose of the /oi Sauvage was, in the minister's 
view, to reduce the degree of marxist influence in the universities. The 
second problem related to the Conseil superieur des corps universitaires 
(CSCU) to which A. Saunier-Sette ( decree 15 August 1979) entrusted 
the task of selecting, via competition (concours), those teachers who 
were to enter a career in higher education. There were many criticisms 
of this procedure. It was alleged that it failed to select the best candi-
dates, as the use ,of the concours ought to have ensured. It was also felt 
that new disciplines and new methods were disadvantaged. However, 
one even graver allegation, that of political bias, was made. Candidates 
of known leftist sympathies were thought to suffer in terms of their 
career. It is therefore scarcely surprising that many appeals were made 
for the suppression of the CSCU. 
One other controversial decision taken by the minister concerned 
Paris VIII - Vincennes, which accepts candidates who are not bacheliers 
but who are at least twenty years old, having been in employment and 
paid social security contributions for at least two years. If the candidate 
is over twenty-four, no conditions of entry are made. The idea behind 
Vincennes, a creation of E. Faure, was to make higher education available 
to the working classes, who are still underprivileged in this respect (see 
Table 6.4), with the liberal professions and higher management still 
taking the lion's share of university places. It had been understood that 
Vincennes could only occupy its then buildings until 1978 at the latest. 
Initially, Marne-la-Vallee was to be Paris VIIl's new home, but it was 
thought to be too distant for students in employment. During its Parisian 
phase, Vincennes was always controversial, for reasons which A. Saunier-
Selte found highly displeasing. 
Table 6.4 Evolution of French student population, 1977-81, according to socio-professional category of parents 
Categories 1977-8 1978-9 1979-80 1980-1 
socio-professionnelles 
des parents Effectifs % Effectifs % Effectifs % Effectifs % 
Agriculteurs exploitants 36.664 5.1 37,325 5.1 36,619 4.9 35,912 4.8 
Salaries agricoles 2,806 0.4 2,692 0.4 2,603 0.4 2,612 0.4 
Patrons du commerce et 
de l'industrie 73,261 10.1 72,735 9.9 71,259 9.6 69,352 9.3 
Professions liberales et 
cadres superieurs 226,660 31.3 229,075 31.1 232,058 31.3 231,901 31.0 
Cadres moyens 117,706 16.3 121,706 16.5 121,638 16.4 124,345 16.6 
Employes ~1.117 8.4 61,929 8.4 62,431 8.4 61,097 8.2 
Ouvriers 86.559 12.0 90,075 12.2 92,132 12.4 91,236 12.2 
Personnel de service 5,973 0.8 6,714 0.9 6,769 0.9 7,170 1.0 
Autres categories 43,123 6.0 42,825 5.8 42,061 5.7 46,149 6.2 
Sans profession ~ rentiers 18.612 2.6 19,297 2.6 19,491 2.6 23,488 3.1 
lndetermines 50,396 7.0 52,488 7.1 54,876 7.4 54,060 7.2 
Total 722,877 100.0 736,861 100.0 741,937 100.0 742,322 100.0 
Source: Commission du Bilan: la France en Mai 1981, vol. 4, l'Enseignement et le developpement scientifique, p. 317 
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Le nom de Vincennes etait associe a tant de faits divers. Dans cette 
'cite interdite', le trafic et la consommation de la drogue, les travaux 
practique de 'sexualite de group', les etudiants illettres, un diplome 
delivre a un cheval, regulierement inscrit par des farceurs sous le nom 
qu'il portait sur les champs de course, coexistaient avec des enseigne-
ments souvent serieux et meme parfois brilliants. Ils defrayaient la 
chronique, scandalisant les esprits dits retrogrades, et emerveillant 
les esprits superieurs de Saint-Germain-des-Pres. (A. Saunier-Sette, 
En premiere ligne, p. 146, Pion 1982) 
On its move to Saint-Denis (Creteil academie) Vincennes had to face 
a reduction of its numbers and a loss of its experiemental role and un-
conventionality. The numbers (27,000 in 1983) are still less than at the 
time of removal (32,000); conditions of entry still apply but Vincennes 
is now much less in the public eye. 
These changes, and the spirit in which they were made, have given 
the impression of a departure from the general line of policy adopted 
by earlier ministers, from 1968 to 1976. 
Elle a rompu, peut-etre sans en avoir conscience, avec l'orientation 
liberate commune a ses predecesseurs. Plutot que de prendre appui 
sur la confiance reciproque entre le ministre et les Universites, elle a 
prefere recourir a des demonstrations d'autorite ... Sous sa ferule le 
retour a ete rapide a des pratiques peu compatibles avec l'autonomie 
et fort etrangeres a l'inspiration liberale qui avait prevalu depuis 
1968. (R. Remond,La regle et le consentement, p. 434) 
Since this was the opinion of an undoubted moderate, it was clear that 
A. Saunier-Se He's policies would appeal even less to the left. The question 
was, would the left when in power consider it sufficient to return to the 
status quo ante, er would further reforms be thought desirable? In 
some specific respects it could be suggested that the present government 
has endeavoured to return to the spirit, if not the letter of the 1968 
legislation. The abrogation of the loi Sauvage, together with the abolition 
of the student quorum (already reduced again to 25 per cent in 1980) 
show clearly the direction of the government's intentions. The new 
arrangements to replace the CSCU provide another example. As already 
mentioned, there had been many requests for its removal, and this was 
done on 24 August 1982 ( decree no. 82-738) when the CSCU was re-
placed by a conseil superieur proviso ire des universites, and subsequently 
by the CSU (conseil superieur des universites). This body is comprised 
of a number of sections and sub-sections relating to disciplines, whose 
members are elected. The task of these sections or sub-sections is essen-
tially to pronounce on candidatures for posts, for which a jury is selected. 
The jury selects approved candidates and submits these to the appropriate 
(sub-)section. The dossiers of approved candidates are then passed for 
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consideration to a commission d'etablissement et de specialistes (CES), 
who would take into account the views of the conseil scientifique and 
of the candidate's own UER council, before arriving at a decision. 
However, if no further steps had been taken by a government com-
mitted to a policy of democratization of education, it might be thought 
that the government was only tinkering with the system. As already 
mentioned, A. Savary took the view that the Loi d'Orientation had not 
given entire satisfaction. It was therefore proposed to bring in legislation 
which would revise the Loi d 'Orientation in the autumn of 1982. Savary 
set up a commission under the presidency of C. Jeantet to prepare a 
text. This was not put before the assemblee nationale until April 1983, 
after eighteen months of enquiry and discussion with all interested 
parties (see Cahiers de !'education nationale no. 15, May 1983, 'Dossier: 
Le projet de reforme des enseignements superieurs, pp. 3 ff.). The bill 
emphasized the principal concepts underlying Faure's legislation, pluri-
disciplinarity, participation, and autonomy. The proposal that aroused 
the greatest controversy however was undoubtedly Jhat of selection. 
While the desire of the government was to increase the number of 
students (bacheliers) entering university for the DEUG (to be retained 
in a modified form much more geared to orientation), there were some 
reservations: (1) If the course were specifically vocational (i.e. classes 
preparatoires, IUTs etc.), then selection would be permitted; (2) at the 
second cycle, the size of the institution and the possibility of jobs at 
the end of training could affect selection. 
Selection is not a thing easily introduced in France, where its supposed 
absence in the university system ends in the most brutal of all - selection 
by failure. Since 1968, it has existed in two main forms: (a) the type of 
baccalaureat obtained, categoryC (mainly scientific) being the one which, 
overall, is most advantageous for future success in higher education, and 
(b) the system adopted for a time whereby Parisian universities could 
only take in the same number of students as they had been allowed in 
the previous year. The result in 1977 and 1978 was what was caustically, 
but aptly, named 'la selection par le sprint'. This was the ultimate 
absurdity: the government, rather than face up to a political taboo, 
obliged the Parisian universities to take th~ first applicants who presented 
themselves, regardless of suitability, and provincial universities to operate 
the 'open door' system. 
It thus seemed as if Savary were prepared to resolve this problem 
once and for all. Yet this solution was not satisfactory for the SNESup 
as it was 'le maintien de procedures de selection autoritaire', at the 
second cycle, and the union asked for its rejection (see SNESup docu-
ment, Loi sur l'enseignement superieur, s.l.n.d.,p.iv). For others,notably 
L. Schwartz, it is the indispensable ingredient which has made, for 
example, the IUTs so successful (see L. Schwartz, Pour sauver l'Univer-
site, Seuil, 1983, pp. 46-8). Selection still appears in the text of the 
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final law, but given the hostility it arouses, it is doubtful whether it will 
be put into effect. 
Concern was also felt about the structural organization of decision-
making. There was a fear that the unions would take over these structures, 
particularly in cases where unions imposed voting discipline on their 
members. Senior academics obviously feared that their voice would be 
swamped by their younger, more politicized colleagues. (See Liberation, 
8 December 1983; Point, 19 December 1983, 'Loi Savary: deux uni-
versitaires s'expliquent', pp. 34-5 .) (There was undoubtedly also dis-
pleasure at the phasing out - in due course - of the prestigious doctorat 
d'Etat, and the maintenance of the doctorat de troisieme cycle.) 
In terms of curriculum too, there were worries about the uniformity 
required by the bill. Teachers of law felt that their courses could not 
fit well into the proposed uniform structures. Students too feared for 
the lowering of their professional qualifications; there were protests, 
demonstrations, strikes and, in Paris, violence which immediately caused 
the old fears about May 1968 to rise again. Savary for a time seemed 
very isolated in his position, but in due course his legislation received its 
two rather hasty readings form Parliament, has been approved in the 
main by the Conseil Constitutionnel, and has formal.ly been law since 
27 January 1984. 
The organization of the new universities and UFR are not unlike the 
Faure structures. The university will be governed by an elected president, 
with a five-year non-renewable mandate. He, with the aid of his bureau, 
would preside over three elective bodies: (1) Conseil d'administration 
(composed of 40-45 per cent teachers and rese!lrchers, 20-30 per cent 
external personalities, 20-25 per cent students representatives, I 0-15 per 
cent non-academic staff) to decide on university policy, and to vote the 
budget; (2) Conseil scientifique, 50-70 per cent teachers/researchers, 
7.5-12.5 per cent students of the Je cycle, 10-30 per cent external 
personalities (who may come from other universities), to attend to 
matters of research, allocation of money for research etc.; (3) Conseil 
des etudes et de la vie universitaire, 75-80 per cent researchers and 
teachers, and students (including formation continue) in equal 
proportions, 10-15 per cent external personalities, with responsibility 
for formation continue, organization and apportioning of teaching 
courses, and student activities. At UFR level, a similar structure, with 
an elected director and council, of which 20-50 per cent may be from 
outside. 
In many ways therefore, the mixture is as before, except that the 
greater emphasis on formation, formation continue and inter-disciplin-
arity could be regarded as a possible advance on Faure. Yet the emphasis 
on vocational training can go too far, and if it is too narrowly oriented, 
then it will be no more helpful in solving the problem of unemployment 
than more academic forms of study. There is also a danger that those 
universities who are prepared to go along with the idea of close co-
The education system 317 
operation with outside bodies in business and industry (see art. 43) may 
themselves lose their own identity and run the risk, as now seems to be 
happening in some British universities, of becoming obsessed by the 
profit motive over and above longer-term considerations. 
If however any success is to be achieved, then further changes (sacri-
fices might be a better word) will certainly be required of the university 
academic staff. Some changes are already being implemented, which 
will be regarded with relative favour or with hostility depending on age, 
seniority or union affiliation (see Le Monde, 1 July 1983). The idea of 
a single corps of teachers has been rejected, probably on grounds of 
expense, yet in other directions, attempts are being introduced to render 
the differences between junior and senior less blatant. One such relates 
to hours of work: all teachers, whatever their status, will undertake, in 
a thirty-two week academic year, 128 lectures or 192 seminars, or 288 
hours' practical work, and they have to be spread out over a working 
week. This bears hardest on the professors, who in the past were required 
to do three hours' teaching per week in a twenty-five week year. As 
with many proposals of this kind, it does not take into account the fact 
that in some disciplines, a seminar may take more preparation and use 
up more energy than a formal lecture, and it also presupposes that 
professors will accept the ruling, and not stipulate for what they regard 
as their prerogative of cours magistraux. 
The other ruling is closely related to the first, and it concerns residence 
near the university where a teacher works. There will now be a require-
ment for university teachers to live within reasonable distance from 
their place of work. This is a very necessary proviso, if students' work 
is in the future to be more vocational and if there is to be more guidance 
for them. It is presumably also intended to deal with that perennial 
phenomenon, the 'turbo-prof who, in its most exaggerated form, arrives 
from Paris at a provincial university early one day, does the required 
load of teaching in that day, and is not seen again on the premises until 
the following week. Of course, derogations (exceptions) are allowed, 
but if orientation is to function effectively, then this regulation will 
have to be strictly applied. 
One serious question remains to be raised. If the left is determined 
to see many more young people attending university, with more contact 
between staff and students than has hitherto been the case, one of two 
things must happen: either all teachers will have to be prepared for a 
much heavier workload, which is doubtful, or the government will have 
to provide more staff, and more financing; and in view of the ever-
increasing budget, it is difficult to see how much farther it can go. Yet 
if one of these two things is not achieved, the Loi Savary could be as 
unsuccessful as the left consider the Loi d'Orientation to have been. 
Anything resembling a conclusion in present circumstances is a virtual 
absurdity. In almost every area of education, reforms are being 
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considered, voted on, or put into practice. From the ideological view-
point of the socialist party, some are much more urgent than others. The 
almost indecent haste with which all this is being done might make the 
British onlooker forget thatM. Mitterrand is in power until 1988! There 
seems little doubt of the government's sincerity53 in endeavouring to 
carry out policies of democratization, decentralization, and autonomy. 
The motivation for the precipitousness with which it is acting does need 
more consideration. On the one hand, the government is going through 
an unpopular period, and if the recession does not right itself, the 
unpopularity will remain. The danger here for M. Mitterrand and his 
government is that the assemblee nationale will be less co-operative 
after 1988, in which case all radical policies should be in position by 
then, and since they have their own logic and cohesion, it might be 
difficult for an incoming right-wing majority to eradicate them. 
Another, more long-term motivation could be the need, as far as 
possible, not merely to change policies, but to transform attitudes, 
mentalities and values to fit them. Some of these changes in attitude 
will, it is hoped, come about by the practice of more participation, 
responsibility, and democracy in school. Yet added to this there is also 
to be an ideological, though not a spiritual, content. 
The onlooker cannot but be struck with the degree of confidence 
that this matter has been taken up with by the present government. 
Under the last administration there seemed to be no confidence as to 
how the question of values should be treated.54 It would clearly be 
naive to assume that because the left won the 1981 election, certainty 
has returned to society. It could probably be alleged that modern society 
still has no more than a consensus of uncertainty. Yet the government 
does seem to have a clear picture of the values it would like society to 
adopt (see, for example, Note de service 26 May 1983, Sensibilislltion 
des eleves aux problemes du Tiers-Monde). 
Yet it is not just a question of internationalism which is relevant 
here. Under the auspices of the reforme Haby, geography and history 
were to be taught together, but also with instruction civique added in. 
Since the implementation of the reforme Haby, chronological history 
has been out of fashion, and it has been replaced by a kind of historical 
sociology based on the Annales school of history. The consequence of 
this has been that the ignorance of pupils as to 'what happened when' 
in their own national history is very substantial (see Le Quotidien de 
Paris, 12 November 1983, IFRES-Sondage). There were misgivings 
when this pedagogi.e de reveil was first introduced, and these were 
voiced more forcefully by eminent historians at a debate organized by 
Historia in May 1980. There were calls for a return to l'histoire evene-
mentielle from P. Goubert, E. Leroy Ladurie, J. Tulard (see Historia, 
May 1980, pp. 6-9). These misgivings received support from the highest 
source, the president himself, who proclaimed himself 'scandalise et 
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angoisse par la perte de la memoire collective des nouvelles generations' 
(Quotidien de Paris, 31 August 1983). The findings of the rapport 
Girault indicated that one in three instituteurs never teach history at 
primary school, and that in the colleges many of the teachers are not 
trained to teach it at primary level. Therefore, it is suggested that there 
should be a return to basic knowledge of national and regional history, 
and that the college is the place where knowledge of other cultures 
should begin. The /ycee should help to form an analytical mentality, 
and extra hours should be given to history in LEP and LT. Teachers 
should also receive an appropriate training. 
This alarm and distress about the teaching of history does have its 
positive side, in the sense that it has permitted the government to make 
clear its priorities in the matter. There can be little solidarity amongst 
citizens if they do not realize why they belong together, and a knowledge 
of this is indispensable. 
Yet there is a darker side to this question, specifically raised by Leroy 
Ladurie, namely the danger of politicization. The abolition of neutrality 
within educational establishments has led to politicization, to violence, 
but also to an impossibility of consensus. There has been of late a dis-
quieting tendency for teachers to give way to partisan feelings at the 
expense of historical accuracy. The matter came to the fore in 1983 
when a number of school textbooks were published for the terminale 
year covering the period 1945-1982. The most flagrant was that produced 
under the auspices of the PCF by Editions Sociales, entitled L 'Histoire 
du temps present, 1939-1982. Yet in the opinion of J.-F. Revel, more 
dangerous are the texts which give no indication of their allegiances. 
Revel ... oncludes 'L'alienation ideologique d'une grande partie du corps 
enseignant provoque une decadence de la conscience professionnelle', 
unthinkable in the 1950s and 1960s, and modem periods of history 
should not be the object of such textbooks, since there is no consensus 
on the very recent past (Midi-Libre, 29 September 1983 J .-F. Revel, 
'Ecole: le nouveau clericalisme'). 
It is undoubtedly healthy that these issues have been raised, and it is 
to be hoped that republican values rather than politicization will prevail. 
Otherwise, instead of the republicanism of J. Ferry, France will suffer 
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its political analyses. It publishes documentary specials on all major 
elections, and also periodic selections of relevant articles in its Dossiers 
et documents series. Le Matin (daily) is pro-socialist and readable. La 
Croix is well informed and not so partisan as its title suggests. Among 
the weeklies, Le Nouvel Observateur caters for the more intellectual 
socialist reader, whereasL 'Express and Le Point are of liberal persuasion; 
L 'Expansion is aimed at cadres and is invaluable for its reporting of the 
social and economic conjuncture. Le Nouvel Economiste is similarly 
useful. Annual summaries of developments in the major areas of French 
society come in L 'Annee politique, economique, sociale et diplomatique, 
edited by E. Bonnefous and J.B. Duroselle and published by PUF and 
Editions du Grand Siecle. Of the main French reviews dealing with 
contemporary politics and society Pouvoirs (each number devoted to 
one theme) and Projet are both penetrating and concise. Revue fran~aise 
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de science politique is more diffuse and academic. In English, West 
European Politics is usually interesting. The best source of rapid infor-
mation on new publications on contemporary France is the Review of 
the Association for the Study of Modern and Contemporary France, an 
interdisciplinary grouping welcoming all who are interested in modem 
France. Details from Dr P. Morris, Politics Dept., Nottingham University. 
Chapter 2 
Economy: The best historical introductions are T. Kemp, Economic 
Forces in French History (Dobson, 1971) and The French Economy, 
1913-39 (Longmans, 1972). See also the clear study of C. Kindleberger, 
Economic Growth in France and Britain (Harvard UP, 1964 ). On post-
war growth, B. Guibert, La Mutation industrielle de la France (2 vols, 
INSEE, 1976), is wide-ranging and well-documented. J.-J. Carre, P. 
Dubois and E. Malinvaud, French Economic Growth (Stanford UP, 
1976) is a more technical discussion. J. Fourastie, Les trente glorieuses 
(Fayard, 1979) is an enthusiastic account, and R. Kuisel, Capitalism 
and the State in Modern France (CUP, 1981) takes a long-term view. 
Recent analyses of the economy include A. Cotta, La France et l'im-
peratif mondial (PUF, 1978) and a wide-ranging series of essays on 
policy in S. Cohen and P. Gourevitch (eds), France in the Troubled 
World Economy (Butterworth, 1982). 
On introductions to contemporary economic structures, P. Maillet, 
La Structure economique de la France (PUF, 1975) is brief; J. Sheahan, 
Introduction to the French Economy (Columbus, Merrill, 1969) brings 
a more political analysis. J. Albertini, L 'Economie franraise - initiation 
(Editions Ouvrieres, I 978) presents the topic in a novel and provocative 
way. J. Hough, The French Economy (Croom Helm, 1982) is a concise 
introduction. Basic information on industry is in Ministere de l 1ndustrie, 
Traits fondamentaux du systeme industriel fran9ais ( 1983). B. Bellon, 
L 'Industrie en France (Flammarion, 1983) is very detailed. 
On agriculture an invaluable introduction is J. Klatzmann, L 'Agri-
culture franraise (PUF, 1978). 
The relationship between economy and state has received much 
treatment, most of it centring on the theme of planning. P. Bauchet, 
La Planification fran9aise (5th ed., Seuil, 1966) seems aware of the 
political dimension of planning, as does J. Sheahan, Promotion and 
Control of Industry in Post-war France (Harvard UP, 1963). Of 
accounts by planners, Y. Ullmo, La Planification en France (Dalloz, 
1975) is readable. J. McArthur and B. Scott, Industrial Planning in 
France (Harvard UP. 1969) shows the structural limits to intervention, 
while J. Zysman, Political Strategies for Industrial Order - State, Market 
and Industry in France (University of California Press, 1977) builds up 
its theory from a detailed study. For international comparisons see 
J. Hayward and M. Watson (eds), Planning, Politics and Public Policy 
(Cambridge UP, 1975) and J. Hayward and 0. Narkiewicz (eds),Planning 
in Europe (Croom Helm, 1978). 
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As regards left-orientated critiques of contemporary structures, 
F. Morin, La Structure financiere du capitalisme franrais (Calmann-
Levy, 1974) is a sophisticated neo-marxist analysis. The PCF view is in 
P. Boccara (ed.), Etudes sur le capitalisme monopoliste d'etat, sa crise et 
son issue (Editions Sociales, 1973). Cf. also PCF, Le Capitalisme mono-
poliste d'etat (2nd ed., Editions Sociales, 1976). A. Gauron, Histoire 
economique et sociale de la Ve. Republique* (Maspero, 1983) is a 
readable left critique of recent developments. 
Invaluable instruments for keeping up with developments in all fields 
of the economy are the ongoing INSEE collections, with a wealth of 
documentation and analyses that are more accessible to non-specialists 
than might be supposed. The main series are D - Demographie; E -
Entreprises; C - Comptabilite; M - Menages and R - Regions. The 
yearly Tableaux de l'Economie franraise (INSEE) is a very handy con-
densed source of information. 
Social stratification: The best historical introduction is G. Dupeux, 
French Society, 1789-1970 (Methuen, 1976). There are interesting 
documents, but a rather shallow presentation, in a work dealing with 
the contemporary period: G. Vincent,Les Franrais, 1945-75: chronique 
et structures d 'une societe (Masson, 1977). C. Quin, Classes sociales et 
union du peuple de France (Editions Sociales, 1976) gives the PCF line. 
A. Granou, La Bourgeoisie financiere au pouvoir (Maspero, 1977) is 
from a more leftist viewpoint. J. Marceau, Class and Status in France* 
(Oxford UP, 1977) is vastly informative and rather eclectic in its leftish 
approach. 
On particular classes or fractions P. Birnbaum et al., La C/asse 
dirigeante fran9aise (PUF, 1978) tries to demonstrate empirically the 
nature of the ruling class. Cf. also here his Sommets de l'etat (Seuil, 
1977). C. Baudelot, R. Establet and J. Malemort, La Petite Bourgeoisie 
en France (Maspero, 1974) is a provocative study, hostile to its subject. 
M. Roy, Les Commerrants: entre la revolte et la modernisation (Seuil, 
1971) pinpoints with no great sympathy the plight of the petit com-
merrant. J.P. Bachy ,Les Cadres en France (Colin, 1971) has concise 
analysis and documents. M. Faure, Les Paysans dans la societe franraise* 
(Colin, 1966) is a good introduction. B. Lambert, Les Paysans dans la 
lutte des classes (Seuil, 1970) presents the articulate view of a leftist 
farmer and union leader. The new middle class is studied subtly in 
R. Mouriaux and G. Grunberg, L 'Univers politique et syndical des 
cadres* (FNSP, 1979) and set alongside the old in G. Lavau et al., 
L 'Univers politique des classes moyennes (FNSP, 1983). 
On elites generally M. Vaughan, Social Change in France (Robertson, 
1980) is clear. Especially illuminating is the work of E. Suleiman, 
notably Elites in French Society (Prince ton UP, 1978) and Politics, 
Power and Bureaucracy (idem, 1974). A wide range of themes are 
studied in J. Howorth and P. Cerny (eds), Elites in French Society 
(Pinter, 1982). 
On the working class P. Gavi, Les Ouvriers (Mercure de France, 
1970) is an impressionistic, leftist view, very much inspired by 1968. 
A more sober scientific analysis comes in G. Adam et al., L 'Ouvrier 
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fran9ais en 1970 (Colin, 1970). Access to the debate about the changing 
nature of the working class can be had through the writings of S. Mallet, 
notably La Nouvelle Classe ouvriere (4th ed., Seuil, 1969) and A. 
Touraine, La Societe post-industrielle (Denoel, 1969). There is valuable 
work by D. Gallie,/n Search of the New Working Class (CUP, 1978) and 
a useful survey-based study in R. De Angelis, Blue Collar Workers and 
Politics - A French Paradox (Croom Helm, 1982) 
Political culture: Most of the general works on the Fifth Republic 
listed in chapter I have some pages on this, but book-length studies 
are rare. The best start is S. Hoffmann (ed.), In Search of France* 
(Harper & Row, 1963), especially Hoffmann's own essay on 'Paradoxes 
of the French Political Community'. Hoffmann has further developed 
his ideas in Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s (New York, 
Viking, 1974). Other studies include E. Deutsch, D. Lindon and P. Weil, 
Les Families politiques (Editions de Minuit, 1966), brief, but brings out 
ideological cleavages, and the provocative, pro-Gaullist view of C. Moraze, 
Les Fran9ais et la republique (Colin, 1956), written at the apogee of the 
Fourth Republic and catching well the attitudes of the day. P. Fougey-
rollas, La Conscience politique dans la France contemporaine (Denoel, 
1963) insists on the tension between national consensus and partisan 
values. H. Waterman, Political Change in Contemporary France 
(Columbus, Merrill, 1969) sees political culture with an 'end of ideology' 
problematic and thus produces a very ideological, transatlantic view. 
P. Avril, Politics in France (Penguin, 1969) has some lucid insights 
from this Mendesist analyst. 
On relations between state and citizen, the most authoritative work 
is by M. Crozier, notably his Societe bloquee (Seuil, 1970) and Le 
Phenomene bureaucratique (Seuil, 1963). On religious cleavages there 
is both sharp analysis and plentiful documentation in A. Coutrot and 
F.-G. Dreyfus, Les Forces religieuses dans la societe fran9aise* (Colin, 
1965) and R. Remond (ed.), Forces religieuses et attitudes politiques 
dans la France contemporaine* (Colin, 1965). A special tradition is 
historically studied in depth in Remond's L 'Anticlericalisme en France: 
de 1815 a nos jours (Fayard, 1976). 
Chapter 3 
Central government: works listed above on the Fifth Republic all contain 
useful accounts of the topic dealt with in this chapter, to which should 
be added an indispensable work of reference: D. Maus, Textes et 
documents sur la pratique des institutions de la Ve Republique, 2nd 
edition, (Documentation fran~aise, 1982). The periodicals Projet, 
particularly the articles entitled 'La conjoncture politique ', and Pouvoirs 
may always be consulted with profit; in the latter, the 'Chronique 
institutionnelle' of P. Avril and J. Gicquel is a goldmine of information. 
The chroniques for 1976-1982 have just been issued in book form, 
PUF, 1983, and may be more easily consulted there. An excellent 
analysis is provided in F. de Baecque, Qui gouverne la France? (PUF, 
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1976), which contains a selection of key documents up to the early 
years of Giscard's presidency. The Gaullist view of the constitution is 
typified by M. Debre and J.-L. Debre, Le Pouvoir politique (Seghers, 
1976) and J.-L. Debre,La Constitution de lave Republique (PUF, 
1975). Among the many works of M. Duveraer, see in particular La ve 
Republique (5th ed.,PUF, 1974); see also informative study by L. Hamon, 
Une Republique presidentielle (2 vols, Bordas, 197 5, 1977). 
On the role of the president of the republic, a useful introduction is 
provided by J. Baguenard, J.-Ch. Maout and R. Muzellec, Le President 
de la ve Republique* (Colin, 1970). J. Massot, La Presidence de la 
republique en France (Documentation franvaise, 1977) situates the 
presidency in its historical context. B. Tricot et al., De Gaulle et le 
service de l'etat (Pion, 1977) give a fascinating, if discreet, account of 
the General's presidency; see also, S. Cohen, Les Conseillers du President 
de la Republique de Charles de Gaulle a Valery Giscard d'Estaing (PUF, 
1980). 
On the role of the prime minister, see J. Massot, Le Chef du gou-
vernement en France (Documentation fran~aise, 1979) for an historical 
approach, and for the services of the prime minister's office, see M. Long, 
Les services du Premier ministre (Presses universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, 
1981 ). 
For basic introductions on the role of parliament, see J.-Ch. Maout 
and R. Muzellec, Le Parlemen t sous la ve Republique ( Colin, 1971) and 
Documents d'etudes, no. 14, Le Controle parlementaire (Documentation 
franvaise, 1970). The role of the deputy and the various constraints put 
upon his/her liberty is well described by J .-C. Masclet, Un depute, 
pourquoi faire? (PUF, 1982). 
The constitutional vicissitudes of de Gaulle's republic are covered by 
Pb. Braud, Les Crises politiques de la ve Republique (Colin, 1970). · 
For an introduction to a study of the conseil constitutionnel see 
G. Dupuis, J. Georgel and J. Moreau, Le Conseil constitutionnel (Colin, 
1970), L. Favoreu and L. Philip, Le Conseil constitutionnel (PUF, 
1978); a more detailed study by the same authors, Les Grandes 
Decisions du conseil constitutionnel (Sirey, 1975) makes clear 
the political implications of the conseil's activities. The mon-
strously expensive Recueil des decisions du conseil constitutionnel, 
(Imprimerie nationale) published annually, is worth consulting as a 
work of reference. On the conseil d'etat, the most up-to-date study in 
English is that of M. Rendel, The Administrative Functions of the 
French Conseil d'Etat (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970). A collective 
historical study, A. Parodi (ed.), Le Conseil d'etat, 1799-1974 (CNRS, 
1974) provides a clear account of its controversial decisions. See also, 
M-.-C. Kessler, Le Conseil d'etat (Colin, 1968) and P. Escoube, Les 
Grands Corps de l'etat (2nd ed., PUF, 1977). 
On the central administration (ministries, etc.), the clearest (and best 
set out) introduction is L. Franvois, Les Institutions politiqua et ad-
ministratives de la France (Hachette, 1976). At a higher level, see 
B. Gournay et al., Administration publique* (PUF, 1967), G. Belorgey, 
Le Gouvernement et ['administration de la France* (2nd ed., Colin, 
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1970). F. de Baecque, L 'Administration centrale de la France (Colin, 
1973) is a highly technical study. On the finance ministry see X. Beau-
champs, Un Etat dans l'etat? le ministere de l'economie et des finances 
(Bordas, 1976). Les Notices de la documentation franraise: Finances 
publiques (Documentation fran~aise, 1974). For a brilliant essay on the 
governing elites, seeP. Birnbaum, Les Sommetsde l'etat (Seuil, 1977);see 
also P. Antoni and J.-D. Antoni, Les Ministres de la ve Republique (PUF, 
1976) for a detailed sociological study of the Fifth Republic's political 
class. 
On the media, a useful accountis to be found in J. Ardagh, France in 
the 1980s (Penguin, 1982). A highly technical and comprehensive 
exposition of the problems, the legal situation and the main theories 
of communication is provided by F. Balle, Institutions et publics des 
moyens d'information (Montchrestien, 1973). See also R. Cayrol, La 
Presse ecrite et audiovisuelle (PUF, 1973). On radio and television, see 
G. Dupuis and J. Raw:, l'ORTF* (Colin, 1970) for a good introduction 
to the ORTF J. Chevallier, La Radio-television entre deux reformes* 
(LGDJ, 1973) and R. Thomas, Broadcasting and Democracy in France* 
(Bradford UP, 1976) for an excellent analysis of the political dimensions 
of the subject. 
On the press see J. L. Lepigeon and D. Wolton,L 'Information demain, 
2nd edition (Documentation fran~aise, 1983) and P. Albert, La Presse 
franraise* (Documentation fran~aise, 1978); but B. Voyenne, La Presse 
dans la societe contemporaine (Colin, 1970) is still very well worth 
reading, together with his L 'Information en France (McGraw-Hill-France, 
1972). 
Local government: There are good introductory works in English, 
notably F. Ridley and J. Blondel, Public Administration in France* 
(Routledge & Kegim Paul, 1969). Two older works which are still of 
interest are B .. Chap¥Jlan, Introduction to French Local Government 
(Allen & Unwin, 1953) and The Prefects and Pro-,incial France (Allen & 
Un win, 195 5), the latter to be supplemented with a well-researched and 
clear study, H. Machin, The Prefect in French Public Administration 
(Croom Helm, 1977). M. Kesselman, The Ambiguous Consensus (New 
York, Knopf, 1967) shows up the realities of small communes, while 
J. Lagroye, Societe et politique: J. Chaban-Delmas a Bordeaux (Pedone, 
1973) is an excellent study of a large town. Pouvoirs 24 ( 1983) 'Le 
Maire' has both theoretical analysis and practical examples. Useful 
primers are P. Richard and M. Cotten, Les Communes franraises 
d'aujourd'hui (PUF, 1983) and J. Auby, Le Commissaire de la Repub-
lique, (PUF, 1983). See also P. Bernard, L 'Etat et la decentralisation -
du pref et au commissaire de la Republique (Documentation fran~aise, 
1983). 
There is an invaluable collection prepared by the ADELS (a group of 
local government specialists close to the PS), aimed mainly at activists, 
but short and easy to read. All are published by Syros. Cf. especially 
G. Gontcharoff and S. Milano, La Decentralisation ( 1982); R. Beaunez 
and J.-P. Muret, La Commune - nouvelles competences, gestion et 
democratie locale ( 1982) and also Les municipales - lois nouvelles, 
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elections, organisation communale (1982); P. Barge et al., L 1nter-
vention economique de la commune (1983). P. Gourevitch, Paris and 
the Provinces - The Politics of Local Government Reform in France 
(Allen & Unwin, 1980) is a readable overview, to be followed by the 
more theoretical P. Gremion, Le Pouvoir peripherique (Seuil, 1976). 
An excellent overview is Y. Meny, Centralisation et decentralisation 
dans le debat politique fran~ais 1945-69 (LGDJ, 1974). 
Inevitably, in the logic of centralization, there are many works on 
public administration which have substantial sections on local (subaltern) 
government. C. Debbasch, L 'Administration au pouvoir (Calmann-Levy, 
1969) is brief but telling. B. Gournay et al., Administration publique* 
(PUF, 1967) is a thorough textbook, as is G. Belorgey, Le Gouverne-
ment et /'administration de la France* (2nd ed., Colin, 1970), which 
brings out well the weight of centralization. For useful comparative 
treatments see J. Lagroye and V. Wright (eds),Local Government in 
Britain and France (Allen & Unwin, 1979); S. Tarrow, Between Center 
and Periphery - Grassroots Politicians in Italy and France (Yale UP, 
1977) and D. Ashford, British Dogmatism and French Praf(matism, * 
(Allen & Unwin, 1982). 
On regions, one needs to approach the problem from an economic 
as well as from a political angle; much pioneer work was done by 
J.-F. Gravier, notably L 'Amenagement du territoire et l'avenir des 
regions fran~aises (Flammarion, 1964 ). There is a readable general 
study by an economic geographer: I. Thompson, Modern France: a 
Social and Economic Geography (Butterworth, 1970). N. Hansen, 
French Regional Planning (Edinburgh UP, 1968) is written from a 
planner's point of view, but is rewarding if at times fairly technical. On 
a more polemical level, J.-J. Servan-Schreiber, Le Pouvoir regional 
(Grasset, 1970) presents a reformist view; a socialist-cum-autonomist 
viewpoint is developed in a series of works by R. Lafont, notably 
Autonomie: de la region a l'autogestion (Gallimard, 1976). 
Pouvoirs 19 ( 19&1 )* 'Regions' is a fascinating survey of the problems 
involved in the new laws. M. Philipponneau, La grande Affaire -
decentralisation et regionalisation (Calmann-Levy, 1981) gives a militant 
view, and a sceptical one is found in J. Vie,La decentralisation sans 
illusion (PUF, 1982). On particular regions, R. Dulong, La Question 
bretonne (FNSP, 1975) is a sophisticated marxist treatment. 
On Corsica a short introduction is J. Renucci, La Corse (PUF, 1982) 
while R. Ramsay, The Corsican Time Bomb (Manchester UP, 1982) 
is a more topical treatment. 
Chapter 4 
The most useful introductions to French parties are F. Borella, Les 
Partis politiques* (2nd ed., Seuil, 1975) which is lucid and critical, and 
J. Frearii, Political Parties and Elections in the Fifth French Republic* 
(Hurst, 1978) which is well documented but less incisive. More up to 
date works are F. Wilson,French Political Parties under the Fifth 
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Republic (New York Praeger, 1982) and D. Bell (ed.), Contemporary 
French Political Parties (Croom Helm, 1981). P. Campbell, French 
Electoral Systems and Elections since 1789 (Faber, 1966) is a concise 
outline. It can be supplemented by F. Bon, Les Elections en France 
(Seuil, 1978) and the handy reference book C. Leleu, Geographie des 
elections fran~aises (PUF, 1971). A classic study of electoral behaviour 
is G. Michelat and M. Simon, Classe, religion et comportement politique 
(FNSP, 1977). Recent trends in the electorate are revealed in J. Cap-
devielle ( ed.), France de gauche, vote a droite (FNSP, 1981). On women 
and politics J. Mossuz-Lavau and M. Sineau, Enquete sur les femmes et 
lapolitiqueenFrance* (PUF, 1983) breaks new ground. Election results 
are analysed in detail in the Dossiers et Documents series of Le Monde, 
and there are further studies in the series of books edited by H. Penniman 
and published by the American Enterprise Institute of Washington: 
The Presidential Elections of 1974 ( 1975) and The French National 
Assembly Elections of 19 78 ( 1980). 
The most important recent party publications, which state theoretical 
and current policy stances, are: Rassemblement pour la Republique, 
A tout France Roudil, 1980); Parti Republicain, Le Projet republicain 
(Flammarion, 1978); Centre des democrates sociaux, L 'Autre Solution 
(Editions Sociales, 1976); Parti socialiste, Projet socialiste (Flammarion, 
1980). There is a handy version of the CPG introduced by G. Marchais: 
Parti communiste fram;:ais, Programme commun de gouvernement 
(Editions Sociales, 1972). 
The right: An essential introduction is R. Remond, The French 
Right Wing from 1815 to de Gaulle (Pennsylvania UP, 1969), which is 
absolutely lucid and should be followed by M. Anderson, Conservative 
Politics in France (Allen & Unwin, 1973). 
On Gaullism the most authoritative work is that of J. Charlot, 
notably Le Gaullisme (Colin, 1970) and The Gaullist Phenomenon 
(Allen & Unwin, 1971). A. Hartley, Gaul/ism (Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1972) offers a sympathetic view. Earlier works, of a more intro-
ductory character but still worth looking at, are: P. Avril, UDR et 
Gaullistes (PUF, 1971) and P. Viansson-Ponte, Les Gaullistes (Seuil, 
1963). J. Touchard, Le Gaullisme, 1940-69 (Seuil, 1978) sets Gaull-
ism, approvingly, in the context of French nationalism. An early PCF 
view is in H. Claude\ Gaullisme et grand capital (Editions Sociales, 
1961 ). A Trotskyist viewpoint is in J.-M. Brohm et al., Le Gaullisme et 
apres: etat fort et fascisation (Maspero, 1974). P. Crisol and Y. Lhomeau, 
La Machine RPR (Intervalle Fayolle, 1978) has much up-to-date and 
solid information on Gaullism under Chirac. Chariot's Le Gaullisme 
d'opposition (Fayard, 1983) illuminates the earlier phase of the move-
ment. Pouvoirs 28 ( 1984) is devoted to the RPR. There is an informative 
biography of its leader in T. Desjardins, Un inconnu nomme Chirac 
(Table Ronde, 1983). 
On Giscardism, literature is beginning to grow. J.-C. CQlliard, Les 
Republicains independants (PUF, 1971) is a thorough early study, to 
be supplemented by a brilliant sociological interpretation of the differ-
ences within the right, P. Birnbaum, Les Sommets de l'etat (Seuil, 1977). 
V. Giscard d'Estaing defines his own position in Democratie fran~aise 
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(Fayard, 1976). B. Lecomte and C. Sauvage, Les Giscardiens (Albin 
Michel, 1978) has much up-to-date information. R.E.M. Irving, Christian 
Democracy in France (Allen & Unwin, 1973) is clear and thorough. 
Essays on various aspects are in the special number of Pouvoirs 9 ( 1979) 
and in V. Wright (ed.), Continuity and Change in France (Allen & 
Unwin, 1984). J.-C. Petitfils,La democratie giscardienne (PUF, 1981), 
covers doctrine and organization. 
Radicalism has had several studies, starting with the brief introduc-
tion by a supporter: C. Nicolet, Le Radicalisme (PUF, 1974). J.-T. 
Nordmann, Histoire des Radicaux, 1820-1973 (Table Ronde, 1974) is 
by a collaborator of J.-J. Servan-Schreiber, whose own Le Manifeste 
(Firmin-Didot, 1977) is a concise statement of current positions. 
Mendesism is discussed in the special number of Pouvoirs 27 (1983) and 
in J. Lacouture, Mendes-France (Seuil, 1981). MRG positions are found 
in M. Crepeau, L 'A venir en face (Seuil, 1981 ). 
The left: G. Lefranc, Les Gauches en France, 1789-1972 (Payot, 
1973) is a long-term study. Studies covering more recent time-spans 
include J. Touchard, La Gauche en France depuis 1900 (Seuil, 1977), 
with its vast grasp of detail and lack of sympathy; F.-G. Dreyfus, His-
toire des Gauches en France, 1940-74 (Grasset, 1975) from a hostile, 
fairly pro-Gaullist viewpoint, and two works by socialists: J. Poperen, 
L 'Unite de la gauche, 1965-73 (Fayard, 1975), a work of meticulous 
detail and R. Verdier, PS-PC: une lutte pour l'entente* (Seghers, 1976). 
J. Charlot (ed.), Quand la Gauche peut gagner (Moreau, 1973) is vital to 
the understanding of the dynamics of left unity. A clear, well-documented 
study is N. Nugent and D. Lowe, The Left in France (MacMillan, 1982) 
and a briefer one is D. Bell and E. Shaw (eds), The Left in France -
Towards a Socialist Republic (Spokesman, 1983 ). The recent wrangling 
is wryly recorded in R. Johnson, The Long March of the French Left 
Macmillan, 1981), while 0. Duhamel, La Gauche et la Cinquieme 
Republique* (PUF 1980), shows at length how the left came round to 
presidentialism. Pouvoirs 20 ( 1982) assesses its performance in office. 
On socialism, it is useful to start with an historical account of the 
SFIO. G. Lefranc, Le Mouvement socialiste sous la Troisieme Repub-
lique (Payot, 1963) is a sound study by an SFIO and trade-union 
activist. R. Quilliot, La SF/O et l'exercice du pouvoir (Fayard, 1972) by 
a socialist senator is essential for understanding the party's decay after 
1945. The dilemmas of the 1960s are studied in detail by two US 
scholars: F. Wilson, The French Democratic Left, 1963-9 (Stanford UP, 
1971) and H. Simmons, French Socialists in Search of a Role, 1956-67 
(Cornell UP, 1970). The structures and leaders of the PS are studied 
briefly, but penetratively, by T. Pfister, Les Socialistes (Albin Michel, 
1977) and more discursively by J.-F. Bizot,Au Parti des socialistes 
(Grasset;-1975). F.-0. Giesbert's biography Franrois Mitte"and ou la 
tentation de l'histoire (Seuil, 1977) is full of insight into the develop-
ment of the post-war left. Recent PS success has led to more studies of 
it (often by professionals from within its ranks). The sharpest is 
H. Portelli, Le Socialisme franrais tel qu 'il est (PUP, 1981) which makes 
short shrift of the party's ideological maximalism. Sociological 
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approaches come from J. Kergoat,Le PS (Sycomore, 1983) and from 
the study of party elites by P. Bacot, Les Dirigeants du PS (Presses 
universitaires de Lyon, 1979), which reproduces Poperenite certainties 
with boring earnestness. American scholars see the party as a modern-
izing.vehicle, cf. G. Codding and W. Safran,Ideology and Politics - the 
Socialist Party of France (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1979) 
and the more interesting B. Brown, Socialism of a Different Kind 
(Greenwood Press, 1982). The ex-communist Y. Roucaute gives a 
CERES line in his Le PS (Bruno Huisman, 1983). A wide range of 
topics is covered in S. Williams (ed.), Socialism in France from Jaures to 
Mitte"and (Frances Pinter, 1983). On the differrent fractions, the 
CERES group present their views in a resolute and readable analysis by 
M. Charzat, J.-P. Chevenement and G. Toutain, Le CERES, un combat 
pour le socialisme* (Calmann-Levy, 1975). Chevenement has also 
produced Le Vieux, la crise, le neuf (Flammarion, 1974) and Les Com-
munistes, les socialistes et les autres (Aubier-Montaigne, 1977). In 
English there is an introduction to CERES in D. Hanley's chapter in 
Bell and Shaw, The French Left, op. cit. Poperenism is explained by a 
loyalist in G. Pudlowski, Jean Poperen et l'UCGS (Editions St. Germain 
des Pres, 197 5). The Rocardians are best approached through M. Rocard, 
Parler vrai (Seuil, 1979) and more theoretically through P. Rosanvallon 
and P. Viveret, Pour une nouvelle culture politique (Seuil, 1977). They 
are attacked from a Trotskyist angle in D. Bensaid, L 'anti-Rocard (La 
Breche, 1980). 
The PCF has several historical studies devoted to it, the most pene-
trating being J. Fauvet, Histoire du parti communiste* (2nd ed., Fayard, 
1977). R. Tiersky, French Communism, 1920-72* (Columbia UP, 1974) 
is very clear. On party structures the work of A. Kriegel, especially Les 
Communistes (Seuil, 1970) is very well informed, and hostile - not un-
surprisingly, perhaps, for an ex-communist. There are essays on varied 
aspects of party activity in F. Bon (ed.), Le Communisme en France 
(Colin, 1969) and D. Blackmer and S. Tarrow, Communism in Italy and 
France (Princeton UP, 197 5). A brief study by A. Stiefbold, The French 
Communist Party in Transition (Praeger, 1977) situates the PCF with 
regard to. the Soviet Union. 
The leadership's view is given in the writings of G. Marchais, notably 
Le Deft democratique (Grasset, 1973) and Par/ons franchement (Grasset, 
1977). J. Elleinstein, Le PC (Grasset, 1976) is by the 'official liberal' of 
the party, now expelled; a more oblique and prudent line of dissent 
comes in G. Molina and Y. Varga, Dialogue ti l'interieur du parti com-
muniste franfais (Maspero, 1978). Of recent works D. Buffin and 
P. Gerbaud, Les Communistes (Seuil, 1981) is a very clear introduction. 
A wide range of issues is discussed in 0. Duhamel and H. Weber, Changer 
le PC? (PUF, 1979). Two hostile views come from ex-member P. Robrieux 
in his Histoire interieure du PC, 3 vols, (Seuil, 1980-2) and J.-J. Becker, 
Le PC veut-il prendre le pouvoir? (Seuil, 1981 ). The most sober assess-
ment is G. Lavau, A quoi sert le PCF? (Seuil, 1981). Little-known aspects 
of party life emerge in R. Pronier, Les Munici,alites communistes (Bal-
land, 1983) and D. Lacorne, Les Notables rouges (FNSP, 1980). A good 
352 Bibliographical essay 
example of recent intra-party dissent is F. Hincker, Le PC au carrefour 
(Albin Michel, 1981). 
On fringe parties, B. Brigouleix, L 'Extreme Droite en France (Inter-
valle-Fayolle, 1977) is well-informed and clear. There is a good guide to 
the theoretical foundations of much French leftism in R. Gombin, Les 
Origines du gauchisme (Seuil, 1971) and T. Pfister, Le Gauchisme 
(Filippachi, 1972). Y. Craipeau, Le Mouvement trotskiste en France 
(Syros, 1971) by a veteran Trotskyite, traces the movement in its fissi-
parousness down to 1.968. On the PSU, M. Rocard, Le PSU et l'avenir 
de la France (Seuil, 1969) is still readable, if slightly dated. On the PSU 
the best informed work in English is by V.-C. Fisera, to be found in 
S. Williams, Socialism in France and D. Bell, Contemporary French 
Parties, op. cit. A useful survey-based study is C. Hauss, The New Left 
in France (Greenwood Press, 1978). Useful introductions to ecologism 
are M.-C. Vadrot, L 'ecologie, histoire d'une subversion (Syros, 1978) 
and D. Simonnet, L 'Ecologisme (PUF, 1981). 
Interest groups: A good start, in terms of a general approach to the 
problem, is J. Meynaud, Nouvelles Etudes sur les groupes depression en 
France (Colin, 1962). On unions, J.-D. Reynaud, Les Syndicats en 
France* (2 vols, Seuil, 1975) is an excellent textbook with many docu-
ments. G. Caire, Les Syndicats ouvriers* ,(PUF, 1971) is very detailed 
and informative. G. Lefranc is sound on trade-union history, see notably 
his brief Le Syndicalisme en France (8th ed, PUP, 1973) and the two-
volume Le Mouvement syndical (Payot, 1969) which goes up to 1968. 
A handy documentary introduction is J. Capdevielle and R. Mouriaux, 
Les Syndicats ouvriers en France* (Colin, 1970). R. Mouriaux, Les 
Syndicats et la societe franraise (FNSP, 1983) is probably the most 
complete textbook. G. Adam, Le pouvoir syndical (Dunod, 1983) is a 
well-documented introduction. Pouvoirs 26 ( 1983) 'Le pouvoir syndical' 
covers many aspects. The new Auroux laws are handily summarized in 
Le Monde, Les nouveaux Droits des travailleurs (Maspero, 1983). Pro-
CGT views are expressed in J. Bruhat and M. Piolo, Esquisse d'une 
histoire de la CGT (CGT, 1966). A critical view, from a communist 
disillusioned by 1968, is A. Barjonet, La CGT (Seuil, 1969). G. Ross 
analyses the relative autonomy of union and party in Workers and 
Communists* (California UP, 1982). A general introduction to CGT is 
R. Mouriaux, La CGT (Seuil, 1983) and an unsympathetic one is 
C. Harmel, La CGT (PUF, 1982). 
The CFDT presents its views in La CFDT (Seuil, 1971) and in the 
committed work by E. Maire and J. Julliard, La CFDT aujourd 'hui 
(Seuil, 197 5). H. Hamon and P. Rotman set CFDT in the context of the 
anti-statist, 'alternative' left in La Deuxieme Gauche (Ramsay, 1982). 
On FO, A. Bergounioux, Force ouvriere (PUP, 1982) is a critical 
left-socialist view. A. Bergeron, FO (Force ouvriere, 1973) gives an 
official view. 
On the CNPF, H. Ehrmann, Organized Business in France (Princeton 
UP, 19 57) is a thorough history, to be brought up to date by the well-
informed B. Brizay, Le Patronat* (Seuil, 197 5). A brief introduction is 
J.-M. Martin,Le CNPF(PUF, 1983). 
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On farmers' groups G. Wright, Rural Revolution in France* (Stan-
ford UP, 1964) is an admirable historical introduction. Y. Tavernier, 
Le Syndicalisme paysan - FNSEA: CNJA * (Colin, 1969) is an excellent 
study of the structures of farmers' organizations. His Univers politique 
des paysans* (FNSP, 1972) is both deep and wide-ranging. There are 
perceptive articles by J. Keeler in S. Berger, Organizing Interests, op. 
cit., and by S. Sokoloff in P. Cerny (ed.), French Politics and Public 
Policy (Methuen, 1980). 
CIDUNATI has attracted little book-length study, but its ideology 
comes across clearly in the autobiographical G. Nicoud, Au Risque de 
deplaire (Bourg de Peage, L'Objectif, 1977). A sober !llld concise 
assessment of the movement is A. Bonnet, 'Un nouveau groupe de 
pression', Revue politique et parlementaire, no. 843, June-July 1973, 
pp. 44-61. 
There is much information in G. Lavau et al., L 'Univers politique des 
classes moyennes* (FNSP, 1983) and S. Berger has an essay in her 
Organizing Interests in Western Europe (Cambridge UP, 1981 ), pp. 
83-102. Peripheral groups are studied in P. Cerny (ed.), Social Move-
ments and Protest in France (Pinter, 1982). 
The FEN has two historical studies: J. Clark, Teachers and Politics in 
France: a Pressure-group Study of the FEN (Syracuse UP, 1967) and a 
more recent and more pro-FEN view R. Cheramy, La Federation de 
!'education nationale: 25 ans d'unite syndicate (Epi, 1974). 
Chapter S 
Values, purposes and organisation: For influences of tradition and 
political culture on foreign policy the best work is still J .-B. Duroselle 
(ed.), La Politique etrangere et ses fondements (Colin, 1954). Discus-
sions of various internal and external influences on foreign policy are in 
W. Wallace, Foreign Policy and the Political Process (Macmillan, 1971), 
applied to France in his chapter in P.G. Cerny and M.A. Schain (eds), 
French Politics and Public Policy (Methuen, 1980), and in a fuller 
theoretical framework provided by K.J. Holsti, International Politics 
(Prentice-Hall, 1974), the best French equivalents being C. Zorgbibe, 
Les Relations internationales (PUF, 2nd edn, 1978) and J.-B. Duroselle, 
Tout empire perira (Sorbonne, 1981); but see works listed in notes 9 
and I O to appreciate diverse interpretations. More empirical approaches 
are in R.C. Macridis, Foreign Policy in World Politics (Prentice Hall, 
1976) and F .S. Northedge (ed.), Foreign Policies of the Powers (Free 
Press, 1975). For discussions of French independent motivations and 
their limitations see S. Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal? France since the 
1930s (New York, Viking, 1974), D. Colard, 'La Conception fran9aise 
de l'independance', Studia Diplomatica, no. 1, 1975, P.G. Cerny, The 
Politics of Grandeur (Cambridge, 1980), A. Grosser, French Foreign 
Policy under de Gaulle (1965, transl. Little, Brown, Boston, 1967), and 
a theoretical analysis in N.H. Waites, 'French Foreign Policy: external 
influences on the quest for independence', Review of International 
Studies, no. 4, 1983. For French purposes since de Gaulle see E.A. 
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Kolodziej, French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou 
(Ithaca, 1974 ), P.-B. Couste and F. Visine, Pompidou et /'Europe 
(Librairies techniques, 1974), J.-C. Petitfils, La Democratie giscardienne 
(PUF, 1981 ), a subject treated critically in C. Zorgbibe, 'La Diploma tie 
giscardienne', Le Monde diplomatique, mars 1978, p. 3, and in the 
substantial if not definitive work La Politique exterieure de Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing (Colloque 26-7 mai 1983, published by Fondation 
nationale des sciences politiques, 1984 ), and for socialist policy Cl. 
Manceron et B. Pingaud, Fran~ois Mitterrand (Flammarion, 1981 ), 
C. Zorgbibe, 'Fran9ois Mitterrand: champion de l'occident ou dissident 
virtue}', Politique internationale, no. 3, 1981, M.-C. Smouts, 'The 
external policy of Fran9ois Mitterrand', International Affairs, no. 2, 
1983, and for the ambitious early period before austerity N.H. Waites, 
'Fance under Mitterrand: external relations', The World Today, June 
1982, and D. Moisi, 'France's new foreign policy',Foreign Affairs, 
winter 1981-2. 
To situate French policy broadly see G. de Carmoy, The Foreign 
Policies of France (Chicago UP, 1970), C. Zorgbibe, Les Politiques 
etrangeres des grandes puissances (PUF, Que sais-je? 2160, 1984), 
J.-M. Le Breton, Les Relations internationales depuis 1968 (Nathan, 
1983), and in English there is P. Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945 
(Longmans, 4th edn, 1983). 
For organisation see J. Chazelle, La Diplomatie (PUF, Que sais-je?, 
1968), Z. Steiner (ed.), The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the 
World (Times Books, 1982), J. Massot, La Presidence de la Republique 
(Documentation fran9aise, 1977) and Le Chef du gouvernement (Docu-
Il!entation fran9aise, 1979) supplemented by M. Long, Les Services du 
Premier Ministre (P.U. d'Aix-Marseille, 1981) but see also works by 
S. Cohen listed in note 24, and the critique by A. Kriegel, 'Fran9ois 
Mitterrand diplomate', Politique internationale, no. 16, 1982. 
Defence: For a penetrating discu~sion of the nature of security see 
B. Buzan, People, States and Fear (Wheatsheaf, 1983), and for the 
alliances seeking to provide it, R. Hunter, Security in Europe (Elek, 
1972). French military arrangements are in L. Ruehl, La Politique 
militaire de la Ve Republique (Fondation nationale des sciences poli-
tiques, 1976), and briefly summarised in H. Haenel, La Defense nationale 
(PUF, Que sais-je? 2028, 1982). A comprehensive analysis of change in 
the armed forces is M.L. Martin, Warriors to Managers: the French 
Military Establishment since 1945 (North Carolina UP, 1981 ), while 
early nuclear developments are analysed in W.L. Kohl, French Nuclear 
Diplomacy (Princeton UP, 1971) and a participant's account is B. Gold-
schmidt, Les Rivalites atomiques (Fayard, 1967). The controversial 
issues involved in the conscript system are discussed in M.L. Martin, 'Le 
Declin de l'armee de masse en France',Revue franraise de sociologie, 
jan-mars 1981, while those involved in arms sales are discussed in A.J. 
Pierre, 'Arms sales: the new diplomacy', Foreign Affairs, winter 1981-2, 
and in E.A. Kolodziej, 'French arms trade: the economic determinants', 
SIPRI Yearbook 1983, the most recent discussion being F. Varrenne, 
'Exportations d'armements', Pro jet, 174 & 177, avril etjuillet-aout 1983. 
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French military strategy and relations with the Atlantic alliance are 
discussed in M.M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic 
Security (John Hopkins UP, 1981). For debate the most recent Gaullist 
view is in F. Valentin, Une politique de defense pour la France (Calmann-
Levy, 1980), while a Centrist view is in F. de Rose, Contre une strategie 
des curiaces (Julliard, 1982) summarised in an article in Foreign Affairs, 
Fall 1982, and socialist views are in articles by P. Dabezies, C. Mellon, 
J.-C. Romer and J. Klein in Projet, juillet-aoiit 1982. J. Klein discusses 
French disarmament policy in Politique etrangere no. 2, 1979, and 
N. Gnesotto discusses PCF policy on euromissiles in the same periodical, 
no. 3, 1983. The political debate can be pursued through sources in 
notes 32 and 33, and is summarized in P.-M. de La Goree, 'La France et 
la defense de l'Europe', Le Monde diplomatique, jan. 1984. Official 
statements of policy can be found regularly in Defense nationale, and 
controversies relating to the 1984-8 loi-programme are discussed in 
Le Point, 19 sept. 1983 and in J. Marcus and B. George, 'The ambiguous 
consensus: French defence policy under Mitterrand', The World Today, 
Oct. 1983. Finally, internal security is discussed by L. Mandeville, 
J.-L. Loubet del Bayle et A. Picard, 'Les Forces de maintien de l'ordre 
en France', Defense nationale, juillet 1977, and sources in note 36. 
Directions of foreign policy: Super-power relations and the French 
role are analysed expertly in A. Grosser, The Western Alliance ( transl. 
Macmillan, 1980). A useful discussion of the de Gaulle period is in 
J. Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (Deutsch, 1970), while 
the Pompidou period is treated by M.-C. Smoots in A. Grosser, Les 
Politiques exterieures europeennes dans la crise (Fondation nationale des 
sciences politiques, 1976), that of Giscard by M. Tatu in the 1983 
Sciences Po. colloque,La Politique exterieure de Valery Giscard d'Estaing 
(1984), and socialist policy is discussed in M.-F. Toinet, 'La France 
socialiste et les Etats-Unis', Le Monde diplomatique, dee. 1981. The 
nature of French relations with the Soviet Union has been analysed in 
R. Legvold, 'Franco-Soviet rapprochement after de Gaulle', Survey, 
autumn 1974, a subject he has brought up to date in Atlantic Quarterly, 
spring 1983; also very useful is T. Schreiber, 'Les Relations de la France 
avec les pays de l'Est 1944-1980',Notes et etudes documentaires, no. 
4569-70, Documentation fran<;:aise, 30 avril 1980 brought up to date in 
nos. 4737-8, 27 Oct. 1983. Insight into French persuasive approaches 
to the US is provided by R. Putnam and N. Bayne, Western Summitry 
(forthcoming, 1984) but points of economic friction are discussed in 
R. Parboni, The Dollar and its Rivals (New Left Books, 1982), and in 
J .-M. Baer, 'L '.Europe des Dix sous les assauts de la puissance americaine ', 
Le Monde diplomatique, juin 1981, though more positive analysis is 
provided by S. Hoffmann, 'L'Europe et les Etats-Unis entre le discorde 
et l'harmonie', Politique etrangere, sept. 1981. 
For French relations with European neighbours the fundamental 
work is J. Rideau et al., La France et les Communautes europeennes 
(Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1975); for successive 
periods the most useful works are F .R. Willis, France, Germany and the 
New Europe 1945-63 (Stanford UP, 1965), E. Jouve,Le General de 
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Gaulle et la construction de /'Europe (LGDJ, 2 vols, 1967-9), P.-B. 
Couste et F. Visine,Pompidou et /'Europe (Librairies techniques, 1974), 
D.M. Pickles, Problems in Contemporary French Politics (Methuen, 
1982), and F. de La Serre, 'La Politique europeenne de la France: New 
Look ou New Deal', Politique etrangere, no. 1, 1982. Analyses of Mit-
terrand 's plans for the EEC are in Economist, 17 Oct. 1981 and in 
Financial Times, 8 Feb. 1984. The fundamental work on relations with 
Germany is R. Poidevin and J. Bariety, Les Relations franco-allemands 
1815-1975 (Colin, 2e edn, 1979), and the chapter by H. Menudier in 
La Politique exterieure de Valery Giscard d'Estaing (1984), but see also 
the expert writings by A. Grosser and his interview in Politique inter· 
nationale, hiver 1982-3. For relations with Britain there is N.H. Waites 
(ed.), Troubled Neighbours: Franco-British Relations in the 20th Century 
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971) updated by his 'Britain and France: 
towards a stable relationship', The World Today, Dec. 1976. Controversies 
regarding political cooperation are discussed in K.J. Twitchett (ed.), 
European Cooperation Today (Europa, 1980) and in C. Hill (ed.), 
National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation (Allen & 
Unwin, 1983). For the debate within France see M.-C. Smouts, 'French 
Foreign Policy: the domestic debate',International Affairs, Jan. 1977, 
S. Serfaty (ed.), The Foreign Policies of the French Left (Westview 
Press, 1979), and an invaluable study of a perennially sensitive topic, 
M. Newman, Socialism and European Unity (Junction Books, 1983). 
For French relations with the 'third world' a very useful start is 
W.H. Morris-Jones and G. Fischer, Decolonisation and After (Cass, 
1980) and more up to date is P. Cadenat, 'La France et le tiers monde', 
Notes et etudes documentaires no. 4701-2, Documentation fran9aise, 
14 jan. 1983. French policy in Africa gets fair analysis from R. Bourgi, 
Le General de Gaulle et l 'Afrique noire (LGDJ, 1980) and La Politique 
fran~aise de cooperation en Afrique: le cas du Senegal (LGDJ, 1979), 
then analysis is provided by P. Dabezies, 'Le role de la France chez ses 
proteges africains', Le Monde diplomatique, avril 1980; also J. Maspero 
(ed.), La France contre l'Afrique, Tricontinental, 1981,1, Paris, Maspero, 
and the special problems of Chad are discussed by E. Rouleau in the 
same periodical in Sept. 1983; socialist policy is discussed by a man 
initially in office, J.-P. Cot, 'La France et l'Afrique; quel changement?', 
Politique internationale, hiver 1982-3. The same issue of that periodical 
carries articles on French relations with the Middle East; then there is 
T.F. von Munchhausen, 'France's relations with the Arab World', 
Aussenpolitik, no. 4, 1981, while penetrating analyses of French 
handling of the Lebanon are S. Turquie, 'Les objectifs de la politique 
fran9aise dans la crise du Liban', Le Monde diplomatique, jan. 1979, 
J.-L. Schlegel, 'Le Liban, Israel et la France', Projet Nov. 1982, and 
French interests in the Indian Ocean are assessed in Projet avril 1982, 
and in Regards sur 1 'actualite, Documentation fran9aise, mai 1983. 
For French relations with Latin America there is M. Tatu, 'La position 
francaise: les difficultes d'etre un bon "latino'", Politique etrangere, 
juin 1982. Finally, French policy in the United Nations has been 
practised by A. Berard, Un Ambassadeur se souvient (3 vols, Plon, 
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1975-9) and analysed by M.-C. Smouts, La France d l'ONU (Fondation 
nationale des sciences politiques, 1979). To draw conclusions one may 
usefully consult E. Jouve, Le Tiers Monde dans la vie internationale 
(Berger-Levrault, 1983). 
Chapter 6 
The daily and periodical press indicated above will provide information 
on this subject. Le Monde de ['education, which goes into greater detail, 
is indispensable. Since January 1982, the education ministry has brought 
out a new monthly publication (much improved on the old Cou"ier), 
entitled Cahiers de ['education nationale. This contains a great deal of 
information presented in an approachable form, and it also has the 
advantage of being relatively inexpensive (at the time of writing, 70 francs 
per year, for ten numbers). Autrement often has perceptive insights to 
offer on the problems of present-day education, which are generally 
made the theme of a single number. 
Statistics are published in the frequent Notes d 'information, published 
by SEIS. There is also a collection of these statistics, hitherto published 
annually, the Tableaux des enseignements et de la formation, the most 
recent edition being for the academic year 1980-1, published by SIGES 
in 1982. However this convenient format is due to be changed, and in 
future a shorter, less detailed version will be produced. For the details 
formerly contained in the Tableaux, the reader will have to consult the 
periodical Statistiques des enseignements, also published by SIGES. To 
cover the gap, a shorter collection of statistics, L 'Education nationale en 
chiffres, annee scolaire 1981-1982, was published by SIGES in October 
1983. 
Periodicals of the teaching unions and of parents' associations are 
always worth consulting, not only for the information which they 
contain, but also for the insight which they give into the mentality and 
ideology of these bodies. The FEN publishes two periodicals, FEN-
lnformations, and L 'Enseignement public, the latter giving much more 
detailed information. See also L 'Ecole liberatrice, organ of theSNI-PEGC, 
SNC-Bulletin (Syndicat national des colleges), and Quinzaine universi-
taire, for a conservative approach. For the mainstream views of higher 
education unions, see Syndicalisme universitaire (SU) of the 
SGEN-CFDT, and le Snesup (Syndicat national de l'enseignement 
superieur-FEN), both appearing twice monthly. Pour l'enfant . .. vers 
l'homme, the organ of the FCPE, is avery revealing, especially on the 
private education issue, whereas la Voix des Parents (PEEP) indicates its 
more moderate stance. 
There is now a four-volume history of education in France, Histoire 
generale de l'enseignement en France, (dir. L.-H. Parias, published by 
Nouvelle Librairie de France, 1981). The third and fourth volumes are 
relevant to a study of modern French education: 3, F. Mayeur, De la 
Revolution a l'ecole'republicaine, 4 A. Prost, L 'Ecole et la famille dans 
une societe en mutation. A useful and accessible work of reference is 
D. Demnard and D. Fourment,Dictionnaire d 'histoire <Je l 'enseignement 
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(J.-P. Delarge, 1981). The best of the more accessible histories is 
undoubtedly that of A. Prost, L 'Enseignement en France, 1800-1967 
(2nd ed., Colin, 1970) while further information is provided by F. Pon-
teil, Histoire de l'enseignement en France, 1789-1964 (Sirey, 1965), 
P. Chevallier et al., L 'Enseignement franrais de la Revolution d nos 
jours (2 vols, Mouton, 1968-71). 
Since so many changes are in perspective in French education, the 
reports commissioned by the education minister on various aspects are 
worth consulting, in spite of their not being the most accessible of 
reading matter. The most significant reports so far published are: 
B. Schwartz, L 'insertion professionnelle et sociale des jeunes, (Documen-
tation Frani,:aise, September 1981) Commission du bilan, La France en 
mai 1981, vol. 4, L 'Enseignement et le developpement scientifique, 
(rapport L. Schwartz), (Documentation Frani,:aise, December 1981); 
A. de Peretti, La Formation des personnels de /'Education nationale 
(Documentation Frani,:aise, 1982); L. Soubre, Decentralisation et 
democratisation des institutions scolaires (CNDP, May 1982); L. Legrand, 
Pour un college democratique (Documentation Frani,:aise, December 
1982); also author of Pour une politique democratique de I 'education 
(PUF, 1977), and L 'ecole unique: d quelles conditions? (Scarabee, 
1981 ); R. Girault,L 'Histoire et la geographie en question (CNDP, 1983); 
A. Prost, Les Lycees et leur itudes au seuil du XX/e siecle (CNDP, 
1984). 
Most accounts of French education contain more than fleeting 
references to the administrative system in its more traditional form. 
One overall account is Cahiers de documentation, L 'Organisation de 
l'enseignement en France (INRDP, 1976). A more exhaustive study is 
J.-L. Cremieux-Brilliac, L 'Education nationale (PUP, 1965). For a more 
recent, and excellent account, see J. Minot, L 'Education nationale, 
(Berger-Levrault, 1979). 
On higher education, C. Fourrier, Les Institutions universitaires 
(PUP, 1971) gives good basic guidance; for a fuller description, see 
I. Boussard, M.-J. Guedon and D. Wolf, Les Institutions universitaires 
franraises (Documentation frani,:aise, 1977). The Cahiers de l'INAS have 
published some useful information with the relevant texts on aspects of 
university structures; Conference des presidents d'universites, 1975; 
Conseil national de l'enseignement superieur et de la recherche, 1975. 
On the issue of Catholic edu.cation, a short history of the church/ 
state problem is provided by B. Mearine, La Question scolaire en France 
(PUP, 1963), see also A. Coutrot and F.-G. Dreyfus, Les Forces religi-
euses dans la societe franraise (Colin, 1965), R. Remond (ed.),Forces 
religieuses et attitudes politiques dans la France contemporaine (Colin, 
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